Credit rationing, interest rates and capital accumulation

A simple endogenous growth model is developed to characterize credit rationing through the capital accumulation process. The model shows that credit rationing on investment loans decreases as capital accumulates and the enforcement cost decreases. We find that the evolution of the interest rate factor (lending interest rate/depositing interest rate) has a similar pattern to the credit rationing probability. However, simulations show that the evolution of the interest rate spread through the capital accumulation process depends on the degree of the enforcement cost. In the empirical part of the paper, we consider fifty-two countries, at different stages of development, over the period 1995–2005. We confirm the theoretical findings relative to the evolution of the interest rate spread and interest rate factor with capital accumulation. These results suggest that, for economies endowed with costly contract enforcement, the interest rate factor could be a better proxy of credit rationing than the interest rate spread.     

Imperfect competition and capital accumulation: the role of price normalization

We consider a capital-accumulation model with infinitely lived households and two production sectors. The intermediate-good sector is characterized by perfect competition, a constant-returns-to-scale technology, and production externalities. The final-good sector is a monopoly operating under constant returns to scale. We analyze the general equilibrium in the sense of Gabszewicz and Vial [Journal of Economic Theory (1972) 4: 381–400] for this economy and different price-normalization rules. It is shown that the qualitative behavior of the equilibrium paths depends crucially on the chosen normalization rule. In particular, whether equilibria are monotonic or oscillating and whether indeterminacy occurs or not may depend on the choice of the numeraire.     

Bank structure, capital accumulation and growth: a simple macroeconomic model

Summary. This paper analyzes the equilibrium growth paths of two economies that are identical in all respects, except for the organization of their financial systems: in particular, one has a competitive banking system and the other has a monopolistic banking system. In addition, the sources of inefficiencies, as a result of monopoly banking, and their relationship to the existence of credit rationing are explored. Monopoly in banking tends to depress the equilibrium law of motion for the capital stock for either of two reasons. When credit rationing exists, monopoly banks ration credit more heavily than competitive banks. When credit is not rationed, the existence of monopoly banking leads to excessive monitoring of credit financed investment. Both of these have adverse consequences for capital accumulation. In addition, monopoly banking is more likely to lead to credit rationing than is competitive banking. Finally, the scope for development trap phenomena to arise is considered under both a competitive and a monopolistic banking system. Received: September 20, 1999; revised version: December 3, 1999     

Unemployment, credit rationing, and capital accumulation: a tale of two frictions

Summary. This paper develops a model in which two information frictions are embedded into an otherwise conventional neoclassical growth model; an adverse selection problem in the labor market and a costly state verification problem in the credit market. The former allows equilibrium unemployment to arise endogenously while the latter is responsible for equilibrium credit rationing. This structure is used to investigate a theoretical link between the level of unemployment and the extent of credit rationing (and capital formation). The presence of the labor market friction is enough to generate scope for multiple steady state equilibria. The model also generates a large class of endogenous cyclical and chaotic dynamical equilibria. Development trap phenomena may also appear. Received: April 10, 1998; revised version: May 20, 1998     

Credit rationing and capital accumulation with investment and consumption loans revisited

A simple model is developed to evaluate the roles of credit rationing and government policies of financial repression in the process of capital accumulation. In the model, credit rationing on both investment and consumption loans decreases as capital accumulates but increases as the government imposes policies of financial repression to a greater extent. While a reduction in credit rationing on consumption loans impedes capital accumulation, such a reduction on investment loans facilitates it. We find that developing countries may be trapped at a low-capital-stock steady state while developed countries converge to a high-capital-stock steady state. Instead of adopting policies of financial liberalization, interestingly, this paper finds that policies of financial repression may enable developing countries to escape the development trap.     

Bilateral oligopoly and quantity competition

Bilateral oligopoly is a market game with two commodities, allowing strategic behavior on both sides of the market. When the number of buyers is large, bilateral oligopoly approximates a game of quantity competition played by sellers. We present examples which show that this is not typically a Cournot game. Rather, we introduce an alternative game of quantity competition (the market share game) and, appealing to results in the literature on contests, show that this yields the same equilibria as the many-buyer limit of bilateral oligopoly, under standard assumptions on costs and preferences. We also show that the market share and Cournot games have the same equilibria if and only if the price elasticity of the latter is one and investigate the differences in equilibria otherwise. These results lead to necessary and sufficient conditions for the Cournot game to be a good approximation to bilateral oligopoly with many buyers and to an ordering of total output when they are not satisfied.     

Bank competition and regional differences

We estimate banks' conduct for Italian regions, then regress the behavioural parameters on selected indicators of local banking market structure and macroeconomic performance. This allows to identify some factors explaining why banks exhibit different patterns of conduct across regions.     

Crises and human capital accumulation

Abstract.  This paper studies the effects of crises on human capital formation. Theoretically, a crisis undermines total factor productivity, which reduces the return to working and to accumulating physical capital. If the crisis is temporary, young agents will study now and work later. Human capital rises. To test our model we rely on inflation crises as our main empirical proxy. Using GMM panel procedures, our analysis for 86 countries in 1970–2000 confirms the positive effects of crises on human capital. Our main findings survive several robustness tests. JEL classification: E31, D90     

Price and quantity competition under free entry

This paper complements that of Cellini et al. (Cellini, R., Lambertini, L., Ottaviano, G. I. P., 2004. Welfare in a differentiated oligopoly with free entry: A cautionary note. Research in Economics, 58:125–33.), which shows that Cournot competition may generate higher welfare compared to Bertrand competition in an economy with free entry. Unlike them, we provide a more general proof for this result and show that Cournot competition generates higher welfare compared to Bertrand competition when the products are sufficiently differentiated. If the products are close substitutes, welfare is higher under Bertrand competition. We show that these qualitative results hold whether or not number of varieties increases market size. We also show when the active firms earn higher profits under Bertrand competition compared to Cournot competition.     

Demographic structure and capital accumulation

This paper develops an overlapping-generations (OLG) model to analyze the consequences of demographic structure changes induced by an exogenous shift in the birth rate. We first show that a finite growth rate of the population that maximizes long-run capital per capita exists. Then, we examine the theoretical properties of this growth rate by showing that: (i) it corresponds to the demographic structure such that the average ages of capital holders and workers are equal; (ii) it is associated to an efficient steady state; (iii) it increases with compulsory transfers from younger to older generations. Finally, we explain why standard OLG models do not exhibit such a growth rate.     

The (quantity) theory of money and credit

The Theory of Money and Credit (1912) is rightly regarded as a seminal book in the development of the Austrian school approach to monetary theory. We argue that Mises’ understanding of the equation of exchange differs from both of the conventional textbook versions, and warrants recognition as being a distinct contribution. After supporting this claim we discuss it in light of expectations, monetary regimes, and the microfoundations of the quantity theory.     

Labor productivity growth: disentangling technology and capital accumulation

How much of the convergence in labor productivity that we observe in manufacturing is due to convergence in technology versus convergence in capital-labor ratios? To shed light on this question, we introduce a nonparametric counterfactual decomposition of labor productivity growth into growth of the capital-labor ratio (K/L), technological productivity (TEP) and total factor productivity (TFP). Our nonparametric specification enables us to model technology allowing for heterogeneity across all relevant dimensions (i.e. countries, sectors and time). Using data spanning from the 1960s to the 2000s, covering 42 OECD and non OECD countries across 11 manufacturing sectors, we find TEP and TFP to account for roughly 46 and ?6% of labor productivity growth respectively, on average. While technological growth at the world level is driven primarily by the US and a handful of other OECD countries, we find strong evidence of convergence in both technology and capital-labor ratios. Interestingly, very few of the usual growth determinants are found to enhance the process of technological catching-up.     

Bank credit and debt,income, and causality: The Sims test on measures of credit

By employing the Sims test this study examines the exogeneity, or casual ordering, of bank credit and two measures of debt from the US Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts. Evidence presented here suggests that Bank Credit and Funds Raised by Private Domestic Nonfinancial Sectors are not appropriate targets. The Sims test of causality clearly indicates undirectional causality running from Total Funds Raised by Private Domestic Nonfinancial Sectors to spending.     

Risk capital,private credit,and innovative production

Abstract Although ideas production plays a critical role for growth, there has been only a modicum of research on the role played by financial forces in fostering new inventions. Drawing on Schumpeterian growth theory, this paper tests the roles of risk capital and private credit in stimulating knowledge production. Using panel data for 77 countries over the period 1965–2009, we find that countries with more developed financial systems are more innovative. A stronger patent protection framework, on the other hand, curbs innovative production.     

Anticipation effects of technological progress on capital accumulation: a vintage capital approach

Due to embodied technological progress new generations of capital goods are more productive. Therefore, in order to study the effects of technological progress, a model must be analyzed in which different generations of capital goods can be distinguished. We determine in what way the firm adjusts current investments to predictions of technological progress. In the presence of market power we show that a negative anticipation effect occurs, i.e. current investments in recent generations of capital goods decline when faster technological progress will take place in the future, because then it becomes more attractive to wait for new generations of capital goods. In case that only investments in new machines are possible, actually a whole wave of anticipation phases arises.     

Price and quality competition

This study considers an oligopoly model with simultaneous price and quality choice. Ex-ante homogeneous sellers compete by offering products at one of two quality levels. The consumers have heterogeneous tastes for quality: for some consumers it is efficient to buy a high quality product, while for others it is efficient to buy a low quality product. In the symmetric equilibrium firms use mixed strategies that randomize both price and quality, and obtain strictly positive profits. This framework highlights trade-offs which determine the impact of consumer protection policy in the form of quality standards.     

Imperfect competition in financial markets and capital structure

We consider a model of corporate finance with imperfectly competitive financial intermediaries. Firms can finance projects either via debt or via equity. Because of asymmetric information about firms’ growth opportunities, equity financing involves a dilution cost. Nevertheless, equity emerges in equilibrium whenever financial intermediaries have sufficient market power. In the latter case, best firms issue debt while the less profitable firms are equity-financed. We also show that strategic interaction between oligopolistic intermediaries results in multiple equilibria. If one intermediary chooses to buy more debt, the price of debt decreases, so the best equity-issuing firms switch from equity to debt financing. This in turn decreases average quality of equity-financed pool, so other intermediaries also shift towards more debt.     

Human capital accumulation and endogenous public expenditures

In this paper, we present an overlapping-generations model, where individuals accumulate human capital through formal schooling. We model the role of the public sector in schooling as one of collecting taxes from households and providing inputs to the learning technology. Public expenditures on schools are determined endogenously. Under plausible restrictions, our model's predictions qualitatively match the observations on schooling, public expenditures on education, and student-teacher ratios. JEL Classification: E13, E62.
Accumulation de capital humain et dépenses publiques endogènes. Dans ce mémoire, les auteurs présentent un modèle de générations qui se chevauchent où les individus accumulent du capital humain via l'éducation formelle. Le rôle du secteur public dans l'éducation est défini comme celui de collecteur d'impôts auprès des ménages et de fournisseur d'intrants dans la technologie d'apprentissage. Les dépenses publiques en éducation sont déterminées de manière endogène. A partir de restrictions plausibles, les prédictions du modèle s'arriment qualitativement aux observations sur le monde scolaire, aux dépenses publiques en éducation, et aux ratios élèves/enseignants.     

Introduction to monetary policy and capital accumulation

The papers in this symposium address the issue of multiple equilibria that can be induced by monetary policy in models with capital accumulation. In particular they examine how the “Taylor Principle”, under which interest rates respond more than proportionately to increases in inflation, can generate multiple equilibria. They also explore the design of policies to avoid the problem of multiple equilibria and indeterminacy.