Enforcing the 1988 Basel Capital Requirements: Did it Curtail Bank Credit in Emerging Economies?

We examine whether the enforcement of bank capital asset requirements (CARs) curtailed the supply of credit in emerging economies. Preliminarily, we identify 16 emerging economies that – according to official and impartial reports – enforced the 1988 Basel standard during the 1990s. Then we perform our twofold econometric analysis. In the former part, we use macro data to test whether, controlling for economic fundamental variables, the enforcement brought about a slowdown in aggregate credit in these countries vis-a-vis other emerging economies. We find some support for our hypothesis. In the latter part, we employ individual bank data to better identify the 'capital crunch' effect of the enforcement. Here, we find that CAR enforcement – according to the 1988 Basel standard – significantly curtailed credit supply, particularly at less well-capitalized banks. The two empirical parts together suggest that the CAR enforcement did curtail aggregate credit in the examined emerging countries and that this result is rooted in the attempt by under-capitalized banks to reduce their loans. We argue that among developing countries – where banks are often the only source of financial intermediation – the positive effect of higher capital requirements, represented by the reduction of poor quality lending, may be offset by their negative impact on bank liquidity and on the level of economic activity. Hence, our results suggest that particular care is required to avoid potential negative macroeconomic effects when phasing in new and higher capital requirements in emerging economies.
(J.E.L.: G18, G21, G28)     

The quality and quantity of bank intermediation and economic growth: evidence from Asia Pacific

We investigate the impact of the quantity and quality of bank intermediation on economic growth across 14 Asia-Pacific economies over 2003–2015. Measures of bank shareholder value efficiency as well as profit and cost efficiency are used as indicators of intermediation quality. We also employ measures of liquidity creation (fat and nonfat) as a proxy for the quantity of bank intermediation. Our main finding is that the quality of bank intermediation (enhanced credit allocation) is a driver of economic growth in developed Asia-Pacific economies, whereas it is the quantity of bank intermediation (capital accumulation) that positively influences growth in developing nations. From a policy perspective, our findings suggest that policymakers in developed nations should concentrate their efforts on reforms that enhance bank efficiency. Second, reforms that stimulate capital accumulation should be encouraged in developing economies because this is the main channel that spurs economic growth.     

The effect of US stress tests on monetary policy spillovers to emerging markets

This paper explores the transmission of US monetary policy through US banks to emerging market economies (EMEs) and the role that stress tests play in this transmission. Data on US banks’ monthly commercial and industrial loan originations shows that: (a) US bank lending to EMEs was sensitive to domestic monetary policy changes during the zero‐lower bound period. (b) Effects of monetary easing were heterogeneous across banks and depended on banks’ stress test results, a proxy for their capital strength. Only banks that comfortably passed the stress tests issued more loans to EME borrowers. (c) Effects of monetary tightening were more similar across banks. (d) Banks shifted their lending to safer borrowers within EMEs in response to monetary easing, leaving the risk of their overall loan books unchanged. These results support the hypothesis that bank capital affects the transmission of easier monetary policy, including across borders. We conjecture that bank lending to EMEs during the zero‐lower bound period would have been even higher had the United States not introduced stress tests for their banks.     

Information production, banking industry structure and credit allocation

We analyse credit allocation when limited-liable banks can engage in costly information production about borrowers. When perfectly diversified credit portfolios cannot be constructed, we show that credit allocation depends on bank capital and the number of banks that can operate in the same market. A concentrated banking industry, one where bank capital is held by few banks, is shown to lead to credit allocation closer to the social optimum. Moreover, in the absence of banking industry consolidation, we find that the removal of intra-state entry barriers reduces welfare and not all independent banking organizations that were viable in formerly protected markets remain so when markets are integrated.     

Competition Among Banks, Capital Requirements and International Spillovers

The design of prudential bank capital requirements interacts with the industrial organization of the banking sector, in particular, with the level of competition among banks. Increased competition leads to excessive risk-taking by banks which may have to be counteracted by tighter capital requirements. When capital requirements are internationally uniform but the levels of competition among banks in different countries are not, international spillovers arise on financial integration of these countries. This result begs a more careful analysis of the effect of financial liberalization on the stability of banking sectors in emerging countries. It also calls into question the merits of employing uniform capital requirements across countries that diverge in the industrial organization of their banking sectors.
(J.E.L.: G21, G28, G38, F36, E58, D62)     

The transmission of bank capital requirements and monetary policy to bank lending in Germany

We investigate the transmission of changes in bank capital requirements and monetary policy, and their interaction, on German banks’ corporate loan growth and lending rates. Our results show that increases in capital requirements are associated with an immediate decrease in total domestic and cross‐border bank lending. Changes in the euro area's monetary policy stance are positively related to corporate loan interest rates in general. Regarding the interacting effect of national bank capital requirements and euro area monetary policy, we observe that the transmission of accommodative euro area monetary policy to corporate lending rates can be attenuated by contemporaneous increases in bank capital requirements. Moreover, more strongly capitalized banks increase their loan growth in response to accommodative monetary policy whereas, for weaker banks, increasing capital requirements implies a decrease in their corporate loan growth. Our results confirm a tradeoff between higher capital requirements and accommodating monetary policy originating from banks’ capital constraints.     

Measuring bank competition under binding interest rate regulation: the case of China

Many empirical studies suggest that financial reform promoted bank competition in most mature and emerging economies. However, some earlier studies that adopted conventional approaches to measure competition have concluded that bank competition in China declined during the past decade, despite progressive reforms implemented since the 1980s. We show that this apparent contradiction is the result of flawed measurement. Conventional indicators such as the Lerner index and Panzar–Rosse H-statistic fail to measure competition in Chinese loan markets properly due to the system of interest rate regulation. By contrast, the profit elasticity (PE) approach does not suffer from these shortcomings. Using balance sheet information for a large sample of banks operating in China during 1996–2008, we show that competition actually increased in the past decade when the PE indicator is used.     

Banking Competition,Risk and Regulation*

In a dynamic framework, commercial banks compete for customers by setting acceptance criteria for granting loans, while taking into account regulatory requirements. By easing its acceptance criteria a bank faces a trade‐off between attracting more demand for loans, thus making higher per‐period profits, and deterioration in the quality of its loan portfolio, thus tolerating a higher risk of failure. Our main results state that more stringent capital adequacy requirements lead banks to set stricter acceptance criteria, and that increased competition in the banking industry leads to riskier bank behaviour. It is shown that risk‐adjusted regulation is effective. In an extension of our basic model, we show that it may be beneficial for a bank to hold more equity than prescribed by the regulator, even though issuing equity is more expensive than attracting deposits.     

Intricacies of competition,stability, and diversification: Evidence from dual banking economies

This paper investigates the nexus of competition and stability by introducing the interaction of diversification and competition. We use a sample of both conventional and Islamic banks from 14 dual banking economies over 2005–2016. The core finding illustrates that competition does not impact bank stability and that diversification is insignificant in the competition-stability nexus. Further, we find that concentration is beneficial for the banking stability of both types of banks. In most of our results, we found no difference in the impact of competition and diversification on the stability of conventional and Islamic banks. To put our findings in a broader context, we argue that no difference between the business models can be considered an early signal of possible convergence between the two systems.     

Endogenous capital market imperfections, human capital, and intergenerational mobility

In this paper, capital market imperfections are endogenized considering an adverse selection problem between banks and borrowers. We develop a growth model with linear OLG wealth dynamics, where agents are heterogeneous in terms of observable wealth and ability, which is private information. We show that banks react to this informational asymmetry by granting higher loans to talented borrowers. This, in turn, helps poor and talented agents to become educated and catch up with the rich agents. Furthermore, the credit market friction leads to greater human capital accumulation.     

Endogenous capital market imperfections,human capital,and intergenerational mobility

In this paper, capital market imperfections are endogenized considering an adverse selection problem between banks and borrowers. We develop a growth model with linear OLG wealth dynamics, where agents are heterogeneous in terms of observable wealth and ability, which is private information. We show that banks react to this informational asymmetry by granting higher loans to talented borrowers. This, in turn, helps poor and talented agents to become educated and catch up with the rich agents. Furthermore, the credit market friction leads to greater human capital accumulation.     

Regulating the banking industry in transition economies: Exploring interactions between capital and reserve requirements

This paper examines the ‘prudential' role of reserve requirements in transition economies using a general-equilibrium banking model. The analysis stresses the role that reserve requirements may play in enforcing an adequate level of bank capitalization in a context in which it is difficult to assess the true value of bank assets. The paper also explores the interactions that exist between capital and reserve requirements and the effect of these regulations on the financial structure of banks and on the level of credit and interest rates.     

Environmental liability and the capital structure of firms

This paper analyses the impact of environmental liability regimes on the capital structure of firms. We show that imposing environmental liability only on polluting firms, with limited liability, increases use of bank debt. Extending environmental liability to banks lowers bank borrowing relative to liability only on firms, with an ambiguous effect relative to no liability. Using US industry-level data we estimate a reduced-form model of bank borrowing by firms and show that the introduction of environmental liability only on firms increased bank borrowing by 15–20%, but when liability was extended to banks, borrowing returned to a level slightly higher than with no liability.     

Ownership,competition, and bank productivity: An analysis of Indian banking in the post-reform period

This paper investigates the effect of ownership and competition on Indian bank productivity since the 1991 reforms. We find that Indian private banks dominate the public and foreign banks both in terms of productivity levels and productivity growth, with the new Indian private banks leading the charge. Competition has a positive impact on productivity for the old Indian private banks, and all the other banks are hurt by competition — the worst hit being new Indian private banks. A similar picture emerges on the productivity growth side, with the new Indian private bank productivity growth being the worst affected as competition increases. An analysis of the pre- and post-1998 periods shows that the latter period displays a much higher productivity gap between the Indian private banks and the public and foreign banks. Indian private bank productivity and productivity growth suffer due to increasing competition in the post-1998 period.     

Credit Availability and Capital Crunch: On the Role of the Heterogeneity of the Banking System

We analyze the impact of a credit crunch on aggregate investment via the heterogeneous structure of the banking system. We develop a model of endogenous credit allocation in which investors and two banks differ according to their level of capital and monitoring technology. In a context of moral hazard problem, we show that banks' cost advantage in the monitoring of small businesses must be compared to their relative amount of capital in order to explain firms' optimal choice of financing, the credit allocation in the economy and the asymmetric impact of a credit crunch on aggregate investment. A shock of the same magnitude on the two banks level of capital may have a different effect on total investment. We stress that the credit crunch is maximum when the shock hits the bank specialized in the financing of small businesses and when this bank is also the less capitalized. This result is supported by recent empirical studies ( Hancock and Wilcox 1998 ).     

银行业市场结构与货币政策冲击——基于异质性银行的模型分析

通过构造货币政策冲击下的贷款市场总体均衡模型,研究在受到资本充足率和存贷比约束的条件下,银行最优信贷决策行为。分析发现,在垄断竞争的银行业市场结构背景下,银行间在价格竞争方面表现出战略互补特征和由此带来的模仿效应。因而,当银行满足资本充足率和存贷比要求时,银行业传导的货币政策信贷渠道是有效的,而当贷款市场中的银行不能满足资本充足率或存贷比要求时,信贷渠道则表现出无效性。     

Impact of financial reforms on efficiency of state-owned,private and foreign banks in Pakistan

This article uses a unique bank level data from 1991 to 2000 and evaluates how financial reforms affect banking efficiency of domestic and foreign banks in Pakistan. The results suggest that banking efficiency falls during initial reform period when banks adjust to enhanced competition but increases in more advanced stages of reform. While in general foreign and private banks show superior efficiency and factor productivity than do state-owned banks, the relative performance of foreign banks worsens after the consolidation stage of the financial reforms is over. We show the importance of link between bank size, asset quality and bank branches with efficiency indexes and also note that every 10% increase in share of nonperforming to total loans decreases banking efficiency by 6 to 10%.     

The relevance of supply shocks for inflation: the spanish case

A retrenchment in crossborder credit is under way, the product of both market forces and political pressure on international banks to lend at home (Economist, 2009). In addition, banks, particularly the largest, have also dramatically expanded their retail banking operations over the past few years (Hirtle and Stiroh, 2007). Our goal, in this article, is to study the effects of default risk on equity returns through bank interest margin management under a renewed focus on domestic retail banking, a trend often attributed to the stability of banking activities. Specifically, this article explores the determinants of optimal bank interest margins based on an option-based firm-theoretical model with multiple sources of structural breaks due to political pressure. The model demonstrates how capital regulation and political pressure on foreign lending return and risk conditions jointly determine the optimal bank interest margin decision. We show that a more stringent capital requirement is linked with lower equity return, but higher default risk of the bank in the return to domestic retail banking. An increased focus on the political pressure on foreign lending return is linked with higher equity return and default risk of the bank. It is also showed that an increased focus on the political pressure on foreign lending risk decreases the bank's equity return and default risk. We conclude that the return to domestic retail banking may be a relatively stable activity when the political pressure decision impacts only the expected risk of the bank's foreign lending and not the return.     

Capital and liquidity in a dynamic model of banking

This paper analyzes capital requirements in combination with a particular kind of cash reserves, that are invested in the risk-free asset, from now on, compensated reserves. We consider a dynamic framework of banking where competition may induce banks to gamble. In this set up, we can capture the two effects that capital regulation has on risk, the capital-at-risk effect and the franchise value effect (Hellman et al., 2000). We show that while capital alone is an inferior policy, compensated reserves, will complement capital requirements, by creating franchise value, and are therefore efficient in solving moral hazard problems.     

提高银行资本能缓解小微企业融资难问题吗*——基于小微企业贷款风险权重降低改革的讨论

本文以银行资本为切入点,从银行提供小微企业贷款的角度,探讨解决小微企业融资难问题可能的路径。新资本监管降低了小微企业贷款的风险权重,改革前后可以视为“准自然实验”。通过构建双重差分模型,本文深入研究银行资本与小微企业贷款的关系,并对“小银行优势理论”进行再检验。结果表明：（1）小微企业贷款风险权重优惠政策显著促进了银行发放小微企业贷款,特别是对小银行来说,政策效果更好;（2）在优惠政策实施之前,资本水平较高的银行会紧缩小微企业贷款,而且这种惜贷行为在大银行中尤为突出;（3）在优惠政策实施之后,资本水平越高的银行对小微企业贷款的偏好反而越强,且这一促进作用的力度在大银行中更为显著。因此,应当继续执行小微企业贷款风险权重优惠,提高银行资本水平,构建多层次银行金融体系,以缓解小微企业融资难问题。