What do we know about the role of financial reporting in debt contracting and debt covenants?

The paper examines the role of financial reporting in debt contracting and in particular focuses on the definition, measurement, and monitoring of accounting-based covenants used to manage agency relationships arising from borrowing by firms. The paper also reviews research in areas of financial reporting where the presence of accounting-based covenants provides incentives to managers, notably choice of accounting method, lobbying on standard setters' proposals, and accounting earnings management. Although US dominated and latterly increasingly focused on large datasets and quantitative and analytical methods, relevant research is available from a range of methodologies and countries and the paper reflects this variety and identifies both inter-jurisdictional differences and inter-temporal changes in debt contracting practices. Despite the extensive research which is reviewed important areas for new research remain.     

Determinants of financial covenants and pricing of debt in private debt contracts: the UK evidence

This paper presents details of financial covenants given by a sample drawn from the largest 200 non-financial quoted firms in the UK in private debt contracts and analyses these data to see whether there are relationships between the nature of the covenants given and firm characteristics. Data were obtained from 72 firms, of which 17 gave no financial covenants. Firm size was found to be the only significant factor influencing whether firms did or did not give covenants as well as the only factor which influenced the margin given on debt. Some types of covenants given were found to be different from those found in previous research. In particular, there is greater use of EBITDA as a base for both interest cover and gearing covenants. This shows the importance of cash flow based lending as opposed to asset based lending for general financing for large firms.     

The Cost of Bond Covenant Restrictions on the Disposition of Assets

The cost of bond covenants restricting the dispositions of assets are examined in this study. Using an option pricing framework, it is shown that the cost of compliance could be high if restrictions are placed on the sale of common stock holdings. Similar results can be obtained by using a simple cash flow approach when calculating the effect on restrictions on the sale of depreciable assets. These costs somewhat offset the tax advantages of debt.     

Accounting Information in Financial Contracting: The Incomplete Contract Theory Perspective

This paper reviews theoretical and empirical work on financial contracting that is relevant to accounting researchers. Its primary objective is to discuss how the use of accounting information in contracts enhances contracting efficiency and to suggest avenues for future research. We argue that incomplete contract theory broadens our understanding of both the role accounting information plays in contracting and the mechanisms through which efficiency gains are achieved. By discussing its rich theoretical implications, we expect incomplete contract theory to prove useful in motivating future research and in offering directions to advance our knowledge of how accounting information affects contract efficiency.     

A Wealth-Based Explanation for Earnings Conservatism

This study extends research on earnings conservatism – the degree to which the accounting system recognizes bad news regarding future cash flows in a more timely manner than good news – by arguing that heterogeneous executives' risk attitudes will influence the degree of conservatism. Prior research has demonstrated that differences in earnings conservatism are mainly the result of differences in institutional factors (Basu (1997) and Ball et al. (2000a)). We hypothesize that more risk-averse managers, who demand a risk premium that offsets the effects of the variance in their compensation, will report more conservative earnings. Earnings conservatism will temper expectations among stakeholders about the future cash flows to be distributed thereby diminishing the likelihood of disappointing outcomes and potential litigation or threats for executives of being fired. The more risk-averse manager would be more inclined to reduce such conflicts, since they will have a destabilizing effect on his future compensation. The empirical results for a sample of Dutch companies over the period of 1983 to 1995 confirm our hypothesis: more risk-averse managers report earnings more conservatively than do less risk-averse managers.     

货币政策波动、银行信贷与会计稳健性

宏观经济政策(如货币政策)如何通过改变微观企业行为来影响经济发展是学术界探讨得比较少的领域。本文在此方向上进行研究尝试,并以货币政策波动对企业会计政策稳健性与银行贷款之间的关系为切人点。具体来说,当货币政策进入紧缩期时,我们预期企业会计政策变得更加稳健,以更容易取得银行贷款。运用1998～2008年的年度数据,并根据央行要求的金融机构存款准备金率、对金融机构的再贷款利率和再贴现利率的变化,我们定义2004、2006、2007年为我国的货币政策紧缩阶段。实证结果基本上支持我们的预期。我们进一步发现依赖于外部融资和拥有更高债务水平的企业会计稳健性更高,持有大量现金的企业会计稳健性更低,国有企业的会计稳健性更低。在会计稳健性的经济后果上,本文发现在货币政策紧缩阶段,会计稳健性的提高有助于企业获得更多的信贷资源。     

Conservative financial reporting, debt covenants, and the agency costs of debt

Considerable research has documented the role of debt covenants and conservative financial accounting in addressing agency conflicts between lenders and borrowers. Beatty, A., Weber, J., and Yu, J. [2008. Conservatism and debt. Journal of Accounting and Economics, forthcoming] document interesting, but mixed, findings on the relation between debt covenants and conservative accounting, and the extent to which the two contracting mechanisms act as substitutes or complements. In this paper, I discuss the economic roles of financial reporting, debt covenants, and conservatism within the debt contracting environment, and attempt to fit BWY's findings within this context.     

The impact of financial reporting quality on debt maturity: the case of private firms

We examine whether the debt maturity structure of privately held firms is associated with the quality of their earnings numbers. We argue that earnings numbers that are better able to predict future cash flows lower information asymmetry between privately held firms and their creditors, improving privately held firms’ access to long-term debt. Furthermore, we examine whether the relationship between privately held firms’ earnings quality and their debt maturity differs between small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and larger privately held firms. Using detailed financial statement information from a sample of privately held Belgian firms, we find that earnings quality is positively associated with the likelihood of having long-term debt and with the proportion of long-term debt in total debt. Further, we report evidence that these associations are more pronounced for SMEs than for larger privately held firms, which is consistent with smaller firms entailing more fundamental risk for creditors.