Accounting Information in Financial Contracting: The Incomplete Contract Theory Perspective

This paper reviews theoretical and empirical work on financial contracting that is relevant to accounting researchers. Its primary objective is to discuss how the use of accounting information in contracts enhances contracting efficiency and to suggest avenues for future research. We argue that incomplete contract theory broadens our understanding of both the role accounting information plays in contracting and the mechanisms through which efficiency gains are achieved. By discussing its rich theoretical implications, we expect incomplete contract theory to prove useful in motivating future research and in offering directions to advance our knowledge of how accounting information affects contract efficiency.     

Financial Reporting Practices of China's Listed Firms

The long‐term success of financial markets depends on the widespread availability of reasonably detailed and reliable financial information. Individual investors depend critically upon companies' regulatory filings and voluntary disclosures to assess their long‐run risks, payoffs, and, ultimately, their intrinsic values. However, a recent string of accounting frauds involving Chinese firms listed on overseas markets has drawn attention to the accounting and governance risks associated with investing in Chinese firms. This article provides a brief overview of the information environment of Chinese capital markets and the primary forces that affect the incentives of Chinese listed companies to provide timely and accurate financial reports. The evidence reviewed here indicates that the adoption of world‐class standards and regulation, although necessary, is not sufficient to generate incentives for transparency. The long‐term health of China's capital markets will also depend upon other reforms that are designed to accomplish the following: (1) improve the protection of investor rights through an effective, independent judiciary court system that promotes civil lawsuits, and through credible regulatory enforcement; (2) strengthen market development activity, especially with respect to foreign investors; and (3) limit political rent‐seeking behavior and deter politicized business decisions, especially in China's state‐owned enterprises. Together, such reforms have the potential to improve corporate governance in China and better align the incentives of the state and majority shareholders with those of minority shareholders, while increasing the ability of accounting to serve a contracting function and the demand for timely information for valuation purposes.     

Relationship Between Controlling Shareholders’ Participation in Share Pledging and Accounting Conservatism in China

This study examines the relationship between controlling shareholders’ participation in share pledging and accounting conservatism in the Chinese stock market. Share pledging introduces risks to controlling shareholders and leads to severe information asymmetry between controlling shareholders and outside minority shareholders. This, in turn, results in competing incentives with regard to financial reporting. We find that controlling shareholders’ participation in share pledging negatively affects accounting conservatism, especially for firms located in regions with weak legal enforcement and poor investor protection. Our study shows that controlling shareholders’ share‐pledging behaviour negatively influences firms’ reporting quality, especially in areas with weak legal systems.     

Conservative financial reporting, debt covenants, and the agency costs of debt

Considerable research has documented the role of debt covenants and conservative financial accounting in addressing agency conflicts between lenders and borrowers. Beatty, A., Weber, J., and Yu, J. [2008. Conservatism and debt. Journal of Accounting and Economics, forthcoming] document interesting, but mixed, findings on the relation between debt covenants and conservative accounting, and the extent to which the two contracting mechanisms act as substitutes or complements. In this paper, I discuss the economic roles of financial reporting, debt covenants, and conservatism within the debt contracting environment, and attempt to fit BWY's findings within this context.     

Why do managers avoid EPS dilution? Evidence from debt–equity choice

Survey evidence reveals that managers prefer to avoid dilution of earnings per share (EPS), though financial theory suggests it is irrelevant in firm valuation. We explore contracting and behavioral explanations for this apparent paradox using a large sample of debt–equity issuers. We first provide evidence that firms with greater agency conflicts between managers and shareholders are more likely to use EPS as a performance measure in bonus contracts. After controlling for possible endogeneity related to compensation contract design, we find that managers are more likely to avoid earnings dilution when their bonus compensation explicitly depends upon EPS performance. This effect is increasing in the magnitude of bonus compensation for this subset of firms; we document no such associations for the firms that do not use EPS in setting bonus pay. Additional tests of firms’ speed of adjustment to target leverage ratios and firms’ debt conservatism levels indicate that explicitly rewarding executives on EPS performance helps to resolve underleveraging problems. We also find that clientele effects are associated with managers’ aversion to earnings dilution. Our findings provide a deeper understanding of the factors that underlie the use of accounting performance in compensation contracts and new evidence on the implications of the contracting role of accounting in firm decision-making.     

Corporate Governance and Accounting Conservatism in China

A principal-agent relationship exists among creditors, shareholders and management, and information asymmetry among them leads to asymmetric loss functions, which induces conservative accounting. This paper investigates the determinants of accounting conservatism using accrual-based measures and data from 2001 to 2006 in China. We find that a higher degree of leverage, lower level of control of ultimate shareholders and lower level of management ownership lead to more conservative financial reporting. We also find that political concerns and pressures among state-owned enterprises are greater than those among non-state owned enterprises, which leads to more conservative financial reporting among the former. However, a decrease in such concerns leads to a decrease in accounting conservatism. Overall, we find that among the determinants of conservatism in China, debt is the most important, followed by ownership, and that board has little influence.     

What do we know about the role of financial reporting in debt contracting and debt covenants?

The paper examines the role of financial reporting in debt contracting and in particular focuses on the definition, measurement, and monitoring of accounting-based covenants used to manage agency relationships arising from borrowing by firms. The paper also reviews research in areas of financial reporting where the presence of accounting-based covenants provides incentives to managers, notably choice of accounting method, lobbying on standard setters' proposals, and accounting earnings management. Although US dominated and latterly increasingly focused on large datasets and quantitative and analytical methods, relevant research is available from a range of methodologies and countries and the paper reflects this variety and identifies both inter-jurisdictional differences and inter-temporal changes in debt contracting practices. Despite the extensive research which is reviewed important areas for new research remain.     

The Impact of Financial Accounting Practices on the Measurement of Profit and Equity: Australia Versus the United States

The purpose of this paper is to make a quantitative comparative analysis of differences between Australian financial reporting practices and U.S. GAAP. The empirical data consist of Form 20-F filings for thirteen Australian incorporated companies for the period 1985–93. Based on prior research, there is a test of the hypothesis that U.S. GAAP is more conservative than Australian financial reporting practice. The results of the empirical analysis offer little support for this hypothesis in the context of the reporting of profit. However, the hypothesis is supported for the reporting of shareholders’ equity. The most frequent and material differences in profits relate to asset measurement, equity consolidation and accounting for intangible assets. Generalizations relating to differences in shareholders’ equity are more difficult to make.     

'An awkward fence to cross': railway capitalization in Britain in the inter-war years

This paper examines the related problems of the capitalization and financial performance of the railway companies in the inter-war period. It examines the critics' view that the railways were over-capitalized, and places the debate in context by analysing the dividend and accounting policies of the companies and the consequences for investment. It also examines the conflicting views of railway management and shareholders over capital expenditure. The paper concludes that the railways were both financially over-capitalized and physically under-capitalized, and so faced very serious financial problems that were incapable of resolution within the existing ownership structure.     

关系股东与融资约束——基于系族集团的经验证据

已有研究指出,控股股东的关系股东加剧了控股股东与中小股东间的利益冲突.关系股东是否具有积极的一面,研究中尚缺乏关注.本文以2003-2017年间附属于系族集团的A股上市公司作为研究样本,实证检验了系族成员关系股东是否以及如何影响融资约束.研究发现,相对于没有关系股东的系族成员,有关系股东的成员企业面临的融资约束更低,在考虑内生性问题后结论依然稳健.进一步研究表明,关系股东通过降低实际控制人与成员企业的信息不对称、促进内部资本市场资源优化配置,以及降低管理层代理成本从而缓解所在成员企业的融资约束.本文揭示了关系股东对融资约束的影响及作用机理,丰富了关系股东与内部资本市场经济后果方面的研究.     

Exploring the Causes of Accounting Restatements by Family Firms

Prior research shows that family firms have better earnings quality than non‐family firms in common‐law countries and highly developed markets. In contrast, we do not find a significant difference in the financial reporting quality between family and non‐family firms in the context of a civil‐law system and less developed market. We show that the financial reporting quality of family firms is conditioned on: (1) the divergence between the controlling shareholders’ voting rights and their cash flow rights, and (2) the firm's reputation for integrity, while these two conditions do not explain the restatement likelihood for non‐family firms. Moreover, when accounting irregularities are detected in the case of family firms, they are associated with more serious accounting restatements. Together, these results imply that the severity of the conflict between ultimate and minority shareholders, and a lack of integrity, explain the propensity for making financial restatements among family firms in a regime characterized as having weak investor protection and concentrated ownership structures.     

母公司个别财务报表中对子公司投资的会计处理方法之辨:成本法还是权益法?

由于我国现行《长期股权投资》会计准则规定在母公司个别财务报表中采用成本法核算对子公司的长期股权投资(以下简称为对子公司投资),这割裂了母公司个别财务报表与合并财务报表的本原逻辑关联,削弱了两者间的互补性,且导致母公司股东基于母公司个别财务报表来厘定分红权利虽然符合《公司法》却很不合理,而基于合并财务报表来厘定分红权利虽更为合理但和《公司法》存在明显冲突.我们对该问题进行了深入分析,论证了在母公司个别财务报表之中采用权益法来核算其对子公司投资的逻辑合理性和现实必要性,并建议修订我国现行《长期股权投资》会计准则,在母公司个别财务报表之中由成本法改为采用权益法来核算其对子公司投资.     

再论经理人股票期权的会计确认

谢德仁和刘文(2002)提出了经理人股票期权会计确认的利润分配观。本文在此基础上进行进一步论证,认为经理人股票期权赠予交易的经济实质是股东为激励经理人而将部分剩余索取权(在财务会计意义上就是利润分配权)让渡给经理人,而不是经理人直接用服务来交换股票期权,经理人股票期权赠予并不以经理人服务的投入为必备前提,经理人股票期权赠予交易内含的价值运动是具有一定价值的剩余索取权(所有者权益)从现有股东那里来,流到经理人处去。因此,在经理人股票期权赠予交易的会计确认上,应将经理人股票期权的对应项目确认为企业的利润分配。     

The deliberation around accounting techniques: accounting for depreciation and foreign exchange in an Indian jute company, 1870-1900

This paper examines the way two accounting techniques, namely depreciation and foreign exchange, were deliberated on, between 1870 and 1900, in an Indian jute company whose shareholders resided in the UK. The arena for these deliberations was the conflictual relationship between controlling and non-controlling shareholders as to how best to account for depreciation and foreign exchange especially when the particular accountings affected distributional issues such as the dividend decision. The purpose of this paper is to analyse and explain the processes by which a company's accounting practices emerge and develop as a contest between different interests. Accounting framed the parameters of the deliberations and provided the language of power and dissent. The paper uses a rich archive that includes narrative and accounting material.     

The economic determinants of the market reaction to proposed mandatory accounting changes in the oil and gas industry: A cross-sectional analysis

This paper examines the economic reasons for the observed negative abnormal common stock performance of firms whose reported earnings and stockholders' equity were negatively affected by the proposed elimination of full cost accounting in the oil and gas industry. Four explanations of the market effects of this mandatory accounting change are examined: (1) naive investor theory, (2) modified naive investor theory, (3) contracting cost theory, and (4) estimation risk theory. These hypotheses are developed in detail and used to generate variables for a cross-sectional model which explains observed return behavior. The effect of the accounting change on total stockholder's equity, the existence of financial contracts denominated in terms of accounting numbers and, to a lesser extent, firm size are shown to be important explanatory variables. The importance of these variables is consistent with both the contracting cost and estimation risk theories.     

Predicting Private Company Failures in Italy Using Financial and Non‐financial Information

The study assesses the use of non‐financial information in predicting financial distress in private companies by developing credit risk models tailored to Italian private companies. The in‐sample and out‐of‐sample prediction test results are indicative of the incremental predictive ability of the two new non‐financial variables, that is, number of shareholders and number of subsidiaries, over accounting ratios and other widely used non‐financial information, including firm age and industry dummies. To be more specific, number of shareholders and number of subsidiaries are negatively associated with private company failures, and the models augmented by the two non‐financial variables improve forecasting performance from acceptable discrimination to excellent discrimination over one‐ to three‐year time horizons.     

Financial Reporting for Private Companies: The Canadian Experience*

The issue of whether small and/or private companies should be allowed to use simplified accounting standards in financial reports has concerned the accounting profession for decades. It has been argued that preparing financial reports in accordance with the large volume of promulgated standards contained in generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), some of which are relatively complex, has put a significant strain on the resources of small/private business. Moreover, information produced and presented in accordance with at least some accounting standards within GAAP may not be relevant for the users of small/private companies' financial statements. In this paper we look at differential reporting in Canadian GAAP, which gives nonpublicly accountable enterprises the ability to opt out of certain CICA Handbook requirements with unanimous consent of the shareholders. We look at lobbying activity in response to the proposed differential reporting standard and at nonpublicly accountable company experience with the differential reporting opportunity in the period since the standard was promulgated.     

Discretionary Accounting Choices: A Debt covenants Based Signalling Approach

This paper seeks to explain the discretionary accounting choices made by managers in a world characterised by asymmetric information between managers and investors. It considers a firm whose capital structure consists of both debt and equity, a manager who protects the interests of the firm's existing shareholders, and a financial market. The manager is committed to engage in an investment opportunity and needs to raise some equity to finance it. He is furthermore endowed with some private information about his firm's future earnings. The paper shows how, under certain conditions, the manager may credibly communicate his private information to investors through his accounting choices. In this equilibrium, the selection of balance sheet strengthening and income increasing accounting choices signals unfavourable information while the use of balance-sheet weakening and income- decreasing accounting choices signals favourable private information. The latter firms should thus experience positive abnormal returns around the announcement dates of their accounting choices.     

Contracts Between Firms and Shareholders

Theory predicts the existence of explicit bilateral contracts between firms and expert shareholders. I assemble and analyze a large-scale data set of these contracts. Using block investments from 1996 to 2018, I find that these contracts involve mainly corporate owners and activist owners, and often specify covenants pertaining to financing, trading, directorships, dividends, joint ventures, corporate investment, financial reporting, and information access. I also find that some of the contract covenants are stated in terms of accounting information, and that the prevalence of these contracts is significantly positively associated with measures of information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. Overall, this study provides some of the first systematic evidence on explicit bilateral contracts between firms and shareholders.     

Measurement Challenges and Consequences in the Australian Public Sector

Among the transformations in accounting and measurement practice that have swept through the public sector in the past decade, the widespread adoption of some variant of cuwent or replacement cost accounting for non-cuwent assets has attracted keen research attention (eg, Walker 1993, Walker et a1 1997). This paper addresses two key issues. First, it explains why cuwent cost accounting style measurement has proliferated in the budget- funded public sector while becoming largely1 extinct in the private sector. Second, it argues that the significance of measurement choices in the public sector extends beyond the appearance and composition of public-sector financial statements, and may have significant implications for contracting and outsourcing choices.