Risk preference,immigration policy and illegal immigration

The paper analyzes the effects of government policy upon illegal immigration. The model used as a vehicle for this analysis is an extension of Ethier's one-small-country model of illegal immigration to a two-country context. We distinguish between the cases of capital immobility and free capital mobility, and consider illegal immigration when there are border patrols by the government and when there are internal enforcement procedures in effect. Unlike previous researchers who have assumed risk neutrality, we examine the impacts of government policy when prospective illegal immigrants exhibit risk averse and risk loving behavior. The relaxation of the risk neutrality assumption leads to the possibility of multiple and unstable equilibria. Moreover, attitudes to risk and the probability of detection are shown to have implications for some equilibrium responses to tighter surveillance.     

Illegal immigration: a supply side analysis

"This paper analyzes the supply-side determinants of illegal immigration using a three-sector general equilibrium model of the source country. Agricultural liberalization raises illegal immigration while liberalization of the high tech sector reduces it. In contrast, capital mobility in the source country renders trade policy ineffective for controlling illegal immigration. Paradoxically, increased enforcement (by the host country) may raise source country unskilled wages, although illegal immigration falls. Finally, under capital mobility, a rise in the source country restrictions on capital inflow raises the level of illegal immigration and reduces the effectiveness of border enforcement efforts by the host country."     

Illegal immigration in the presence of labor unions

"This paper develops a general equilibrium framework of a two-sector economy which incorporates illegal immigration in the presence of labor unions. It demonstrates that stricter enforcement of immigration laws, by reducing the demand for or supply of illegal aliens, benefits all legal workers in the economy. The model is used to evaluate the impact of these policy changes on national income. Results indicate that national income does not necessarily fall when immigration controls are tightened. The existence of a union mitigates the negative welfare impact of a reduction in the number of illegal immigrants."     

A theory of permissible illegal immigration

In many countries laws are not enforced against visibly present illegal immigrants. The visibly present illegal immigrants also tend to be concentrated in particular sectors. We explain such permissible illegal immigration in an endogenous-policy model where selective sector-specific illegality transforms illegal immigrants from non-sectorally specialized to sector-specific factors of production. Under initial conditions where no immigrants are present, the median voter opposes immigration. When, however, a population of illegal immigrants has accumulated, ongoing illegal immigration becomes an endogenous equilibrium policy, at the same time that a majority of voters opposes legal immigration and opposes amnesty that would legalize the immigrants' presence. We also establish a basis for domestic voters preferring that illegal immigrants be employed in service rather than traded-goods sectors.     

Illegal immigration in a heterogeneous labor market

This paper examines the effects of illegal immigration in a neoclassical growth model with two groups of workers, skilled and unskilled. We show that although illegal immigration is a boon to a country as a whole, there are distributional effects, whose sign is in general ambiguous. This is because all sources of income of both groups are affected and some of these changes tend to move income in opposite directions. Nevertheless, calibration exercises show that the wealth distribution is likely to become more unequal as the number of illegal immigrants increases. We confirm most of our calibration results analytically in a small open economy version of the basic model. Finally, our results remain robust when we extend the model to allow for endogenous skill acquisition.     

Foreign aid as a discipline on illegal immigration

This paper deals with a sanctions policy toward reducing illegal immigration. Using a single-period game, it shows that by imposing a penalty on each apprehended illegal alien, the host country will increase the motivation of the source country to expend money for preventing illegal immigration. It is also shown that although the sanctions are allowed to go only one way, by increasing the efficiency of catching illegal aliens, both parties will be motivated to expend money for restraining illegal immigration. The author thanks Gideon Hollander, Eliakim Katz, and an anonymous referee for their valuable help. All errors are the author's responsibility.     

International immigration and economic welfare in an efficiency wage model: The co-existence case of both legal and illegal foreign workers

Abstract. In the developed countries some native workers are unemployed while there exist illegal unskilled (legal skilled) foreign workers who are complementary to (substitutable for) natives and their wages are usually lower than (equal to) that of natives. Reflecting this situation, we introduce two types of immigrant in an efficiency wage model. It is shown that domestic government should exclude illegal foreign workers but welcome legal ones if the total number of illegal immigrants is small enough and well controlled. On the other hand, legal immigration should be restricted if the flood of illegal immigration is out of control.     

Illegal aliens,unemployment and immigration policy

"This paper develops a simple two-country model of illegal immigration in an attempt to examine the interaction among variables such as the stock of migrant labor, the unemployment rates of the two economies, and the rate of spending by the host country on the enforcement of its immigration restrictions. The focus of the analysis is on the dynamics of immigration policy and on its role in determining the nature of the mechanism by which disturbances to the labor market of one country are transmitted to that of the other in the short run and in the long run."     

Government policy under price uncertainty: A source of volatility in illegal immigration

This paper provides an alternative explanation for why illegal immigration can exhibit substantial volatility. We develop a model economy where migrants make decisions in the face of uncertain border enforcement and transfers from the host country. The uncertainty is extrinsic, a sunspot, and arises due to ambiguity regarding government policy; the sunspot manifests itself as uncertainty in the commodity price of money. Immigration volatility stems from both the trade‐off between the marginal benefits and costs (transfers and enforcement) to migrating and the existence of a sunspot. Finally, we examine the impact of changes in government policies on migration levels.     

America's post-war immigration policy

This article provides a historical perspective on immigration policy in the US after World War II and assesses the present situation. US immigration and refugee policy has undergone significant change since World War II. The McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, which instituted a system of proportional quotas based on national origins, was discarded in 1965 following years of criticism that it discriminated against nonwhites. Third World immigrants, especially from Asia and the Americas, have benefited from the immigration laws. However, the problems resulting from unrestricted and undifferentiated immigration are now becoming apparent, even to liberal critics of previous national origins policies. During the 1970s, there was a 61% increase in the number of Mexican nationals in the US and Mexicans currently comprise over 20% of the population in 40 Congressional districts in 8 states. 83.3% of legal immigrants, and all illegal immigrants, are of non-European descent--a fact that may retard their assimilation and intensify ethnic tensions. There is a danger that the concept of national borders may become superfluous. The theoreticval liberalism of the 1950s and 1960s is, in the 1970s, being confronted with the reality of large numbers of immigrants unable and unwilling to be absorbed into a previously European-dominated country. It is concluded that the enforced application of the concept of equality in matters of immigration has not been the panacea that its liberal proponents envisioned.     

Capital–skill complementarity and the immigration surplus

We build a neoclassical growth model with overlapping dynasties and capital–skill complementarities to evaluate changes in immigration policy. Calibrating the model using US data, we quantify the differential effects of skilled and unskilled immigration on factor returns and on the welfare of different sectors of the population. An influx of high-skilled immigrants lowers the wages of skilled workers, raises the wages of unskilled workers, and because of the relative complementarity between capital and skilled labor, substantially raises the rate of return to native-owned capital. By contrast, an influx of unskilled immigrants produces an opposite effect on wages, and has only a negligible effect on the return to capital. Because of capital–skill complementarity, an increase in the number of skilled immigrants generates an immigration surplus—the overall welfare benefit accruing to the native population—that is approximately ten times larger than the immigration surplus generated by an identical increase in the number of unskilled immigrants. This differential welfare effect is far higher than can be accounted for by the disparity between the productivities of each type of worker.     

Is the new immigration less skilled than the old?

This paper analyzes trends in the skills of immigrants to the US in the post-World War II period. Changes in the supply, demand, and institutional factors determining immigration are analyzed for their implications for immigrant skills. During the past 4 decades immigration has shifted from being predominantly European and Canadian in origin to being predominantly Asian and Latin American, and there have been changes in the criteria for rationing immigration visas. Immigrant skills can be analyzed within the context of a model of the supply of immigrants and the US demand for immigrants. Of the Asian immigrants subject to numerical limitation, the proportion who were occupational preference principals declined from 18.2% in 1970, to 11.9% in 1975, to 8.1% in 1981. A growing stock of the foreign-born population who are illegal aliens may lower immigrant quality; for low-skilled workers in neighboring low-income countries the economic incentives for illegal migration are very large. Immigrants from the UK have the highest annual earnings, with Canadian, other European, South Asian, East Asian, and other American immigrants having successively lower earnings. The Mexicans and the Vietnamese have the lowest earnings. Over the period 1950 to 1980, US immigration changed from primarily drawing immigrants from countries whose nationals have high relative earnings in the US primarily drawing immigrants from countries whose nationals do less well. Recent immigrants are less favorably selected on the basis of their level of schooling. The analysis of the relative earnings of immigrants during the 1970s using 3 data files shows there has been little change for white immigrants, an ambiguous pattern for Mexican immgrants, perhaps a small decline for Cuban immigrants, and a small rise for Asian immigrants. Overall, without returning to rationing by country of origin, public policy could raise immigrant skill levels by changing the balance between kinship and the individual's skills in the rationing of visas.     

The effect of mode 4 liberalization on illegal immigration

This paper aims to assess the impacts of the temporary movement of workers on the illegal immigration. It uses a discrete time, forward-looking model with heterogeneous agents, in order to describe the decision made by illegal migrants from developing countries. Illegal migrants are supposed to accede only to the informal sector and are price takers, as they have no negotiating power. Taking into account these specifications, the theoretical model is solved analytically and illustrated numerically. It demonstrates that under some conditions, the liberalization of temporary movement of workers could lead to a decrease of illegal migration.     

Public opinion on immigration in Europe: Preference and salience

Studies of public opinion on immigration have focused on the responses to survey questions about whether the individual would prefer more or less immigration (preference) but not on his or her assessment of its importance as a policy issue (salience). Analysis of data from the European Social Survey and Eurobarometer indicates that preference and salience are associated with different individual-level characteristics. At the national level they move differently over time and in response to different macro-level variables. Both dimensions of opinion must be taken into account as influences on the formation of immigration policy.     

Offshoring,immigration, and the native wage distribution

Abstract This paper presents a simple model that examines the impact of offshoring and immigration on wages and tests these predictions using U.S. state‐industry‐year panel data. According to the model, the productivity effect causes offshoring to have a more positive impact on low‐skilled wages than immigration, but this gap decreases with the workers’ skill level. The empirical results confirm both of these predictions and thus present direct evidence of the productivity effect. Furthermore, the results provide important insight into how specific components of offshoring and immigration affect the wages of particular types of native workers.     

Efficiency Wages and International Factor Mobility

This paper incorporates efficiency wages into the Heckscher-Ohlin model. The capital intensive sector pays higher wages than the other sector. One result is that tariffs to attract capital increase welfare by increasing the quality, not quantity, of jobs available. However, there are distributional effects among laborers. Some see an increase in wages, others become unemployed. The paper also investigates policies in the presence of illegal immigration. If immigration cannot be limited, a high wage country is best served by a capital outflow that eliminates the incentive for the labor inflow. Again, there are distributional effects among the workers. [F20]     

The collective good motive for immigration policy

The authors consider immigration policy in the particular setting of scale economies in consumption. A model of a jurisdiction with a collective good motive for instituting an immigration policy is developed, and comparative statistical results are derived     

Dynamic effects of changes to Japanese immigration policy

This paper uses a single-sector dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous households to analyse Japanese immigration policy. We examine the effects on output, consumption, factor prices, and utility. We do this for both steady states and transition paths. We find that: (a) aggregate output, investment, and consumption in Japan are likely to rise with any sort of loosening of immigration restrictions; (b) allowing more skilled immigration generates greater aggregate changes; (c) raising skilled immigration relative to unskilled immigration drives down skilled workers’ wages, consumption, and utility, while cutting the skilled to unskilled immigration share has the opposite effects; and (d) such immigration policy changes have small effects compared to those that occur naturally due to business cycle fluctuations     

The U.S. immigration crisis

A review of the factors affecting immigration to the United States is presented. The authors develop the argument that present levels of immigration, particularly illegal immigration, are detrimental to U.S. interests, and that current global population trends will make this situation progressively worse. Stricter controls on immigration are considered.     

改善经济运行环境的时机选择:政府与资本的博弈

通过政府与国内非法、合法资本持有者间的不完美信息动态博弈模型,得出政府对待非法资本的严厉打击,将在一定程度上引起国内整体性的跟随性流出。即政府对待非法资本的态度,将在一定程度上影响我国资本净流出/流入的方向。而国内存在大量资本净流入时,相当于放宽了政府对非法资本的严厉打击的现实约束,为在资本净流量波动尽量小的前提下改善经济运行环境创造了条件。