Private information flow and price discovery in the U.S. treasury market

Using intraday data, we identify the intensity of private information flow in the U.S. Treasury market. Our results show that the intensity of private information flow is highly correlated with public information shocks and higher for longer maturity bonds. More importantly, we find that bond price changes associated with high intensity of private information flow tend to be persistent, whereas those associated with low intensity of private information flow are more likely reversed. While public information and private information are the main determinants of bond price variations on days with news announcements, private information and liquidity shocks are important determinants of bond price variations on days with no significant events. Finally, we show that the depth of limit order book is inversely related to the intensity of private information flow. Nevertheless, informed dealers do not seem to use hidden orders to disguise their trading intentions.     

Insider trading,future earnings,and post-earnings announcement drift

This paper examines the association between insider trading prior to quarterly earnings announcements and the magnitude of the post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD). We conjecture and find that insider trades reflect insiders’ private information about the persistence of earnings news. Thus, insider trades can help investors better understand and incorporate the time-series properties of quarterly earnings into stock prices in a timely and unbiased manner, thereby mitigating PEAD. As predicted, PEAD is significantly lower when earnings announcements are preceded by insider trading. The reduction in PEAD is driven by contradictory insider trades (i.e., net buys before large negative earnings news or net sells before large positive earnings news) and is more pronounced in the presence of more sophisticated market participants. Consistent with investors extracting and trading on insiders’ private information, pre-announcement insider trading is associated with smaller market reactions to future earnings news in each of the four subsequent quarters. Overall, our findings indicate insider trading contributes to stock price efficiency by conveying insiders’ private information about future earnings and especially the persistence of earnings news.     

Private versus Public Ownership: Investment,Ownership Distribution,and Optimality

Examined in this paper is the choice between private and public incorporation of an asset for an entrepreneur (asset owner) who hires a manager with superior information about the asset's return distribution. Public sale of equity is shown to be the preferred alternative when (a) capital market issue costs are low or (b) the assest's idiosyncratic risk is high and the owner is either sufficiently risk averse or sufficiently “optimistic” about the asset's expected return. Thus, those assets deemed most valuable by their owners will tend to be publicly incorporated. The paper also explores the impact of incorporation mode—private versus public—and information structure on the firm's investment policy and ownership distribution.     

Quote revision and information flow among foreign exchange dealers

In a multi-dealer market without transaction disclosure, quote revision partially reveals the posting dealer's private information/belief and may have an impact on other dealers’ pricing decision. Using continuous quotes from three major dealers in the interbank foreign exchange market, I find significant information externality from one dealer's quotes to others. The information content of quote revision is positively related to the overall order flow to the market, as opposed to order flow to the posting dealer. At 15-min interval or above, public information becomes the dominant component that drives quote revision. Furthermore, public information appears to induce positive serial correlation and private information causes negative serial correlation in short-term quote revision.     

Financial Reporting and Supplemental Voluntary Disclosures

A standard result in the voluntary disclosure literature is that when the manager's private information is a signal correlated with the firm's liquidation value, mandatory disclosures substitute for voluntary disclosures. In this paper, we assume that the manager's private information complements the mandatory disclosure and show that the content and likelihood of a voluntary disclosure depend on whether the mandatory reports contain good or bad news. This different information asymmetry produces new, testable implications regarding the probability of and market reaction to voluntary disclosures. We also show that changes in mandatory disclosure regulations can have unintended consequences due to their effects on the manager's willingness to voluntarily provide supplemental disclosures.     

Do analysts affect bad news timeliness?

I investigate the effect of analysts on the speed with which bad news is reflected in earnings. Intuitively, the more analysts that cover a firm, the more costly it will be for the firm to keep bad news suppressed. Thus, analyst coverage should positively affect bad news timeliness (BNT) (but not necessarily the differential timeliness of bad news over good news, or conditional conservatism). Using brokerage house mergers as a natural experiment with a difference-in-differences design, I find that an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage decreases BNT; that is, analysts positively affect BNT. The decrease in BNT is robust to controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity, using a propensity score matched sample, persists for up to three years after the brokerage house merger, and is stronger for firms with relatively low analyst coverage before the merger. The result improves our understanding of how analysts affect a firm's information environment.     

Do managers withhold bad news from credit rating agencies?

Research documents that managers, on average, withhold bad news and emphasize good news in their public disclosures. We ask whether the same is true in their private communications with credit rating agencies. We study how rating agencies anticipate and react to public information events as a function of their access to rated firms’ private information. We show that, in terms of ratings downgrades, rating agencies exhibit relatively more anticipation and less reaction to negative (compared to positive) public information events when they have more access to private information. Our results are strongest when firms are most optimistic in their public disclosures and are not due to rating agencies focusing their efforts on downside risk. Overall, we find consistent evidence that rated firms provide less optimistic information to rating agencies in their private communications and that this information is reflected in credit ratings.

     

Intraday volume and volatility relations with and without public news

This paper reexamines the dynamic relation between intraday trading volume and return volatility of large and small NYSE stocks in two partitioned samples, with and without identifiable public news. We argue that the sequential information arrival hypothesis (SIAH) can be tested only in periods containing public news. After partitioning the sample into periods with and without public news, we find bi-directional Granger-causality between volume and volatility in the presence of public information as hypothesized by the SIAH. Our analysis further suggests that return volatility is higher in the periods with public news, while trading volume is significantly higher in the no-news period; perhaps owing to the importance of private information for trading stocks. Using the sample without public news, we find evidence that volume Granger-causes volatility without feedback. These results are broadly consistent with behavioral models like the overconfidence and biased self-attribution model of [Daniel, K., Hirshleifer, D., Subrahmanyam, A., 1998. Investor psychology and security market under- and over-reactions. Journal of Finance 53, 1839–1885]. It appears that overconfident investors overrate the precision of their private news signals and therefore trade too aggressively in the absence of public news; when public news arrives, investors’ biased self-attribution triggers excessive return volatility.     

Uncertainty triggers overreaction: evidence from corporate takeovers

Behavioural finance models suggest that under uncertainty, investors overweight their private information and overreact to it. We test this theoretical prediction in an M&A framework. We find that under high information uncertainty, when investors are more likely to possess firm-specific information, acquiring firms generate highly positive and significant gains following the announcement of private stock and private cash acquisitions (positive news) while the market heavily punishes public stock (negative news) deals. On the other hand, under conditions of low information uncertainty, when investors do not possess private information, the market reaction is complete (i.e. zero abnormal returns) irrespective of the type of acquisition. Overall, we provide empirical evidence that shows that information uncertainty plays a significant role in explaining short-run acquirer abnormal returns.     

Is PIN priced risk?

Several recent papers assume that private information (PIN), proposed by Easley et al. [2002. Is information risk a determinant of asset returns? Journal of Finance 57, 2185–2221; 2004. Factoring information into returns. Working Paper, Cornell University], is a determinant of stock returns. We replicate Easley et al. (2002) and show that while PIN does predict future returns in the sample they analyze, the effect is not robust to alternative specifications and time periods. There is no evidence that PIN factor loadings predict returns or that PIN factor returns reflect future GDP growth. PIN exhibits no association with implied cost of capital derived from analysts’ earnings forecasts. Overall, our findings cast doubt on whether PIN reflects information risk systematically priced by investors.     

Short-sale constraints and informational efficiency to private information: A natural experiment

Exploiting a regulatory change in short-sale constraints (Regulation SHO) as a natural experiment, this paper examines the effect of short-sale constraints on informational efficiency of stock prices to private information. I find that short-sellers act as informed traders prior to forthcoming analyst news and trade on negative private information. When short-sale constraints are relaxed for pilot stocks (treatment group), both trading volume and stock price sensitivity increase prior to the analyst announcement for bad news but not for good news, relative to that of nonpilot stocks (control group). The findings are consistent with the Diamond and Verrecchia model that predicts that short-selling increases the speed of adjustment of stock prices to private negative information. In the cross-section, the effect of Reg SHO is stronger in stocks of firms with weak and uncertain information environments (i.e., small firms and firms with high analyst forecast dispersion).     

Does the effect of revealed private information on initial public offering (IPO) first trading day return differ by IPO market heat?

By IPO market regime, I decompose the effect of revealed private information on the initial return of IPOs (initial public offerings) into adjusted and unadjusted private information and find (i) investment banks partially adjust the offer price in return for revealed private information in all but the non‐hot IPO market; (ii) the economic importance of private information associated with IPOs (and hence agency costs) is procyclical; and (iii) industry information spillovers between IPOs occur only in the hot and very‐hot IPO markets.     

Discussion of “The Role of Information Precision in Determining Cost of Equity Capital”

Botosan, Plumlee, and Xie (this issue) demonstrate an association between a proxy for cost of capital and proxies for public and private information precision. These proxies have limitations that suggest caution in interpreting their results, absent evidence of proxy validity. The proxy for cost of capital is based on Value Line's beliefs about expected returns, not actual expected returns. The proxy for private information measures information revealed by analysts, not information used by inside traders. In this paper, Botosan, Plumlee, and Xie (this issue; hereafter BPX) empirically explore the joint effect that public and private information precision have on the cost of equity capital. Their key findings are that more precise public information lowers the cost of capital, while more precise private information raises the cost of capital. The paper considers whether public and private information are substitutes or complements but finds no evidence of an interactive effect. This is an important question with significant policy implications for firms, investors, and regulators. While there is (as the authors discuss) considerable prior literature on the topic, the matter is empirically unsettled, so further evidence is welcome. Also, the authors make an important point that, given the correlation between public and private information, it is essential to control for one when analyzing the effect of the other. The reliability of the results in BPX depends on whether the proxies used in the paper effectively measure the underlying economic constructs. Cost of equity capital is proxied by a formula using Value Line forecasts, while public and private information measures are based on analyst forecast dispersion and accuracy. Most of the following discussion considers how reliable these proxies might be.     

The Disciplinary Role of Financial Statements: Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions of Privately Held Targets

This study examines whether requiring the disclosure of audited financial statements disciplines managers’ mergers and acquisitions (M&As) decisions. When an M&A transaction meets certain disclosure thresholds, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires the public acquirer to disclose the target's audited financial statements after the merger is completed. Using hand‐collected data, I find that the disclosure of private targets’ financial statements is associated with better acquisition decisions. Furthermore, I find that this disciplining effect of disclosure is more pronounced when monitoring by outside capital providers is more difficult and costly, and when other disciplining mechanisms are weaker. Finally, these findings are robust to several alternative explanations, such as monitoring from blockholders and voluntary disclosures. In sum, the evidence suggests that the ex post mandatory disclosure of private targets’ accounting information disciplines managers’ acquisition decisions and improves acquisition efficiency.     

Does information vault Niagara Falls? Cross-listed trading in New York and Toronto

We document differential private information in cross-border asset pricing using the probability of informed trading (PIN) for Canadian shares traded on both sides of Niagara Falls. Relative to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) has more informed trades and a larger information share. This cross-border information imbalance is associated with small but positive price premiums in New York as predicted by a model. The dynamics of these premiums depends on trade informativeness. Lastly, the PIN for TSX trading typically rises upon cross-listing on the NYSE, which is consistent with the negative event-study response.     

Options, short-sale constraints and market efficiency: A new perspective

This paper undertakes a new investigation of the potential for options to mitigate short-sale constraints. I find that option introduction alleviates 79% of the price adjustment efficiency disparity between short-sale constrained and unconstrained stocks in relation to negative news. No significant improvement in adjustment efficiency is found in response to positive information. These results are robust to controls for endogeneity biases associated with the option introduction selection process. Further, I find evidence that post-option improvement in efficiency is similar in relation to private and public information. This suggests that short-sale constraint effects stem, at least in part, from an irrational, optimism bias or another behavioral source as suggested theoretically by Miller (1977). Collectively, these results suggest that options act as an effective substitute to short-sales, significantly contributing to the informational efficiency of the market.     

The Impact of Firm-Specific Public News on Intraday Market Dynamics: Evidence from the Turkish Stock Market

This study attempts to discover the intraday firm-specific news announcements and return volatility relation in the Turkish stock market. The GARCH framework is utilized to investigate the impact of firm-specific public news announcements on volatility persistence with and without trading volume. For the majority of the stocks in the sample, the volatility persistence diminishes with the inclusion of firm-specific news, implying that news is impounded rapidly into prices. This effect is more pronounced for larger stocks. When there is no news, the trading volume does not appear to reduce the volatility persistence for the majority of stocks, possibly due to the presence of private information possessed by informed traders.     

The Impact of Corporate Governance Press News on Stock Market Returns

Stock market prices reflect information regarding firms’ business environments, operations and, in general, their fundamentals. Recently, various studies have analysed the link between news coverage and stock prices but no evidence exists on how channels and ways of communication of information affect investors’ behaviour. We analyses these aspects focussing on a large sample of corporate governance news published between 2003 and 2007 in ‘Il Sole 24 Ore’, Italy's major financial newspaper. We show that before news is made public investors are only able to assess the type of corporate governance event underlying it. After publication, investors are influenced by the content (positive or negative) and the tone of communication (strong or weak) of the news.     

Private monitoring,collusion, and the timing of information

When a principal's monitoring information is private (nonverifiable), the agent should be concerned that the principal could misrepresent the information to reduce the agent's wage or collect a monetary penalty. Restoring credibility may lead to an extreme waste of resources—the so‐called burning of money. A more realistic and efficient outcome is feasible when the private information arrives in time to rescale the agent's effort. Rescaling is more effective than pure monetary penalties because effort has different values to different parties whereas money is equally valuable to all parties. Furthermore, when rescaling is feasible, private monitoring is more efficient than public monitoring subject to collusion because nonmonetary penalties are ineffective to deter collusion.