How fair-value accounting can influence firm hedging

The potential influence of accounting regulations on hedging strategies and the use of financial derivatives is a research topic that has attracted little attention in both the finance and the accounting literature. However, recent surveys suggest that company hedging can be substantially influenced by the accounting for financial instruments. In this study, we illustrate not only why but also how the accounting regulations may affect hedging behavior. We find that under mark-to-market accounting, most firms concerned with earnings smoothness adopt myopic hedging strategies relative to the benchmark, cash flow hedging. The specific influence of the accounting regulations depends on market and firm-specific characteristics, but, in general, the firms dramatically reduce the extent of hedging addressing price risk in future accounting periods. We illustrate that the change in hedging behavior significantly dampens the increase in earnings volatility stemming from fair value accounting of derivatives. However, the adjusted hedging strategies may substantially increase the firms’ cash flow volatility.     

Corporate Hedging Policy and Equity Mispricing

We show that firms’ use of derivatives is negatively associated with stock mispricing. This result is consistent with the notion that hedging improves the transparency and predictability of firms’ cash flows resulting in less misvaluation. Furthermore, we show that the negative relationship between mispricing and hedging is particularly strong when market value is below fundamental value, which is consistent with prior evidence that hedging has a positive impact on firm valuation. Finally, we provide evidence that a “spread‐out” hedging policy that entails the use of a variety of derivative contracts can be more effective in reducing mispricing.     

Does Fair Value Reporting Affect Risk Management? International Survey Evidence

We survey CFOs from 36 countries to examine whether and how firms altered their risk management policies when fair value reporting standards for derivatives were introduced. A substantial fraction of firms (42%) state that their risk management policies have been materially affected by fair value reporting. Firms are more likely to be affected if they seek to use risk management to reduce the volatility of earnings relative to cash flows and if they operate in countries where accounting numbers are more likely to be used in contracting. We document a substantial decrease in foreign exchange hedging and in the use of nonlinear hedging instruments. Finally, firms that take active positions are more likely to be affected by fair value reporting. Taken together, our evidence indicates that requirements to report derivatives at fair values have had a material impact on derivative use; while speculative activities have been reduced, sound hedging strategies have been compromised as well.     

WHY MOST FIRMS CHOOSE LINEAR HEDGING STRATEGIES

I investigate the efficiency of alternative hedging strategies of nonfinancial firms facing hedgeable price risk, unhedgeable quantity risk, and financial contracting costs in low-profit events. The analysis suggests that variance-minimizing hedging strategies are very close in economic terms to optimal, value-maximizing hedging strategies for most firms. Furthermore, the marginal gains from shifting to nonlinear hedging strategies are often small enough to be neglected. These results illuminate some puzzling findings in survey studies of firms' hedging practices and suggest an alternative view on firms' selective hedging practices termed "cautious selective hedging."     

The role of risk management in mergers and merger waves

We show that merger activity and particularly waves are significantly driven by risk management considerations. Increases in cash flow uncertainty encourage firms to vertically integrate and this contributes to the start of merger waves. These effects are incremental to previously identified causes of wave activity. Our risk management hypothesis is further supported by cross-sectional differences in the likelihood that a firm vertically integrates, and by the post-acquisition characteristics of vertically integrating firms. These results are consistent with the view (from the industrial organization literature) that vertical integration is an operational hedging mechanism that reduces the cost of increased uncertainty.     

What lies beneath: Foreign exchange rate exposure,hedging and cash flows

This paper presents results from an in-depth analysis of the foreign exchange rate exposure of a large nonfinancial firm based on proprietary internal data including cash flows, derivatives and foreign currency debt, as well as external capital market data. While the operations of the multinational firm have significant exposure to foreign exchange rate risk due to foreign currency-based activities and international competition, corporate hedging mitigates this gross exposure. The analysis illustrates that the insignificance of foreign exchange rate exposures of comprehensive performance measures such as total cash flow can be explained by hedging at the firm level. Thus, the residual net exposure is economically and statistically small, even if the operating cash flows of the firm are significantly exposed to exchange rate risk. The results of the paper suggest that managers of nonfinancial firms with operations exposed to foreign exchange rate risk take savvy actions to reduce exposure to a level too low to allow its detection empirically.     

Hedging and competition

We consider firms that, all else equal, wish to minimize variability in their internal capital (due to convex costs of raising external funds). The firms can hedge the cash flow risk of the project, but not that of winning or losing the auction. We characterize optimal hedging and bidding strategies in this competition framework. We show that access to financial markets makes firms bid more aggressively, possibly even above their valuation for the project. In addition, hedging increases the variance of bids and makes firm values more dispersed. Further, with hedging, the covariance of internal capital changes with the risk factor is negative, and is more negative, the higher the correlation of the hedging instrument with the risk factor.     

Free Cash Flow and Stockholder Gains in Going Private Transactions

We investigate the source of stockholder gains in going private transactions. We find support for the hypothesis advanced by Jensen that a major source of these gains is the mitigation of agency problems associated with free cash flow. Using a sample of 263 going private transactions from 1980 through 1987, our results indicate a significant relationship between undistributed cash flow and a firm's decision to go private. In addition, we find that premiums paid to stockholders are significantly related to undistributed cash flow. These results are especially strong for firms that went private between 1984 and 1987 and also for firms whose managers owned relatively little equity before the going private transaction.     

Collateral and capital structure

We develop a dynamic model of investment, capital structure, leasing, and risk management based on firms' need to collateralize promises to pay with tangible assets. Both financing and risk management involve promises to pay subject to collateral constraints. Leasing is strongly collateralized costly financing and permits greater leverage. More constrained firms hedge less and lease more, both cross-sectionally and dynamically. Mature firms suffering adverse cash flow shocks may cut risk management and sell and lease back assets. Persistence of productivity reduces the benefits to hedging low cash flows and can lead firms not to hedge at all.     

The Determinants of Currency Risk Management in Latin American Nonfinancial Firms

This paper investigates the determinants of currency risk management in nonfinancial firms in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, based on a panel data sample of firms that list as American depositary receipts from 2001 to 2004. Our evidence indicates that derivatives held for hedging purposes can yield cash flows of the same order of magnitude of capital expenditures, operational earnings, and financial expense, unlike what was previously found by Guay and Kothari (2003) for U.S. firms. We study not only the decision to use derivatives, but also the magnitude of derivatives holdings and the importance of operational hedging in firms' risk management strategies. We find that economies of scale, financial distress costs, informational asymmetry, and growth opportunities are important for risk management decisions, and that firms do not hedge because of potential tax benefits.     

Board Composition And Corporate Use Of Interest Rate Derivatives

We provide new evidence on the motives for corporate hedging by examining the relation between the quality of the firms' monitoring mechanisms and the quantity of interest rate derivatives employed. Because the capital structure decision and hedging decision are considered to be endogenous, the firm's capital structure and level of interest rate derivative use are modeled simultaneously. We show a positive relation between the relative influence of outside directors and the quantity of derivatives used. This evidence indicates that outside directors take an active role in derivatives usage and that firms employ hedging in the shareholders' best interests.     

THE INFLUENCE OF FIRM‐ AND CEO‐SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS ON THE USE OF NONLINEAR DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS

We examine why firms use nonlinear derivatives (e.g., options). Our results suggest that option characteristics in investment opportunities and debt, the payoff structure of incentive compensation, and free cash‐flow agency problems influence the firm's choice. Investment opportunities, internally generated cash flow, business risk, and option compensation positively influence the use of nonlinear currency derivatives. Option feature in bonds positively influence the use of nonlinear interest rate derivatives, whereas bonus and stock compensation, and CEO tenure have a negative influence. In sum, nonlinear cash flow characteristics in investment opportunity, debt, and executive compensation all relate positively to nonlinear derivative usage.     

Hedging,selective hedging,or speculation? Evidence of the use of derivatives by Brazilian firms during the financial crisis

This paper analyse the use of foreign exchange derivatives by non-financial publicly traded Brazilian companies from 2007 to 2009. Using balance-sheet data on firms’ positions in derivatives and their foreign exchange exposure, the paper verifies the existence of three groups of derivative users: hedgers, selective hedgers – companies that significantly changed the volume of derivatives used during this period, but used them in line with their currency exposure – and active speculators – companies that adopted positions that would have been inadvisable had the aim been to hedge their currency exposure. Selective hedgers and speculators have one similarity: both tried to obtain gains through the continuous process of domestic currency appreciation. Confirming the optimal hedging literature, the paper shows that several firm characteristics are able to explain the use of derivatives and hedging by firms but market timing in the derivative markets is explained solely by firms’ foreign exposure, corporate governance and the macroeconomic environment.     

Is cash negative debt? A hedging perspective on corporate financial policies

We show theoretically that while cash allows financially constrained firms to hedge future investment against income shortfalls, reducing current debt is a more effective way to boost investment in future high cash flow states. Thus, constrained firms prefer higher cash to lower debt if their hedging needs are high, but lower debt to higher cash if their hedging needs are low. We provide empirical evidence that supports our theory. Our analysis points to an important hedging motive behind cash and debt management policies. It suggests that cash should not be viewed as negative debt in the presence of financing frictions.     

Why Firms Use Currency Derivatives

We examine the use of currency derivatives in order to differentiate among existing theories of hedging behavior. Firms with greater growth opportunities and tighter financial constraints are more likely to use currency derivatives. This result suggests that firms might use derivatives to reduce cash flow variation that might otherwise preclude firms from investing in valuable growth opportunities. Firms with extensive foreign exchange-rate exposure and economies of scale in hedging activities are also more likely to use currency derivatives. Finally, the source of foreign exchange-rate exposure is an important factor in the choice among types of currency derivatives.     

Monitoring mechanisms,managerial incentives,investment distortion costs,and derivatives usage

We relate derivatives usage to the level of corporate governance/monitoring mechanisms, managerial incentives and investment decisions of UK firms. We find evidence to suggest that the monitoring environment, e.g., board size, influences both currency and interest rate derivatives usage. Managerial compensation plans also influence derivatives usage. Investment decisions are affected by the governance and managerial compensation plans of firms, which in turn impact on derivatives usage. We find a strong tendency for UK firms to reduce derivatives usage in situations where derivatives usage should be increased. There is limited evidence that firms use hedging substitutes to avoid monitoring from external capital markets.     

自由现金流量创造力与违约风险——来自A股公司的经验证据

本文基于我国A股上市公司数据,研究了企业自由现金流量创造力与违约风险之间的关系。研究发现:(1)企业自由现金流量创造力越强,其违约风险越低。经过一系列稳健性检验后,该结论依旧成立。(2)自由现金流量创造力越强的企业往往有更低的债务规模、更高的资产收益率和更低的股票波动,因而其违约风险更低。(3)自由现金流量创造力与违约风险的负相关关系,主要存在于货币政策紧缩时期以及外部信息环境较差的企业。本文发现意味着,监管部门和投资者应重视上市公司自由现金流量创造力不足所带来的潜在债务违约风险,通过不断提高公司自由现金流量创造力,助力我国宏观经济与微观企业高质量发展。     

The determinants of corporate cash management policies: Evidence from around the world

We examine the determinants of corporate cash management policies across a broad sample of international firms. We document that firms in countries with strong legal protection of minority investors are more likely to decrease their cash holdings in response to an increase in cash flow than are firms in countries with weak legal protection. This relationship is most pronounced for firms that are financially constrained and those with high hedging needs. More importantly, we do not find evidence that financial development plays an incremental impact on the cash flow sensitivity of cash, after controlling for the effect of legal protection. Therefore, we argue that the legal protection of investors (rather than financial development) represents the first-order effect in influencing international firms' cash management policies. The results are robust to alternative specifications. In general, our findings reinforce the importance of country-level legal protection of investors in mitigating the effects of firm-level financial constraints and hedging needs on corporate cash management policies.     

A Unified Theory of Tobin's q,Corporate Investment,Financing, and Risk Management

We propose a model of dynamic investment, financing, and risk management for financially constrained firms. The model highlights the central importance of the endogenous marginal value of liquidity (cash and credit line) for corporate decisions. Our three main results are: (1) investment depends on the ratio of marginal q to the marginal value of liquidity, and the relation between investment and marginal q changes with the marginal source of funding; (2) optimal external financing and payout are characterized by an endogenous double‐barrier policy for the firm's cash‐capital ratio; and (3) liquidity management and derivatives hedging are complementary risk management tools.     

The effect of financial constraints,investment policy,product market competition and corporate governance on the value of cash holdings

This study empirically investigates the value shareholders place on excess cash holdings and how shareholders’ valuation of cash holdings is associated with financial constraints, firm growth, cash‐flow uncertainty and product market competition for Australian firms from 1990 to 2007. Our results indicate that the marginal value of cash holdings to shareholders declines with larger cash holdings and higher leverage. However, firms that are more financially constrained, that have higher growth rates and that face greater uncertainty exhibit a higher marginal value of cash holdings. These findings are consistent with the explanation that excess cash holdings are not necessarily detrimental to firm value. Firms with costly external financing and that also save more cash for current operating and future investing needs find that the market values these cash hoarding policies favourably. Finally, there is limited evidence of an association between various corporate governance measures and the value of cash holdings for a shorter sample period.