Home market effects with endogenous costs of production

In a standard imperfect competition model, we endogenize the costs of production of firms in the increasing returns sector (IRS) via process R&D. We show that firms in the larger region in terms of demand invest more in R&D (i.e.: they are bigger in size and have lower marginal costs) than firms in the smaller region, since the former exploit larger economies of scale in production to pay for the costs of R&D. As a result, when the return on R&D is high, the larger region does not employ disproportionately more labor nor attracts a disproportionately larger share of firms in the IRS in relation to share of demand it hosts, i.e.: negative home market effects (HMEs) in employment and in the number of firms. When this occurs, only partial agglomeration of the IRS in the larger region is sustainable in equilibrium. Even so, the larger region always runs trade surplus in the IRS, i.e.: HME in trade patterns.     

Optimal dividend policy with random interest rates

Several recent papers have studied the impact of macroeconomic shocks on the financial policies of firms. However, they only consider the case where these macroeconomic shocks affect the profitability of firms but not the financial markets conditions. We study the polar case where the profitability of firms is stationary, but interest rates and issuance costs are governed by an exogenous Markov chain. We characterize the optimal dividend policy and show that these two macroeconomic factors have opposing effects: all things being equal, firms distribute more dividends when interest rates are high and less when issuing costs are high.     

External spillovers, internal spillovers and the geography of production and innovation

We consider a three-location duopoly model such that (i) firms choose production and innovation locations before (Bertrand) competition takes place and (ii) there are internal and external knowledge spillovers. We show: (1) agglomerations where firms earn negative profits may exist when there are both external and internal knowledge spillovers; (2) greater external spillovers do not necessarily favor agglomeration; (3) decreasing communication costs tend to favor agglomeration; (4) there are exactly two types of agglomeration equilibria: either both firms innovate in the agglomeration, or there is an innovator and an imitator; and (5) if there is a location where both firms produce, then innovation must take place in this location.     

Misallocation,informality, and human capital: Understanding the role of institutions

The aim of this paper is to quantify the role of formal-sector institutions in shaping the demand for human capital and the level of informality. We propose a firm dynamics model where firms face capital market imperfections and costs of operating in the formal sector. Formal firms have a larger set of production opportunities and the ability to employ skilled workers, but informal firms can avoid the costs of formalization. These firm-level distortions give rise to endogenous formal and informal sectors and, more importantly, affect the demand for skilled workers. The model predicts that countries with a low degree of debt enforcement and high costs of formalization are characterized by relatively lower stocks of skilled workers, larger informal sectors, low allocative efficiency, and measured TFP. Moreover, we find that the interaction between entry costs and financial frictions (as opposed to the sum of their individual effects) is the main driver of these differences. This complementarity effect derives from the introduction of skilled workers, which prevents firms from substituting labor for capital and in turn moves them closer to the financial constraint.     

Delegation in a mixed oligopoly: the case of multiple private firms

Previous research examining mixed duopolies shows that the use of an optimal incentive contract for the public firm increases welfare and that privatization reduces welfare. We demonstrate that these results do not generalize to a mixed oligopoly with multiple private firms. We derive the optimal incentive contract for a public firm that weighs both profit and welfare and show that its use may either increase or decrease welfare depending on the number of private firms and the exact nature of costs. We also identify the conditions that determine whether or not privatizing the public firm facing an optimal incentive contract reduces welfare. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Disclosure Regulation in Duopoly Markets: Proprietary Costs and Social Welfare

Abstract

The argument of proprietary costs is commonly used by firms to object against proposed disclosure regulations. The goal of this paper is to improve our understanding of the welfare consequences of disclosure in duopoly markets and to identify market settings where proprietary costs are a viable argument for firms to remain silent. We, therefore, solve the optimal disclosure strategies and distinguish two different potentially costly effects of disclosing private information: the strategic information effect and the market information effect. We identify the market settings for which a regulator prefers to impose disclosure regulation so as to maximise consumer surplus or total surplus. Regulation may be necessary because (i) the increase in welfare outweighs proprietary costs to the firms, or (ii) firms are trapped in a prisoners' dilemma. The first primarily applies to Bertrand competition with demand uncertainty and, to a lesser extent, to Cournot competition. The second applies primarily to Cournot competition and Bertrand competition with cost uncertainty.     

Profit Margins,Adjustment Costs and the Business Cycle: An Application to Spanish Manufacturing Firms*

The objective of this paper is to investigate the cyclical behaviour of mark‐ups, using a panel of Spanish manufacturing firms over the period 1990–1998. Margins are estimated from the optimal conditions derived from the firm's optimisation problem, which assumes that labour inputs are subject to adjustment costs. A number of results emerge from the estimations. First, we find positive and asymmetric adjustment costs for permanent labour inputs. Second, price‐cost margins are markedly procyclical. Our estimates suggest that labour adjustment costs more than double the variability of average margins with respect to Lerner indexes. Third, we find differences in the parameters of the adjustment technology across industries which make markups of intermediate and production good industries more cyclical than consumer good industries. Finally, industry‐specific price‐cost margins are higher in more concentrated industries.     

Sovereign wealth funds,productivity and people: The impact of Norwegian Government Pension Fund‐Global investments in the United Kingdom

Sovereign wealth funds have an increasing presence in the global financial ecosystem, principally through their investments in equities, which, in turn, may influence HRM. This study examines the influence of the world's largest sovereign wealth fund, the Norwegian Government Pension Fund‐Global (NGPF‐G), on employment in its U.K. investee firms. We find that firms with NGPF‐G investment are significantly less likely to reduce their demand for labour, more specifically in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. When a drop in the demand for labour does occur, it is less extreme when compared to similar organisations without a NGPF‐G shareholding, and this is evident even in the case of relatively small NGPF‐G investments. These findings are in line with the fund's objective of promoting corporate sustainability and Norwegian values. We draw out the key implications of our findings for HR practice.     

Mixed Duopoly with Subcontracting

Existing literature on mixed oligopoly focuses on competition among different types of firms but ignores their possible cooperation. We allow cooperation between a public firm and a private firm through subcontracting in a Hotelling mixed‐duopoly model. We find that when subcontracting is possible, the equilibrium without subcontracting is not socially optimal because subcontracting can lower total production costs. And if both firms engage in subcontracting, the existence of a public firm can guarantee the first best equilibrium, whether it is the low‐cost firm or not. But when a private firm is the low‐cost firm, it is more profitable for it to choose vertical foreclosure. And the consequent equilibrium is not socially desirable anymore. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Sarbanes-Oxley wealth effects: focus on technology firms

We evaluate the shareholder wealth effects surrounding the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). While other studies have also measured wealth effects, none has separately examined technology firms. We discuss the unique characteristics of technology firms and assess whether technology firms are differentially affected. Our results show the portfolio of 218 technology firms experienced significantly more favorable wealth effects than the portfolio of 940 non-technology firms in response to events indicating stringent reform legislation. The cross-sectional analyses suggest that board independence, growth expectations, and R&D expenditures are influential factors in the differential stock price response of technology firms. Across our full sample of 1,158 firms, we find that wealth effects are less favorable for firms that likely will incur high compliance costs and more favorable for firms that are expected to benefit from improved governance and improved transparency.     

Age-specific dynamic labor demand and human capital investment

To study the optimal age-specific labor demand and human capital investment at the firm level we extend the standard dynamic labor demand model by introducing ‘age’ as a second dynamic variable and distinguish between two types of workers: ‘low skilled’ and ‘high skilled’. Applying an age-structured optimal control model we derive qualitative features of the optimal age-specific hiring and training effort. For the case of a linear revenue and production function we prove that firms do not anticipate changes in adjustment costs in their optimal decisions. This result no longer holds if a nonlinear revenue or production function is considered.     

The intensity of incentives in firms and markets: Moral hazard with envious agents

While most market transactions are subject to strong incentives, transactions within firms are often not explicitly incentivized. This paper offers an explanation for this observation based on the assumption that agents are envious and suffer utility losses if others receive higher wages. We analyze the impact of envy on optimal incentive contracts in a general moral hazard model and isolate the countervailing effects of envy on the costs of providing incentives. We show that envy creates a tendency towards flat-wage contracts if agents are risk-averse and there is no limited liability. Empirical evidence suggests that social comparisons are more pronounced among employees within firms than among individuals that interact in markets. Flat-wage contracts are then more likely to be optimal in firms.     

Analysis of Korean IT startups’ initial public offering and their post-IPO performance

Since the financial crisis in Korea, by focusing on core technology, IT startups have played an important role in the recovery of Korea’s economy through innovating technologies and creating new jobs. Even though there are many startups, it is not very common to reach the point of the initial public offering (IPO) and the post-IPO performance of the firms is mostly declining. Since it is rather difficult to apply conventional performance measures to very young firms, IPO has been used as a tool for performance evaluation. This study adopts the IPO as an early-stage measure for the performance of high technology startups. It is important to find out whether an earlier IPO of firms leads to a better performance and capability of firms. We investigate the relationship between the time to IPO of firms and their post-IPO performance for 3 years after their IPO by adopting samples of 79 information technology hardware firms founded after 1996 and listed between 2000 and 2004 in the KOSDAQ. Four determinant factors, including entrepreneurs’ experience, venture capital investment, startups’ technology sourcing, and technology portfolios which determine the firm’s time lag to getting to the IPO, are identified. The findings contain several results. First, the patent has positive effects on the firms’ performance after an IPO and on the firms’ growth before the IPO. Second, a faster technology acquisition via technology alliance has a positive influence on the firms’ IPO regardless of internal technologies. Third, concentrating on core technology, instead of diversifying can mature the startup firms faster. These indicate that a startup’s efficient initial strategy is critical for its performance and it enhances the credit and confidence of the market.     

Why do companies choose to go ipos? New results using data from Taiwan

We examine the determinants of IPOs in Taiwan for the period 1989 to 2000. The regulations in Taiwan permit us to identify firms that met IPO requirements but chose not to go public, allowing for comparisons of firms that choose IPOs and those do not. We find strong evidence that IPOs are not motivated by financing need, that larger and profitable firms are more likely to list equity, and that venture capital provides certification to firm credibility. Other findings provide support for information asymmetry, listing costs, liquidity, owners’ diversification desire, timing, and facilitation of M&As as factors influencing IPO decisions. (JEL G32, G15, G24)     

A small country's high-tech dilemma: the challenge facing new technology-based firms in Norway

Judging from their profit trends, new technology-based firms have not been very successful in Norway. After ten or more years of activity, fewer than half a dozen has accumulated profits over £1 million. Those that risked large initial investments in order to standardize an innovative new technology enjoyed the greatest amount of success. Most firms were able to develop a prototype, but many had great difficulties gearing up for production. Insufficient financing and know-how were the main problems. Firms have had more problems with production than with marketing, but very few seem prepared for the costs and challenges of an international marketing effort. Most lacked a clear marketing strategy or business plan. Financing was often a problem: there was little private investment, and equity capital was often scarce with a mean debt to equity ratio of less than 30%. Most firms received some sort of public funding, usually in support of product development, but so far it has had little impact on profit trends. A multi-national follow-up study with access to a larger data base would provide many more insights.     

Labor's liquidity service and firing costs

This paper studies the specific effect that firing costs can have on firms facing liquidity constraints. When firing costs are zero and a time gap exists between production and its associated revenues, firing allows firms to hold on to their liquid assets by saving on wages, and thus, allows firms to cope better with liquidity shocks when external financing is too costly or unavailable. I refer to this feature as labor's liquidity service. Higher firing costs reduces the value of labor's liquidity service, and thus, increases firms' incentive for hoarding liquidity and reduces firms' demand for production inputs. In addition to this negative effect at the creation margin of production, firing costs have a relatively higher positive effect on the destruction margin of production of financially restricted firms. This paper presents a model that develops these ideas and shows that the presence of firing costs has a stronger negative effect on the output of firms facing liquidity constraints. Regression analysis, based on country-industry panel data sets, provides empirical evidence consistent with the liquidity service effect of firing costs. I find a relatively stronger negative effect of firing costs on the output of industries with higher liquidity requirements and a relatively stronger negative effect of firing costs on the output of small, and more likely financially constrained, firms.     

Spatial externalities and agglomeration in a competitive industry

We introduce spatial spillovers as an externality in the production function of competitive firms operating within a finite spatial domain under adjustment costs. Spillovers may attenuate with distance and the overall externality could contain positive and negative components with the overall effect being positive. We show that when the spatial externality is not internalized by firms, spatial agglomerations may emerge endogenously in a competitive equilibrium. The result does not require increasing returns at the private or the social level, increasing marginal productivity of private capital with respect to the externality, or location advantages. In fact agglomerations may emerge with decreasing returns to scale, declining marginal productivity of private capital with respect to the externality, and no location advantage. The result depends on the interactions between the structures of production technology and spatial effects as shown in the paper. No agglomerations emerge at the social optimum when spillovers are internalized and diminishing returns both from the private and the social point of view prevail. Numerical experiments with Cobb–Douglas and CES technologies and an isoelastic demand confirm our theoretical predictions.     

To merge or not to merge: That is the question

In this paper we analyze the implementation of socially optimal mergers when the regulator is not informed about all parameters that determine social and private gains from potential mergers. We show that implementation requires a certain degree of agreement between social and private incentives. The most important example where this congruence is present is when the uncertainty refers to cost savings, because in this case society and firms want costs savings to be as high as possible. Then, it is possible to induce firms to truthfully reveal the costs savings induced by the merger.Received: 7 June 2001, Accepted: 14 June 2004, JEL Classification: D78, L13, L41This paper was presented at the First CODE meeting held in Barcelona, June 1997 and in seminars at the universities of Alicante, Caen, Carlos III, Bilbao, Complutense (Madrid) and Málaga. We would like to thank P. Amor ós, D. Cardona-Coll, P. Hammond, A. Lozano, C. Martinez, V. Merlin, D. Moreno, B. Moreno, D. Mookherjee, J. Naeve, P. Pereira, R. Renault, A. Snoy and F. Vega-Redondo for their useful comments. The authors are solely responsible for any remaining errors. They acknowledge financial support from CICYT BEC2002-02194, PB97-0120, BEC2001-0535 and the IVIE.     

Comparative statics for profit-maximizing and labor-managed cournot oligopolies

Comparative static results are derived for two types of oligopoly: profit-maximizing and labor-managed Cournot oligopolies. After establishing a general principle for comparative statics for oligopoly, we will examine how a shift in the demand function, changes in the wage rate, indirect tax rates and fixed costs, and technical change affect the equilibrium Cournot industry and firms‘ outputs, firms’ profits and dividends per unit of labor. We will also analyze the effects of entry. Our analysis makes an extensive use of the relationship existing between an individual firm's and industry outputs. We will derive two kinds of stability conditions: one behavioristic and the other computational. Finally, we will conduct comparative static analysis for mixed oligopoly where several profit-maximizing and labor-managed firms co-exist.