Difference in degrees: CEO characteristics and firm environmental disclosure

We contribute to the literature on firms' responses to institutional pressures and environmental information disclosure. We hypothesize that CEO characteristics such as education and tenure will influence firms' likelihood to voluntarily disclose environmental information. We test our hypotheses by examining firms' responses to the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) and find that firms led by newly appointed CEOs and CEOs with MBA degrees are more likely to respond to the CDP, while those led by lawyers are less likely to respond. Our results have implications for research on strategic responses to institutional pressures and corporate environmental performance. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How firms respond to being rated

While many rating systems seek to help buyers overcome information asymmetries when making purchasing decisions, we investigate how these ratings also influence the companies being rated. We hypothesize that ratings are particularly likely to spur responses from firms that receive poor ratings, and especially those that face lower‐cost opportunities to improve or that anticipate greater benefits from doing do. We test our hypotheses in the context of corporate environmental ratings that guide investors to select ‘socially responsible,’ and avoid ‘socially irresponsible,’ companies. We examine how several hundred firms responded to corporate environmental ratings issued by a prominent independent social rating agency, and take advantage of an exogenous shock that occurred when the agency expanded the scope of its ratings. Our study is among the first to theorize about the impact of ratings on subsequent performance, and we introduce important contingencies that influence firm response. These theoretical advances inform stakeholder theory, institutional theory, and economic theory. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Investor Reaction to Covert Corporate Political Activity

Research summary : Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission and subsequent developments created a covert channel for firms to allocate resources from corporate treasuries to political activity. Through the use of a financial market event study of an accidental disclosure of firms' contributions to a Republican nonprofit organization, I examine investors' reactions to covert investment in independent political expenditures. I find that, on average, contributing firms experienced positive abnormal returns around the disclosure event and that these abnormal returns were more positive for firms in heavily regulated industries as well as those previously making campaign contributions to candidates. However, firms that recently faced a shareholder resolution on political spending disclosure experienced negative abnormal returns, suggesting that the controversial nature of covert activity moderated investors' reactions. Managerial summary : The purpose of this study is to examine how investors reacted to an accidental disclosure of firms' investments in “dark money,” a new form of corporate political activity allowed by the U.S. Supreme Court in its Citizens United decision. I find that, on average, investors reacted positively toward firms identified as making these new political investments, especially if the firms previously engaged in electoral politics or operate in heavily regulated industries. However, this reaction turned negative if the firm recently faced a shareholder resolution asking that it voluntarily disclose all of its political investments. An implication for managers is that they should consider their firms' legal and information environments as fully as possible before committing resources to new and potentially controversial political tactics. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are aliens green? Assessing foreign establishments' environmental conduct in the United states

Previous research has found that foreign‐owned establishments often lack specific capabilities needed to respond to local business conditions and are held to a higher standard by local stakeholders. These establishments compensate, however, by possessing offsetting capabilities such as technological excellence. In this article, we investigate how these conflicting forces shape the environmental conduct of foreign‐owned facilities. Using data from the Environmental Protection Agency, we find that foreign‐owned establishments generate more waste yet manage more waste than U.S.‐owned establishments. We also find evidence that both domestic and foreign‐owned firms generate more waste if they operate multiple facilities across multiple jurisdictions in the United States. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cross‐border acquisitions by state‐owned firms: How do legitimacy concerns affect the completion and duration of their acquisitions?

Research summary: Cross‐border acquisitions may raise legitimacy concerns by host‐country stakeholders, affecting the acquisition outcomes of foreign firms. We propose that theorization by local regulatory agencies is a key mechanism that links legitimacy concerns with acquisition outcomes. Given that theorization is time consuming and its outcome is uncertain, we argue that state‐owned foreign firms experience a lower likelihood of acquisition completion and a longer duration for completing a deal than other foreign firms. Moreover, we introduce a set of firm characteristics (target public status, target R&D alliances, and acquirer acquisition and alliance experiences) that may affect the threshold level of legitimacy, thereby altering the proposed relationships. Our framework and findings provide useful implications for institutional theory on its core concept of legitimacy. Managerial summary: Cross‐border acquisitions by state‐owned foreign firms may lead to national security concerns and thus debates and discussions among local regulatory agencies. We argue that such institutional processes may reduce the likelihood of acquisition completion and prolong the duration of acquisition completion. Using cross‐border acquisitions in the United States, we find that acquisitions by state‐owned foreign firms are not less likely to be completed than acquisitions by other foreign firms, but they take more time to be completed. Moreover, state‐owned foreign firms are less likely to complete an acquisition when the target firm has more R&D alliances. However, their acquisition experience and alliance experience in the host country increase the likelihood of acquisition completion, whereas their alliance experience alone shortens the acquisition duration. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Married to the firm? A large‐scale investigation of the social context of ownership

Research summary : Using a large sample of private firms across Europe, we examine how the social context of owners affects firm strategy and performance. Drawing on embeddedness theory and the institutional logics perspective, we argue that embeddedness in a family, in particular the nuclear family, can strengthen identification and commitment to the firm, but can also induce owners to behave more conservatively. Consistent with this argument, we find that family‐owned firms have higher profit margins, returns on assets, and survival rates compared to single‐owner or unrelated‐owners' firms, but also invest and grow more slowly, hold greater reserves of cash, and rely less on external debt. These differences are most pronounced when the two largest shareholders are married. Our results highlight the key role of marital ties in explaining differences in behavior and performance among firms. Managerial summary : Despite the prevalence of the married‐couple ownership structure in firms, little research has been dedicated to understanding how these firms are managed and perform. We examine the behavior and performance of firms owned by married couples in a large panel of closely held Western European firms. We find that married‐owner family firms are managed more conservatively relative to firms with unrelated owners and even to other family‐owned firms. In particular, married‐owner family firms invest and grow more slowly and rely less on external finance. However, they also exhibit greater performance stability and higher profitability. Our findings suggest that social relationships among owners have a large impact on firm strategy and performance, and highlight some potential trade‐offs to performance when married couples control firms. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Pawn to Save a Chariot,or Drawbridge Into the Fort? Firms' Disclosure During Standard Setting and Complementary Technologies Within Ecosystems

Research summary: W ithin an ecosystem, standard setting coordinates development of complementary technologies across firms. But each firm can itself own multiple of these complementary technologies. We study how a firm's own complementary technologies influence its disclosure inclination during standard setting. We identify a tradeoff: disclosure increases value‐creation of the firm's non‐disclosed complementary technologies, but also heightens expropriation risk. Using data on the U.S. communications equipment industry 1991–2008, we show that the firm's complementary technologies increase its disclosure inclination when its technological areas are less crowded, but decrease such inclination when there are SSO members with strong expropriation abilities. Findings stress that disclosure involves but a piece of the firm's portfolio; a systemic perspective of the entire portfolio provides a more comprehensive picture of value‐creation during standard setting . Managerial summary: W hy should a firm disclose its key technology to participate in standard setting within an ecosystem? We urge managers to think beyond “disclosing to ensure compatibility with other firms' complementary technologies within the ecosystem” as a motivation, to also consider how disclosure affects the firm's own complementary technologies within its portfolio. Disclosure in one technological area makes the firm's nondisclosed complementary technologies in other areas more valuable to itself, especially with fewer rivals competing in these other areas. But disclosure also renders the firm susceptible to losing these complementary technologies to rivals, especially when rivals have strong expropriation abilities. Analyzing disclosure decisions by communication equipment firms, we show that this tradeoff is indeed a relevant consideration in managers' strategic calculations when participating in standard setting . Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

煤炭行业上市公司环境绩效信息披露研究——基于社会责任报告

在煤炭行业37家上市公司中,搜集到20家公司2008—2013年度社会责任报告94份,总披露率43.32%。对社会责任报告中环境绩效信息采用内容分析法进一步研究发现,从时间的顺序看环境绩效信息披露的形式和内容方面均显示数量和质量的提高,但地区间、市场间和公司间存在着显著差异。样本公司的环境信息披露的数量和质量仍需提高,30项环境绩效指标中每份报告平均披露仅8.93项,定量环境绩效披露率仅为18.67%。     

Internal agglomeration and productivity: Evidence from microdata

Research Summary: We study how internal agglomeration—geographic clustering of business establishments owned by the same parent company—influences establishment productivity. Using Census microdata on the population of U.S. hotels from 1987-2007, we find that doubling the intensity of internal agglomeration is associated with a productivity increase of about 2% in pre-existing establishments. We consider several mechanisms that may be driving the productivity effect and find evidence consistent with the idea that an economically meaningful component of the productivity effect is due to knowledge transfer between internally agglomerated establishments. We replicate our main findings with Census microdata on the full population of U.S. restaurants from 1987-2007, suggesting that the internal agglomeration effects we document may generalize broadly to other industries with multi-unit firms. Managerial Summary: Internal agglomeration is the geographic clustering of business establishments owned by the same parent company. This paper uses detailed Census data on hotels and restaurants to show how internal agglomeration influences performance. Interestingly, knowledge sharing between owned establishments in the same metropolitan area appears to be a key driver of the internal agglomeration effect.     

Foreshadowing as Impression Management: Illuminating the Path for Security Analysts

Research summary: Managers can disclose information to security analysts as a form of impression management, but doing so is problematic because competitors can use that same information at the expense of the firm. We identify an impression management technique we call foreshadowing, which refers to hinting about future potential strategic activity. Foreshadowing provides information of value to analysts that can influence their evaluations of a firm, but not so much information as to put the firm at a competitive disadvantage. We hypothesize and find that managers who foreshadow acquisition announcements receive fewer analyst downgrades following the announcements, especially when there is more analyst uncertainty about the firm. We also hypothesize and find that analysts' responses to foreshadowing positively influence the likelihood that managers eventually acquire other firms. Managerial summary: Security analysts are often suspicious when firms announce acquisitions as those announcements are cumbersome to analyze on short notice and raise questions about managerial motivations that might not represent the best interests of the firm. We find that managers can improve analyst reactions to acquisition announcements by disclosing some information of value to analysts—specifically by hinting that an acquisition could occur in the future. We refer to such hints as foreshadowing. Foreshadowing entails giving analysts information to reduce their suspicions and facilitate their analyses, but not so much information as to degrade the firm's competitive information advantage over other firms. Foreshadowing also allows managers the option to reconsider actually executing the acquisition if analysts respond negatively to its possibility. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Agglomeration effects and performance: a test of the Texas lodging industry

While competition decreases rents for firms, the presence of competitors may create benefits. Competitors that agglomerate, that are physically proximate, may create externalities—production efficiencies or heightened demand that increases rents. When such externalities exist, then who gains from and who contributes to them? We examine how other competitors' traits affect performance in Texas's lodging industry. In rural markets, we find that chain hotels and larger hotels contribute to positive externalities. While expecting those hotels similar to the establishments creating these externalities to gain, we find the opposite. Independent hotels and smaller hotels gain the most. Interestingly, some establishments are harmed. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How do institutional investors react to local shocks during a crisis? A test using the COVID-19 pandemic

We examine how institutional investors reacted to geographically dispersed local shocks during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic. A sample of real estate investment trusts (REITs) enables us to link two layers of geography: the locations of the assets in which the REITs were invested and the headquarters locations of institutional investors who owned REIT shares. We find that the institutional ownership of firms with an economic interest in the investors’ home markets declined more if those markets were heavily affected by the pandemic. In addition, the ownership responses to the COVID-19 shock were larger in those markets in which REITs had larger portfolio allocations and in markets that were home to the investors. Importantly, we find that nonpassive and short-term investors may have overreacted to the local shocks because their REIT portfolios subsequently underperformed relative to passive and long-term investors. Our study highlights the importance of geography in the formation of investors’ expectations during market crises.     

Do global firms increase their environmental disclosure and performance? Symbolic versus effective operations and the moderating role of liability of origin. Legitimation implications

This paper analyzes the debate regarding the implications of international firms' strategies for their environmental approaches across multiple regions by distinguishing between symbolic and effective environmental operations. Furthermore, we extend previous literature by considering the relevant moderating role of a firm's liability of origin on these relationships. Using panel data of 292 firms in the period from 2011 to 2018 in the energy and utility sectors, our results show that a firm's progressive globalization increases its environmental disclosure but does not affect its environmental performance. Interestingly, our results demonstrate that a weak home country institutional context reinforces a global firm's interest in gaining legitimation through both its environmental disclosure and performance; however, a strong level of home country institutional development reduces its interest in environmental sources of legitimation. Our results contribute to previous literature on how global firms may gain environmental legitimacy using diverse strategies.     

Costly Information Disclosure in Oligopoly

We examine the effect of competition on the incentive of firms to disclose quality to consumers before trade when information disclosure is not costless. We demonstrate that no firm will disclose information in the limit, no matter how small the disclosure cost is; that is, the market outcome converges to complete concealment of information as the number of competing firms becomes larger. Nonetheless, it can be shown that under a mild condition, the equilibrium amount of information disclosure is socially excessive for any number of firms, so discouraging information disclosure by levying a tax may increase social welfare.     

Subnational institutional contingencies and executive pay dispersion

This paper investigates the impact of subnational institutional contingencies on executive pay dispersion structure and the relationship between pay dispersion and firm performance. Using executive compensation data on Chinese listed firms between 2000 and 2011, we find that executive pay dispersion is significantly lower in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), while is significantly higher in cross-listed firms and to a smaller degree in firms located in developed regions. There is also evidence that executive pay dispersion is smaller during the voluntary compensation disclosure period. After controlling for endogeneity of pay determination, we find that executive pay dispersion is positively associated with firm performance. In addition, the positive link between executive pay dispersion and firm performance is stronger in non-SOEs than in SOEs, and stronger in firms located in more developed regions than those not. Our findings are also robust to alternative measures of pay dispersion and firm performance.     

Independent boards and the institutional investors that prefer them: Drivers of institutional investor heterogeneity in governance preferences

Institutional investors report that they prefer to invest in firms with greater board independence despite the fact that researchers have been unable to demonstrate a link between board independence and firm performance. We investigate whether differences among institutional investors affect these preferences. We find that trading strategies have some effect but that mutual funds—facing the strongest institutional pressures—have significantly stronger preferences for firms with greater board independence than do other types of institutional investors. This suggests that institutional investor preferences for independent boards are at least partially driven by institutional pressures rather than anticipated reductions in agency costs. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

系族企业信息披露行为研究：基于民营上市公司的经验分析

利用2009年民营上市公司的数据,从强制性信息披露、自愿性信息披露、信息披露真实性和信息披露及时性等几个方面分析了系族企业与非系族企业信息披露行为的差异。发现其差异主要体现在自愿性信息披露上,系族企业的自愿性信息披露水平明显低于非系族企业的自愿性信息披露水平。另外,对于系族企业来说,两权分离度越大,自愿性信息披露水平越低。这说明系族企业的两权分离度越高,利益侵占情况越严重,终极产权所有者越倾向于对其他投资者隐瞒信息。     

Does Technological Change Affect Union Wage Bargaining Power?

This paper uses data from a survey of Canadian establishments to consider the effects of computer-based process technological change on wage bargaining power. The analysis finds that union wage differentials for blue-collar workers as a whole were lower among firms that had introduced process computerization than among those that had not. The relationship between technological change and the union wage premium differed, however, for skilled and unskilled labour. The union wage effect was lower for skilled workers and higher for general manual occupations in the sub-sample where process computerization had occurred. Explanations for these observed relationships appear to involve both economic and institutional components.     

Necessity as the mother of ‘green’ inventions: Institutional pressures and environmental innovations

Drawing on institutional theory and innovation literature, we argue that greater regulatory and normative pressures concerning environmental issues positively influence companies' propensity to engage in environmental innovation. Analysis of environment‐related patents of 326 publicly traded firms from polluting industries in the United States suggests that institutional pressures can trigger such innovation, especially in those firms displaying a greater deficiency gap (i.e., firms polluting relatively more than their industry peers). Moreover, we find that this effect is stronger when asset specificity is high, and that the availability of resources plays different roles depending on the type of pressures (regulatory vs. normative).Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Competing capitalisms: capital investment in American,German, and Japanese firms

This study explains one way the home country institutional environment causes strategy differences across firms from different countries. It contrasts the investment conduct of American, German, and Japanese firms in the 10 largest manufacturing industries. We find profound national differences among these firms that are stable across industries. These differing conducts are tied to the institutional environments of the home market. The shareholder firms of the United States make investments primarily in response to expected investment returns, measured by Tobin’s Q ratio. The coalitional firms of Germany and Japan make investments primarily in response to the availability of internal finance, measured by operating cash flow. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.