试论CAFTA的报复制度

报复制度是CATFA(中国-东盟自由贸易区)争端解决机制的重要组成部分,是确保仲裁庭建议和裁决得以执行和争端解决机制有效运行的关键所在。通过对WTO与CAFTA两者的报复制度进行比较分析,指出了CATFA报复制度在监督程序、报复水平的确定标准等方面存在不足,并提出了相关的改进建议。     

WTO争端解决机制报复制度的法律实践及分析

WTO争端解决机制被誉为“皇冠上的明殊”,随着国际贸易的发展与实践,争端解决机制虽然取得了很多成效,但同时也暴露了很多问题。中止减让或其他义务作为WTO争端解决机制中最强有力的强制措施,是争端解决机制的执行程序中不可或缺的一环。WTO体系下的“报复”制度对传统国际法上报复概念的一大突破是引入了“交叉报复”,丰富了报复的形式,增强了报复的威慑作用。本文旨在分析“报复”制度在实践过程中遇到的阻碍,并试图提出一些建议。     

WTO现行贸易报复机制的缺陷分析

在WTO争端解决机制下,适用贸易报复的主要目的是促使被诉措施的实施方将其适用的措施调整至与WTO协定或争端解决机构的建议和裁决相一致。但WTO现行贸易报复规则存在程序与实体上的缺陷,WTO争端解决机构所裁定的报复措施的救济效力是不充分的。     

WTO争端解决机制的法律性质

WTO争端解决机制被誉为WTO皇冠上的明珠,自其运行以来,既以其专业高效广受赞誉,又因其程序设计的冲突和裁决执行的效果引发批评。将"就DSU的改进和澄清"列入正式议程的多哈回合至今未果。专家组的临时性、争端解决程序透明度不足、补偿和报复的不溯及既往、报复的效果不足等WTO争端解决机制的不足到底仅仅属于技术性的缺陷还是根植于机制自身的法律性质,首先涉及到对WTO争端解决机制法律性质的廓清,同时该问题的解决也是我们进一步了解和更好地运用WTO争端解决机制的基础。     

中美欧贸易报复制度的比较研究

WTO体制下,贸易报复是争端解决的最后保障,但WTO争端机制旨在解决成员之间的争端,因此,要赋予私人请求本国政府对另一国家进行贸易报复的权利,仍然需要国内立法.目前,各主要大国都通过国内立法赋予本国国民权利,以请求本国政府对另一国家进行贸易报复,为争端解决的国内程序和国际程序的衔接提供了基础,使得本国国民可以通过国内程序启动WTO的争端解决程序.与美欧相比,我国关于贸易报复的立法和实践经验均不甚丰富,确实需要借鉴较为完备的美欧立法,完善我国的有关法律制度.     

WTO月度报告

一、WTO争端解决 WTO授权欧盟对美40亿美元报复 5月7日,世贸组织作出决定,同意欧盟对美国实施40亿美元的贸易报复。此项报复来源于欧美外贸公司税收优惠争端案。此前,WTO争端解决机构裁定美国的销售公司税收优惠法案违反了WTO规则,并裁定其对欧盟造成40亿美元的经济损失。     

WTO报复措施威慑力的实证分析

本文采用个案分析和成本收益法来分析WTO报复措施的威慑力在WTO争端解决机制中的作用和对政策制定者的影响,并分析了WTO报复措施威慑力的局限性,希望政策制定者在采取贸易保护措施时全面考虑,审慎决定,趋利避害,采取报复措施的国家要合理、有效地使用报复措施。     

建立WTO集体报复制度的可行性

报复措施是WTO争端解决机制(Dispute Settlement Mechanism)中的最后手段。然而该措施存在不如人意之处,因此有些国家向GATT和WTO提出过集体报复的设想。本文拟通过研究集体报复制度提出的背景、借鉴联合国的集体报复制度,探讨建立     

WTO多哈回合争端解决机制谈判及内容概析——以专家组程序为例

WTO争端解决机制被誉为"WTO皇冠上的明珠",正在进行中的WTO多哈回合谈判重要内容之一就是对WTO争端解决机制进行"改进和澄清"。在WTO争端机制将发挥愈加重要作用背景下,此种修改将直接涉及和影响包括中国在内的广大发展中国家的重大和长远利益。本文概要介绍了多哈回合WTO争端解决规则谈判的进展和面临难点,此后以专家组程序方面的改革建议为例对争端解决规则谈判内容的细致性和演进情况进行了介绍,并在某些问题上试图对中国可考虑观点做出建议。     

WTO争端解决机制中报复措施探讨

从正面角度讲，报复是一个当原告政府胜诉而被告国政府不遵守判决时能单边使用的救济；从负面角度讲，它似乎违背WTO原则，而鼓励新的贸易限制。文章着眼于研究WT0争端解决机制在不服从判决问题上的规定，探讨报复对WT0争端解决是否是一个适当的有效的方法，是否对所有成员国都适用，并对如何更好地改进现行的WT0争端解决机制提出一点建议。     

Dispute Settlement at the WTO: Impacts of a No Deal in the US‐Brazil Cotton Dispute

On the day before Brazil was to start imposing retaliatory sanctions against the United States in the WTO dispute settlement case regarding unfair domestic and export upland cotton subsidies, the parties have reached a preliminary concession aimed at settling this eight‐year‐long trade dispute. In this paper, we explore the economywide impacts of a no deal with specific emphasis on intellectual property retaliation in a computable general equilibrium framework. As awarded by a WTO dispute settlement panel, Brazil would have been entitled to $591 million in retaliatory sanctions in goods sectors and $238 million in intellectual property sanctions. We find that retaliation by Brazil would have led to welfare gains for all countries except the United States. Most importantly, however, had Brazil not been allowed to retaliate in the form of suspension of intellectual property rights, the impact of trade retaliation alone would have been negative for both Brazil and the United States, a case of shooting oneself in the foot to shoot at the other person's foot.     

“后报复”阶段的规则研究与多哈DSU改革方案——以US/Canada-Continued Suspension案为例

DSU规定了实施报复的条件和程序,但对报复实施后的监督和终止却疏于规范。US/Canada–Continued Suspension呈现了"后报复"阶段的各种问题。上诉机构报告对终止报复的条件、解决后报复执行异议的适当程序、有权且负有义务启动程序的争端方等的裁决和诠释,对完善WTO裁决执行机制具有正面的体制性意义,但也因突破了DSU案文和忽视进行中的DSU谈判,被指责为超越权限的造法。多哈回合DSU谈判对"后报复"问题形成的两种改革方案均未全然接受上诉机构报告的结论,而是各自采纳了互不相同的逻辑和解决思路。     

Antidumping and retaliation threats

We propose and test two ways in which retaliation threats may dampen the antidumping (AD) activity we observe. First, the threat of retaliatory AD actions may make a domestic industry less likely to name a foreign import source in an AD petition. Second, the prospect of a GATT/WTO trade dispute may make government agencies less likely to rule positive in their AD decision. Using a nested logit framework, we find evidence that both retaliation threats substantially affect US AD activity from 1980 through 1998.     

US–Brazilian cotton policies

Brazil filed a lawsuit with the WTO against the United States for providing cotton production and export subsidies, and the WTO ruled in favour of Brazil. Brazil threatened to impose retaliatory tariffs if the United States does not comply with the WTO rulings. After a prolonged litigation stretching from 2002 to 2010, both countries agreed to a negotiated settlement wherein the United States paid Brazilian cotton producers to compensate for any adverse effects. This study develops a political economic model to theoretically analyse US cotton policies, Brazil's threat of retaliatory tariffs and the negotiated settlement between the two countries. The theoretical results show that the volume of cotton output, supply price response, politicians' apathy for the public welfare, elasticities of excess supply/demand and the magnitude of US transfers play a crucial role in determining US policies. This study contributes to the literature by being the first to model political economic aspects of the complex system of trade and domestic policies in the cotton industry using a three-country framework, tariff retaliation and transfers between the countries.     

Cotton Subsidies,the WTO,and the ‘Cotton Problem’

Following an 8‐year‐long dispute over cotton subsidies, Brazil and the US signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 21 April 2010, effectively paving the way for settling the dispute. This paper argues that cotton subsidies are just the tip of the iceberg while a number of other, perhaps more important, issues require attention and, indeed, political will. Chief among them is the persistent divergence between cotton prices and the prices of other agricultural commodities which reflects, for the most part, the large supply response by China and India, a direct consequence of conversion to biotech cotton varieties in these (and other) countries. Such a response – which kept cotton prices low, compared to other commodities – imposes a competitive disadvantage to nonusers of biotech cotton. The paper also highlights two additional constraints faced by the cotton‐producing countries of West and Central Africa, namely the structural inefficiencies of their primary processing industries (also known as ginning) and the appreciation of the CFAf against the US dollar. Without downplaying the importance of subsidy elimination, this paper concludes that these impediments should receive high priority in the policy agenda.     

Setting Boundaries Rather than Imposing Bans: Is it Possible to Regulate Consumer Arbitration Clauses to Achieve Fairness for Consumers?

The benefits of arbitration as a form of alternative dispute resolution in business to business disputes, particularly international business to business disputes, are well recognized and will be discussed in this article. Concerns arise, however, where arbitration is sought to be imposed as a method of dispute resolution upon consumers, through the inclusion of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts. Whilst there is a body of literature which argues strongly against the enforceability of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts, there is little consideration in the literature as to the possible benefits of consumer arbitration which might warrant enforceability within particular regulatory boundaries. To date, the pro-arbitration stance taken by some commentators and courts is premised on freedom of contract arguments rather than consumer benefit. This article will explore whether it is possible to overcome a number of the current concerns regarding the use and enforcement of consumer arbitration clauses through constructing a regulatory framework which will give rise to a fair alternative dispute resolution mechanism for consumers. The article will begin by exploring the current context which includes limitations upon the arbitrability of consumer disputes in a number of jurisdictions. It will then go on to consider what might be the benefits of facilitating consumer arbitration as a mechanism for alternative dispute resolution, particularly in the context of international consumer disputes. The article will then outline a range of concerns regarding the perceived unfairness of consumer arbitration and will draw upon current and potential regulatory models to consider ways of addressing those concerns. The article will conclude with recommendations for a regulatory model designed to facilitate fair consumer arbitration.     

The North American–European Union Dispute Over Beef Produced Using Growth Hormones: A Major Test for the New International Trade Regime

At the time, the negotiation of the SPS agreement was seen as a major accomplishment of the Uruguay Round. One of the first major tests of both the SPS and the WTO’s new dispute settlement system was the long standing and acrimonious dispute between the EU and the US and Canada over trade in beef produced using hormones. Both the SPS and the disputes system performed as expected but the EU, the loser in the case, has chosen to ignore the WTO Panel’s ruling and accept retaliation. As a result, the credibility of the WTO is threatened and the outcome suggests that new negotiations may be required. The issues in the case are outlined and implications for trade in biological products drawn.     

Comment on Fritz Breuss “WTO Dispute Settlement: An Economic Analysis of Four EU–US Mini Trade Wars”

In his excellent empirical analysis of the WTO dispute settlement process, Fritz Breuss has amply demonstrated the undesirability of trade retaliation by applying the CGE model to the transatlantic mini trade wars in the Hormones, Bananas, Foreign Sales Corporations and Steel Safeguards cases. The author's conclusion that tariffs are very bad instruments for countermeasures is uncontested. However, the practicability of a mechanism of direct transfers as proposed by the author may be questionable. The comments also discuss the purpose of retaliation (countermeasures) in the WTO dispute settlement system and summarize Japan's experience with the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.     

论WTO法律框架下的跨TRIPS协定交叉报复

贸易报复是wT（）争端解决机制赋予当事方的最后救济手段。如今。跨TRIPS协定交叉报复逐渐成为受到弱小经济实体欢迎的新方式。实践也证明这种报复形式的确有其优越之处，既能对发达工业化国家败诉方产生有效的威慑作用，刺激其及时执行DSB裁决，还可改善报复实施国家的社会福利水平。不过和所有新兴事物一样。跨TRIPS协定交叉报复也存在风险，报复实施方需要精心谋划对策，才能确保此种报复方式之优越性得以充分发挥。     

知识产权国际组织内部争端解决机制述评──基于WIPO和WTO的理论和实践

知识产权国际争端是知识产权国际保护制度和市场交易制度演化的结果。但在20世纪90年代之前,知识产权国际组织争端解决制度实际上是对传统国际公法争端解决机制的交叉援引,争端解决方式缺失国际仲裁和知识产权国际组织内部的争端解决程序。90年代后,国际商事仲裁范围的扩大、WIPO的机构改革和WTO的成立促成WIPO和WTO确立了内部争端解决机制,这是知识产权国际保护制度的重大发展。在国际争端解决实践中,WIPO和WTO的内部争端解决机制得到了成功的运用。