Self-referential thinking and equilibrium as states of mind in games: fMRI evidence

Sixteen subjects' brain activity were scanned using fMRI as they made choices, expressed beliefs, and expressed iterated 2nd-order beliefs (what they think others believe they will do) in eight games. Cingulate cortex and prefrontal areas (active in “theory of mind” and social reasoning) are differentially activated in making choices versus expressing beliefs. Forming self-referential 2nd-order beliefs about what others think you will do seems to be a mixture of processes used to make choices and form beliefs. In equilibrium, there is little difference in neural activity across choice and belief tasks; there is a purely neural definition of equilibrium as a “state of mind.” “Strategic IQ,” actual earnings from choices and accurate beliefs, is negatively correlated with activity in the insula, suggesting poor strategic thinkers are too self-focused, and is positively correlated with ventral striatal activity (suggesting that high IQ subjects are spending more mental energy predicting rewards).     

Selective immigration policies, human capital accumulation and migration duration in infinite horizon

An increasing literature fosters selective immigration policies as a tool to increase human capital in both source and destination countries. These policies are supposed to prompt incentives to education, and–if selection is sufficiently severe–to increase the human capital stock in source countries. Nonetheless, when compared to open migration, selective policies make returns to education uncertain, and they may harm incentives to invest in human capital. As a consequence, they may reduce the human capital stock even though selection is “severe”. Moreover, when repeated migration is possible, they backfire on migration duration. We obtain our results in an infinite-horizon model that, unlike the current literature, places no restriction on the number of possible migration spells and allows for the possibility of a forced emigration.     

The Carrot vs. the Stick in Work Team Motivation

This paper reports on the use of carrot (positive) and stick (negative) incentives as methods of increasing effort among members of work teams. We study teams of four members in a laboratory environment in which giving effort towards the team goal is simulated by eliciting voluntary contributions towards the provision of a public good. We test the efficiency-improving properties of four distinct environments: monetary prizes given to high contributors versus monetary fines assessed to low contributors, where high/low contributor is defined first in terms of absolute contributions and then in terms of contributions relative to abilities—which we call handicapping. Our results show that both carrot and stick can increase efficiency (i.e., contributions) levels by 10–28%. We find that handicapped incentives promise the highest efficiency levels, and when handicapping is not used penalties may be more effective than prizes. The implications for work teams and suggestions for practical implementation are discussed.     

The optimal neglect of inflation: An alternative interpretation of UK monetary policy during the “Great Moderation”

This paper argues that UK monetary policymakers did not respond to the inflation rate during most of the “Great Moderation” that ran from the early 1990s to the mid-2000s. We derive a generalisation of the New Keynesian Phillips curve in which inflation is a non-linear function of the output gap and show that the optimal response of the policy rule to inflation depends on the slope of the Phillips curve; if this is flat, manipulation of aggregate demand through monetary policy does not affect inflation and so policymakers cannot affect inflation. We estimate the monetary policy rules implied by a variety of alternative Phillips curves; our preferred model is based on a Phillips curve that is flat when output is close to equilibrium. We find that policy rates do not respond to inflation when the output gap is small, a situation that characterised most of the “Great Moderation” period.     

Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations

This paper looks at the incentives of individual members of a monetary policy committee to gain a reputation for inflationary toughness. I show a policy maker can have more or less incentive to build a reputation when part of a group. But, group policy making leads to higher expected social welfare. Not publishing individuals' votes, raises the temptation to inflate and lowers expected social welfare. If the culture or rules of a central bank puts more weight on senior policy makers, the incentive to build a reputation is greater, but expected social welfare may be higher or lower.     

Corruption,intrinsic motivation,and the love of praise

Do higher wages prevent corruption (bribe taking)? We investigate a setting where individuals who apply for public sector jobs are motivated not just by monetary incentives but also by intrinsic motivation and concern for the collective reputation of their profession. We show that an increase in monetary compensation may cause reputation‐concerned individuals to be more prone to participate in corruption due to an “overjustification” effect. The overall effect of monetary incentives on fighting corruption crucially depends on the composition of the pool of public sector workers for two reasons: first, different types of workers react differently to the same policy; second, the composition of the pool of workers affects individual behavior through its effect on collective reputation. These results imply in particular that policies to fight corruption should focus more on increasing the collective reputation of the public sector rather than using monetary incentives, which have perverse effects on some agents.     

“Interest Rate Trap”, or Why Does the Central Bank Keep the Policy Rate Too Low for Too Long?

In this paper, we provide a framework for modeling one risk‐taking channel of monetary policy, the mechanism whereby financial intermediaries' incentives for liquidity transformation are affected by the central bank's reaction to a financial crisis. The anticipation of the central bank's reaction to liquidity stress gives banks incentives to invest in excessive liquidity transformation, triggering an “interest rate trap” – the economy will remain stuck in a long‐lasting period of suboptimal, low interest rate equilibrium. We demonstrate that interest rate policy as a financial stabilizer is dynamically inconsistent, and the constrained efficient outcome can be implemented by imposing ex ante liquidity requirements.     

Money, endogenous fertility and economic growth

This paper analyzes the issue of money superneutrality through an intertemporal optimizing model of capital accumulation with endogenous fertility, i.e. endogenous population growth. Two elements of this setup invalidate money superneutrality: (i) a demand for fertility that depends on real money balances, and (ii) an inverse relation between capital–labor ratio and population growth. Higher monetary growth increases fertility, since it reduces its opportunity cost, and hence diminishes capital intensity, and per capita output. This reverse Tobin effect is matched by an increase in aggregate capital and output growth rates. In this framework, the optimal monetary growth rule is a “distorted Friedman rule”.     

Altruism,Warm Glow and the Willingness-to-Donate for Green Electricity: An Artefactual Field Experiment

The ongoing liberalization of electricity markets in most western countries forms the background of our artefactual field experiment. Using a Cheap talk design [R.G. Cummings and L.O. Taylor. American Economic Review 89 (1999) 649–665] with supplementary monetary incentives, we test for presence of “warm glow” motivations [J. Andreoni. Journal of Political Economy 97 (1989) 1447–1458; Economic Journal 100 (1990) 464–477] in the willingness-to-donate for electricity generated from renewables. Our data from 200 participants supports impure altruism, that is, individuals benefit from both contributing to environmental quality and its current level when opting in favor of green electricity. Furthermore, we find evidence of crowding-out as well as crowding-in effects. Depending on the knowledge of people about electricity markets and the types of electricity contracts offered, “all-or-none” contracts are most likely to bring about crowding-out effects.     

On optimality in collective institutional choice

Conditions are investigated under which democratic choice of the division of land between collective and “private” use and of the distribution of collective income between “needs” and “work” payments will produce a Pareto-optimal land allocation and optimal collective labor incentives. Sen's optimal rule for the degree of “needs” distribution is found to result from self-interested voting on this parameter when the distribution of labor inputs is unskewed or when votes are weighted by labor contributions. This in turn increases the optimality of land allocation, which can be further improved by a simple rental scheme. J. Comp. Econ., Dec. 1981, 5(4), pp. 392–403. Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island.     

Human capital depletion, human capital formation, and migration: a blessing or a “curse”?

We specify conditions under which a strictly positive probability of employment in a foreign country raises the level of human capital formed by optimizing workers in the home country. While some workers migrate, “taking along” more human capital than if they had migrated without factoring in the possibility of migration (a form of brain drain), other workers stay at home with more human capital than they would have formed in the absence of the possibility of migration (a form of brain gain).     

When punishment fails: Research on sanctions, intentions and non-cooperation

People can become less cooperative when threatened with sanctions, and previous research suggests both “intentions” and incentives underlie this effect. We report data from an experiment aimed at determining the relative importance of intentions and incentives in producing non-cooperative behavior. Participants play a one-shot investment experiment in pairs. Investors send an amount to trustees, request a return on this investment and, in some treatments, can threaten sanctions to enforce their requests. Decisions by trustees facing threats imposed (or not) by investors are compared to decisions by trustees facing threats imposed (or not) by nature. When not threatened, trustees typically decide to return a positive amount less than the investor requested. When threatened this decision becomes least common. If the request is large relative to the sanction then most trustees return nothing. If the request is small, trustees typically return the requested amount. These results do not vary with investors' intentions.     

Absenteeism: A comparison of incentives in alternative organizations

This paper uses a game-theoretic model to analyze the incentives workers may have to play “hookey” from work given that there is an outwardly unobservable probability of being sick and thus being unable to work. We compare incentives and equilibria in labor-managed firms (LMFs) and in profit-maximizing firms (PMFs), both in single-period and repeated games. We show, among other things, that in an egalitarian LMF there are circumstances under which members will not work when it is optimal to work, while the PMF suffers from the opposite problem; daily paid workers will work even when it would be better if they did not.     

Theories of choice under risk: Insights from financial markets

To date, the plausibility of theories of choice under risk hinges are mainly on experimental evidence. This paper devises and implements an approach amenable of assessing the performance of three families of models (expected utility, rank-dependent expected utility, and the cumulative prospect theory) using information from financial asset markets. Our findings unequivocally support reference-point dependence, diminishing marginal sensitivity, loss aversion, and nonlinear weighting of (gain and loss) physical probabilities. The empirical observations are found to be robust to, inter alia, the parameterization of the utility and probability weighting functions, “day-of-the-week effects”, the choice of a reference point, and the introduction of possible, low-probability market crashes (peso component).     

Industrial policy in developing countries

Traditionally, proindustry policies were associated with incentives for import substitution and an inward-oriented development strategy. This is no longer so. Whereas in the past, world-market orientation was seen as implying reliance on primary production, today policies favoring international competition and export orientation are considered compatible with policies favoring rapid industrialization. Differences of opinion on the appropriate degree of public intervention remain. The debate between “purist” laissez-faire advocates and those who believe in industrial planning, public investment, and generous subsidies often obscures the real need for reduction in antiexport bias, rationalization of incentives, and reform of public-sector activities.     

Monetary transmission mechanism in Turkey under free float using a small-scale macroeconomic model

This study analyzes the monetary transmission mechanism in the Turkish economy following the switch to free float under informal inflation targeting scheme in the aftermath of the February 2001 crisis. A small-scale macroeconomic model is simulated using equations for output gap, exchange rate, sub-items of inflation, short-term policy rate, government borrowing rate, “Embi+ Turkey” and inflation expectations. The preliminary results indicate that, despite some slight departures, both static and dynamic simulations capture the dynamics of the fundamental economic variables. The results also show that at a time of weak domestic demand, output gap has been seemingly less significant in determining inflation. Furthermore, risk premium as measured by “Embi+ Turkey” has a high explanatory power in shaping government borrowing rate and exchange rate. Finally, forward-looking component of inflation has been effective in determining non-administered prices.     

Assortative matching, adverse selection, and group lending

This note reconsiders a theoretical result asserted to explain the success of group lending programs in LDCs. It has been claimed that if groups are allowed to form themselves, risky and safe borrowers will sort themselves into relatively homogenous groups. This “positive assortative matching” can be exploited by lenders to solve an adverse selection problem that would otherwise undermine the effectiveness of such lending programs. I show that the positive assortative matching result does not necessarily hold if earlier models are extended to incorporate dynamic incentives.     

Perpetual youth and endogenous labor supply: A problem and a possible solution

In the “perpetual youth” overlapping-generations model of Blanchard and Yaari, if leisure is a “normal” good then some agents will have negative labor supply. We suggest a solution to this problem by using a modified version of Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman’s utility function. The modification incorporates real money balances, so that the model may be used to analyze monetary as well as fiscal policy. In a Walrasian version of the economy, we show that increased government debt and increased government spending raise the interest rate and lower output, while an open-market operation to increase the money supply lowers the interest rate and raises output.     

Complementary credit networks and macroeconomic stability: Switzerland's Wirtschaftsring

The Swiss Wirtschaftsring (“Economic Circle”) credit network, founded in 1934, provides residual spending power that is highly counter-cyclical. Individuals are cash-short in a recession, and economize by greater use of WIR-credits. A money in the production function (MIPF) specification implies that transactions in WIR form a stabilizing balance that makes up for the lack of ordinary currency. Thus, unlike the ordinary money, WIR money is negatively correlated with GDP in the short run. This implication is confirmed by empirical estimates. Such credit networks play a stabilizing role that should be considered in monetary policy.     

Control of SO2 emissions from power plants: A case of induced technological innovation in the U.S.

This paper investigates how the details of government actions induce innovation—the overlapping activities of invention, adoption and diffusion, and learning by doing—in “environmental technology,” products and processes that either control pollutant emissions or prevent emissions altogether. It applies multiple quantitative and qualitative measures of innovation to a case subject to several “technology-push” and “demand-pull” instruments: sulfur dioxide control technology for power plants. The study employs analyses of public R&D funding, patents, expert interviews, learning curves, conference proceedings, and experience curves. Results indicate that: regulation and the anticipation of regulation stimulate invention; technology-push instruments appear to be less effective at prompting invention than demand-pull instruments; and regulatory stringency focuses inventive activity along certain technology pathways. Increased diffusion of the technology results in significant and predictable operating cost reductions in existing systems, as well as notable efficiency improvements and capital cost reductions in new systems. Government plays an important role in fostering knowledge transfer via technical conferences, as well as affecting the pattern of collaborative relationships within the technical research community via regulatory changes that affect the market for the technology. Finally, the case provides little evidence for the claim that cap-and-trade instruments induce innovation more effectively than other instruments.