On the dynamic effects of using hired labor in the Kibbutz—theory and case studies

This study analyzes the effect of employing hired labor in the Kibbutz. The main motivations are the premises contained in the newly emerging “The Change” or “The New Kibbutz” approach. Using the traditional LMF model with heterogeneous labor, we show that, although using hired labor will improve the economic situation of the Kibbutz in the short-run, in the long-run Kibbutz membership will consist of only those types of labor to which the “Self Labor” principle applies.     

Player Types and Self-Impression Management in Dictatorship Games: Two Experiments

Recent experimental research on dictatorship games shows that many dictators share their outcomes with unknown, anonymous others. The data suggests that dictators can be “typed” as rational (taking the maximum), equal (splitting outcomes equally), or “other.” This paper experimentally tests the self-impression management model, which predicts that individuals act to show themselves in a positive light, even when they are the only observer of their own behavior. The model predicts that the “other” type of dictator will avoid being greedy by taking more only as their choices are increasingly restricted. Results from two experiments support the model's predictions. The conclusion advocates differentiating basic psychological motivations in modeling individual behavior. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, C91, D63.     

Venture capital: Structure and incentives

Venture capital is a major source of financing for firms in their early stages of development. Such businesses, especially in the high technology industries, are characterized by a high degree of uncertainty and asymmetry of information. In this paper we analyze the relationship between a venture capital organization (“capitalist”) and the initial owner of an entrepreneurial entity in which it invests (“entrepreneur”). We focus on the agency problems and derive a compensation system. In our model the capitalist provides a combination of equity and debt financing while the owner provides equity financing which serves as a signal affecting the beliefs (“optimism”) of the capitalist. The interesting result is that since the capitalist is assumed to be more risk averse than the entrepreneur, he is made to be more optimistic than the entrepreneur at the optimum.     

Afterword on the Five-Year Outlook: Problems and promises

The editors offer a synthesis that reflects the motivations and concerns that underlie this volume and present “some reasonably tempered hopes and future prospects”. Among the former, they discuss “political/ institutional issues” impinging on the Outlook—its purpose, production, users, and feedback—as well as “technical/intellectual” ones. Among the latter, they note that for Outlook reports beyond the second, current signals are that the science policy community will be involved more substantially, and that contributions in general will be decentralized. They foresee the Outlook evolving into a forum for discussion and advocacy of future science-technology priorities.     

Nuclear future - A case of method bias?

This study points out major errors in an article published in this journal by Nitta and Yoda [1] titled, “Challenging the Human Crisis: ‘The Trilemma.’” Nitta and Yoda forecast a nuclear future based on assumptions of a high energy demand, scarce oil reserves, and a low potential of renewable energy sources. The validity of these assumptions is analyzed, and they are found inaccurate. Nitta and Yoda also use different forecasting techniques for different technologies that encourage the prospects of nuclear power and discourage the future of solar energy. No arguments are provided for the different choices of forecasting methods. When discussing future alternatives, the approach taken is of vital importance, because the method itself often affects the result.     

The economics of shortage and problems of reform in Chinese industry

This paper employs the economics of shortage framework to examine post-Mao reforms in Chinese state-owned industry. Performance has been disappointing because reforms through 1985 failed to fundamentally alter economic agent behavior. The “soft” budget constraints at the enterprise and local government levels continue to generate “quantity” and “expansion” drives. The resultant inflationary pressures have necessitated administrative interventions and thwarted reform progress. The Maoist legacy of active participation by local governments in economic management is high-lighted as a major obstacle to the elimination of paternalism in state-enterprise relations.     

Is error learning behaviour stabilizing?

It is very commonly admitted that error-learning behaviour in general improves the stability of dynamical economic evolutions. We show here, in the context of Temporary General Equilibrium Theory, that such an intuition is not true, in the sense that “most often,” for a large class of models, learning does not assuredly leads to more stable dynamics. The presentation of the problem then allows for a discussion of the type of hypothesis—very high levels of information or very careful behaviours—which can invalidate such a conclusion.     

When does the majority become a majority? Empirical analysis of the time at which main market adopters purchase the bulk of our sales

The idea of a dual-market structure in the early stages of a product's life cycle has become one of the most widely accepted ideas among new product marketing practitioners in the past decade. Concepts such as “Early Market/Main Market” and “Visionaries/Pragmatists” have entered the lexicon of high-tech executives to express the notion that the market for new products is composed of early and main markets with a discontinuity in the diffusion process in between them. Moreover, these concepts have been at least partially tested and verified in the marketing academic literature in the past few years.We extend this branch of research by investigating the timing issues in dual-market cases. We define Change-of-Dominance Time (CD-Time) as the number of years it takes main market adopters to outnumber early market adopters. We empirically investigate this timing issue on a comprehensive data set of new product sales in the consumer electronics industry. We find that regarding explanatory determinants of CD-Time, external influence, such as advertising, to the early market is the most important explanatory variable.We examine the relationship between CD-Time and other early product life cycle phenomena: Takeoff, Saddle, and Rogers' size of adopter categories. We found relatively high correlations between these phenomena and CD-Time.The answer to the question “When does the majority become a majority?” is indeed “at 16%”! In a dual-market setting, the average time at which the main market outnumbers the early market is when 16% of the market has already adopted the product. In terms of time, in 75% of the cases the majority becomes a majority in 5 to 10 years.     

On preferences for being self-employed

The concept of procedural utility assumes that agents not only receive utility from outcomes but also attach an independent value to the procedures that lead to these outcomes. This paper analyzes whether the preferences that underlie procedural utility are homogeneous using the case of independence at the workplace. I exploit the event of German reunification to assign preferences for independence to respondents without using data on occupational choice or directly reported procedural preferences. I find that the self-employed report higher job satisfaction than the employed, even after controlling for income and hours worked. However, there is a significant amount of heterogeneity in this effect: while “independent types” experience a large increase in job satisfaction from being self-employed, the most “hierarchical types” could even experience a decrease.     

Limiting the system and reshaping lifestyles: Solving unemployment by social and technical innovations

We have become used to seeing crises in growth, unemployment, and inflation as purely economic problems that can be overcome by suitable economic and political means. One basic assumption of the following reflection however, is that the above might be only half the picture. To paraphrase a formula of Friedrich Engels, the concern is not “in the first and last instance” with questions of the “economic basis,” but with questions of the current images of human kind, social milieus and lifestyles. Solutions will thus tend to lie in social innovations and reorganization of the System insofar as they complement the new lifestyles.     

Alternate forecasts of the job content and skill requirements of the American economy in 1980

This paper analyzes the potential job content and skill requirements of the American economy in 1980 under three alternate economic futures. Detailed occupational manpower requirements are generated on the basis of a “Status Quo” economy, a “Social Welfare” economy, and a “Defense” economy in the near future. Occupational manpower requirements are then translated into a Job Family-Skill Content classification to determine how these alternate national priority choices may affect future requirements for specific jobs, skills, educational preparation, and vocational training. The results obtained indicate the job families and skill classifications most sensitive to changes in basic economic parameters, and also identify long run trends in manpower and educational requirements unaffected by shifting social priorities and patterns of federal expenditures. The implications of these findings for manpower and educational planning are briefly discussed.     

The impact of liberalization on bureaucratic corruption

Liberalization increases the number of goods available for consumption within a country. Since bureaucrats value variety, this raises the marginal utility of accepting a bribe. This “benefit effect” is counteracted by an increasing “cost effect” from corruption deterrence activities that arise due to greater international pressure to curb corruption. The interaction of these two effects can lead to a non-monotonic relation between liberalization and corruption. Moreover, pre-commitment to deterrence activities is shown to be more effective in controlling corruption. Empirical evidence supports the existence of a non-monotonic relation between economic openness and corruption among developing countries.     

Can Japan succeed in “Chigyo-ka” (intelprise-formation)?

There are two aspects in today's information revolution that started in the late 1970s. The first is an aspect referred to as “the third industrial revolution,” which triggers the transition to the “21st century system of Industrialization.” The information revolution in this sense brings the creation of new “breakthrough industries (new multimedia industries).” And the second aspect of the information revolution possesses the characteristics of both a technological revolution and a social revolution and brings about the arrival of the third phase of the historical evolutionary process of the modern civilization, which proceeds through three phases, namely “militarization, industrialization, and then informatization.”If the bearers of modern industrialization are a “group of enterprises” that have been engaged in the race in order to gain “wealth” (generalized means of exchange/exploitation power), and if these enterprises' activities have been exercised in the world market where their products have been sold, then it is appropriate to call the bearers of informatization a “group of intelprises.” They will be engaged in the race to gain “wisdom” (generalized means of persuasion/induction power), then stages of their activities can be called a “global intelplace” where “sharables,” that is, information and knowledge, will be disseminated. And now, toward the 21st century, the third phase of modernization, which can be called the “informatization/intelprise formation” or the “wisdom game” (intellectualism), is about to begin.Japan's “ie society (a society based on the ie principle—literally, it means “house” but here it is interpreted as cultural principle for organizing a society), which has been going through the process of evolution on the Japan Archipelago, has developed a network-based organization with little stratification within its infrastructure. In this sense, Japanese society can be characterized as a “network-oriented society” in which intelprises and an intelplace in the broad sense have functioned as the essential components of the society since Middle Ages. In general, an intelplace and intelprises that operate actively within this framework serve as the flexible bases for different types of social relations and institutions, such as states and markets and eventually integrate these into the society to a certain extent. In fact, it took place quite regularly during the modernization “in the narrow sense,” or Westernization of Japanese society after the Meiji Restoration. There exist some problems, however. Some of the characteristics found in Japanese society may become obstacles to activities aimed at the sharing and promotion of information and knowledge in the global intelplace and Japanese participation in the “wisdom game.” Badly needed are serious efforts for Japanese intelprise-formation to reduce these obstacles as much as possible.     

Consistent representative democracy

We study axioms which define “representative democracy” in an environment in which agents vote over a finite set of alternatives. We focus on a property that states that whether votes are aggregated directly or indirectly makes no difference. We call this property representative consistency. Representative consistency formalizes the idea that a voting rule should be immune to gerrymandering. We characterize the class of rules satisfying unanimity, anonymity, and representative consistency. We call these rules “partial priority rules.” A partial priority rule can be interpreted as a rule in which each agent can “veto” certain alternatives. We investigate the implications of imposing other axioms to the list specified above. We also study the partial priority rules in the context of specific economic models.     

Futures research scenarios and time succession

The possibility of introducing time-succession into a type of scenario approach used in futures research is examined, starting from Duperrin and Godet's SMIC-74 method, which deals with sets of nondated binary events and requires as input data the individual probabilities of these events and their time-independent conditional probabilities, taken by pairs. Time succession is then considered successively at two levels: 1)as a means used just to make conditional probabilities more accessible to intuition, following a proposal of Mitchell and Tydeman, to which a simplification is suggested; and 2) as a characteristic to be kept in the time-succession dependent scenarios that are finally dealt with. In the second the investigated period is split into q time “scenes,” as suggested by Olaf Helmer, and a method is proposed using the same algorithm as is used in SMIC-74, but in which binary events, as basic elements, are replaced by “boxed-events.” A boxed-event consists in the couple formed by an event and a “box” that represents either one of the q time scenes or the nonoccurrence of the event. The procedure by which experts can be consulted about the individual and conditional probability data required is described in some detail.     

Self-referential thinking and equilibrium as states of mind in games: fMRI evidence

Sixteen subjects' brain activity were scanned using fMRI as they made choices, expressed beliefs, and expressed iterated 2nd-order beliefs (what they think others believe they will do) in eight games. Cingulate cortex and prefrontal areas (active in “theory of mind” and social reasoning) are differentially activated in making choices versus expressing beliefs. Forming self-referential 2nd-order beliefs about what others think you will do seems to be a mixture of processes used to make choices and form beliefs. In equilibrium, there is little difference in neural activity across choice and belief tasks; there is a purely neural definition of equilibrium as a “state of mind.” “Strategic IQ,” actual earnings from choices and accurate beliefs, is negatively correlated with activity in the insula, suggesting poor strategic thinkers are too self-focused, and is positively correlated with ventral striatal activity (suggesting that high IQ subjects are spending more mental energy predicting rewards).     

Anonymous yes–no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval

Symmetric (3,2) simple games serve as models for anonymous voting systems in which each voter may vote “yes,” abstain, or vote “no,” the outcome is “yes” or “no,” and all voters play interchangeable roles. The extension to symmetric (j,2) simple games, in which each voter chooses from among j ordered levels of approval, also models some natural decision rules, such as pass–fail grading systems. Each such game is determined by the set of (anonymous) minimal winning profiles. This makes it possible to count the possible systems, and the counts suggest some interesting patterns. In the (3,2) case, the approach yields a version of May's Theorem, classifying all possible anonymous voting rules with abstention in terms of quota functions. In contrast to the situation for ordinary simple games these results reveal that the class of simple games with 3 or more levels of approval remains large and varied, even after the imposition of symmetry.     

An introduction to nanotechnology policy: Opportunities and constraints for emerging and established economies

Nanotechnology has captured wide attention all over the world and excited the imagination of young and old alike. Interest in the subject has increased remarkably during the last few years because of potential technological applications, and commercial interest has skyrocketed. The promise of nanotechnology as an economic engine that can redefine the wellbeing of regions and nations is pervasive; yet the imprecise language, and overuse of the term nanotechnology, has made that term fuzzier, broader, and trendier than many imagined possible. This is especially evident in nanotechnology market projections, which rose dramatically over the past five years as more traditional “product families” were engulfed by the expanding use of the term. Government policy regarding nanotechnology has often resembled an embrace of imagination rather than a systematic use of what Sun Tzu and others have taught about strategic decision making. Further, if nanotechnology is truly the next wave of technology product paradigms, how will we provide an educated workforce to support it? Moreover, in company with these societal benefits come increased societal risks. This paper is intended to provide policy makers and strategists with observations that might limit actions such as those that led to the “over-hype” of nanotechnology and to the fear (or discounting) of societal risks. In the latter case we might learn from the experiences of policy makers connected with other emerging enabling-technology bases, such as nuclear energy and, to a lesser extent, the “dot-com” boom.     

When is reputation bad?

In traditional reputation models, the ability to build a reputation is good for the long-run player. In [Ely, J., Valimaki, J., 2003. Bad reputation. NAJ Econ. 4, 2; http://www.najecon.org/v4.htm. Quart. J. Econ. 118 (2003) 785–814], Ely and Valimaki give an example in which reputation is unambiguously bad. This paper characterizes a class of games in which that insight holds. The key to bad reputation is that participation is optional for the short-run players, and that every action of the long-run player that makes the short-run players want to participate has a chance of being interpreted as a signal that the long-run player is “bad.” We allow a broad set of commitment types, allowing many types, including the “Stackelberg type” used to prove positive results on reputation. Although reputation need not be bad if the probability of the Stackelberg type is too high, the relative probability of the Stackelberg type can be high when all commitment types are unlikely.