Endogenous growth through investment-specific technological change

This paper examines a model in which growth takes place through investment-specific technological change, which in turn is determined endogenously through research spending. In particular, the role of the degree of substitutability between research spending and new capital construction is explored. It is shown that the effect of a change in the capital tax rate on the growth rate can depend on the degree of substitutability between research spending and new capital construction. Research subsidies tend to have a larger impact on the growth rate than would an investment tax credit of the same magnitude. Increases in the capital tax rate can increase the growth rate of the economy, even in the absence of externalities. In contrast to the existing literature, the welfare cost of capital taxation in this model can be negligible. There may be multiple tax rates on capital that achieve the same growth rate. It is demonstrated that in the presence of certain types of positive externalities, the optimal growth rate can be attained through the use of capital taxes—rather than subsidies.     

Environmental capital flight and pollution tax

This paper analyzes the impacts of a production pollution tax on environmental capital flight and national product in a two-country static general equilibrium model with two-way foreign investment. It is assumed that the capital input in both countries is a composite good of domestic and imported capital. And pollution is assumed to originate in the production process. The productivity of capital in each country is negatively (or positively) related to the worldwide aggregate emissions.The analysis shows that when a domestic pollution tax is levied, domestic capital outflows increase and foreign capital inflows decrease for sufficiently high elasticities of substitution between labor (immobile input) and capital (mobile input) in both countries. Moreover, with negative transnational externalities, increases of a domestic pollution tax reduce domestic production and increase foreign production. The difficulty of substitution between immobile and mobile inputs hinders the optimal allocation of worldwide capital and national product. In this paper, the optimal pollution tax is based on global welfare maximization, not on global income maximization, taking into consideration the impact of income change on individual welfare. Therefore, an optimal pollution tax in the developing country should be lower for a given rate of pollution.     

CONSUMPTION AND LEISURE EXTERNALITIES, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND EQUILIBRIUM EFFICIENCY

This paper analyzes the effects of consumption and leisure externalities on growth and welfare in a two‐sector endogenous growth model with human capital accumulation. Both types of externalities are shown to affect the long‐run equilibrium and optimal growth rates in a rather different way. The relationship between the steady state of the market and the centrally planned economy is also analyzed. The optimal growth path can be decentralized by resorting to consumption or labor income taxation, whereas capital income should be untaxed. Numerical simulations suggest that growth and welfare effects of mild consumption and leisure externalities may be quantitatively important.     

Tax Havens,Growth, and Welfare

This paper develops an endogenous growth model featuring tax havens, and uses it to examine how the existence of tax havens affects the economic growth rate and social welfare in high‐tax countries. We show that the presence of tax havens generates two conflicting channels in determining the growth effect. First, the public investment effect states that tax havens may erode tax revenues and in turn decrease the government's infrastructure expenditure, thereby reducing growth. Second, the tax planning effect of tax havens reduces marginal cost of capital and hence encourages capital accumulation so as to spur economic growth. The overall growth effect is ambiguous and is determined by the extent of these two effects. The welfare analysis shows that tax havens are more likely to be welfare‐enhancing if the government expenditure share in production is low, or the initial income tax rate is high. Moreover, the welfare‐maximizing income tax rate is lower than the growth‐maximizing income tax rate if tax havens are present.     

Public capital and patterns of growth in the presence of threshold externalities

This paper studies the relation between public capital accumulation and long-run economic growth. We emphasize three phenomena that may be accompanied by the presence of public capital: increasing returns, rivalry, and threshold externalities. We formulate a simple growth model that captures these features of public capital in a tractable manner. Assuming that investment for public capital financed by income taxation, we show that the threshold externalities may generate multiple equilibria, so that the pattern of growth and the realization of a specific steady-growth equilibrium are quite sensitive to the rate of income tax as well as to expectations of agents.     

A TALE OF TAX POLICIES IN OPEN ECONOMIES

To evaluate fiscal policy reforms for Euro‐area countries, this article develops and calibrates a small open economy model. Debt reduction reforms require higher tax rates in the short term in exchange for lower rates in the long term as the debt‐servicing burden falls. Using the capital income tax to implement such a policy leads to welfare gains; the consumption tax, a very small welfare gain; and the labor income tax, a welfare loss. Holding fixed the long‐run debt–output ratio, offsetting a lower capital income tax with either a higher labor income or consumption tax generally yields welfare gains.     

Replacing the U.S. income tax with a progressive consumption tax: A sequenced general equilibrium approach

This paper examines the welfare consequences of changing the current U.S. income tax system to a progressive consumption tax. We compute a sequence of single period equilibria in which savings decisions depend on the expected future return to capital. In the presence of existing income taxes, the U.S. economy is assumed to lie on a balanced growth path. With the change to a consumption tax, individuals save more and initially consume less. As the capital stock grows, consumption eventually overtakes that of the original path, and the economy approaches the new balanced growth path with higher consumption and a greater capital stock. Both the transition and the balanced growth paths enter our welfare evaluations. We find the discounted present value of the stream of net gains is approximately $650 billion in 1973 dollars, just over 1 percent of the discounted present value of national income. Larger gains occur if further reform of capital income taxation accompanies the change. We examine the sensitivity of the results, both to the design of the consumption tax and to the values of elasticity and other parameters. The paper also contains estimates of the time required to adjust from one growth path to the other.     

Optimal fiscal policy, uncertainty, and growth

This paper analyzes the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy in a stochastic endogenous growth model. Due to externalities in human capital accumulation, the market allocation is inefficient, thereby justifying government intervention. The uncertainty stemming from technological disturbances affects the growth rate, which can be explained by precautionary motives of risk averse agents. Fiscal policy means consist of a consumption tax, investment subsidies, and bonds. We obtain counter-acting growth effects of investment subsidies, which are differentiated with respect to deterministic and stochastic capital income components. The policy implications from the deterministic model are substantially extended in the stochastic context. A general rule for a welfare maximizing policy is derived, which is represented by a continuum of alternative tax-transfer-schemes. We discuss three benchmark cases, which crucially differ with respect to their implications regarding the size of the government expenditure share.     

Optimal Tax Policy, Market Imperfections, and Environmental Externalities in a Dynamic Optimizing Macro Model

This paper develops a dynamic real business cycle model that highlights pollution externalities (on welfare and production) and market imperfections and uses it to determine the socially optimal tax policy that encompasses labor income, capital income, and emission taxes. We show that the optimal tax on capital and labor income only addresses the production inefficiency (and is time-invariant), while the tax on the environmental externalities affects both the production inefficiency and the environmental spillovers (and is time-varying). More interestingly, the socially optimal emission tax will be characterized by a Keynesian-like stabilizer that is designed to mitigate business cycle fluctuations, i.e., that will stimulate the economy with a lower emission tax during recessions. In a positive analysis, we show that the beneficial effects arising from pollution taxation will become larger the greater is the degree of the firms' monopoly power. In addition, a triple dividend in terms of improving environmental quality and increasing employment and firms' profit can be simultaneously realized if the environmental production externality is more significant and if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption is relatively small.     

International Commodity Taxation under Monopolistic Competition

We analyze non‐cooperative commodity taxation in a two‐country trade model characterized by monopolistic competition and international firm and capital mobility. In this setting, taxes in one country affect foreign welfare through the relocation of mobile firms and through changes in the rents accruing to capital owners. With consumption‐based taxation, these fiscal externalities exactly offset each other and the non‐cooperative tax equilibrium is Pareto efficient. With production‐based taxation, however, there are additional externalities on the foreign tax base and the foreign price level that lead non‐cooperative tax rates to exceed their Pareto efficient levels.     

A cost‐benefit analysis of R&D tax incentives

Abstract.  Although technical knowledge generates spillover benefits, production of technical knowledge creates congestion externalities; thus, private R&D investment could be inefficient. A computable general equilibrium model is used to rank tax incentives by their effects on research effort and measure welfare effects. Five results stand out: R&D tax credits produce relatively large increases in research effort and welfare. Lower corporate income tax rates and ITCs for downstream users of high‐tech production inputs rank second. Revenue losses from lower personal income tax rates can produce welfare losses. Ironically, ITCs for upstream producers of innovative inputs are ineffective. Incremental R&D credits dominate comprehensive credits. JEL Classification: E62, H21, O38     

Fiscal policy under a minimum‐time objective

In an endogenous growth model, we characterize the fiscal policy driven by a minimum‐time objective of economic development. We find that in equilibrium government should levy the highest possible consumption taxes, reduce public expenditures to the lowest possible level, and keep labor income tax rate and capital income tax rate satisfy a substitution relationship at the balanced budget constraint. We also identify the condition under which income tax rate should be set to zero. We further find that the equilibrium fiscal policy is equivalent to the growth‐maximizing fiscal policy, whereas it generally deviates from the welfare‐maximizing fiscal policy. We hence identify a circumstance where setting the policy goal of reaching an economic‐performance target as soon as possible cannot be justified in the sense of maximizing the welfare of households.     

Growth Effects of Taxation Under Altruism and Low Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution

An increase in the tax rate on capital income may raise the rate of economic growth when the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is low and intergenerational transfers are absent. Since the strength of the bequest motive depends on tax rates, this paper provides conditions under which taxing capital income, and then reducing the labour income tax, is more growth enhancing than the classical policy of zero taxes on capital income, and vice versa.     

Optimal Capital Income Taxation with Means‐tested Benefits

This paper studies the interaction between capital income taxation and a means‐tested age pension. Our results document that the existence of a social insurance program financed from general revenue puts an upward pressure on the optimal tax rate. We also show that there is a negative relation between taper (benefit‐reduction) and optimal capital income tax rates. The potential welfare gain from optimizing capital taxation in the presence of a universal retirement transfer system is relatively higher. However, when the transfer is substantially means tested, the gain is lower, because the means test effectively operates as a tax on retirement capital.     

Capital income taxation in a growing world economy

This paper deals with dynamic adjustment in large economies to changes in the rate of capital income taxation or in the rate of investment tax credit in one country. The framework applied in the paper is a continuous-time, overlapping generations model with two countries. It features population growth and debt non-neutrality. We address impact and steady state effects of capital income tax and investment subsidy changes in the home country on consumption per capita, the capital intensity, and the per capita net foreign asset position in both countries. We also briefly consider individual welfare consequences of these policies.     

On Cost Benefit Rules for Green Taxes

This paper concerns the welfare effects of a green tax reform in a dynamic general equilibrium model with preexisting taxes on labor income and capital income. In comparison with previous studies on green taxes in dynamic models, which have focused their main attention on long run effects of such reforms, I derive cost benefit rules for a change in the tax mix by using the properties of the value function in optimal control theory. This enables me to relate the welfare effect of a change in the tax mix to responses in employment, the capital stock, (flow) emissions and the stock of pollution along the whole general equilibrium path. Another contribution of the paper is to examine under what conditions an emission tax, which is set permanently below the marginal damage of pollution, is welfare superior to an emission tax path that fully internalizes the external effect.     

Government financing in an endogenous growth model with financial market restrictions

Summary. In this paper, we develop an endogenous growth model with market regulations on explicitly modeled financial intermediaries to examine the effects of alternative government financing schemes on growth, inflation, and welfare. In the presence of binding regulation, there is always a unique equilibrium. We perform four alternative policy experiments; a change in the seigniorage tax rate, a change in the seigniorage tax base, a change in the income tax and a change in the fiscal-monetary policy mix. We find that in the presence of binding legal reserve requirements, a marginal increase in government spending need not result in a reduction in the rate of economic growth if it is financed with an increase in the seigniorage tax rate. Raising the seigniorage tax base by means of an increase in the reserve requirement retards growth and it has an ambiguous effect on inflation. An increase in income tax financed government spending also suppresses growth and raises inflation although not to the extent that the required seigniorage tax rate alternative would. Switching from seigniorage to income taxation as a source of government finance is growth reducing but deflationary. From a welfare perspective, the least distortionary way of financing an increase in the government spending requirements is by means of a marginal increase in the seigniorage tax rate. Under the specification of logarithmic preferences, the optimal tax structure is indeterminate. Received: March 20, 2000; revised version: June 26, 2001     

Estate taxes, consumption externalities, and altruism

We study how the introduction of consumption externalities affects the optimality of the dynamic equilibrium in an economy displaying dynastic altruism. When the bequest motive is inoperative consumption externalities affect the intertemporal margin between young and old consumption and thus modify the intertemporal path of aggregate consumption and capital. The optimal tax policy that solves this intertemporal suboptimality consists of a tax on capital income and a pay-as-you-go social security system. The latter solves the excess of capital accumulation due to the inoperativeness of the bequest motive and the former solves the suboptimal allocation of consumption due to consumption externalities. When the bequest motive is operative consumption externalities only cause an intratemporal misallocation of consumption but do not affect the optimality of the capital stock level. This suboptimal allocation of consumption implies in turn that the path of bequest deviates also from optimality. The optimal tax policy in this case consists of an estate tax and a capital income tax.     

A Model of Tradeable Capital Tax Permits

Standard models of horizontal capital tax competition predict that, in a Nash equilibrium, states set tax rates inefficiently due to externalities—capital inflow to one state corresponds to capital outflow for another state. Researchers often suggest that the federal government impose Pigouvian taxes to correct for these effects and achieve efficiency. We propose an alternative incentive‐based regulation: tradeable capital tax permits. Under this system, the federal government would require a state to hold a permit if it wanted to reduce its capital income tax rate from some predefined benchmark. These permits would be tradeable across states. We show that, if the federal government sets the correct number of total permits, then social efficiency is achieved. We discuss the advantages of this system relative to the canonical suggestion of Pigouvian taxes.     

Foreign Debt,Foreign Direct Investment and Volatility

We investigate how foreign debt and foreign direct investment (FDI) affect the growth and welfare of a stochastically growing small open economy. First, we find that foreign debt influences the growth of domestic wealth by lowering the cost of capital, while FDI affects the country's welfare by providing an additional source of permanent income. Second, a decline in domestic investment may improve domestic welfare as FDI replaces the gap. Even when the welfare deteriorates, its magnitude is mitigated, leaving more room for discretionary fiscal policy. Third, a fiscal policy aimed to stabilize domestic output fluctuations needs to be conducted not to crowd out the welfare benefit of FDI too much. Fourth, an economy with both types of foreign capital experiences wider welfare swings by external volatility shocks than the one with foreign debt alone, while the welfare effects from domestic volatility shocks are mitigated. The welfare effects of fiscal shocks are much smaller with both types of foreign capital. Lastly, the first-best labor income tax covers the government absorption by the labor's share of total output, and the capital income tax covers the rest. Investment is penalized or subsidized depending on the social marginal cost-gain differential.