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1.
This study examines the interrelation between board composition and variables that capture various agency and financial dimensions of the firm. The agency literature suggests that outside directors on the board provide important monitoring functions in an attempt to resolve, or at least mitigate, agency conflicts between management and shareholders. The agency literature indicates that other mechanisms such as managerial equity ownership, dividend payments, and debt leverage also serve as important devices in reducing agency conflicts in firms. This study argues and documents that an inverse relationship exists between the proportion of external members on the board and managerial stock ownership, dividend payout, and debt leverage. This is consistent with the hypothesis that individual firms choose an optimal board composition depending upon alternative mechanisms employed by the firm to control agency conflicts. Board composition is also found to be systematically related to a number of other variables including institutional holdings, growth, volatility, and CEO tenure. 相似文献
2.
Drawing on institutional theory, this study examines the factors that pressured Korean firms to appoint outside directors to their boards. While this practice could be considered to be a management innovation in Korea, in the Anglo‐American corporate governance system it has long been used as one of several mechanisms to mitigate agency costs between management and shareholders. As such, this response by Korean firms, following the 1997–98 currency crisis in Asia, could be seen as an example of corporate governance convergence on the Anglo‐American model, where higher levels of outside director representation on the board are the norm. We examine the antecedents of having a higher proportion of outside directors on Korean boards. Our findings indicate that larger firms that are under stricter control by the government have higher representation of outside directors on the board. We also find a positive and significant relationship between the proportion of outside directors and business group affiliation, poor prior firm performance, higher levels of debt and foreign ownership. 相似文献
3.
This paper provides an analytically tractable continuous-time model in which a time-inconsistent manager can divert part of the firm’s cash flows as private benefits at the expense of outside shareholders. We endogenously determine the investment scale, investment threshold, optimal coupon and default threshold under managerial discretion. We demonstrate that time-inconsistent managers each have a trade-off between the timing and scale of investment.Among a number of important implications, by exploring agency costs of equity as deviations from the investment and financing policies that maximize equity value, our analysis reveals that a certain degree of time inconsistency in managerial preferences decreases the agency costs of equity. We also find that a naive manager more severely distorts the investment and financing policies than does a sophisticated manager, which leads to higher agency costs of equity. Finally, we document that the impacts of corporate governance variables, such as the managers’ property parameter and/or the level of managers’ ownership, depend on the managers’ beliefs regarding their future time-inconsistent behavior; this prediction provides novel empirical tests. 相似文献
4.
We investigate the valuation effects of German firms targeted by hedge funds and by private equity investors. We argue that both types of investors differ from other blockholders by their strong motivation and ability to actively engage and reduce agency costs. Consequently, we find positive abnormal returns following a change in ownership structure. However, these effects differ markedly between both investors, as proxy variables for agency costs only explain the market reaction for our private equity subsample. We conclude that private equity funds seem to be more successful at creating shareholder value, which could be due to their longer-term perspective and a higher adaptability to the surrounding corporate governance system. 相似文献
5.
6.
Ilya Okhmatovskiy 《Journal of Management Studies》2010,47(6):1020-1047
In many countries governments not only regulate business activities, but also become involved in the corporate governance of individual firms through ownership and board ties. While existing studies usually focus either on benefits of political connections or on costs of government influence, a political embeddedness perspective helps us consider both advantages and constraints associated with ties to the government. In particular, firms with direct ties to the government will experience significant costs associated with government officials' involvement in the corporate governance process. In contrast, firms with ties to state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) are connected to the government indirectly and thus, while getting access to state‐owned resources, avoid costs associated with the government's interventions. This study compares the performance consequences of board and ownership ties to the government with the consequences of board and ownership ties to SOEs. I find that ties to SOEs are associated with higher profitability, while no significant differences are discovered for firms with direct ties to the government. 相似文献
7.
Mehul Raithatha 《Managerial and Decision Economics》2018,39(6):712-732
In this study, we examine whether governance practices brings down agency cost. We find that board size, board attendance, and CEO duality are important governance characteristics that influence the agency cost. We also bring out systematic differences in governance practices of the business group affiliated firms and stand‐alone firms. Larger board and proportion of independent director helps in reducing the agency cost for group affiliated firms supporting monitoring hypothesis. On the other hand, the governance structure of stand‐alone firms supports commitment hypothesis where we observe that board busyness and CEO duality help in reducing the agency cost. 相似文献
8.
William Bradford Chao Chen Yang Zhao 《Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting》2019,30(2):113-144
This paper examines the association between firms’ corporate governance and credit ratings (both bond ratings and issuer ratings) in China. In addition to considering the financial attributes of bond issuers, we ask to what extent do credit rating agencies consider the corporate governance attributes of issuers? In concept, bondholders are concerned with the financial effects of how corporate governance resolves the agency conflicts between bondholders and managers, majority and minority shareholders, and shareholders and bondholders. We find that corporate governance affects bond issuer credit ratings in China. After controlling for firms’ financial attributes, we find that issuer ratings are positively related to dual‐listing, whether the firm is a state‐owned enterprise, the ownership of the second to the tenth largest shareholder; and negatively related to the relative scale of audit fees. We attribute the positive association between dual‐listing and credit rating to higher quality and transparency of information reported by the dual‐listed firm. The value to bondholders of the implicit government guarantee of debt payments more than offsets the negative association between firm value and being an SOE. Bond rating agencies expect that the change in agency costs with a reduction in the ownership of the largest shareholder benefits bondholders. To credit rating agencies, the scale of audit fees (relative to total assets of the accounting firm) signals interest binding between the client firm and the accounting firm that threatens the independence of auditing and the quality of financial reporting. We also find that bond‐specific attributes: collateral and issue size, are positively related to bond credit ratings. 相似文献
9.
Carl Pacini William Hillison David Marlett Deanna Burgess 《Journal of Economics and Finance》2005,29(1):46-72
Recent deregulation of financial services by the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, also known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act (GLB), places more reliance on corporate governance to oversee the actions of financial institutions. We examine whether
corporate governance variables explain bank shareholder reaction to GLB passage. We find that banks with better board oversight
react favorably to the GLB and banks with less effective board monitoring react less favorably to the GLB. Banks with lower
leverage, lower insider ownership, less board activity, a smaller board, fewer inside directors, and less visibility respond
more positively to the GLB. Results indicate investor approval of the legislative effort to increase the role of corporate
governance in the banking industry and affirm the importance of effective corporate oversight among financial institutions.
The authors thank the reviewers for their insights and suggestions. 相似文献
10.
Using a unique sample of 444 entrepreneurial IPOs in the UK and France this paper examines links between founders' characteristics,
venture capital (VC) syndication and the development of effective boards in entrepreneurial firms. It argues that VC-backed
IPOs suffer from two sets of agency problems which are related to principal-agent and principal-principal relationships between
the founders and members of the VC syndicate. The empirical evidence shows that there is a curvilinear relationship between
the intensity of founders' external ties and VC syndication. Founders' retained share ownership is negatively associated with
VC syndication. We also find that in syndicated IPOs there is a higher involvement of passive private equity firms and “business
angels” investing alongside VC firms, both in terms of their number and equity presence. VC-syndicated IPOs have more independent
boards than IPOs with no VC involvement. Board independence is negatively associated with founders' retained equity. These
results are consistent with the assumption that board independence is used to mitigate agency costs associated with VC involvement
in IPO firms. Our findings also identify significant differences in governance characteristics between the UK and France.
While French IPOs have less independent boards, they involve more VC backing in general and syndicated VC funding in particular,
than UK IPOs. 相似文献
11.
Benedicte Millet‐Reyes Ronald Zhao 《Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting》2010,21(3):279-310
French companies operate in a unique environment characterized by the strong involvement of block shareholders such as families and banks. Furthermore, the French legal system allows firms to choose between a one‐tier or a two‐tier board structure. This study investigates whether this choice can affect the firm's operating and stock performance. Our regression results provide strong evidence that ownership and board structures are used together as corporate governance tools. In particular, the agency cost of debt is strongly affected by their interaction when institutional investors are also bank lenders. Our test results show that while family control has a negative impact on corporate governance, French institutional blockholders play a positive role as monitors of one‐tier structures. In contrast, they are more likely to misuse the two‐tier board system by promoting interlocked directorship, board opacity and their own interests as creditors. Our regression analysis reveals that foreign institutional investors do not have any impact on firm performance, regardless of board structure. Finally, we do not find any inverse relationship between board size and efficiency in France. 相似文献
12.
Chih-Yung Lin Yan-Shing Chen Ju-Fang Yen 《The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance》2014,54(4):500-512
Given the worldwide economic importance of bank loan financing, we empirically investigate the roles of borrowers’ ownership and board structure in bank loan terms through a comprehensive dataset, which includes the complete history of individual bank loan contracts for firms publicly listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE). We find that firms with smaller deviation in shareholder voting and cash flow rights, larger non-retail shareholding, fewer shares pledged by the board of directors, independent directors, and firms without dual boards are more likely to borrow from banks at lower spread. In addition, good governance practices are also associated with larger loan size or longer loan period, suggesting that banks take into account borrowers’ governance practices when designing loan contracts. This fact is consistent with the agency cost and information risk explanations of Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003). Furthermore, this study uncovers that the beneficial effect of good governance practices on bank loan contracting is more pronounced in borrowers with high leverage and poor rating, which implies that the monitoring role of governance is more crucial in risky firms. Our findings are robust to the various characteristics of firms and loans. 相似文献
13.
abstract Boards of directors have a number of roles. The board's monitoring function has been the subject of much work. Less examined is the role that the board has in setting company strategy. This paper uses agency and network perspectives in developing and testing the relationship between board characteristics and involvement in strategic decision making. Using primary and secondary data, our results suggest that the level of board involvement in strategic decision making is related to a number of governance variables. We demonstrate that involvement is generally lower where boards are highly interlocked. We also show that certain types of board interlocks – namely horizontal (same industry) and those involving direct links with the banking sector – are particularly associated with this negative effect. There is weaker evidence that board strategic involvement is lower where the roles of company chief executive and chair are combined. We find no evidence that factors such as board size, or the percentage of outside directors per se are related to board involvement in strategic decision making. In doing so, this paper adds to the growing literature synthesizing the structural features and processes of boards. 相似文献
14.
Boards of Directors and Shark Repellents:Assessing the Value of an Agency Theory Perspective 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Steven A. Frankforter Shawn L. Berman & Thomas M. Jones 《Journal of Management Studies》2000,37(3):321-348
Because shark repellents decrease the vulnerability of firms (and their incumbent managers) to the market for corporate control, the decision to adopt these devices represents an excellent test of agency theory. In this empirical study, we examined the relationships between the adoption of shark repellents and several mechanisms that, according to agency theory, should align the interests of corporate board members and shareholders and/or make directors more effective monitors of management behaviour. Of the variables included, only board stock ownership (especially by employee directors) was linked to a reduced propensity to adopt shark repellents in the predicted manner. Two variables not immediately as- sociated with agency theory — the proportion of inside directors appointed by the incumbent chief executive officer (CEO) and a lower ratio of CEO compensation to the compensation of other top executives — were linked to higher rates of shark repellent adoption. Given that agency theory explains relatively little of the variance in shark repellent adoption, we advocate serious consideration of other theoretical formulations for corporate governance, including two approaches — stewardship theory and agent morality — that take the moral ('other regarding') obligations of directors seriously. 相似文献
15.
Pablo de Andrés Laura Arranz-Aperte Juan Antonio Rodríguez-Sanz 《Economics of Governance》2017,18(2):179-208
A sample of 6169 firm year observations in 14 western European countries between 2002 and 2009 is used to investigate how committee practice within boards of directors is related to company characteristics, and to the existence of alternative corporate governance instruments in place. We find that committees in Europe are prevalent in larger companies, and in companies with large and independent boards. However, we also find that leverage, director interlocking, concentrated ownership, and the presence of managers on the board mitigate the use of committees, suggesting that committee use is limited by the existence of alternative governance mechanisms. Consequently, recent regulatory changes in Europe that promote the creation of committees within boards may be unsuited for certain types of company, especially smaller companies and those with concentrated ownership. 相似文献
16.
Ali Meftah Gerged 《Business Strategy and the Environment》2021,30(1):609-629
This study seeks to examine whether internal corporate governance (CG) mechanisms affect corporate environmental disclosure (CED) in emerging economies. Using a sample of 500 firm-year observations, this study distinctively applies a linear panel quantile regression (PQR) model to examine the CG–CED nexus in Jordan. This technique is supplemented with conducting a two-step dynamic generalised method of moment (GMM) model to overcome any potential occurrence of endogeneity problems. This study reports an increasing trend in CED practice among the sampled companies over the period of analysis, yet it is still at an early stage as compared with their developed counterparts. Furthermore, this study suggests that board size, board independence, CEO duality and foreign ownership have positive associations with CED. In contrast, managerial ownership, institutional ownership and ownership concentration are negatively associated with the disclosed amount of environmental information in the Jordanian context. Theoretically, board structures appeared to be more efficient than ownership structures in reducing agency conflicts by addressing the asymmetric gap of information and promoting the disclosure of environmental information. These findings add to the debate about whether ownership structures detrimental to CED in developing economies. Specifically, when it comes to spending money on CED, owners seemed to be more concerned about any reductions in their share of the pie and may, therefore, be less motivated to disclose their companies' environmental information. This paper provides managers, owners and policymakers with a set of context-specific recommendations related to the crucial need for a more concerted effort to integrate governance and environmental regulations in order to ensure sustainability in emerging markets. 相似文献
17.
Gloria Cuevas Rodríguez Concepción Alvarez-Dardet Espejo Ramón Valle Cabrera 《Journal of Management Studies》2007,44(4):536-560
abstract This paper explains, through a field study and from an agency perspective, how monitoring and incentive alignment mechanisms change to support the interests of a privatized firm's new ownership. In this case, privatization led to important changes in the board of directors and to more formal performance evaluation and compensation systems for top managers, as profitability and financial control gained relevancy with the firm ownership change. Our results show that differences in incentives management before and after privatization are due to different agency relations in the two periods. We also argue that in a privatization framework the relation between monitoring and incentive alignment mechanisms is complex, not simply substitutive as agency theory would predict, and this finding allows us to refine and extend agency theory for this specific context. 相似文献
18.
Shawn D. Howton Shelly W. Howton Gerard T. Olson 《Journal of Economics and Finance》2001,25(1):100-114
This study examines the role of the board of directors for IPO pricing irregularities. Theory suggests that initial underpricing
may be the result of asymmetric information and the long-run underperformance may be the result of managerial mismanagement
of new funds due to agency conflicts. A strong board of directors can potentially reduce both asymmetric information and agency
problems. We find that the structure of the board is related to IPO pricing anomalies. Initial returns are directly related
to share ownership by insiders and the percentage of independent outsiders, and long-run returns are directly related to share
ownership by insiders. 相似文献
19.
Jiatao Li 《Managerial and Decision Economics》1994,15(4):359-368
Patterns of corporate governance and control differ significantly across countries because of national differences in structures of ownership and composition of boards of directors. Based on agency theory, we examine the relationship between ownership structure and the composition of the board of directors of 390 large manufacturing firms based in Japan, Western Europe and the United States. In particular, we examine how ownership concentration, bank control and state ownership affect the percentage of outside directors on the corporate boards. The results show that, consistent with predictions of agency theory, ownership structure has significant effects on board composition. 相似文献
20.
Sidney Leung Bertrand Horwitz 《Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting》2004,15(3):235-260
Weakness of corporate governance and lack of transparency are often considered causes of or contributors to the Asian Financial Crisis. Publicly listed companies in Hong Kong, like other Asian firms, have concentrated director ownership. The study uses voluntary segment disclosure above the benchmark minimum as a proxy for transparency and examines its relationship to the ownership structure and composition of corporate boards in Hong Kong. We find that: (1) high (concentrated) board ownership explains the extent of low voluntary segment disclosure and this negative relationship is stronger when firm performance is very poor; (2) the contribution of non‐executive directors to enhance voluntary segment disclosure is effective for firms with low director ownership but not for concentrated‐ownership firms. These results have implications for policy makers and regulators in the Asia‐Pacific region striving to improve governance and transparency. 相似文献