Do Retail Investors Follow Insider Trades?

On the basis of transaction records of retail investors provided by a large financial institution, this article analyzes whether, in the aggregate, retail investors do copy insider trades. The results suggest that insider trades are indeed an important piece of information for the transactions of retail investors, whose buy–sell imbalances (BSIs) increase in stocks which insiders buy, and whose BSIs decrease following insider sales. These results are robust when considering stock characteristics and general attention effects. With regard to trading insider stocks, retail investors’ preferences for growth and attention are less pronounced when compared with trades of noninsider stocks.     

Regulating Insider Trading In Betting Markets

Although trading in securities in conventional financial markets on the basis of inside information is restricted by law, the rules against such trading in betting markets are rather more ambiguous. It is argued in this paper that, since insider trading in betting markets imposes a cost on the great majority of bettors, tighter strictures against such trading would benefit all but the insiders. This case is supported by the use of empirical evidence which shows that betting markets which are characterized by tighter controls against insider activity are also characterized by a significantly lower incidence of such activity.     

Informed manipulation

In asymmetric information models of financial markets, prices imperfectly reveal the private information held by traders. Informed insiders thus have an incentive not only to trade less aggressively but also to manipulate the market by trading in the wrong direction and undertaking short-term losses, thereby increasing the noise in the trading process. In this paper we show that when the market faces uncertainty about the existence of the insider in the market and when there is a large number of trading periods before all private information is revealed, long-lived informed traders will manipulate in every equilibrium.     

融券制度与内部人寻租——来自准自然实验的经验证据

内部人寻租一直以来是理论与实务界关心的重点,如何有效抑制内部人寻租行为是资本市场的重大课题。本文以内部人交易度量内部人寻租,分析了融券制度对内部人寻租的影响。研究发现:(1)融券制度对内部人寻租有显著抑制作用,并且融券规模越大,内部人寻租越少。(2)相比于国有企业,非国有企业当中融券制度对内部人寻租的抑制作用更加明显。本文还将内部人交易分方向进行回归,结果显示融券制度对内部人寻租的抑制作用主要体现在卖出方向上。本文进一步分析了融券制度影响内部人寻租的路径,发现“竞争效应”和“信息效应”是融券制度影响内部人寻租的两条重要路径。本文考虑了竞争性解释——分析师关注的作用,发现分析师关注并不能影响本文结论的正确性;本文还利用反面事实推断、倾向得分匹配、反向因果检验等方法,确保实证结论的稳健性。本文的研究结果,丰富了内部人寻租的特征及影响因素研究,有利于市场监管部门加强对内部人寻租行为的控制;扩充了有关融券制度的文献,为卖空制度的推行及完善提供理论依据。     

Minimally acceptable altruism and the ultimatum game

I suppose that people react with anger when others show themselves not to be minimally altruistic. With heterogeneous agents, this can account for the experimental results of ultimatum and dictator games. Moreover, it can account for the surprisingly large fraction of individuals who offer an even split with parameter values that are more plausible than those that are required to explain outcomes in these experiments with the models of Levine [Levine, D.K., 1998. Modeling altruism and spitefulness in experiments. Review of Economic Dynamics 1, 593–622], Fehr and Schmidt [Fehr, E., Schmidt, K.M., 1999. A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 817–868], Dickinson [Dickinson, D.L., 2000. Ultimatum decision making: a test of reciprocal kindness. Theory and Decision 48, 151–177] and Bolton and Ockenfels [Bolton, G.E., Ockenfels, A., 2000. ERC: a theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition. American Economic Review 90, 166–193].     

Equity Purchases by Insiders and the Filing of Antidumping Petitions

The paper presents the first analysis of insider trading in the context of public policy implementation. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proscribes trading by corporate insiders upon material information that is not yet in the public domain. Although the SEC interprets what constitutes material information, it has historically focused on earnings, mergers, and acquisitions. Using a panel of US firms from 1985–87, the authors disclose a significant relationship between the filing of an antidumping petition and insider buying in the two months preceding the filing month. This suggests that the SEC should expand its focus to include public policy.     

Germany's New Insider Law: The Empirical Evidence after the First Year

Abstract. This paper investigates insider trading activities in German stocks during the first year following implementation of the new Insider Law on 1 July 2002. It can be observed that insiders act as contrarian investors. They buy stocks after prices have fallen and sell stocks after prices have risen. In general, insider trades are very profitable. A typical stock purchased by an insider yields an abnormal return of almost 3 per cent during the 25 days following the transaction. In contrast, a typical stock that has been sold by insiders achieves an abnormal return of nearly −3 per cent over the same time period. Outsiders who copy the transactions of insiders can achieve nearly the same abnormal returns. Abnormal returns remain substantial even after transaction costs. The results suggest that prices of stocks in which insiders trade do not seem to be semi-strong efficient.     

Contractual restrictions on insider trading: a welfare analysis

Summary. This paper analyzes the welfare effects of permitting firms to negotiate contractually the right to allow corporate insiders to trade shares in the firm on private information. A computational framework is employed to (i) analyze formally the effects of insider trading on managerial investment choice, the informational efficiency of stock prices, and the welfare of all investor types; and (ii) examine the effectiveness of various compensation schemes (such as stock and insider trading rights) to mitigate conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. I show that shareholders will typically choose not to grant insider trading rights to managers. This decision is socially optimal. Received: September 23, 2000; revised version: December 12, 2000     

An empirical comparison of implied tree models for KOSPI 200 index options

This paper compares implied tree models for KOSPI 200 index options with regards to the pricing and hedging performance. With Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein's [Cox, J., Ross, S., & Rubinsteinm, M., 1979. Option pricing: A simplified approach. Journal of Financial Economics, 7, 229–263] standard binomial tree (SBT) model as a benchmark, we analyzed three models: Rubinstein's [Rubinstein, M., 1994. Implied binomial trees. Journal of Finance, 49, 771–818] implied binomial tree (IBT), Jackwerth's [Jackwerth, J. C., 1997. Generalized binomial trees. Journal of Derivatives, 5, 7–17] generalized binomial tree (GBT), and Derman and Kani's [Derman, E., & Kani, I., 1994. Riding on a smile. Risk, 7, 32–39] implied volatility tree (IVT) models. The SBT model, the simplest, shows the best performance. Moreover, the delta-hedged strategy in all of the binomial models generates, on average, negative gains. This finding, consistent with the findings by Bakshi and Kapadia [Bakshi, G., & Kapadia, N., 2003. Delta-hedged gains and the negative market volatility risk premium. Review of Financial Studies, 16, 527–566], indicates the existence of a negative market volatility risk premium.     

Insider trading returns and dividend signals

The literature shows that insider trading activities and dividends contain information content and serve as signals to firm value. If insider return is a proxy for information asymmetry, we should expect a positive relation between dividends and insider returns. Using a sample of unambiguous (good and bad) news concerning earnings and dividend announcements from Hong Kong firms, we show that information asymmetry is stronger for bad news firms with insider sales than good news firms with insider purchases. In addition, we improve the methodology of Khang and King [Khang, K., & King, T. H. D. (2006). Does dividend policy relate to cross-sectional variation in information asymmetry? Evidence from returns to insider trades. Financial Management, 35, 71–94] and provide evidence that dividend is a credible signal for measuring information asymmetry.     

Evaluation periods and asset prices: Myopic loss aversion at the financial marketplace

Examining myopic loss aversion (MLA [Benartzi, S., Thaler, R., 1995. Myopic loss aversion and the equity premium puzzle. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, 73–92]) in real financial markets has several merits: in repeated situations investors may learn from each other, aggregate market prices may eliminate individual violations of expected utility, and individuals may decide differently in real situations than in laboratories. We utilize a special feature at the Tel Aviv stock exchange (TASE): occasional shifts of securities from daily to weekly trading. If investors’ decisions are influenced by trading frequency manipulation, then returns should be predictably affected. MLA results in a negative relation between risk aversion and the length of the evaluation period. Thus, the longer the evaluation period is, the lower the expected return is. This intuition also suggests reduced sensitivity to economic events in longer evaluation periods. We find strong support for MLA in the marketplace when testing expected return, as well as return sensitivity.     

Insider trading and stock prices

We examine the informational content of insider trades and its value to market investors using a US dataset. Overall, our results support the view that insider actions have positive predictive power for future returns. However, these results may come with some caveats. First, it is not the actions of all insiders (directors, officers and large shareholders) that have predictive power for future returns, but typically only those of directors and officers (senior management). Second, while director actions have predictive power for firm of all sizes, officers only have predictive power for small firms. The signal emanating from buys is stronger than the signal emanating from sells. Finally, the trading actions of directors, and to a lesser extent, officers have significant effects on the trading behaviour of other groups of insiders.     

The effects of insider trading on insiders effort in good and bad times

We analyze the effects of insider trading on insiders' effort decisions and on the value of firms. We consider a situation in which the final output of a firm and the productivity of managerial effort will depend on whether the firm is in a good or a bad state. When the state is not verifiable, the managerial contract cannot be made explicitly contingent on it: consequently, a contract that does not allow for insider trading would lead to the insiders' facing the same incentive scheme in good and bad times. Under a contract that allows for insider trading, however, insiders will buy shares on receiving (ahead of the market) good news and will sell shares on receiving bad news; consequently, they will end up facing different incentive scheme in good and bad times. Whether this effect is desirable depends on how the marginal productivity of managerial effort in good times compares with that in bad times. In particular, we show that allowing insider trading may improve managers' effort decisions and consequently may increase corporate value and benefit shareholders.     

Can an overconfident insider coexist with a representativeness heuristic insider?

This paper develops an insider trading model that incorporates the presence of rational, overconfident, and representativeness heuristic insiders. We find that the heuristic insider and overconfident insider trade more aggressively on their information than the rational insider, and that therefore, a higher probability exists for them to earn more profits. Furthermore, both higher heuristic bias of the heuristic insider and greater overconfidence of the overconfident insider lead to less expected profit for the rational insider and less expected loss for the noise trader. Moreover, in an equilibrium, both higher heuristic bias and greater overconfidence of an insider lead to a more efficient and stable market.     

Real and financial effects of insider trading with correlated signals

Summary. In this paper we study the real and financial effects of insider trading in a Static, Kyle-type model. In our model the insider is also the manager of the firm. Hence the insider chooses both the amount of the real output to be produced and the amount of the stock of the firm to trade. The aim of the paper is to study the relationship between financial decisions and real decisions. In particular, we examine how insider trading on the stock market affects the real output and price and how the real decision making affects the financial variables, such as the extent of insider trading, stock prices, and the stock pricing rule of the market maker. In the model, the market maker observes two correlated signals: the total order flow and the market price of the real good. We study the informativeness of the stock price and the effects on insider's profits. We also construct a compensation scheme that aligns the interests of the insider and the firm. Finally, we generalize the pricing rule set up by a competitive market maker and analyze the comparative statics of the model. Received: October 3, 1999: revised version: December 1, 1999     

Efficient Selection and Insider Contracting Groups: a Comment on the Yarbrough & Yarbrough Paper

Beth & Robert Yarbrough's paper reviews and augments an extensive literature analyzing how insider trading groups support the process of exchange. They argue that these groups efficiently adapt to changes in the transacting environment. Yarbrough & Yarbrough's argument is compelling for groups operating in a free and open civil society but not when competition among groups is impaired by barriers to entry and externalities. This article considers whether insider trading groups are able to reach a steady-state equilibrium and presents a number of historical and contemporary examples in which insider trading groups plant the seeds of their own destruction.     

Educational opportunity and income inequality

Affordable higher education is, and has been, a key element of social policy in the United States with broad bipartisan support. Financial aid has substantially increased the number of people who complete university—generally thought to be a good thing. We show, however, that making education more affordable can increase income inequality. The mechanism that drives our results is a combination of credit constraints and the ‘signaling’ role of education first explored by Spence [Spence, A. Michael, 1973. Job Market Signalling, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87(3) Aug., 355–374]. When borrowing for education is difficult, lack of a college education could mean that one is either of low ability or of high ability but with low financial resources. When government programs make borrowing or lower tuition more affordable, high-ability persons become educated and leave the uneducated pool, driving down the wage for unskilled workers and raising the skill premium.     

上市公司内部人减持行为的内在机制综述

本文认为上市公司的内部人减持行为具有其内在机制,上市公司内部人的减持行为有的是出于增加自身流动性的考虑,有的是对资产重新配置,有些则是利用信息优势获取超额收益,无论减持出于何种目的,源于何种动机,都是从理性经济人的角度出发最优化自身现状达到利益最大化。有关上市公司内部人交易的研究文献不胜枚举,研究的范围和角度也纷繁迥异,因此本文致力于对已有文献做一个总结归纳,找到已有研究的内在逻辑。本文从内部人持有股票的流动性限制、内部人减持的行为动机、内部人减持的外部效应以及法律监管效应这四个角度探寻了内部人减持交易存在的内在机制,同时,对中国特殊的资本市场环境下所存在的内部人减持行为的研究作了全面的梳理,希望为今后的理论研究提供一定的参考和借鉴。     

内幕交易违法所得认定问题研究

为验证潜在概率违法所得法(即PPD法)在认定股市内幕交易违法所得方面的可行性以及实际效果,运用该方法对我国沪深两市发生内幕交易的个案进行了违法所得额的模拟计算。结果表明,PPD法的实证效果欠佳,无法发挥其优势,目前应继续采用实际收益法和潜在确定性违法所得法对上市公司的违法所得进行认定,同时建议补充制定"实际减损"标准。     

Reviews

Book reviewed in this article:
The Australian Economy. Simple Economic Studies , by D. B. Copland
The Crisis in Australian Finance , 1929-31, by E. O. G. Shann, and D. B. Copland
The Battle of the Plans , by E. O. G. Shann and D. B. Copland
Britain and World Trade and Other Economic Essays. By A. Loveday
The Civil Service in the Modern State. By Leonard D. White
Our Financial System, An Introductory Text , by Albert S. Keister
Outlines of Economics , by Richard T. Ely
The Australian Banking and Credit System , by A. L. Gordon MacKay
Communism and Christianity , by G. V. Portus
Economics of Modern Industry , by Percy Ford
Economic Disarmament. A Study on International Co-operation. By J. H. Richardson
The Provision of Credit, with Special Reference to Agriculture. By Professor H. Belshaw
An Economic Survey of Australia.
Distribution in the United States and Europe.
An Outline of Australian Economics. By E. Ronald Walker and K. B. Madgwick
The Round Table—A Quarterly Review of the Politics of the British Commonwealth,1 No.
Economic Fragments. By D. H. Robertson, M.A.
Budget Control: An Introduction to the Financial System of New South Wales. By F. A. Bland