Reviewing IFRS Goodwill Accounting Research: Implementation Effects and Cross-Country Differences

We review 42 studies from 2008 to early 2017 about IFRS goodwill accounting choices for recognition, impairment, and disclosure of goodwill, focusing on cross-country evidence of implementation effects. We develop a model of application of goodwill accounting based on IFRS 3, IAS 36, and country- and firm-level influences to analyze the research and to summarize existing evidence about goodwill accounting choices. We report evidence in support of IFRS accounting for goodwill recognition, impairment, and disclosure from many countries. However, evidence regarding value relevance is mixed. Overall, there is a lack of cross-country evidence regarding factors affecting goodwill accounting. Many studies show goodwill recognition, impairment, and disclosure are associated with economic and firm factors, and there is some evidence about the impact of managerial incentives and a lack of timeliness in impairment recognition. There is scope for more cross-country studies showing how institutional factors affect the application of IFRS 3 and IAS 36.     

Goodwill or “No-will”: Hubris in the tone at the top

In this study, we examine the effect of hubris in the “tone at the top” on goodwill accounting, specifically the proportion of the purchase price allocated to goodwill following a business combination, and subsequent decisions to write down goodwill. Using a sample of CEO letters to shareholders from firms listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange, we carry out textual analysis of CEO letters to identify hubristic language markers. Regression analyses show that hubristic tone is positively and significantly associated with the purchase price allocation to goodwill. Furthermore, we predict that hubristic managers are more likely to overestimate future cash inflows related to goodwill and are less likely to perceive the need for a potential write-down. Consistent with this prediction, we find that hubristic tone in the CEO letters is associated with less timely goodwill write-downs. This study contributes to the literature on goodwill accounting, the role of CEO attributes on corporate decision making, and to research on CEO-speak, by providing evidence that a hubristic tone at the top can explain strategic choices by management and accounting outcomes.     

Changes in the value relevance of goodwill accounting following the adoption of IFRS 3

This study examines the value relevance effects of changes in goodwill accounting in a European setting. International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 3 replaced accounting rules that emphasized goodwill amortization over short useful lives which kept goodwill balances low. Goodwill accounting under IFRS 3 largely relies on manager fair value estimates of acquired business units. Using Swedish data, we show that goodwill amortizations were not value-relevant prior to the adoption of IFRS 3. However, impairments reported in addition to amortization were significantly related to stock returns during that period. In contrast, under the impairment-only regime prescribed by IFRS 3, impairments are no longer statistically related to stock returns.     

资产负债表债务法在企业合并所得税会计中的应用

新会计准则中,明确规定企业所得税核算采用资产负债表债务法,并规范了商誉的计量。但是对企业合并时,合并商誉对所得税的影响如何确认和计量未作规范。本文结合企业合并时对商誉的会计处理,初步探讨了其对所得税影响的确认和计量在资产负债表债务法下确认和计量的方法。     

The relative and incremental value relevance of goodwill before and after SFAS No. 142

We explore the value relevance of goodwill against two benchmarks: other accounting information and long-lived tangible assets. Prior research suggests that fair value estimates for goodwill must be inferred from other available information because of the nature of goodwill, including its intangibility. Such inferences are highly discretionary and may limit the usefulness of reported goodwill estimates. Because Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 142 relies exclusively on fair value estimates to subsequently measure goodwill, reported values considering management’s increased discretion may be less reliable and less value relevant when presented in conjunction with other accounting information. However, the subsequent accounting measurement for goodwill is not dissimilar from the subsequent measurement for long-lived tangible assets, which are also subject to impairment. In general, impairment measurement is subjective; management may have greater insight, even in the presence of management incentives and other accounting information, that may help confirm or disconfirm investors’ own goodwill estimates. Using other accounting information and long-lived tangible assets as benchmarks for the value relevance of goodwill, we find that reported goodwill provides greater value relevance relative to other accounting information after SFAS 142 and that the difference between the value relevance of goodwill and other long-lived tangible assets is also significantly greater following SFAS 142.     

Goodwill under IFRS: Relevance and disclosures in an unfavorable environment

The accounting treatment of purchased goodwill under IFRS has been severely criticized due to the extensive use of fair value accounting. The purpose of this study is to enrich the ongoing debate upon this issue by drawing attention to the market valuation implications of goodwill in a country outside the Anglo-Saxon accounting paradigm, where the application of fair value accounting has been seen as more problematic. The results indicate that, in the case of purchased goodwill, fair value accounting generates relevant accounting numbers but only in companies that comply highly with IFRS disclosure requirements.     

Peer effect in the initial recognition of goodwill

This study investigates the peer effect in the initial recognition of goodwill. We find that firms imitate their peers in the initial recognition of goodwill. The higher the tendency for imitation, the higher the proportion of goodwill recognized. Imitation behavior in the initial recognition of goodwill cannot be explained by information acquisition or rivalry motivations. Instead, we find evidence that managers’ opportunistic motivations explain the peer effect in the initial recognition of goodwill and the overestimation of goodwill arising from imitation tendencies. Executive overconfidence weakens the peer effect but exacerbates the overestimation of goodwill caused by imitation tendencies. Finally, the higher the imitation tendency, the greater the probability and amount of goodwill impairment in the future. This further confirms that the peer effect leads to overestimation of goodwill. The findings of this study enrich the literature on goodwill and provide insightful empirical evidence for regulating goodwill accounting. The results show that the conservatism principle should be reinforced in the initial recognition of goodwill.     

Overpaid acquisitions and goodwill impairment losses — Evidence from the US

The purpose of this study is to shed light on the reliability of accounting goodwill numbers by examining whether many goodwill impairment losses arise from overpayment for the target at the time of the acquisition, rather than from a subsequent deterioration of goodwill values. A second related objective is to assess whether the goodwill impairment test introduced by SFAS 142 improved the ability of accounting standards to timely capture situations in which the amount of goodwill is overstated and should thus be written down.     

Is older goodwill value relevant?

Although previous research has generally found that goodwill reported in firms’ financial reports is relevant to equity valuation, no known studies have directly examined whether the value‐relevance of purchased goodwill holds as it ages. We examine this issue in the Australian context to determine whether the market attaches different values to the components of Australian firms’ goodwill when it is disaggregated into different ‘ages’. Our results suggest that recently acquired goodwill has information content whereas ‘older’ goodwill does not. Our findings have implications for goodwill accounting practice and recent changes to goodwill accounting standards.     

Debt contracting and the goodwill debate

Extant literature offers mixed evidence on the quality of goodwill after the promulgation of SFAS 141/2 (Li and Sloan, 2017; Lee, 2011; Chen et al., 2008). We reconcile these conflicting findings by examining the role of managerial incentives in determining the efficacy of SFAS 141/2 in improving the quality of goodwill reporting. Using the context of debt contracting, we find that the value-relevance of goodwill is higher for firms that include goodwill in debt covenants in the post-SFAS 141/2 period. We also find that in the post-period, firms that include goodwill in their debt contracts appear to take timelier impairments. In addition, debt contracts in these firms also have tighter covenant thresholds, further corroborating the increased value-relevance of goodwill under the current impairment regime. We also document a relatively higher frequency of covenant violation for firms that use goodwill in their debt contract in the post-SFAS 141/2 period. Taken together, our results inform ongoing discussions regarding the accounting for goodwill and provide new insight into understanding of debt contracting and the role of accounting standards therein.     

Motives underlying the method of payment by UK acquirers: the influence of goodwill

The treatment of goodwill in the UK has been the subject of a recent contentious Financial Reporting Standard, FRS 10. It is shown that goodwill write-off considerations appear to have an influence on the form of payment used in the acquisition, and that this influence is associated with the relative portion of the acquirer's net worth which is available for write-offs and the ratio of goodwill to target asset value. These findings are robust to controlling for factors shown to have influenced the choice of acquisition financing by Martin (1996), and to additional controls for any over-valuation of equity. The result that the accounting treatment of goodwill is associated with the financing decision in an acquisition is one that may have important policy implications for UK accounting.     

Examining the Patterns of Goodwill Impairments in Europe and the US

We examine the patterns of goodwill impairments in Europe and in the US over the period from 2006 to 2015, for a sample of more than 35,000 firm-year observations. We define the timeliness of goodwill impairments as the frequency of accounting impairments conditional to indications of economic impairments. We measure indications of economic impairment with three metrics: equity market value minus equity book value less than goodwill, market-to-book smaller than one and negative earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA). Our research strategy leads us to draw very different conclusions than those in the recent EFRAG (2016) study. While median levels of goodwill on the books between US and European firms are relatively similar, we find several indications that US firms recognise timelier impairments, at least during 2008 and 2009, that is, the early years of the financial crisis. We further document that US impairers write down a much greater percentage of their beginning balance of goodwill than European impairers. During the financial crisis, the median level of impairment by US firms was 63% of opening goodwill in 2008 and 40% in 2009, whereas median European write-downs were only 6% and 7% of opening goodwill, respectively. Even though European firms are more likely to impair over multiple years, the cumulative impairments never come close to the level of US firms, be it in a single year or cumulative over multiple years. We also find that the frequency of accounting impairment is small compared to the number of firms presenting evidence of economic impairment: only 20–25% of firms recognise impairments depending on the measure of economic impairment. This has often been interpreted by academics as a sign of untimely write-offs. Accounting differences between US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and International Financial Reporting Standards are unlikely to explain our results. One caveat of our analysis is that it does not allow us to draw conclusions on whether the observed differences between US and European firms are driven by differences in conditional conservatism and/or big bath accounting practices.     

Goodwill — An Example of Puzzle-Solving in Accounting

The nature of goodwill continues to be misunderstood by most accountants and confusion surrounding the measurement and reporting of goodwill persists. The rejection of official accounting standards on goodwill is a common occurrence. A dynamic open system perspective is used in this paper to re-examine the nature of goodwill. It is found that a meaningful economic interpretation can be developed for internally generated goodwill but not for 'purchased goodwill'. There is an inability to identify the stream of benefits specifically associated with goodwill arising on acquisition.     

Goodwill Accounting in Selected Countries and the Harmonization of International Accounting Standards

Economic and financial markets interpenetrate and national economies are increasingly interdependent. This results in a growing need for comparability of accounting procedures internationally. Accounting for goodwill illustrates this phenomenon. By specifying the recommended asset treatment for purchased, positive goodwill, and the five-year amortization period, IASC has taken a significant step towards harmonization of goodwill accounting. As noted in the article, however, the implications for consolidated income may be quite drastic. This is especially so with respect to the implications of the revised IAS 22 (following IAS ED 32) for potential leveraged corporate buy-outs.     

Did the goodwill accounting standard impose material economic consequences on Australian acquirers?

This research explores the empirical association between takeover bid premium and acquired (purchased) goodwill, and tests whether the strength of the association changes after the passage of approved accounting standard AASB 1013 in Australia in 1988. AASB 1013 mandated capitalization and amortization of acquired goodwill to the income statement over a maximum period of 20 years. We use regressions to assess how the association between bid premium and acquired goodwill varies in the pre‐AASB and post‐AASB 1013 periods after controlling for confounding factors. Our results show that reducing the variety of accounting policy options available to bidder management after an acquisition results in a systematic reduction in the strength of the association between premium and goodwill.     

Does a goodwill impairment regime better reflect the underlying economic attributes of goodwill?

IFRS adoption transformed the accounting treatment for goodwill in many countries. Instead of amortizing goodwill, firms now test for its impairment and write off impairment losses against income. Accounting standard‐setting bodies claim that an impairment regime better reflects the underlying economic value of goodwill than systematic amortization. We investigate this claim by comparing the association between goodwill accounting charges against income and firms’ economic investment opportunities in amortization and impairment regimes. We find that the association between firms’ goodwill charges against income and the firms’ investment opportunities is stronger during the IFRS regime than the AGAAP regime. This indicates that, as claimed, impairment charges better reflect the underlying economic attributes of goodwill than do amortization charges.     

The impact of different goodwill accounting methods on stock prices: A comparison of amortization and impairment-only methodologies

In March 2020, the IASB issued a discussion paper – ‘Business Combinations – Disclosures, Goodwill and Impairment’ – which discussed, inter alia, whether to introduce a sort of counterreformation of IAS 36 that might lead to the reintroduction of goodwill amortization. Among other things, the IASB, leveraging key findings from academic research, questioned a) the disclosure provided by entities applying IFRS 3 requirements and b) the timing of impairment write-downs and their overal¹l magnitude.The main goal of this study, focusing on a large sample of European listed companies since the adoption of IAS in 2005, is to test the value relevance of goodwill under the current accounting framework and the alternative hypothesis of an amortization regime.Our findings show that the information provided by listed companies to market investors under the current accounting regime (verification at least annually of the recoverability of the value of the goodwill carrying amount through the impairment test) – the level of goodwill before and post impairment, as well as goodwill write downs – is value relevant and contributes to explain the level of the market to tangible book value multiple. On the contrary, simulating the alternative accounting scenario of goodwill amortization, we found that the information conveyed to market investor would not be value relevant, with the amortization itself added back to the multiple. The results support the current accounting framework and indicate that the best way to improve goodwill accounting is by enforcing present rules.This study aims to provide a multidimensional contribution to the current debate within the IASB, leveraging the largest database in Europe.     

Towards an understanding of the phases of goodwill accounting in four Western capitalist countries: From stakeholder model to shareholder model

The objective of this paper is to illustrate that the change in shareholders’ attitude towards firms (from stakeholder model to shareholder model) influences the accounting treatments of goodwill. Our study is based on four countries (Great Britain, the United States, Germany, and France) and covers more than a century, starting in 1880. We explain that all these countries have gone through four identified phases of goodwill accounting, classified as (1) “static” (immediate or rapid expensing), (2) “weakened static” (write-off against equity), (3) “dynamic” (recognition with amortization over a long period) and (4) “actuarial” (recognition without amortization but with impairment if necessary). We contribute several new features to the existing literature on goodwill: our study (1) is international and comparative, (2) spans more than a century, (3) uses the stakeholder/shareholder models to explain the evolution in goodwill treatment in the four countries studied. More precisely, it relates a balance sheet theory, which distinguishes four phases in accounting treatment for goodwill, to the shift from a stakeholder model to a shareholder model, which leads to the preference for short-term rather than long-term profit, (4) contributes to the debate on whether accounting rules simply reflect or arguably help to produce the general trend towards the shareholder model, (5) demonstrates a “one-way” evolution of goodwill treatment in the four countries studied, towards the actuarial phase.     

Does writing down goodwill imperil a CEO’s job?

We find that accounting charges for goodwill impairment, which imply a deterioration in the capabilities of acquired assets to generate expected cash flows, provide useful indicators of CEO underperformance. The results show that the size and presence of a goodwill impairment charge are positively associated with forced, but not voluntary, CEO turnovers. This implies that goodwill impairment provides information before CEO changes occur. We also find that goodwill impairment has incremental power to predict forced turnover when it is unexpected based on book value relative to market value of equity and when it runs counter to overall firm performance. The association between goodwill impairment and forced CEO turnover varies with audit quality, consistent with the importance of the perceived reliability of accounting information for its effect on CEO retention decisions. Given that the FASB recently considered eliminating annual goodwill impairment testing (FASB, 2022) whereas the IASB not only prefers impairment testing but is considering requiring additional related disclosures (IASB, 2020), our evidence on the informativeness of goodwill impairment charges is timely.     

Disclosure of fair value measurement in goodwill impairment test and audit fees

Recent increases in the occurrence and magnitude of goodwill impairment charges highlight the increasing importance of the role of the auditor in goodwill accounting. This study examines the association between disclosures about the fair value measurement of goodwill and audit fees. We find that goodwill-related disclosures are positively related to audit fees, consistent with the idea that auditors increase their audit efforts to mitigate potential reputational and litigation losses (“audit risk effect”). Additionally, our results indicate that the information asymmetry and investor scrutiny moderate the association between goodwill-related disclosures and audit fees. One possible explanation is that auditors take goodwill-related disclosures as a signal of truthful goodwill accounting and this “signaling effect” partially offsets the “audit risk effect” of goodwill-related disclosures when information asymmetry or investor scrutiny is perceived as high.