On the efficiency of fixed price equilibrium

We study the efficiency properties of K-equilibrium, a species of fixed price equilibrium. In particular, we examine the interrelations among K-equilibria and two of its properties: order and voluntariness. We also consider several alternative concepts of optimality.     

Transfer price and equilibrium in multidivisional firms: an examination of divisional autonomy and central control

The problem faced by a firm that oversees two divisions, one of which produces and one of which uses an intermediate good, is considered. Since divisions have information that is not available to the centre, it is useful to allow the divisions some autonomy in their sales and procurement decisions. The analysis allows the centre to specify the transfer price that must be used in trades between divisions as well as placing restraints on their ability to trade with outside firms. In most of the models presented in this paper, the centre cannot observe the market price of the intermediate product, and in some models it cannot observe divisional costs. It is shown how the centre can obtain the full information solution in the simplest case by using a penalty factor that encourages internal trade. However, when divisional costs are not observable, the full information outcome is not obtainable. In this case, the optimal value of the penalty factor implies a tradeoff between the benefits of allowing divisions to act to take advantage of price opportunities in outside markets and savings in transactions costs of trades between divisions.     

Location equilibrium with asymmetric firms: the role of licensing

It is known that if exogenous cost heterogeneities between the firms in a spatial duopoly model are large, then the model does not have a pure-strategy equilibrium in location choices. It is also known that when these heterogeneities are stochastically determined after firms choose their locations, spatial agglomeration can appear. To tackle these issues, the current paper modifies the spatial framework by allowing firms to exchange the cost-efficient production technology via royalties. It is shown that technology transfer guarantees the existence of a location equilibrium in pure strategies and that maximum differentiation appears in the market.     

Measuring market power when firms price discriminate

We propose conduct parameter-based market power measures within a model of price discrimination, extending work by Hazledine (Econ Lett 93:413–420, 2006) and Kutlu (Econ Lett 117:540–543, 2012) to certain forms of second-degree price discrimination. We use our model to estimate the market power of US airlines in a price discrimination environment. We find that a slightly modified version of our original theoretical measure is positively related to market concentration. Moreover, on average, market power for high-end segment is greater than that of low-end segment.     

Supply and marginal firms in general equilibrium

For economies with a large number of small firms, price induced changes in supply are decomposed into substitution and entry effects. Marginal firms (those earning zero profit) play a significant role in the determination of the slope of aggregate supply.     

Antidumping and heterogeneous quality adjustment of multi-product firms: Evidence from Chinese exporters

This paper investigates the effect of antidumping on multi-product firms’ adjustment in export quality using highly disaggregated Chinese exports data at the firm-product-country level for the period 2000–2014. In response to antidumping, firms tend to upgrade the quality of their exports for targeted products in affected markets by product adjustment, with this effect being more pronounced for firms with ex ante higher product quality. Antidumping induces resource reallocation across firms for a product such that higher-quality firms upgrade the quality while lower-quality firms are unaffected, and reallocation across products within a firm with the quality of products of higher competency increasing more substantially under antidumping policy. Our paper contributes to our understanding on how a multi-product firm adjusts by reallocating resources across products in the face of trade policy shocks.     

A Keynesian general equilibrium model with competitive firms and rational expectations

A Keynesian general equilibrium model is developed from neoclassical principles. The model is based on competitive firm behavior, and optimizing agents that form expectations rationally. Firms determine their product price to maximize expected profits. Non-neutrality results follow from micro foundations that view firms as committing to a price and output level before actual demand is observed. It follows that optimal output levels are in part determined by demand conditions. In the general equilibrium framework, increases in government spending lead to welfare-improving increases in aggregate output.I thank Tom Cosimano, Strat Douglas, Douglas Gale, Norm Miller, Nick Rowe, Geoffrey Woglom, and two anonymous referees for valuable comments. The responsibility for potential errors remains entirely my own.     

Optimal inventories and equilibrium price behavior

This paper departs from the established tradition of equilibrium inventory theory by examining the relationship between inventories and market prices when production is instantaneous but distribution is costly. Inventory holdings are not buffer stocks and do not facilitate production smoothing; rather, production variability exceeds the variability of final sales. Voluntary holdings of marketable finished goods are not restricted to occasional “speculation” during periods of unexpectedly low demand, but may persist even when capital losses are anticipated. In these respects, the paper reconciles important features of the inventory decision problem with the results of modern investment theory.     

General equilibrium with price intervention policies: a computational approach

Three alternative formulations of general equilibrium under price intervention policies are presented in a computational framework. In the first, minimum or ceiling prices are supported by a government marketing agency. Revenues are recycled to consumers in the minimum price case, and losses covered by lump sum taxes in the ceiling case. Similarities to general equilibrium with taxes are stressed. In the second, sector specific minimum prices are considered similar to Harris-Todaro equilibria. In the third, government price supports operate through market interventions. Existence is discussed, numerical examples presented, and possible policy applications outlined.     

Bertrand vs. Cournot equilibrium with risk averse firms and cost uncertainty

Summary. In an oligopoly game with cost uncertainty and risk averse firms, we show that Bertrand and Cournot equilibrium have different convergence properties when the market is replicated. The Cournot equilibrium price converges to the competitive price. Under very typical and somewhat general conditions, the highest Bertrand equilibrium price converges to one higher than the competitive equilibrium. We also give examples to show how to compute the limit of the highest Bertrand equilibrium prices and illustrate the ideas of the proof. We explore conditions under which the supply curve is upward sloping, a useful condition for our results. Received: April 20, 2000; revised version: May 10, 2001     

Asymmetric capacity constraints and equilibrium price dispersion

Price dispersion arises despite perfect information about prices. In equilibrium the higher capacity firm adopts a high-price, high-availability strategy, the lower capacity firm adopts a low-price, low-availability strategy, and consumers are more likely to shop at the high-price firm.     

Financial reporting quality and price competition among nonprofit firms

The article examines some statistical evidence that supports the view that US labour and capital shares of income return to some long-run historical values. We estimate the long-run share values and the length of time it takes to converge to them. We account for the interdependence of the shares by using a vector error–correction model, and this specification is tested against a VAR alternative using Johansen's method to characterize the properties of the cointegrating vector. We find support for the idea that labour and capital shares have historically been mean reverting, in spite of the fairly restrictive assumptions implied when invoking the Cobb–Douglas production function as the rationale. The cumulative impulse response functions indicate that for capital and labour shares, the time required to revert back to long run levels is in the order of thirty quarters.     

Endogenous uncertainty in a general equilibrium model with price contingent contracts

Summary This paper views uncertainty and economic fluctuations as being primarily endogenous and internally propagated phenomena. The most important Endogenous Uncertainty examined in this paper is price uncertainty which arises when agents do not have structural knowledge and are complelled to make decisions on the basis of their beliefs. We assume that agents adopt Rational Beliefs as in Kurz [1994a]. The trading of endogenous uncertainty is accomplished by using Price Contingent Contracts (PCC) rather than the Arrow-Debreu state contingent contracts. The paper provides a full construction of the price state space which requires the expansion of the exogenous state space to include the state of beliefs. This construction is central to the analysis of equilibrium with endogenous uncertainty and the paper provides an existence theorem for a Rational Belief Equilibrium with PCC. It shows how the PCC completes the markets for trading endogenous uncertainty and lead to an allocation which is Pareto optimal. This paper also demonstrates that endogenous uncertainty is generically present in this new equilibrium.This research was supported in part by the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei of Milan, Italy, and by the National Science Council of Taiwan. The authors thank Carsten K. Nielsen for valuable suggestions.     

Endogenous fixprices and sticky price adjustment of risk-averse firms

A risk-averse price-setting firm which knows the quantity demanded at the status quo price but has imperfect information otherwise may choose not to change it although an otherwise identical risk-neutral firm would do so, provided the variance of the firm's subjective probability distribution over quantities demanded as a function of price displays a kink at the status quo. This is equivalent to risk aversion of order one. When no such endogenous fixprice exists, the size of price adjustment still tends to zero as risk aversion tends to infinity, and to any arbitrarily small menu cost there exists a degree of risk aversion so that the firm will not adjust.     

Existence of an equilibrium in first price auctions

Summary We study the first price auction game with an arbitrary number of bidders when the bidders' valuations are independent from each other. In technical words, we work within the independent private value model. We show that if the supports of the valuation probability distributions have the same minimum and if this minimum is not a mass point of any of these distributions, then a Nash equilibrium of the first price auction exists. We then modify the first price auction game by adding a closed interval of messages. Every bidder has to send a message with the bid he submits. These messages are used in the resolution of the ties. The winner of the auction is chosen randomly among the highest bidders with the highest value of the message among the highest bidders. In the general case, we prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium for this augmented first price auction.I wish to thank Mamoru Kaneko and a referee for their comments on an earlier draft.     

Asset price bubbles in Arrow-Debreu and sequential equilibrium

Summary. Price bubbles in an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium in an infinite-time economy are a manifestation of lack of countable additivity of valuation of assets. In contrast, the known examples of price bubbles in a sequential equilibrium in infinite time cannot be attributed to the lack of countable additivity of valuation. In this paper we develop a theory of valuation of assets in sequential markets (with no uncertainty) and study the nature of price bubbles in light of this theory. We define a payoff pricing operator that maps a sequence of payoffs to the minimum cost of an asset holding strategy that generates it. We show that the payoff pricing functional is linear and countably additive on the set of positive payoffs if and only if there is no Ponzi scheme, provided that there is no restriction on long positions in the assets. In the known examples of equilibrium price bubbles in sequential markets valuation is linear and countably additive. The presence of a price bubble means that the dividends of an asset can be purchased in sequential markets at a cost lower than the asset's price. We present further examples of equilibrium price bubbles in which valuation is nonlinear, or linear but not countably additive.