Central Transfer a Curse or Blessing? Evidence from the Relative Revenue Effort of Indian States

This paper evaluates the revenue effort of Indian states during the 13th and 14th Finance Commission periods and estimates the impact of central transfers recommended by the Finance Commission on the relative revenue effort of states. Using panel data the study finds that Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Assam and Kerala are the top five states with the greatest relative revenue effort. Further, the impact of central transfers on revenue effort was found to be negative, suggesting that greater devolution encourages laxity in the state's tax collection efficiency by providing perverse incentives.     

Revisiting the redistribution effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers: evidence from Taiwan

This paper employs a panel of 23 local governments in Taiwan over 1998–2010 to re-estimate the redistribution effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers by considering a self-financing resources of local government as the transition variable in panel smooth transition regression models. Empirical results show that the income (or tax revenues) redistribution effects of fiscal transfer policies are nonlinear and vary with time and across local governments. The grants from central government can improve income and tax revenues distribution of local governments; however, the centrally allotted tax revenues have inverse effects and the total fiscal transfers have ambiguous effects. The total fiscal transfer is a proper policy instrument for improving income redistribution, and the grants for improving tax revenues redistribution. However, high self-financing resources ratios are harmful for these redistribution effects.     

NONLINEAR INCOME TAXATION AND MATCHING GRANTS IN A FEDERATION WITH DECENTRALIZED IN‐KIND TRANSFERS*

We extend to a fiscal federalism setting the literature on redistributive in‐kind transfers in the presence of nonlinear income taxation. Local governments have a cost advantage, motivating decentralization of the in‐kind transfer. The cost structure varies across regions, and the central government cannot observe which region is which. We show that decentralized in‐kind transfers can, in this setting, be an even more important instrument for relaxing self‐selection constraints, thus, helping redistribution, than in single‐government models. We characterize the optimal marginal tax rates and matching grants. The grants have a very different structure than the one derived in earlier studies.     

Correlated Pollutants, Interregional Redistribution and Labor Attachment in a Federation

We examine the efficiency of federal policies in a federation characterized by decentralized leadership, imperfect labor mobility and transboundary pollution. Selfish regional governments regulate correlated pollutant emissions by choosing pollution tax and abatement levels in anticipation of the center’s redistributive policy. The center’s objective function obeys a proportional equity principle, which implies that its choice of interregional transfer satisfies the equalization of weighted regional welfare levels. Regional and central governments make their choices subject to migration incentives. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium for the sequential game played by regional and central governments yields socially optimal policies. An erratum to this article can be found at     

Electronic filing,tax preparers and participation in the Earned Income Tax Credit

In 2002 more than 18 million low-income individual taxpayers received the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Despite its size, non-participation in this program is a concern and substantial effort is devoted by the IRS, local governments and many non-profits to address it. Using variation across states in the introduction of state electronic filing programs, we show that the introduction of electronic filing had a significant effect on participation in the EITC. Our results are robust to accounting for other welfare, EITC and IRS reforms introduced during the same period. We speculate that the impact of this policy change on the tax preparation industry played an important role in increasing participation.     

Using a discontinuous grant rule to identify the effect of grants on local taxes and spending

When investigating the effects of federal grants on the behavior of lower-level governments, it is hard to defend the handling of grants as an exogenous factor. Federal governments often set grants based on characteristics and performance of decentralized governments. In this paper we make use of a discontinuity in the Swedish grant system in order to estimate the causal effects of general intergovernmental grants on local spending and local tax rates. The formula for the distribution of funds is used as an exclusion restriction in an IV-estimation. We find evidence of crowding-in, where federal grants are shifted to more local spending, but not to reduced local tax rates.     

POVERTY TRAPS WITH LOCAL ALLOCATION TAX GRANTS IN JAPAN

This essay investigates poverty traps related to Local Allocation Tax (LAT) grants in Japan. LAT grants, which are transfers of funds from the central government to local governments, make efforts for enhancing regional economic growth, due to the calculation of the LAT grants. Using a simple dynamic model, we show that LAT grants lower regional income and are a disincentive to localities to increase their estimated tax revenue. Using panel Granger (non‐)causality tests, we find empirical support for asserting that there are poverty traps due to the LAT grants in Japan.     

Economic theory and econometric dynamics in modelling wages and prices in the United Kingdom

We show that a “competing claims” model of imperfect competition can explain the movements of wages and prices in the United Kingdom, using quarterly data covering 1976–93. We argue that careful attention both to economic theory and to the interaction between dynamics and identification is crucial in the building of the model and to dynamic econometric models in general. We use a small numerical example with simulated cointegrated data to illustrate the potential pitfalls. First version received: January 1998/final version received: November 1998     

Size Does Matter: Technical and Scale Efficiency in Indian State Tax Jurisdictions

Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is used to measure tax efficiency in 15Indian states from 1980/81 to 1992/93. Tax efficiency is shown to be conditional on state gross domestic product (SDP), agriculture's share in state SDP,and a poverty index. The considerable remaining efficiency differences areattributable to the small size of some tax jurisdiction rather than to technical inefficiency. Multilateral Malmquist tax indices show that six of the states were consistently efficient, while three were consistently inefficient. Tax efficiency grew at an average annual rate of 3.9% until 1986/87, but growth ceased after that date for all but two states.     

Why are tax revenues of local governments so low?

Using a unique data set on federal grants and tax revenues of more than 5000 Brazilian cities, we find that the federal government imposes an implicit tax of almost 10% on city governments’ tax revenues: for every dollar that a city collects from its residents, the federal government withdraws grants worth 9 cents from the city. Our findings suggest that local government tax revenues are low not because federal grants crowd out tax revenues, but because tax revenues crowd out federal grants.     

Money demand, the Cagan model, testing rational expectations vs adaptive expectations: The case of Turkey

This paper estimates the Cagan type demand for money function for Turkish economy during the period 1986:1–1995:3 and tests whether Cagan's specification fits the Turkish data using an econometric technique assuming that forecasting errors are stationary. This paper also tests the hypothesis that monetary policy was implemented in aiming to maximize the inflation tax revenue. Finally, the Cagan model is estimated with the additional assumption of rational expectations for Turkey for the considered period. First version received: March 1998/final version received: October 1998     

Taxation and Labor Markets

We exploit the common features of models such as union, search and efficiency wage models to develop a framework that can be used to analyze the effects of any revenue-neutral tax reform on employment. In particular, we show that taxes paid by workers are not equivalent to taxes paid by firms when taxes are non linear. Moreover, we show that the positive impact of tax progressivity on employment is attributable only to a limited set of hypotheses. Received May 2, 2001; revised version received November 27, 2001 Published online: December 5, 2002     

On the choice of functional form in stochastic frontier modeling

This paper examines the effect of functional form specification on the estimation of technical efficiency using a panel data set of 125 olive-growing farms in Greece for the period 1987–93. The generalized quadratic Box-Cox transformation is used to test the relative performance of alternative, widely used, functional forms and to examine the effect of prior choice on final efficiency estimates. Other than the functional specifications nested within the Box-Cox transformation, the comparative analysis includes the minflex Laurent translog and generalized Leontief that possess desirable approximation properties. The results indicate that technical efficiency measures are very sensitive to the choice of functional specification. Perhaps most importantly, the choice of functional form affects the identification of the factors affecting individual performance – the sources of technical inefficiency. The analysis also shows that while specification searches do narrow down the set of feasible alternatives, the identification of the most appropriate functional specification might not always be (statistically) feasible. First version received: November 1999/Final version received: July 2001 RID="*" ID="*"  The authors wish to thank Almas Heshmati, Robert Romain, and an anonymous referee for insightful comments and suggestions. Special thanks go to the associate editor who handled the paper, and whose careful reading and suggestions have improved the paper substantially. The second author wishes to acknowledge the financial support from “President SSHRC” from the University of Saskatchewan. The usual caveats with respect to opinions expressed in the paper apply. Senior authorship is shared. This is University of Nebraska-Lincoln Agricultural Research Division Article No. 13270.     

Assessing the impact of taxes on female labor supply using a finite mixture approach

This paper expands the standard analysis of female labor supply to permit preference heterogeneity by using a finite mixture model. Using the extended model, we obtain theory consistent results whereas a traditional model produces a negative substitution effect. We use our model to illustrate the labor supply effects of a tax reform, corresponding to 1983–1992 changes in the Swedish income-tax schedule. The results shows an expected reduction in tax revenues of about 17%. Finally, we use Monte Carlo simulations and show that our proposed mixture model is robust towards different misspecifications. First version received: March 1998/final version accepted: October 1999     

Contracting out refuse collection

In this paper we seek an explanation for the reservations of local authorities towards contracting out. Although empirical evidence suggests that contracting out results in a significant cost decrease, a majority of Dutch municipalities provides for waste collection services themselves. Based on theoretical insights we model the choice between private, public, in-house, and out-house refuse collection. The models are estimated using a database comprising nearly all Dutch municipalities. We find evidence that the number of inhabitants, the transfer by central government, and interest group arguments are important explanations. Interestingly, ideology seems to play a minor role.  Compared to earlier studies we estimate more general models. Although the same qualitative results are found for parametric and semiparametric models, we find strong statistical evidence that a parametric specification is far too inflexible. Differences between the parametric and the semiparametric marginal effects are substantial. Thus, more attention is needed for the implications of model specification. First version received: November 2000/Final version received: May 2002 We thank two anonymous referees for their comments on an earlier version.     

The hidden economy in Spain – A monetary estimation, 1964–1998

The aim of this paper is to estimate the level and evolution of hidden income in Spain during the period 1964–1997. To this end, we employ the well-known monetary approach which supposes that the hidden economy is a response on the part of the economic agents to the tax burden, one which manifests itself in an excess of demand for currency. The estimation has been made on the basis of the ADL technique, an ECM and Johansen's cointegration approach. The period chosen was characterised by multiple institutional changes, an increase in the tax burden and wide-ranging financial liberalisation. This has obliged us to formulate a specific monetary model to estimate the hidden economy and is one of the original features of that model. First version received: February 1999/Final version received: March 2001     

A Model of Tradeable Capital Tax Permits

Standard models of horizontal capital tax competition predict that, in a Nash equilibrium, states set tax rates inefficiently due to externalities—capital inflow to one state corresponds to capital outflow for another state. Researchers often suggest that the federal government impose Pigouvian taxes to correct for these effects and achieve efficiency. We propose an alternative incentive‐based regulation: tradeable capital tax permits. Under this system, the federal government would require a state to hold a permit if it wanted to reduce its capital income tax rate from some predefined benchmark. These permits would be tradeable across states. We show that, if the federal government sets the correct number of total permits, then social efficiency is achieved. We discuss the advantages of this system relative to the canonical suggestion of Pigouvian taxes.     

The Organization of Public Service Provision

This paper addresses the question of how the responsibility for the delivery of social services, including health, education, and welfare programs, should be divided between state and central governments. We combine a random voting model and the incomplete contracts paradigm to formalize the trade‐off between central and state responsibility for service delivery, and find that authority should rest with the party for whom the marginal impact of the service on re‐election chances is greater. This in turn means that, other things equal, states with lower than average health, education, or welfare status should be given responsibility for service delivery, while authority in states with above average indicators should reside with the central government. Also, we show that there is no presumption that states that are given authority for service delivery should necessarily be granted expanded tax authority.     

Do fiscal transfers alleviate business tax competition? Evidence from Germany

According to theory, capacity equalization grants cause local governments to internalize the effects of their tax policies on revenues of neighboring jurisdictions and so raise equilibrium tax rates. This paper empirically analyzes the incentive effects of equalizing transfers on business tax policy by exploiting a natural experiment in the state of Lower Saxony which changed its equalization formula as of 1999. We resort to within-state and across-state difference-in-difference estimates to identify the reform effect on municipalities' business tax rates. Confirming the theoretical prediction, the reform had a significant impact on the municipalities' tax policy in the 4 years after the reform with the effect stabilizing in the fourth to fifth years. The finding is robust to various alternative specifications.     

Vertical fiscal imbalance and local fiscal indiscipline: Empirical evidence from China

Based on Chinese city-level panel dataset, this paper examines the effects of vertical fiscal imbalances (VFI) on local fiscal indiscipline in a partial fiscal decentralization setting. We find that higher VFI induces a form of fiscal indiscipline: a reduction of tax collection effort by local governments. In addition, by exploiting the unique Chinese fiscal institution of “extra-budgetary” revenues, we show that in this case higher VFI does not alter local governments’ tax collection effort. Even though local governments also possess full taxing power for “extra-budgetary” revenues, these revenues do not contribute to the determination of central fiscal transfers to local governments, thus creating very different incentives for local governments response to VFI. Our results shed light on the working mechanism of the VFI and provide significant implications for improving the design of fiscal decentralization policy in China and elsewhere.