检察机关职务犯罪侦查阶段羁押必要性审查制度研究

羁押必要性审查制度是为了进一步限制审前逮捕羁押这一刑事强制措施的使用,强化对犯罪嫌疑人、被告人合法权益的保障。但目前捕后羁押必要性审查制度具体的操作程序并不完备,尤其是针对职务犯罪侦查自身特殊性的羁押必要性审查,相关配套的程序和机制有待进一步明确。为确保羁押必要性审查制度价值的实现,亟待从理论上对符合职务犯罪案件特点的捕后侦查阶段羁押必要性审查制度展开针对性的研究。     

羁押必要性审查制度研究

超期羁押、高羁押率是刑事羁押的顽疾,对于羁押必要性的检查监督一直存在很大空白,新《刑事诉讼法》第93条增设了羁押必要性审查制度,是强化检查监督的重要举措,但该规定相对原则,可操作性不强。对羁押必要性审查制度科学构建,以充分体现法律尊重人权与诉讼保障的法律价值。     

完善捕后羁押必要性审查制度的对策

作为是一项新的诉讼制度,羁押必要性审查要求检察机关从法律监督的角度,加强对审前羁押的审查力度,对无羁押必要的及时建议相关部门变更刑事强制措施,是对逮捕权加以控制的重要途径。通过对司法实践的检视,这一制度仍需要在反思基本理念的基础上、在制度设计层和实践操作层面进行完善,才能更好地发挥其价值。     

论取保候审制度的适用与完善

取保候审是我国刑事强制措施体系中的一种非羁押性的强制措施,这项制度设计的初衷是为了保障犯罪嫌疑人和被告人的合法权益,保障刑事诉讼活动的顺利进行.然而由于取保候审制度在立法上的缺陷以及在实践中出现的偏差,该项制度存在着取保候审前的适用条件过于"严"而适用率低,同时取保候审后的监管措施又过于"宽"而导致监管不力的问题.这种现象与宽严相济的刑     

比较美国保释制度看我国的取保候审

取保候审制度作为替代羁押的一种强制措施,对保护犯罪嫌疑人、被告人的人身自由具有重大价值。本文通过考察美国的保释制度,分析了我国取保候审制度存在的问题和改革的方向     

我国的取保候审制度探讨

从世界范围内刑事诉讼现代化的经验来看,合理的保释制度已被证实是平衡羁押弊端的有效武器,进而成为公认的国际刑事司法准则.保释制度目前已为许多国家所采纳,我国于1996年修订刑事诉讼法时亦也明确规定了取保候审制度.但在司法实践中,由于立法不尽完善,司法人员执法观念的滞后,取保候审制度作为一项非羁押性的强制措施,它的贯彻执行并不尽如人意,还存在亟待解决的问题.     

我国羁押制度的历史分析

随着新的刑事诉讼法颁行,尊重与保障人权的理念更加根植于我们的内心。而从漫长的历史长河来看,这样一种根本价值的存在也经历了一个漫长的过程。羁押制度作为刑事诉讼法中一个具有历史意义的制度从其发展就可以窥见整个人权事业取得的点点滴滴的进步以及我们所付出的的努力。本文中笔者将对从夏商周到明清时期的囚禁制度进行剖析,以对我国羁押制度的历史和人权的进步有更为深刻的了解。     

企业制度公正与企业伦理建设

企业制度公正是确保企业正常经营活动的重要保障,并对企业伦理建设具有积极的促进作用。但是,企业制度公正本身又有其内在的缺陷,需要通过企业伦理建设塑造遵守制度的主体品质,并弥补制度公正的不足。因此,企业制度公正与企业伦理建设两者不可偏废。     

略论撤销拘役缓刑与有期徒刑的数罪并罚——从陈静盗窃案看我国数罪并罚制度之缺陷

数罪并罚制度作为我国一项重要的刑罚制度,在刑事司法实践中具有广泛的适用性.但由于我国的数罪并罚制度规定得太笼统,特别是对撤销拘役缓刑与有期徒刑的数罪并罚未作明确规定,导致司法实践中很难把握实施.为此,分别从拘役和有期徒刑之间如何并罚及羁押日期如何折抵刑期等方面进行了详细的论述.     

我国刑事诉讼“回避”制度现状及完善探究

回避制度作为我国刑事诉讼的一项重要制度,其存在和完善不仅有利于程序正义的实现,保障人们的合法权益,同时也有利于提高司法机关的权威性和公信力。但在具体的实践中,由于受重实体轻程序思想的影响,回避制度往往形同虚设,不被人们所重视。本文主要通过对我国现行刑事诉讼回避制度的现状进行分析,并借鉴世界其他国家相关规定,为完善我国回避制度提出几点建议。     

在市场经济管理体制下发挥统计监督职能作用

市场经济管理体制下,我国统计工作不仅要强调统计服务功能,也要注重统计的监督职能。文章对如何发挥统计监督职能进行了阐述。     

Behavioral uncertainty and investments in cooperative relationships

We study a cooperative relationship between two economic agents, in which one agent can make investments in the relationship to reduce the probability that the other agent defects. The probability of defection is derived from an incomplete information decision model of the transaction partner. We show that the relationship between investment and probability of defection depends on the type of uncertainty considered and analyze the effects of parameter changes on the optimal level of investment. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Rising Income Inequality in a Time of Plenty: The Influence of Micro-Justice Standards and Group Membership on Macro-Justice Perceptions

Rising income inequality in the 1990s was used to examine the links between micro- and macro-justice. Data from a sample of 119 managers and 334 union members supported our hypothesis that those who more strongly endorsed equality norms at the micro-justice level perceived macro-level income inequality as more unjust. Looking at two key subgroups, our hypothesis that union members were more likely than managers to endorse an equality norm was not supported. Yet managers were significantly more likely than union members to endorse an equity norm at the micro level, as predicted. Finally, our fourth hypothesis that the equality norm mediates the relationship between union membership and perceived injustice was not supported.     

The role of organizational justice in organizational citizenship behavior

This special issue highlights the relationships between the concepts of organizational justice and organizational citizenship behavior. The articles advance our understanding of these concepts and their relevance to organizational behavior by describing the theoretical and empirical relationship between them. The present article sets the stage for the papers that follow by providing background on the concepts of organizational justice and organizational citizenship behavior and explaining various connections between them.     

Non-self-averaging of a two-person game with only positive spillover: a new formulation of Avatamsaka’s dilemma

In this game [Aruka in Avatamsaka game structure and experiment on the web. In: Aruka Y (ed) Evolutionary controversies in economics. Springer, Tokyo, pp 115–132, 2001], selfishness may not be determined even if an agent selfishly adopts the strategy of defection. Individual selfishness can only be realized if the other agent cooperates, therefore gain from defection can never be assured by defection alone. The sanction by defection as a reaction of the rival agent cannot necessarily reduce the selfishness of the rival. In this game, explicit direct reciprocity cannot be guaranteed. Now we introduce different spillovers or payoff matrices, so that each agent may then be faced with a different payoff matrix. A ball in the urn is interpreted as the number of cooperators, and the urn as a payoff matrix. We apply Ewens’ sampling formula to our urn process in this game theoretic environment. In this case, there is a similar result as in the classic case, because there is “self-averaging” for the variances of the number who cooperate. Applying Pitman’s sampling formula to the urn process, the invariance of the random partition vectors under the properties of exchangeability and size-biased permutation does not hold in general. Pitman’s sampling formula depends on the two-parameter Poisson–Dirichlet distribution whose special case is just Ewens’ formula. In the Ewens setting, only one probability α of a new entry matters. On the other hand, there is an additional probability θ of an unknown entry, as will be argued in the Pitman formula. More concretely, we will investigate the effects of different payoff sizes from playing a series of different games for newly emerging agents. As Aoki and Yoshikawa (Non-self-averaging in macroeconomic models: a criticism of modern micro-founded macroeconomics, Economics Discussion Papers 2007-49. . November 26, 2007) and Aoki (J Econ Interact Coord 3:1–3, 2008) dealt with a product innovation and a process innovation, they criticized Lucas’ representative method and the idea that players face micro shocks drawn from the same unchanged probability distribution. In the light of Aoki and Yoshikawa (Non-self-averaging in macroeconomic models: a criticism of modern micro-founded macroeconomics, Economics Discussion Papers 2007-49. . November 26, 2007), we show the same argument in our Avatamsaka game with different payoffs. In this setting, innovations occurring in urns may be regarded as increases of the number of cooperators in urns whose payoffs are different.     

The Price of Envy—An Experimental Investigation of Spiteful Behavior

When receiving less resources than a competitor, envy may be evoked that may result in spiteful behavior. This paper applies evolutionary theory to understand envy and its outcomes. A theoretical framework is developed that is based on the cause–effect relationships of unequal outcomes, envy, defection of cooperation, and welfare loss. To test this framework, an experiment with 136 participants is run. The results confirm that receiving less than another can indeed lead to experiences of envy and defection of future cooperation, producing a welfare loss of one‐sixth. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Child-custody reform, marital investment in children, and the labor supply of married mothers

Research on child custody primarily focuses on the well-being of children following divorce. We extend this literature by examining how the prospect of joint child custody affects within-marriage investment in children through changes in household bargaining power. Variation in the timing of joint-custody reforms across states provides a natural-experiment framework with which to examine within-marriage investment in children. The probability of children's private school attendance declines by 12% in states that adopt joint-custody laws. We also find evidence linking joint-custody reform to higher rates of labor force participation for married mothers, which may indicate less time devoted household production.     

加强农村公路建设、养护管理工作浅议

阐述了当前农村公路建设管养中存在的问题,提出了解决问题的办法。     

Evolution of repeated prisoner's dilemma play under logit dynamics

In an evolutionary set-up, we append an ecology of iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) game strategies, consisting of unconditional cooperators (AllC), unconditional defectors (AllD) and reactive players (TFT) with two repeated strategies that have received less attention in the evolutionary IPD game literature: the error-proof, “generous” tit-for-tat (GTFT) which, with a certain probability, re-establishes cooperation after a (possibly by mistake) defection of the opponent and the penitent, “stimulus–response” (WSLS) strategy that resets cooperation after the opponent punished for defection. An abundance of rock–paper–scissors like patterns is discovered in the 3×3 ecologies comprising Pavlovian and “generous” players. Interestingly, the evolutionary success of Pavlov seems to depend on the absence of unconditional cooperators in the ecologies investigated.     

基于交易金额的在线信誉模型设计和分析

信誉模型是在线信誉体系的一个重要组成部分,本文针对现有信誉模型忽略交易金额的缺陷,结合已有的信任研究成果,构建了基于交易金额的在线信誉模型,并结合真实交易数据比较了现有模型和本模型的优劣之处,以期为在线消费提供用户信誉更全面的评估。