Oligopoly under incomplete information: On the welfare effects of price discrimination

We study competition by firms that simultaneously post (potentially nonlinear) tariffs to consumers who are privately informed about their tastes. Market power stems from informational frictions, in that consumers are heterogeneously informed about firms’ offers. In the absence of regulation, all firms offer quantity discounts. As a result, relative to Bertrand pricing, imperfect competition benefits disproportionately more consumers whose willingness to pay is high, rather than low. Regulation imposing linear pricing hurts the former but benefits the latter consumers. While consumer surplus increases, firms’ profits decrease, enough to drive down utilitarian welfare. By contrast, improvements in market transparency increase utilitarian welfare, and achieve similar gains on consumer surplus as imposing linear pricing, although with limited distributive impact. On normative grounds, our analysis suggests that banning price discrimination is warranted only if its distributive benefits have a weight on the societal objective.     

Referrals in search markets

This paper compares the equilibrium outcomes in search markets with and without referrals. Although it seems clear that consumers would benefit from referrals, it is not at all clear whether firms would unilaterally provide information about competing offers since such information could encourage consumers to purchase the product elsewhere. In a model of a horizontally differentiated product market with sequential consumer search, we show that valuable referrals can arise in the equilibrium: a firm will give referrals to consumers whose ideal product is sufficiently far away from the firm's offering. We allow firms to price-discriminate among consumers, and consumers to misrepresent their tastes. We found that the equilibrium profits tend to be higher in markets with referrals than in markets without. Consumers tend to be better off in the presence of referrals when search costs are not too low, and under a certain parameter range, referrals lead to a Pareto improvement.     

The effects of personal information on competition: Consumer privacy and partial price discrimination

This article studies the effects of consumer information on the intensity of competition. In a two dimensional duopoly model of horizontal product differentiation, firms use consumer information to price discriminate. I contrast a full privacy and a no privacy benchmark with intermediate regimes in which the firms can profile consumers only partially. I show that with partial privacy firms are always better-off with price discrimination: the relationship between information and profits is hump-shaped. In particular, competing firms prefer to target consumers with partial but asymmetric information about preferences. Instead, consumers prefer either no or full privacy in aggregate, but the effects of information on individual surplus are ambiguous: there are always winners and losers. Finally, I study the information acquisition incentives of the firms when there is an external data seller. When this upstream data broker holds partially informative data, an exclusive allocation arises. Instead, when data is fully informative, each competitor acquires consumer data but on a different dimension. These findings are relevant for the strategic decisions of firms active in digital markets and contribute to the policy debate surrounding privacy, exclusive access to data and competition.     

Quality differentiation and firms’ choices between online and physical markets

We study firms’ choices between online and physical markets with respect to product quality and competition, and examine consequences of transparency policies on price competition and market structure. We investigate two contrasting forces. First, since consumers cannot fully inspect an online product’s quality prior to purchase, conventional wisdom and some of the literature suggest that this attracts low-quality products to the online market (a pooling effect). On the other hand, the literature on vertical product differentiation indicates that a firm with a lower-quality product may prefer to reveal its product quality in the physical market because quality differentiation helps alleviate price competition (a differentiation effect). We show that an entrant firm with product quality lower than that of the offline incumbent may choose the physical market, whereas the entrant with a quality higher than the incumbent’s may sell online. More generally the two contrasting forces can give rise to a wide range of product quality—from low-end to high-end—in both markets.     

All-pay competition with captive consumers

We study a game in which two firms compete in quality to serve a market consisting of consumers with different initial consideration sets. If both firms invest below a certain threshold, they only compete for those consumers already aware of their existence. Above this threshold, a firm is visible to all and the highest investment attracts all consumers. On the one hand, the existence of initially captive consumers introduces an anti-competitive element: holding fixed the behavior of its rival, a firm with a larger captive segment enjoys a higher payoff from not investing at all. On the other hand, the fact that a firm’s initially captive consumers can still be attracted by very high quality introduces a pro-competitive element: a high investment becomes more profitable for the underdog when the captive segment of the dominant firm increases. The share of initially captive consumers therefore has a non-monotonic effect on the investment levels of both firms and on consumer surplus. We relate our findings to competition cases in digital markets.     

Implementing COOL: Comparative welfare effects of different labeling schemes

Country-of-origin labeling (COOL) is being implemented in different forms and degrees in the United States and other countries across the world. The first implementation of mandatory country of origin labeling (MCOOL) in the United States was for seafood in 2005. This is an example of partial MCOOL because it exempts the foodservice sector and excludes processed seafood from labeling. Using a conceptual framework, we analyze the welfare impacts of partial MCOOL when compared to no, voluntary, and total mandatory COOL, taking into account imperfect competition in the downstream markets, information asymmetry, and diversion of low-quality product to the unlabeled market. The model is general enough to apply to any incomplete regulation for which the perceived low-quality product is required to be labeled, such as the labeling of genetically modified food in the European Union. Our results show that when consumers have a strong enough preference for domestic relative to imported product, regulators can overestimate the gain in consumer welfare from partial mandatory labeling if they ignore the diversion of lower quality imports to the unlabeled sector. We show that if the preference for domestic product is large enough, total MCOOL benefits the home market the most overall, including domestic consumers and producers, but not the imperfectly competitive downstream agents. However, if total MCOOL is too costly to implement, partial MCOOL is the second-best solution, but only if consumers falsely believe the unlabeled product to be of higher quality than it truly is. Our results suggest more research is needed to determine the extent to which consumers value the information provided by MCOOL and to enable regulators to consider the welfare impact of diversion in evaluating incomplete mandatory labeling regulations.     

Buyer power through the differentiation of suppliers

This paper argues that rival retailers may choose to differentiate their supplying producers, even at the expense of downgrading the quality of the product offered to consumers, to improve their buyer power. We show that, through the differentiation of suppliers, a retailer may obtain a larger slice of a smaller pie, i.e, smaller bilateral joint profits. Thus, the “only” purpose of differentiation is to gain increasing buyer power. This result may hold (i) when retailers compete in the final market or (ii) when retailers are active in separate markets. The differentiation of suppliers, which results from a buyer power motive, may be harmful for consumer surplus and social welfare.     

MARKET SEGMENTATION WITH NONLINEAR PRICING*

We study the benefits and drawbacks of allowing firms to offer different price‐quality menus to captive consumers and to consumers more exposed to competition (market segmentation). We show that the effect of market segmentation depends on the relationship between the range of consumer preferences found in captive and competitive markets. When the range of consumer preferences in captive markets is ‘wide,’ segmentation is quality and (aggregate) welfare reducing, while the opposite holds when the range of consumer preferences in captive markets is ‘narrow.’ Segmentation always harms captive consumers, while it always benefits consumers located in competitive markets.     

Non-linear pricing and conscious consumption

We consider a duopolistic market in which a green firm competes with a brown rival and each firm sells two quality-differentiated products. We study optimal non-linear contracts offered by the two firms when consumers: (i) Are privately informed about their willingness to pay for quality, and (ii) differ in their environmental consciousness. We characterize how consumers with different valuations for quality self-select into firms and show that the ranking of qualities, relative prices and profits all depend on the interplay between consumers’ valuations and firms’ cost heterogeneity. Interestingly, when consumers’ valuations for quality are relatively low, the brown firm does not offer a low-quality variety. This contrasts with the situation of full information, in which both firms commercialize a high- and a low-quality variety. Hence, the lack of information about consumers’ valuations may not only favor the green firm in terms of higher prices and profits, but also reduce the product range offered by the brown rival.     

Estimating consumer surplus in the mobile telecommunications market: The case of Korea

This paper estimates consumer surplus in the Korean mobile telephone services (MTS) market. The Korean mobile telecommunications market has grown rapidly since 1997 when competition was introduced and Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) technology was commercialized. Because consumer surplus is relevant to the controversy over establishing an appropriate price level between consumers and service providers, the need for a robust measurement of benefit from MTS is increasing. The measured net consumer surplus estimated by means of elasticities of demand reached about US$48.8 billion in the period 1996–2004 and the changes amounted to about US$8.8 billion during the same period. In particular, after competition was introduced into the market with an accompanying price decrease and increase in the number of subscribers, consumers have benefited greatly. Therefore, it can be inferred that a facility-based competition policy and the reduction in price of access such as handset subsidies all played a positive role in the early diffusion of MTS in Korea. The estimated consumer surplus in this paper does not include network externality (option externality); if this were considered, the total social welfare of the consumer would be larger.     

Real-Time Pricing and Imperfect Competition in Electricity Markets*

We analyze the effects of the adoption of real-time pricing (RTP) of electricity when generating firms have market power. We find that an increase in consumers on RTP contracts decreases peak prices and increases off-peak prices, increases consumer surplus (both for switching and non-switching consumers) and welfare, while decreasing industry profits, with these effects being magnified by the extent of market power. We illustrate these results by calibrating our model to the New Zealand electricity market, and find that taking into account the market power of generating firms increases the efficiency gains from RTP adoption by 41%.     

基于商品质量偏好的双边市场定价策略分析

本文研究了双边市场一方用户群体提供商品或服务的质量在垄断市场情形和单归属（接入）寡头垄断市场情形下对双边市场平台定价问题。研究结果表明：在寡头垄断情形下,消费方和厂商的接入费用和其本身对质量的敏感程度及质量成本系数相关,平台具有鼓励符合条件的用户接入平台的动机。在单归属的寡头垄断情形下,平台之间的厂商无质量差异时,平台倾向于定高价以获取由商品质量引起的双边市场的剩余价值,而消费者和厂商均没有提高商品质量的要求和激励;在寡头平台之间的商品或服务质量差距小,质量信息不透明时,优势平台会随着质量差距扩大而提高厂商的接入费用,其消费者的数量也会增多;若质量信息透明,质量劣势平台为了保持市场份额,其价格与另一寡头平台的消费者市场的接入费用差距与质量差距成正比,而在厂商市场的接入费用差距与质量差距成反比。     

Business groups and corporate transparency in emerging markets: Empirical evidence from India

This study examines the difference in corporate transparency of firms affiliated with business groups and unaffiliated firms in India. Based on previous studies we measured corporate transparency using equity analysts’ forecast error and dispersion. We find that firms affiliated with business groups are less transparent than unaffiliated firms. Lack of transparency leads to higher analyst forecast error and dispersion. This study also finds that business group-affiliated firms with more intra-group capital transactions have higher forecast error and dispersion. The findings of this study suggest that firms affiliated with business groups are less transparent due to their reliance on internal capital markets, and therefore lack incentives to disclose information to market participants. As a result, the information asymmetry between business groups and the capital market is higher, restricting the activities of information intermediaries such as equity analysts, who play an important role in the external capital market.     

Strategic segmentation of a market

When competing firms target information towards specific consumers through direct marketing activities, complete segmentation of markets can result. We analyze a two-stage duopoly where, prior to price competition, each firm targets information to specific consumers and only consumers informed by a firm can buy from it. This has the effect of endogenously determining market segments in a model of ‘sales'. In equilibrium, pure local monopoly emerges; firms target and sell to mutually exclusive market segments. When the cost of marketing approaches zero, market shares reflect relative production efficiency (equal shares when firms are symmetric); this may not be the case when marketing cost is high.     

Developing viable farmers markets in rural communities: An investigation of vendor performance using objective and subjective valuations

Farmers markets are drawing increasing attention by consumers as a local source of fresh foods; by producers as an alternative marketing opportunity to improve farm sales; and by policy makers concerned about the limited availability of affordable, nutritious foods in low-income, sparsely-populated rural areas. Using unique data collected from customers, vendors, and markets in a rural region of New York State, we develop an empirical model of subjective and objective measures of vendor performance to identify important factors for improved market sustainability. The empirical results suggest four inter-related planning recommendations when considering market and public policy interventions: (1) establishing larger, centrally located markets with public sector contributions, (2) targeting variety in products and vendors, (3) prioritizing attention to marketing and promotion, and (4) reducing cost burdens to underserved, low-income residents. As rural areas are spatially unique, future research across a variety of rural communities and regions will be important to the further development of sound initiatives aimed at improving market performance and access to healthy foods.     

Price competition when three are few and four are many

I examine price competition in a market for a homogeneous good when consumers observe prices subject to a random shock (perception error). When firms have symmetric costs, there exists a unique equilibrium in pure strategies, which is symmetric. When there are up to three sellers in the market, the sellers extract the entire consumer surplus. However, with at least four firms, assuming that the marginal cost is sufficiently low relative to consumers’ valuation, both consumers and producers may enjoy a positive surplus. The marginal-cost pricing is never observed in an equilibrium with finitely many firms. Potential policy implications are discussed.     

Behavior based price personalization under vertical product differentiation

We study price personalization in a two period duopoly with vertically differentiated products. In the second period, a firm not only knows the purchase history of all customers, as in standard Behavior Based Price Discrimination models, but it also collects detailed information on its old customers, using it to engage in price personalization. The analysis reveals that there exists a natural market for each firm, defined as the set of customers that cannot be poached by the rival in the second period. The equilibrium is unique, except when firms are ex-ante almost identical. In equilibrium, only the firm with the largest natural market poaches customers from the rival. This firm has highest profits but not necessarily the largest market share. Aggregate profits are lower than under uniform pricing. All consumers gain, total welfare is higher herein than under uniform pricing if firms’ natural markets are sufficiently asymmetric. The low quality firm chooses the minimal quality level and a quality differential arises, though the exact choice for the high quality depends upon the cost specification.     

Quantifying the Effects of Price Discrimination Under Imperfect Competition*

This article analyzes the effects of broadband carriers switching from price discrimination to uniform pricing. Broadband carriers often use third-degree price discrimination. In Colombia, broadband carriers rely on government-issued socio-economic information to segment markets. I use demand and marginal cost estimates to quantify the effects of switching from price discrimination to uniform pricing in an environment of high income disparity. The results provide direct evidence of large consumer surplus transfers from poorer to wealthier households. Poorer households respond by subscribing to slower Internet plans, which may undermine prior efforts to increase download speeds in this demographic.     

Meat marketing in Burkina Faso after the devaluation of the FCFA: Insights into the functioning of informal market systems

The strategies that participants in informal African markets adopt in response to shocks have rarely been analysed, yet these can provide important insights into how such markets function. Policy advice often seeks to modernise trading practices within such markets so as to improve efficiency. However, efforts to improve efficiency could have undesirable consequences if the current functioning of the markets is inadequately understood. In Burkina Faso, the FCFA devaluation in 1994 led to increasing livestock exports and a subsequent meat shortage on the domestic market. Based on market statistics from Burkina Faso and household interviews, the study investigates the status of meat consumption before and up to four years after the devaluation. Results indicate that the price increase for cattle was only transmitted to consumers after a time lag. Meat is more frequently sold in little heaps than on a weight basis. Lower per-kg prices of smaller size heaps imply an income gain for poorer consumers. Butchers use all edible body parts in addition to the carcass (i.e. head, hoofs, intestines) to buffer price fluctuations and to cope with the consumers’ notion of a fixed nominal price. This suggests that butchers and their clients are embedded in networks of what [S. Plattner, 1989. Economic behavior in markets. In: Plattner S. (Ed.), Economic anthropology, Stanford, pp. 209–222.] called equilibrating economic relations, which are favoured by the perishable nature of meat. Selling live animals or meat by weight is often considered as a measure to increase transparency within informal markets. However, the introduction of formalized or standardized marketing measures alone, without lowering the transaction costs of other components of the value chain, risks undermining the equilibrating social relationships that play an important role particularly for the poorer market actors, and thereby disadvantaging vulnerable population groups.     

Stabilizing food markets in eastern and southern Africa

A major challenge for agricultural policy in Africa is how to address the market instability-related causes of low farm productivity and food insecurity. This paper highlights structural changes affecting the behavior of food markets in eastern and southern Africa and discusses their implications for the design of strategies to stabilize food prices. These changes include (1) an increasing trend in maize prices toward import parity levels, reflecting an emerging structural maize deficit in much of the region; (2) increasingly diversified food consumption patterns in both rural and urban areas; (3) highly concentrated marketed maize surplus, which have largely unrecognized implications for the magnitude of price risk faced by most farm households; and (4) the strategic interactions between private and public marketing actors leading in some cases to heightened market instability and food crises. In the prevailing dual market environment now characterizing most of the region, greater coordination, transparency, and consultation between private and public market actors is needed to achieve reasonable levels of food price stability and predictability.