Unobserved Heterogeneity,Exit Rates,and Re‐Employment Wages

Exit rates from unemployment and re‐employment wages decline over a period of unemployment, after controlling for worker observable characteristics. We study the role of unobserved heterogeneity in an economy with asymmetric information and directed search. We show that the unique equilibrium is separating and that skilled workers have more job opportunities and higher wages. The composition of the unemployed varies with the duration of unemployment, so average exit rates and wages fall with time. The separating equilibrium relies on performance‐related pay schemes and the ability of firms to commit to renting an input that is complementary to worker skills.     

Optimal unemployment insurance and redistribution

We characterize optimal income taxation and unemployment insurance in a search‐matching framework where both voluntary and involuntary unemployment are endogenous and Nash bargaining determines wages. Individuals decide whether to participate as job seekers and if so, how much search effort to exert. Unemployment insurance trades off insurance versus search and participation incentives. We also allow for different productivity types so there is a redistributive role for the income tax and show that a piecewise linear wage tax internalizes the macro effects arising from endogenous wages. Type‐specific lump‐sum taxes and transfers can then redistribute between individuals of differing skills and employment states. Our analysis embeds optimal unemployment insurance into an extensive‐margin optimal redistribution framework where transfers to the involuntarily and voluntarily unemployed can differ, and nests several standard models in the literature.     

Minimum wages and youth unemployment

This paper constructs a labor search model to explore the effects of minimum wages on youth unemployment. To capture the gradual decline in unemployment for young workers as they age, the standard search model is extended so that workers gain experience when employed. Experienced workers have higher average productivity and lower job finding and separation rates that match wage and worker flow data. In this environment, minimum wages can have large effects on unemployment because they interact with a worker's ability to gain job experience. The increase in minimum wages between 2007 and 2009 can account for a 0.8 percentage point increase in the steady state unemployment rate and a 2.8 percentage point increase in unemployment for 15–24 year old workers in the model parameterized to simulate outcomes of high school educated workers. Minimum wages can also help explain the high rates of youth unemployment in France compared to the United States.     

Monitoring Job Offer Decisions,Punishments, Exit to Work,and Job Quality

Unemployment insurance systems include the monitoring of unemployed workers and punitive sanctions if job search requirements are violated. We analyze the causal effect of sanctions on the ensuing job quality, notably on wages and occupational level. We use Swedish data and estimate duration models dealing with selection on unobservables. We also develop a theoretical job search model that monitors job offer rejection versus job search effort. The empirical results show that, after a sanction, the wage rate is lower and individuals move more often to a part‐time job and a lower occupational level, incurring human capital losses.     

JOB SEARCH AND ASSET ACCUMULATION UNDER BORROWING CONSTRAINTS*

This article examines the relationship between wealth accumulation and job search dynamics. It proposes a model in which risk‐averse individuals search for jobs, save, and borrow to smooth their consumption. One motivation for accumulating wealth is to finance voluntary quits in order to search for better jobs. Using data on men from the National Longitudinal Survey (1979 cohort), I estimate the individual's dynamic decision problem. The results show that borrowing constraints are tight and reinforce the influence of wealth on job acceptance decisions, namely that more initial wealth and access to larger amounts of credit increase wages and unemployment duration.     

Job Security,Financial Security and Worker Well‐being: New Evidence on the Effects of Flexible Employment

This paper uses panel data drawn from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey to provide new evidence of the links between unemployment, wages, job security, financial security and workers' well‐being for workers in flexible employment. Our findings indicate that workers in flexible employment encounter more unemployment and experience increased job insecurity; unemployment is associated with wage penalties. Lower wages, job insecurity and financial insecurity affect well‐being. However, these negative outcomes are mitigated by longer job tenure. Our results have implications for moves towards a flexicurity model of employment     

The impact of local unemployment rates on reservation wages and the duration of search for a job.

Evidence about the relationship of local unemployment rates and individuals' reservation wages and duration of search for a job if unemployed is sparse and mixed. This study uses US data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to test whether relatively high local unemployment rates reduce the reservation wages of area residents or increase the duration of search. Labour search theory provides the grounding for the sample selection corrected simultaneous equations econometric model. In neither OLS nor 2SLS results is evidence found that local unemployment rates affect either reservation wages or the duration of search. These results suggest that policies targeted at alleviating unemployment should focus on increasing the demand for labour rather than hope that such policies will be beneficial if pursued in high-unemployment areas because of their effects on labour force characteristics.     

Choice and success of job search methods

Job seekers influence the arrival rate of job offers by the choice of search effort and the search methods they use. In this paper we empirically investigate the effect of different search methods on search outcomes. We use unique data on the search behavior of job seekers in Austria, which matches survey information with administrative records. We analyze the quality of job matches in terms of wages and job durations for employed and unemployed workers. We find that the public employment office specializes in the support of low quality workers. For them it is equally efficient as other search channels.     

Reservation wage analysis of unemployed youths in Australia

This paper focuses on the analysis and structural estimation of the reservation wage function from a job search model using modified 2SLS and maximum-likelihood procedures with selectivity bias adjustments. The existing structural approaches to estimation are also reviewed. Empirical estimates of the determinants of the reservation wages of unemployed youths in Australia are obtained using data from the Australian National Longitudinal Survey. The results support most of the predictions of the job search model and indicate the presence of positive duration dependence in unemployment. These findings differ from the populaly held view of declining probability of escape from unemployment as its duration increases. There is also evidence which suggests that quantity constraints are important in determining unemployment in Australia.     

RESIDUAL WAGE DISPERSION WITH EFFICIENCY WAGES

This article extends a classic on‐the‐job search model of homogeneous workers and firms by introducing a shirking problem. Workers choose their effort levels and search on the job. Firms elicit effort through wages and monitoring; an inverse relationship between wages and monitoring rates is derived. Wages play a dual role by allocating labor supply and motivating employee effort. This gives rise to an equilibrium wage distribution that contrasts with existing literature. In particular, I show that a hump‐shaped and positively skewed wage distribution, as observed empirically, can be derived even when firms and workers are, respectively, identical.     

Block recursive equilibria for stochastic models of search on the job

We develop a general stochastic model of directed search on the job. Directed search allows us to focus on a Block Recursive Equilibrium (BRE) where agents' value functions, policy functions and market tightness do not depend on the distribution of workers over wages and unemployment. We formally prove existence of a BRE under various specifications of workers' preferences and contractual environments, including dynamic contracts and fixed-wage contracts. Solving a BRE is as easy as solving a representative agent model, in contrast to the analytical and computational difficulties in models of random search on the job.     

The Sri Lankan Unemployment Problem Revisited

High unemployment in Sri Lanka has been attributed to unrealistic expectations, to queuing for public sector jobs, and to stringent job security regulations. However, the empirical evidence supporting these explanations is weak. This paper analyzes individual records from the 1995 Labor Force Survey, and time series for wages in the formal and informal sectors of the economy. The paper rejects the unrealistic‐expectations hypothesis by comparing the impact of education on the actual wages of those who have a job and on the lowest acceptable wages of the unemployed. But it finds substantial rents associated with jobs in the public sector, and in activities protected by high tariffs or covered by job security regulations. A time‐series analysis of the impact of unemployment on wage increases across sectors suggests that many among the unemployed are waiting for “good” job openings, but are not interested in readily available “bad” jobs.     

AN ON‐THE‐JOB SEARCH MODEL OF CRIME,INEQUALITY, AND UNEMPLOYMENT*

We extend simple search models of crime, unemployment, and inequality to incorporate on‐the‐job search. This is valuable because, although simple models are useful, on‐the‐job search models are more interesting theoretically and more relevant empirically. We characterize the wage distribution, unemployment rate, and crime rate theoretically, and use quantitative methods to illustrate key results. For example, we find that increasing the unemployment insurance replacement rate from 53 to 65 percent increases unemployment and crime rates from 10 and 2.7 percent to 14 and 5.2 percent. We show multiple equilibria arise for some fairly reasonable parameters; in one case, unemployment can be 6 or 23 percent, and crime 0 or 10 percent, depending on the equilibrium.     

The Impact of Social Segregation on the Labor Market Outcomes of Low-Skilled Workers*

We study the impact of network homophily on labor market outcomes in a search-and-matching model with two job search channels: the formal market and social contacts. There are two worker types: low-skilled and high-skilled workers. The homophily level determines whether the referral networks of the two types are mixed or segregated from each other. We show that there exists an intermediate homophily level that minimizes the unemployment rate and maximizes the wages of low-skilled workers. Complete integration does not maximize the welfare of low-skilled workers, unless it improves their productivity. We argue that our model can explain the empirical findings on the labor market effects of the Moving-to-Opportunity experiment and the integration of immigrants.     

A MATCHING MODEL WITH ENDOGENOUS SKILL REQUIREMENTS>*

We consider a labor market in which workers differ in their abilities and jobs differ in their skill requirements. The distribution of worker abilities is exogenous, but we model the choice of skill requirements by firms. High‐skill jobs produce more output than low‐skill jobs, but high‐skill jobs require high‐skill workers and thus are more difficult to fill. We use a matching model together with a Nash bargaining approach to wage setting to determine the equilibrium mix of job types, along with the equilibrium relationship between worker and job characteristics, wages, and unemployment.     

Equilibrium unemployment as a discipline device when finding employment is costly

Abstract In this paper, we study a model that incorporates costly job search into an efficiency wage model. We show that the relationship between wages and detection rates is ambiguous in this framework. The model can generate a positive relationship, consistent with empirically reasonable values for unemployment rates, job finding rates, and employment duration.     

Optimal unemployment insurance in an estimated job search model with savings

This paper estimates a job search model with savings on Danish micro data that include observations on wealth and wages. Controlling for extensive observed and unobserved worker characteristics heterogeneity, the estimation relates observed unemployment spells to the model implied hazard rate for each worker. The model estimates are sensible and fit the data well. Optimal UI policy is determined in the estimated model as a trade-off between insurance provision and distortion of search incentives. The analysis emphasizes an important policy sensitivity to the interest rate and the importance of including transitional dynamics in the analysis.     

JOB FLOWS AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN AN EQUILIBRIUM UNEMPLOYMENT MODEL WITH FIRM‐SPECIFIC SKILL TRAINING*

We introduce productivity enhancing firm‐specific skill training into the labour search model in which the firm‐specific skill training intensity and the job destruction rate are endogenously determined. It is shown that the higher the intensity of such training, the lower the rates of unemployment, job creation and job destruction. The paper's model provides a theoretical framework to understand the often mentioned peculiarity of the Japanese labour market; prevalently low rates of unemployment, job creation and job destruction in Japan are due to its training system which promotes workers to acquire firm‐specific skills.     

Estimating mobility rates in search models with initial condition problems

Previous empirical work on job search has proposed different approaches to estimating mobility rates assumed in models of search. However, these methods either only work for specific models of wage determination, or else require that we know the initial distribution of productivity for workers in our sample. In this paper we show it is possible to estimate mobility rates without having to restrict attention to models in which wages are constant over the course of a job or to assume that the initial distribution of productivity is known. More generally, the approach we propose allows us to freely estimate one degree of unobserved heterogeneity, be it in initial conditions or mobility rates. Applying our results to data from the NLSY suggests that the theoretical restrictions on the initial distribution of productivity implied by the standard model can overstate the extent of frictions to upward mobility.     

Labor Market Experiment

This experiment involves having students search in a hypothetical job market for jobs paying wages in a known range but an unknown wage distribution. Different trials change variables to allow for search costs, unemployment insurance, recessions, and investment in human capital.