Uncertainty and markets for renewable resources

The market allocation of renewable resources is examined when growth rates are affected by random disturbances. Given free access to a renewable resource, environmental disturbances are shown to affect the biological survival of the resource. The optimal solution is then examined and it is shown to be achieved by a competitive allocation when property rights are clearly defined given rational expectations or a complete set of contingent futures markets. The stochastic dynamics are shown in each case to differ considerably from the deterministic model.     

Endogenous production organization during market liberalization: farm level evidence from Romania

This paper analyzes the production organization structure of farm sectors in a transition country (TC) where a number of organization modes emerged. Under imperfect markets rural households make optimal organization mode choices by adjusting their physical resources according to the non-tradable managerial input that they allocate in farming. Empirical results for Romania strongly support the hypothesis that the optimal organization mode choice is influenced by household’s human and physical capital endowments as well as by the market environment. Policies providing access to capital and secure property rights would facilitate shift to individual farming modes and efficient resource reallocation.     

Property rights for natural resources and sustainable growth in a two-country trade model

We analyze a dynamic two-country trade model between a technological leading country and a technological follower economy. The output production in the follower economy needs a renewable natural resource as an essential input. We first prove that the innovation developed in the leading country guarantees sustainable growth in this economy. Moreover, trade of innovation also enables sustainability in the resource-dependent economy. We analyze different property rights regimes depending on whether the resource is managed by a central authority (a monopoly firm in the leading economy or the government in the follower country) or the exploitation rights are equally distributed among many harvesters in the follower country. The second main goal of the paper is to analyze how the ownership and distribution of the exploitation rights upon the natural resource may affect the sustainable growth rate for the two trading economies, the resource conservation and the consumers’ welfare. We obtain the standard result that the resource is better preserved when owned by a monopolistic agent (either a foreign firm or the government). When the property rights belong to a monopoly located in the leading country, the two economies grow faster than when they belong to either the government or many owners in the follower country. When the resource is monopoly-owned, consumers in the leading economy attain a higher welfare when the monopoly is located in this country, but the equivalent is not true for consumers in the follower economy. The comparison of welfares with the case of multiple owners is unclear.     

房地产市场中的政府行为外部效应解析

1988年建立的土地有偿使用制度,实现了我国土地产权的市场化,对培育土地市场和促进经济发展发挥了重要作用,但土地产权的界定不够明晰,缺少外部效应内部化的政策机制,引发土地市场的一系列问题.借助新制度经济学的分析框架,从土地产权的角度分析了政府行为对土地市场的影响,并运用特征价格法,对广州市地铁二号线和内环路建设的实例,分析评价了政府行为对土地价值的影响.最后从完善土地产权的角度探讨了政府在土地市场中的角色和作用,指出由于缺乏对政府行为引起的"得益"和"受损"的应对机制,导致政府利益受损和土地市场的不公平与不确定性,需从土地产权角度出发,完善相关政策.     

The right to the city

The right to the city is not merely a right of access to what already exists, but a right to change it. We need to be sure we can live with our own creations. But the right to remake ourselves by creating a qualitatively different kind of urban sociality is one of the most precious of all human rights. We have been made and re‐made without knowing exactly why, how, and to what end. How then, can we better exercise this right to the city? But whose rights and whose city? Could we not construct a socially just city? But what is social justice? Is justice simply whatever the ruling class wants it to be? We live in a society in which the inalienable rights to private property and the profit rate trump any other conception of inalienable rights. Our society is dominated by the accumulation of capital through market exchange. To live under capitalism is to accept or submit to that bundle of rights necessary for endless capital accumulation. Free markets are not necessarily fair. Worse still, markets require scarcity to function. The inalienable rights of private property and the profit rate lead to worlds of inequality, alienation and injustice. The endless accumulation of capital and the conception of rights embedded threin must be opposed and a different right to the city must be asserted politically. Derivative rights (like the right to be treated with dignity) should become fundamental and fundamental rights (of private property and the profit rate) should become derivative. But new rights can also be defined: like the right to the city which is not merely a right of access to what the property speculators and state planners define, but an active right to make the city different, to shape it more in accord with our heart's desire, and to re‐make ourselves thereby in a different image.     

Property Rights and Natural Resource Management in Developing Countries

This essay surveys the literature on property rights and natural resource management in developing countries. Focus is on policy relevant discussions concerning collective action, property regimes, local institutions for natural resource management, the evolution of individual property rights to land, land titling by government and poverty–environment linkages. The tendency to draw policy conclusions from simplistic analysis is criticised, and the need for more credible empirical research is highlighted.     

企业治理结构的变迁：一个基于产权博弈的观点

本文在阐述企业治理结构和产权等相关概念的基础上,从产权博弈的角度对于当今典型的内部监控型企业治理结构和外部监控型企业治理结构的变迁作了深入的分析。本文的结论是:企业治理结构的变迁是产权博弈的结果。考虑市场因素和制度环境下的资本产权当事人之间博弈均衡形成的企业治理结构将是一种合理的形式。     

CHALLENGING THE CHALLENGERS: A REVIEW OF SERENA OLSARETTI'S LIBERTY, DESERT AND THE MARKET AND DANIEL ATTAS'S LIBERTY, PROPERTY AND MARKETS

These books attack free markets and libertarianism, alleging that their fundamental assumptions are philosophically indefensible. Olsaretti challenges the thesis that free markets produce distributively just outcomes. At most, however, she shows that limited, desert-based justifications of free-market outcomes fail to satisfy her questionable desiderata, and that particular entitlement-based justifications are inadequately supported when they confound voluntariness and freedom. Attas challenges libertarianism itself, claiming that it is fundamentally wrong, and that libertarian notions of property rights are unsustainable. But he considers only arguments based on defective notions of self-ownership and confused notions of freedom; other, more robust justifications of liberty and property are ignored. Though both of these books fail to demonstrate the strong conclusions they assert, they highlight the dangers of substituting polemic for philosophy. Free markets, property and liberty need, and deserve, rigorous philosophical defences.     

数字信息时代图书馆资源共享与知识产权保护

数字信息时代图书馆数字化建设为资源共享提供了前所未有的技术条件,但同时又面临着知识产权的严峻挑战。本文论述了数字图书馆建设中涉及的知识产权法律问题、信息资源共享与知识产权的关系,以及信息资源的合法使用与知识产权保护的统一。     

基于物业管理行业的低碳城市经济发展途径

作为一个新兴产业,物业管理产业必须能顺应低碳经济发展这一历史潮流,抓住契机,倡导低碳物业管理,提高对可再生能源、资源的循环利用率,为建设低碳城市提供支持。文章主要从物业管理的高能耗现状及存在的垃圾处理、人们的节能意识以及物业设施设备的维修养护等问题出发,探索城市低碳生活路径,从而打造低碳物业。     

Property rights theory,transaction costs theory,and agency theory: an organizational economics approach to strategic management

Property rights theory has common antecedents with contractual theories of the firm such as transaction costs and agency theories, and is yet distinct from these theories. We illustrate fundamental theoretical principles derived from these three theories by analyzing the business case of oil field unitization. Theoretical principles and application of theory to oil field unitization are each summarized. From this, it is possible to see how property rights theory is well suited to explain business situations where inefficient economic outcomes persist. Additionally, property rights theory forges new theoretical connections with other branches of organizational economics, in particular, resource‐based theory. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Common Heritage Principle:

A bstract An effort is underway to apply the common heritage principle to certain unique global resources while promoting economic development Under this precept, property rights to such resources are said to belong to all nations and their citizens rather than being subject to national sovereignty The doctrine is examined in theory and as applied in the outer space and law of the sea treaties Its possible application to Antarctica is explored in relationship to the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) which is now considering a minerals regime for the continent Assessing the international political situation suggests the powerful bloc of ATS nations will ignore the common heritage principle However, a different outcome is possible, given a convergence of the Antarctic mining and global atmospheric issues of the greenhouse and ozone varieties Under this scenario, the global atmosphere and Antarctica would be common property resources whose property rights are owned by all nations     

物权、物权法与会计目标

本文在回溯物权制度演进的基础上,界定了物权内涵、物权与产权的关系,探讨了物权与会计目标的内在一致性,分析了物权法的颁布与实施对实现会计目标的积极作用。认为强化整个社会的物权意识、全面落实物权法的有关规定,有利于实现会计降低交易费用、保护相关产权主体权益和优化资源配置的目标。     

A Property Rights Paradox: George and Rothbard on the Conservation of Environmental Resources

A bstract . Murray N. Rothbard is recognized as one of the most articulate modern critics of Henry George's land value tax. A leading libertarian thinker, Rothbard condemns George's recommendation that government act to affect private transactions in land, arguing that such interventions infringe on previously defined private property rights. However, Rothbard's social system has no explicit mechanism for accommodating the emergence of tradeable property rights to newly recognized environmental resources. In effect, Rothbard calls for controls on such resources—no trading. Henry George, on the other hand, provides for the evolution of new property rights and their emergence into private markets. The paradox here is that George's solution to the property rights question might accommodate the social yearnings of one of his most severe critics, Murray N. Rothbard.     

RAMPING UP AFRICAN GROWTH: LESSONS FROM FIVE DECADES OF GROWTH EXPERIENCE

Since the 1960s economic growth rates have been far lower in sub-Saharan Africa than in other developing regions. This poor performance has resulted primarily from endemic rent-seeking and the over-regulation of markets. To achieve high growth rates, African countries must improve the investment climate by reforming institutions, enhancing infrastructure and protecting property rights.     

Privatization Versus Groundwater Central Management

A group of free market natural resource economists argue that the current system of limited property rights for groundwater users should be replaced by a new system of freely transferable property rights This, they contend, would provide the more efficient allocation of groundwater resources and help alleviate the water scarcity problem in the United States Their case for privatization is critically appraised Groundwater hydrology , common property, contamination , and other third party effects are examined to determine the set of circumstances under which privatization would work best The following alternatives to the full privatization plan are also examined central management, legal reform , and "French style" privatized management of water systems     

地热资源测井评价与开发

地热资源是一种资源的利用不受其它因素影响、对环境污染最小的可再生、可持续使用能源。本文介绍了地热资源的分类、形成条件以及特点。以华北平原为主要研究区块,J热水井为例,阐述储层的评价方法,确定泥质含量、孔隙度、渗透率以及含水饱和度的计算方法,井温资料和地区经验公式确定地层温度,据测井评价资料进行井下作业,下套管后开始固井,进行固井质量评价,固井质量良好的条件下进行射孔,开始投产。     

企业产权和内部控制与会计角色

文中基于产权界定中的公共领域，阐述了企业产权的三个组成部分：股东直接行使的所有权（R1）、公司的法人产权（R3）、经营集团凭借其竞争优势而攫取的股东放弃行使的留在公共领域中的部分含租产权（R1）。认为三者的不同比例构成了企业的产权结构，它决定着公司治理的绩效，并由此揭示了企业内部控制的核心。在此基础上，阐明了会计在企业内部控制中所扮演的角色。     

PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AND GROWTH AS POLITICAL EQUILIBRIA

Abstract This paper presents a survey of the literature on property rights and economic growth. Different theoretical mechanisms that relate property rights to economic development are discussed. Lack of protection of property rights can result in slow economic growth through different channels: expropriation of private wealth, corruption of civil servants, excessive taxation and barriers to adoption of new technologies. The origins of property rights are also considered. Different theories are illustrated but more attention is paid to the ‘social conflict view’ and its success and limitations. The second part of the paper illustrates relevant empirical works on property rights and growth.     

Replicating Walrasian equilibria using markets for membership in labor-managed firms

In standard models of the labor-managed firm, labor is misallocated in the short run. This problem can be eliminated by introducing a market for membership in each firm. These markets substitute for the capitalist labor market and support equilibria isomorphic to Walrasian equilibria. Such LMFs resemble familiar Ward-Domar-Vanek LMFs by ensuring that firm sizes are optimal for ex post members, but they also have the property that firm sizes are optimal for workers endowed with ex ante membership rights.