A Welfare Ranking of Multilateral Reductions in Real and Tariff Trade Barriers when Firms are Heterogenous

Trade liberalization comes about through reductions in various types of trade barriers. This paper introduces, apart from the customary real trade costs (i.e. iceberg and fixed export costs), two revenue generating trade barriers (i.e. an ad valorem tariff and a trade license) into a standard heterogeneous‐firms‐trade model with Pareto distributed productivities. We derive analytical welfare rankings of all four liberalization channels for an equal effect on two openness measures, for any trade cost level and while all four barriers are simultaneously present, i.e. for any initial equilibrium. We show that when openness is measured at retail prices, not border prices, the welfare rankings are sensitive to the degree of efficiency in revenue redistribution, e.g. the share of tariff revenues wasted on rent‐seeking activities. As a result, multilateral tariff reductions can switch from the least to the most preferred mode of liberalization. Among the other three barriers we establish a universal welfare ranking for any strictly positive level of revenue redistribution and for either measure of openness.     

Market entry and trade weighted import costs

Trade weighting is a common method of aggregating trade frictions. It will understate changes in these costs when there are non‐ad valorem trade costs and quality differences. Newly traded goods enter at higher trade costs than previously traded ones. Lower import costs shift trade to low‐quality goods with higher measured trade costs. These effects are quantitatively important. U.S. import costs fall more than twice as fast as trade weighted measures from 1974 to 2004 after the impact of shifting quality and newly traded goods is accounted for. Empirical estimates that use trade weighting will underestimate the welfare impact of trade costs.     

Transfers, the terms of trade, and capital accumulation

Abstract .  In the context of a two-sector overlapping-generations model it is demonstrated that a steady-state transfer paradox may arise under commodity trade with stability and without distortions or bystanders. The existence of the paradox is due to the effect of the transfer on world capital accumulation, which is shown to always (i.e., for any ranking of factor intensities and savings rates) improve the donor's terms of trade. Transfers may also improve steady-state welfare for both donor and recipient and produce paradoxical welfare results along the transition path.     

Export,FDI and the welfare gains from trade liberalization

This paper extends Melitz and Redding (2015) to analyze the welfare gains from trade liberalization by adding foreign direct investment(FDI). Our model predicts that with FDI activities, welfare gains from trade liberalization will be strictly lower than those in a model without FDI, but only takes exports into account. In addition, the calibrated model indicates that with FDI activities, aggregate welfare reaches its maximum when the fixed export costs are positive rather than 0. Furthermore, we decompose the welfare gains induced by trade liberalization from continuing exporters, and switchers. The results show that in any case, with or without FDI, continuing exporters contribute a larger share to welfare gains than status switching firms.     

Exchange rate volatility and international trade: A general-equilibrium analysis

We analyze the relation between exchange-rate volatility and the volume of international trade, in a general-equilibrium stochastic-endowment economy with imperfect international commodity markets, and treating both variables as endogenous. Even in the simplest model, the sign of the relation depends on the source for the change in volatility. For instance, more volatility of the endowments and higher costs to international trade both boost exchange risk (and lower welfare); but the first increases the expected volume of trade, while the second decreases trade. Note that even the (inter-equilibria) relation between trade and welfare is ambiguous.     

Fixed export cost heterogeneity, trade and welfare

Recent literature on the workhorse model of intra-industry trade has explored heterogeneous cost structures at the firm level. These approaches have proven to add realism and predictive power. This paper presents a new and simple heterogeneous-firms specification. We develop a symmetric two-country intra-industry trade model where firms are of two different marginal cost types and where fixed export costs are heterogeneous across firms. This model traces many of the stylized facts of international trade. However, we find that with heterogeneous fixed export costs there exists a positive bilateral tariff that maximizes national and world welfare.     

THE CLOSED-LOOP EFFECTS OF MARKET INTEGRATION IN A DYNAMIC DUOPOLY

This paper develops a dynamic game model of reciprocal dumping to reconsider welfare effects of market integration, i.e. reductions in transport costs. We show that welfare under trade is unambiguously less than welfare under autarky for any level of transport costs, which is impossible in static models where trade is profitable if the transport cost is low enough. This is because the negative effect through closed-loop property of feedback strategies dominates the positive effects.     

A welfare analysis of unilateral trade and FDI liberalization

This paper uses a heterogeneous‐firms model to examine the pro‐competitive channel through which FDI affects national welfare. The model shows that the country from which FDI originates experiences a welfare gain following liberalization. However, a counterintuitive finding is that the welfare of the host country deteriorates. This is explained by the production relocation process that leads to an increase in the mass of domestic firms in the source country and a decrease in the host country. The model also confirms that unilateral trade liberalization brings a similar result even in the presence of bilateral FDI flows.     

Second-best trade policies in Cournot oligopoly

In this paper we study the optimal import policy in an oligopolistic market with a given number of quantity-setting firms. In the absence of fixed costs, we show that if the policy instrument is an import quota, the optimal policy is either free trade or autarky, while if the instrument is a tariff the optimal policy is neither free trade nor autarky. In the case of fixed costs, we show that contrary to the traditional protectionist argument, a restrictive import policy might increase domestic welfare by increasing domestic consumers' surplus, instead of increasing domestic profits.     

The Effects of Trade Liberalization between Heterogeneous Countries on Endogenous Mergers

This paper examines the effects of trade liberalization on merger behavior. We endogenize merger choice among owners in an oligopolistic industry in asymmetric countries to analyze the consequences of trade cost reductions on competitiveness and welfare. In this context, the non‐cooperative game supports asymmetric market structures. We also find that trade liberalization is not necessarily pro‐competitive in countries with the competitive advantage, even if trade costs are completely abolished. Moreover, the tariff‐jumping explanation of international mergers does not necessarily apply. The welfare analysis shows that merger behavior can significantly alter any gains from liberalization. Countries should consider enforcing competition in regional agreements. Specifically, to avoid a reduction in domestic welfare following trade‐liberalizing reductions in trade costs, a high‐cost country's optimal policy may be to ban international mergers.     

On the welfare effects of trade and investment liberalization

Using a three-factor knowledge- and physical capital model of trade and multinational activity, we consider a set of policy experiments to assess the welfare effects of trade and investment liberalization in general equilibrium. Specifically, we address the question of whether and under which circumstances a single versus a combined trade/investment liberalization strategy or a unilateral versus a bilateral policy change is preferable from a single country's and the world's point of view. The focus of this paper is to look at three relevant questions. First, when is investment liberalization beneficial and when is it harmful for a single economy or the whole world? Second, is pure investment liberalization a welfare maximizing strategy? Third, when is either kind of liberalization (trade, investment, or both) welfare improving and when neither of them?     

Does trade stimulate product quality upgrading?

This paper investigates whether increased import competition leads firms to engage in incremental innovation reflected in product quality upgrading using Chilean manufacturing firm‐product data and measuring product quality with unit values (prices). We identify causal effects of import competition using an effective trade barrier measure – transport costs – as instruments for import penetration ratios across industries. Transport costs have a negative and significant effect on product quality. The evidence suggests that estimated unit value increases capture product quality upgrading, imports’ competition effects drive quality upgrading, and benefits depend on firms’ industrial specialization. Easier access to intermediate inputs also fosters quality upgrading.     

The welfare effect of a free trade agreement in the presence of foreign direct investment and rules of origin

This paper investigates the welfare effect of forming a free trade agreement (FTA). To receive tariff‐free treatment, firms must comply with the rules of origin (ROO). Outside firms could undertake either market‐oriented or export‐platform foreign direct investments (FDIs). ROO have the following effects: (i) An infeasible FTA may become feasible by deterring outside firms' FDIs, (ii) an FDI of a less efficient firm could replace that of an efficient firm, or (iii) FDIs made before the FTA is concluded might be eliminated. These potential effects complicate the welfare effect of the FTA and could decrease the consumer surplus.     

The trade paradox persists under excise taxes

Brander and Krugman (1983) and Sertel (1988) followed by Krugman (1989), showed two sides of a ‘trade paradox’: The paradox in competition, viz. that opening trade (or increasing competition) may cause welfare to decline, and the paradox in efficiency, viz. that an increase in unit transport cost may increase welfare. In this paper, we consider the situation in an environment where interventionist trade policies are not permitted but each country is sovereign to impose an excise tax (or subsidy). The paradoxes persist under equilibrium excise taxes, reckoned both at the non-cooperative (Nash or dominant strategy) equilibrium and at the cooperative solution among tax-imposing authorities maximizing welfare. We also see that the paradoxes persist in a taxless environment where market equilibrium is Stackelberg rather than Cournot.     

Trade liberalization in a differentiated duopoly reconsidered

Constructing a model of differentiated Cournot duopoly, we consider welfare effects of trade liberalization (i.e. reductions in transport costs). We examine both multilateral trade (i.e. the firms in both countries export bilaterally) and unilateral trade, under which foreign entry is possible but the home firm cannot export. Some new results on trade gains under differentiated oligopoly are proved and their implications are discussed.     

Global inequality and international trade

The paper analyses the effect of widespread trade liberalisationon global income inequality. The analysis of the trend in globalinequality during 1981–97, presented in the first partof the paper, shows that the apparent growth of income inequalityamong countries conceals a process of convergence. Some developingcountries achieved significantly faster economic growth thanthe advanced industrialised countries and, though small in number,they actually account for a majority of the population of thedeveloping world. Thus international inequality (i.e., the inequalityof distribution of per capita incomes among the world's population)in fact declined even though the inter-country income inequalityincreased. The analysis in the second part of the paper shows(i) that while improved trade performance did have a stimulatingeffect on growth performance of countries, trade liberalisationhad extremely varied effects on trade performance across countries,and (ii) that the distribution of benefits and costs of tradeliberalisation across countries has been such as to reduce internationalinequality without affecting inter-country inequality.     

On the static and dynamic costs of trade restrictions for small developing countries

We analyze the costs of trade restrictions for a small developing economy (LDC). Intermediate goods invented elsewhere are only introduced on the LDC market if it is profitable to do so. The LDC economy evolves to a balanced growth path in which income, welfare, and the share of available goods increase if trade restrictions fall. The adjustment path is asymmetric: an increase in trade restrictions leads to a slow-down of economic growth, while a decrease may lead to a rapid catch-up process. The dynamic costs of trade restrictions are in general substantially larger than the static costs.     

Heterogeneous firms,trade liberalization and agglomeration

Abstract In this study, we develop an economic model to examine agglomeration of heterogeneous firms following trade liberalization. In a closed economy, we show that high‐productivity firms are more likely to agglomerate because they benefit more from agglomeration than their low‐productivity counterparts. However, trade liberalization, especially with a high‐productivity partner, favours partial agglomeration; that is, low‐productivity firms relocate away from the region where high‐productivity firms agglomerate. Consequently, the welfare gap between the domestic regions of an economy narrows following trade liberalization. The latter result suggests that trade liberalization promotes regional economic development.     

Moving beyond the iceberg model: The role of trade relations in endogenizing transportation costs in computable general equilibrium models

Modeling trade and transportation costs is an essential part of multiregional or spatial computable general equilibrium models where interregional trade plays an important rolein shaping economic activity. The majority of such models use the iceberg trade cost approach where part of the produced output (representing the material costs of transportation) is assumed to melt away during transportation. There are a few models which employ a more refined approach with an explicit transportation sector providing transportation services which are then used to ship goods between locations. In this paper we show that this approach, although much more convenient than the iceberg approach, still lacks full usability due to the fact that markets, hence prices are defined at the regional level and as a result, transportation costs can not be endogenous at the trade relation level. Moreover, under regional level market clearing the iceberg and the more detailed approach are equivalent. We propose to refine the definition of market equilibrium and move it to the trade relation level. Using this approach we can gain full advantage of the explicit transport sector in the model with respect to trade cost evolution. We show through simulations that refining the way trade costs are modelled indeed gains new insights, and that moving the market definition to the trade relational level leads to qualitative changes in the effect of labor supply shocks on main model variables. The paper also presents a method to estimate a SAM by reallocating data from standard industries to a transportation sector which is then consistent with the model setup. This SAM can be used to calibrate the refined model with a detailed transportation sector.     

Countries, regions and trade: On the welfare impacts of economic integration

We study the impact of falling international trade costs and falling national transport costs on the economic geography of countries involved in an integration process. Each country is formed by two regions between which labor is mobile, whereas there is no international mobility. Goods can be traded both nationally and internationally at positive, but different, costs. A decrease in trade costs and/or in transport costs has a direct impact on prices and wages, which allows us to account for the impact of changes in these parameters on the economic geography and welfare of each country. We show that, as trade barriers fall, the benefits of integration come after its costs. We also show that national transport policies are of the beggar-thy-neighbor type. On both counts, policy coordination is required in the process of economic integration.