Long-term unemployment, social assistance and labor market policies in Romania

Long-term unemployment in Romania has grown in both absolute and relative terms in the last few years, leading to increased expenditures, both absolutely and in relation to unemployment benefits, for the support allowance and social assistance programs and for pensions to labor force drop-outs. The paper uses a variety of data sources, including registration information, labor force surveys, and our own survey of registered unemployed (SRU) to describe these trends in the characteristics of Romanian unemployment and to examine differences across unemployment benefit (UB), short-term and long-term support allowance (SA) recipients. We employ the data to estimate the transition flow probability from the UB to the SA program; discuss the work incentives, income maintenance effects, and public costliness of the labor market and social insurance (including pension and disability) policies; and investigate the effects of the policies and of other characteristics of the unemployed and the areas where they live on the hazard for the escape rate from unemployment for UB and SA recipients separately.     

Reassessing the ins and outs of unemployment

This paper uses readily accessible aggregate time series to measure the probability that an employed worker becomes unemployed and the probability that an unemployed worker finds a job, the ins and outs of unemployment. Since 1948, the job finding probability has accounted for three-quarters of the fluctuations in the unemployment rate in the United States and the employment exit probability for one-quarter. Fluctuations in the employment exit probability are quantitatively irrelevant during the last two decades. Using the underlying microeconomic data, the paper shows that these results are not due to compositional changes in the pool of searching workers, nor are they due to movements of workers in and out of the labor force. These results contradict the conventional wisdom that has guided the development of macroeconomic models of the labor market since 1990.     

Labour market transitions and unemployment duration: Evidence from Bulgarian and Polish micro-data1

The segmentation of the labour market is one of the most striking characteristics of the transition process in Central and Eastern European countries. Not only do the young, unskilled workers and women face a high risk of unemployment, but joblessness also varies significantly geographically. This paper sheds some light on labour market segmentation in transition countries by analysing individual records of individuals registered at the labour offices of two Polish regions (Warsaw and Ciechanov and two Bulgarian regions (Sofia and Botevgrad) over the initial three to four years of the transition to a market economy. The empirical results confirm the existence of highly selective firing and hiring processes in the Polish and Bulgarian labour markets. Overall, unskilled or poorly educated workers have the highest probability of becoming unemployed and remaining without a job for a long period of time. We also analysed the determinants of unemployment duration across regions and over time using a piece-wise constant hazard model with multiple destinations, i.e. employment and exit from the labour force. The results suggest that the unemployed with a high education and previous experience in the private sector have a higher probability of getting a new job, especially in the more dynamic labour markets, while those without previous work experience tend to stay unemployed for a longer period of time and often leave the labour market. The econometric results also suggest that the reforms of the unemployment benefit systems have produced important effects on unemployment flows.     

Equilibrium unemployment and retirement

We first propose some new empirical evidence on the fact that the labor market conditions matter for the retirement decision at the individual level: we investigate whether unemployed workers retire before employed workers, other things being equal. Our main objective in this paper is then to propose an equilibrium unemployment approach to retirement decisions that allows us to derive the positive and normative features of retirement decisions when search and matching frictions are considered. Two main conclusions emerge: the retirement decision of unemployed workers depends on the labor-market frictions whereas that of employed workers does not; the existence of search externalities makes the retirement age of unemployed workers intrinsically suboptimal. Considering Social Security policy issues, we show that the complete elimination of the implicit tax on continued activity is not necessarily welfare-optimizing in a second best world where the labor market equilibrium suffers from distortions.     

A coalitional theory of unemployment insurance and employment protection

This paper examines the role of coalition formation in the empirically observed negative correlation between employment protection and unemployment benefit. We study an economy composed of four groups of agents (capitalists, unemployed people, low- and high-skilled workers), each one represented by a politician. Politicians first form political parties and then compete in a winner-takes-all election by simultaneously proposing policy bundles composed of an employment protection level and an unemployment benefit. We first show that, in the absence of parties (i.e., in a citizen-candidate model), low-skilled workers are decisive and support a maximum employment protection level together with some unemployment benefit. We then obtain that, under some conditions, allowing for party formation results in all policy equilibria belonging to the Pareto set of the coalition formed by high-skilled workers together with unemployed people. Policies in this Pareto set exhibit a negative correlation between employment protection and unemployment benefit.     

Work incentive and other effects of social assistance and unemployment benefit policy in the Czech Republic

In this paper we provide an account of most of the passive labor market policies (unemployment compensation, social assistance, state social support and the pension system) in the Czech Republic during the 1990–1996 period. The eligibility requirements and benefit levels are described in great detail. Using Labor Force Survey data, we compare the characteristics of unemployed people receiving unemployment benefits with those receiving social assistance and those not receiving any benefits and we find significant differences in their characteristics. Finally, we provide an analysis of the work disincentive effects of the unemployment and social assistance benefits by comparing these benefits to market wages and by analyzing the effect of being in the system on the duration of unemployment of two cohorts of unemployed in 1994 and 1995. We find that social assistance benefits are fairly generous for low income families with more children, individuals with these characteristics have a higher probability of receiving social assistance and they tend to stay unemployed longer than those people with relatively fewer dependants. We conclude that the social assistance scheme seems to be having some disincentive effects for at least one group in the population.     

Skilled-unskilled wage inequality and unemployment: A general equilibrium analysis

The paper develops a static three sector competitive general equilibrium model of a small open economy in which skilled labor is mobile between a traded good sector and the non-traded good sector and unskilled labor is specific to another traded good sector. Capital is perfectly mobile among all these three sectors. We introduce involuntary unemployment equilibrium in both the labor markets and explain unemployment using efficiency wage hypothesis. We examine the effects of change in different factor endowments and prices of traded goods on the unemployment rates and on the skilled-unskilled relative wage. Also, we introduce Gini-Coefficient of wage income distribution as a measure of wage income inequality; and show that a comparative static effect may force the skilled-unskilled relative wage and the Gini-Coefficient of wage income distribution to move in opposite directions in the presence of unemployment.     

Trade liberalization and unemployment: Theory and evidence from India

A widely held view among the public is that trade liberalization increases unemployment. Using state and industry-level unemployment and trade protection data from India, we find no evidence of any unemployment increasing effect of trade reforms. In fact, our state-level analysis reveals that urban unemployment declines with trade liberalization in states with flexible labor markets and larger employment shares in net exporter industries. Moreover, our industry-level analysis indicates that workers in industries experiencing greater reductions in trade protection were less likely to become unemployed, especially in net export industries. Our results can be explained within a theoretical framework incorporating trade and search-generated unemployment and some institutional features of the Indian economy.     

Sectoral shifts and unemployment persistence

This paper deals with possible explanations of unemployment persistence within a sectoral approach to the Austrian labour market. First the concept of unemployment persistence is specified in terms of the time series properties of the unemployment rate. Sectoral job gains and job losses form the labour market flows in this approach. The standard matching model is replaced then by a model of the competition between the unemployed and new entrants in the labour market for new jobs as an ‘adding up’ demand system of the AIDS type. The estimations of different system specifications indicate, that the sectoral structure of job gains plays a role in the competition mechanism between unemployed workers and new entrants.     

Rural-urban migration,urban unemployment and underemployment,and job-search activity in LDCs

A quantity adjustment framework is used to analyze unemployment and underemployment in less developed countries (LDCs). The basic premise of the formal theoretical model presented is that the same kinds of forces that explain the choices of workers between the rural and urban sectors can also explain thier choices between 1 labor market and another within an urban area and are most likely made simultaneously. The decision makers, whether family units or individuals, are presumed to consider the various labor market opportunities available to them and to choose the one which maximizes their expected future income. In the model the primary equilibrating force is taken to be the movement of workers between labor markets, not changes in wages. The point of departure is the received theory of rural urban migration in LDS, which is the model of Harris and Todaro (1970). The 1st step is a summary of the basic features of the model. While accepting their basic approach emphasizing movement of workers rather than changes in wages, it is shown that the particular implication of the model with respect to the equilibrium urban unemployment rate substantially overstates the rates actually observed by Turnham (1971) and others. The analysis is then extended to consider several important factors which have previously been neglected--a more generalized approach to the job search process, the possibility of underemployment in the so-called urban "murky sector," preferential treatment by employers of the better educated, and consideration of labor turnover--and demonstrate that the resulting framework gives predictions closer to actual experience. Harris and Todaro in their original discussion concluded that a combination of a wage subsidy in the modern sector and physical restriction of migration would be required to realize a first best state lying on the economy's production possibility frontier. Subsequently Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1974) challenged them and demonstrated that a first best solution can be achieved by means of a variety of alternative tax or subsidy schemes, none of which require migration restriction. This analysis suggests 3 additional policy variables, beyond those considered by either pair, which might be expected to have an important effect on the volume of unemployment and underemployment in LDCs: a smoothly functioning labor exchange would reduce the incentive to remain unemployed while searching for a superior job; the size of the educational system would also influence the amount of unemployment; and it is job hiring in the modern sector, more than the number of jobs, which primarily influences workers' locational decisions.     

Cash Transfers to the Poor and the Labor Market: An Equilibrium Analysis

This paper studies the effects of cash transfers to the poor on the labor market. This is investigated in a matching model with endogenous labor market participation and job destruction. Depending on their productivity, workers might want to stay in the job, become unemployed, or leave the labor market; in addition, workers out of the labor force might decide to search for a job. Cash transfers are introduced to all agents with income below a given level. Two qualitative results are found: (i) The size of cash transfers has a negative effect on the employment rate, but an ambiguous effect on the unemployment rate; and (ii) the coverage of this welfare program has a positive effect on the employment rate, and an ambiguous effect on the unemployment rate. The numerical simulations also show that: (i) if the government target is to reduce inequality and poverty, the more efficient policy is to increase the level of benefits instead of increasing the eligibility of the program; (ii) compared with a welfare program that condition eligibility to labor market participation, the “unconditional” cash transfer program has a stronger impact on inequality and poverty, but with a reduction in labor market participation and output.     

Welfare states and unemployment

Summary This paper studies equilibrium unemployment in a search model where the government both provides liberal unemployment insurance and taxes labor at high progressive tax rates. It is shown how progressive income taxation can counteract a high unemployment rate under generous unemployment insurance. In particular, high marginal taxes reduce workers' incentives to switch jobs in response to changing economic opportunities. This lower labor mobility reduces unemployment but at the cost of a less efficient labor allocation.We are grateful to William Dupor, Krishna Kumar, and Ashok Rai for excellent computer programming.     

Optimum income taxation and layoff taxes

This paper analyzes optimum income taxation in a model with endogenous job destruction that gives rise to unemployment. It is shown that optimal tax schemes comprise both payroll and layoff taxes when the state provides public unemployment insurance and aims at redistributing income. The optimal layoff tax is equal to the social cost of job destruction, which amounts to the sum of unemployment benefits (that the state pays to unemployed workers) and payroll taxes (that the state does not get when workers are unemployed).     

Minimum wages and youth unemployment

This paper constructs a labor search model to explore the effects of minimum wages on youth unemployment. To capture the gradual decline in unemployment for young workers as they age, the standard search model is extended so that workers gain experience when employed. Experienced workers have higher average productivity and lower job finding and separation rates that match wage and worker flow data. In this environment, minimum wages can have large effects on unemployment because they interact with a worker's ability to gain job experience. The increase in minimum wages between 2007 and 2009 can account for a 0.8 percentage point increase in the steady state unemployment rate and a 2.8 percentage point increase in unemployment for 15–24 year old workers in the model parameterized to simulate outcomes of high school educated workers. Minimum wages can also help explain the high rates of youth unemployment in France compared to the United States.     

Redistribution and employment policies with endogenous unemployment

We study optimal redistribution policy in an economy with three types of unemployed persons: those unable to work, the voluntarily unemployed, and the involuntarily unemployed. Both voluntary and involuntary unemployment are endogenous. Voluntary unemployment arises because individuals have different preferences, while involuntary unemployment results from frictions in the labour market or from an efficiency wage. We consider the employment policies of a well-informed government when it can and cannot commit to its policies. The model is simple, yet rich enough to reflect real-world policies, including transfers to the disabled, welfare for non-working employables, unemployment insurance, employment subsidies, and taxes on workers and firms.     

French unemployment: a transatlantic perspective

The paper compares the French and US labour markets. It shows that differences in unemployment rates are especially acute for young and old workers, but appear to be negligible for middle-aged workers. All French workers, however, experience job flows that are quite distinct from their American counterparts as they are exposed to long spells of infrequent unemployment, which is the opposite to the US case. Critical differences across ages and skills regarding the patterns of exit from and entry into employment are also displayed. The paper dispels the view that these differences originate from the behaviour of the unemployed (or the set of institutions that guide their decisions), and that this is new to the French labour market.     

Equilibrium unemployment, search behaviour and unemployment persistency

Unemployment persistency and high equilibrium unemployment isoften assumed to be caused by rigidities and low search efficiencyin the labour market, especially in European welfare stateswith generous income replacement schemes. These arguments aretested on data from Sweden, an old welfare state with a longperiod of full employment that has changed into a situationwith high unemployment. Data show a clear and very strong unemploymentduration dependency, but it is not possible to prove that thisis a result of low employability among the long-term unemployed.Getting a job is most of all associated with relative qualifications,recall expectations and local labour market conditions, andnot with search behaviour or high wage demands. It is arguedthat unemployment duration when unemployment is high can bestbe understood as a selection process rather than a search process,and that econometric estimations of equilibrium unemploymentare too pessimistic about the potential for an expansive economicpolicy. It is also argued that an active labour market policyis a more efficient compliment to such a policy than changesin income replacement ratios.     

结构转型缓慢、失业严重和分配不公的制度症结

Usually 65%–80% of the employment can be taken by small-and-medium-sized enterprises in a country. The more small-and-medium-sized enterprises are active in the economy, the higher proportion of the middle income classes in the population, and the lower proportion of the poor people caused by unemployment and under-employment. Therefore, without changing the policy inclination to support gigantic or large companies we cannot solve the problem of surplus on labor force, urban unemployment and gap of income distribution. Now we may face the danger of developing into “the Latin-America trap”. At present we should focus on institutional reform of the government and promote the development of small-and-medium-sized enterprises.     

Migration,Unemployment, and Skill Downgrading

In this paper, we analyze the labor market impacts of immigration under flexible and rigid labor market regimes. A general equilibrium framework is developed, accounting for skill heterogeneity and labor market frictions, where unemployed medium‐skilled manufacturing workers are downgraded into low‐skilled service jobs, while low‐skilled service workers might end up unemployed. The analytical analysis shows that medium‐skill immigration decreases low‐skilled unemployment under the flexible regime, indicating a complementarity effect, while the rigid regime induces a substitution effect, leading to low‐skilled unemployment. Moreover, it leads to wage polarization. In a numerical analysis, the economic effects of different migration scenarios are quantified.     

The impact of unemployment on inequality and poverty in OECD countries

The purpose of this research is to examine the contribution of unemployment to income inequality and poverty in various OECD countries. These relationships have been explored using Luxembourg Income Study micro-data. Considerable differences across OECD countries are revealed through the use of within-household unemployment distributions. These differences help to explain most of the observed divergences in the relationship between unemployment and income distribution, in conjunction with the heterogeneous influence of social benefits on the economic position of the unemployed in these countries. A sub-group decomposition analysis corroborates the limited effect of unemployment on income distribution in most of the considered countries. However, it seems clear that the unemployed are among those with the highest risk of experiencing poverty.
JEL classification: D31, I32, J31.