The economic debate on power: a Marxist critique

In the economic debate on power, seemingly opposite positions have been presented. Contractualists have claimed that power relations do not exist in capitalism, and radicals have maintained that they are ubiquitous. In the middle, transaction costs and property rights economists have argued that power relations exist only within the firm. The underlying conception, however, is the same: power is an interpersonal relation caused by imperfections in the decision-making context and is incompatible with Walrasian competition. The difference among these theories involves their viewpoints on the concrete spread of imperfections in reality. The thesis of this paper is that this narrow conception of power is a consequence of neoclassical methodology. Following Marx, I analyze power as a social relation, and I discuss three problematic aspects of the neoclassical conception: its individualistic methodology, the assumption of universal rather than historical categories, and an ontology that conflates production and circulation.     

Patriarchy versus Islam: Gender and Religion in Economic Growth

ABSTRACT

This contribution evaluates whether affiliation with Islam is a theoretically and statistically robust proxy for patriarchal preferences when studying the relationship between gender inequality and economic growth. A cross-country endogenous growth analysis shows that direct measures of patriarchal institutions dominate a variety of religious affiliation variables and model specifications in explaining country growth rates, and that using religious affiliation, particularly Islam, as a control for culture produces misleading conclusions. This result is robust to the inclusion of measures of gender inequality in education and income, indicating that establishing and maintaining patriarchal institutions (a process this study calls “patriarchal rent-seeking”) exact economic growth costs over and above those measured by standard gender inequality variables. One of the key contributions of this study is to draw on unique institutional data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Gender, Institutions and Development (GID) database to better understand the gendered dynamics of growth.     

经济自由及其变动的增长效应——来自跨国经济增长面板数据的再检视

经济自由是市场经济的基础，是社会基础设施（Social Infrastructure）的核心内涵。经济自由的提升有利于提高存量资本的生产配置效率，并对国内外投资给出积极信号，推动经济增长。本文在新古典经济增长理论框架下，研究各国社会基础设施发展水平的不同及其转型动态，用近百个国家的增长面板数据验证经济自由水平及其提升的增长效应。此外，本文还用动态面板数据的GMM估计方法检验发现，经济自由是经济增长的Granger原因，而后者不是前者的Granger原因。该结论对发展中国家的经济发展政策具有指导意义。     

Economic Synthesis: A Review of the Work of Boris Ischboldin

Current research on efficiency wages and transaction costs utilizes models of economic behavior that require a theory of market institutions. Yet the institutional structure of market exchange appears at odds with the neoclassical theory of markets under perfect competition. Both Samuel Bowles/Herbert Gintis and David Levine recognize this as a problem for traditional economic theory. Bowles and Gintis suggest that market power is a prerequisite for the effective utilization of resources within the capitalist enterprise. Levine identifies market exchange with the need for individuals to define for themselves a distinct way of life in order to secure the recognition of others and preserve the integrity of the self. The middle ground between a theory of market power and individual personality formation lies in the inherent social relations governing market exchange. By exploring this middle ground, market exchange can be presented as a set of communicative practices through which individual needs are shaped and power is either challenged or maintained.     

Policy making and rent-dissipation: An experimental test

We present a transfer-seeking model of political economy that links the theory of Becker (1983) with Tullock-type models of politically contestable rents. In our model the size of the transfer is determined endogenously, and over-dissipation of rents is predicted even under conditions of risk-neutrality and perfect rationality. We implement an empirical test of this model by collecting behavioral data in a laboratory experiment. We confirm the existence of behavior that leads to over-dissipation of rents in games with both symmetric and asymmetric political power. To the extent that the transfer-seeking costs are social costs, our findings imply that the total costs of running government might be greatly underestimated if the value of the rent is used as a proxy for the rent-seeking cost. We also confirm the hypotheses that lowering the political power of one player can lead to smaller rent-seeking expenditures and to larger transfers Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C91, D72     

When green isn't mean: economic theory and the heuristics of the impact of environmental regulations on competitiveness and opportunity cost

The conventional neoclassical economic wisdom argues that the opportunity costs of environmental regulations are high, with negative implications for costs and profits and, by implication, for growth and per capita gross domestic product (GDP). The minority view that environmental controls induce cost offsets that minimise such opportunity costs is marginalised by the conventional wisdom, which assumes that economic agents are x-efficient in production. A behavioral model of the firm is presented in this paper, whereby x-inefficiency in production prevails even in a world of perfect product market competition that is dominated by rational economic agents. In this model, environmental regulations affect both the level of x-efficiency and the extent of technological change and greener firms can be cost competitive and profitable. However, private economic agents cannot be expected to adopt ‘Green’ economic policy independent of regulations since, in this model, there need not be any economic advantage accruing to the affected firms in becoming greener.     

International Trade and Gender Wage Discrimination: Evidence from East Asia

The paper explores how competition from international trade affects gender wage discrimination in two open economies. According to neoclassical theory, if discrimination is costly, then increased industry competitiveness from international trade lessens the incentive for employers to discriminate against women. This effect should be stronger in concentrated sectors, where employers can use excess profits to cover the costs of discrimination. Alternatively, increased international trade may reduce women's bargaining power to achieve wage gains. Results for Taiwan and Korea indicate that, in contrast to neoclassical theory, competition from foreign trade in concentrated industries is positively associated with wage discrimination against women.     

Constitutional design for a rent-seeking society: Voting rule choice

If rent-seeking costs are considered in addition to, and separate from, external costs and decision costs in Buchanan and Tullock's economic theory of constitutions, total interdependence costs may have multiple local minima close to the decision-making extremes. As a result, the global minimum, which gives the optimal decision rule, may be much closer to “unanimity rule” or “individual rule” than to “simple majority rule”. Further, the comparison of the minimum total interdependence costs for the public sector with those for the private sector would only justify a smaller scope and size for the public sector than would be the case if rent-seeking costs were ignored. Finally, systematic variation in rent-seeking cost could account for dramatic regime shifts between dictatorship and democracy.     

Modelling Social Infrastructure and Economic Growth

This paper develops a growth model with a public sector and a human capital sector to explore the impact of social infrastructure on investment in physical capital, the accumulation of skills, output, and consumption. We show that the implications of the model are consistent with the empirical observations of Hall and Jones (1999 ). Economies where government policies and institutions encourage production over diversion have a larger 'stock' of social infrastructure, conditional on population size and sophistication of diversion technologies, which raises output per worker by increasing the extent of participation in market, rather than diversive, activities. The magnitude of these effects depends on economic agents' inherent propensity for rent-seeking. In addition, economies with unstable governments may suffer from an under-provision of social infrastructure and, consequently, have reduced levels of capital and output per worker.     

Social conflict and growth

Despite the predictions of the neoclassical theory of economic growth, we observe that poor countries have invested at lower rates and have not grown faster than rich countries. To explain these empirical regularities we provide a game-theoretic model of conflict between social groups over the distribution of income. Among all possible equilibria, we concentrate on those that are on the constrained Pareto frontier. We study how the level of wealth and the degree of inequality affects growth. We show how lower wealth can lead to lower growth and even to stagnation when the incentives to domestic accumulation are weakened by redistributive considerations.     

Money as a medium of exchange and monetary growth in an underdevelopment context

This paper constructs a neoclassical monetary growth model applicable to less developed economies, in that (1) the economy is assumed to be labour-surplus (as a result of which its steady-state growth rate is an endogenous variable), and (2) differential savings propensities on the part of profit- and wage-earners are postulated. The model predicts that an increase in the rate of monetary expansion increases the steady-state rate of inflation, increases the capital-labour ratio, reduces the money-labour ratio, and reduces the steady-state growth rate. Because of this last-mentioned fact, an inflationary policy is held to be unfavorable to economic development, despite the fact that it increases the capital-labour ratio. Some implications of the analysis for the well-known ‘choice of techniques’ problem are also discussed.     

Sustainable Development in Affluent Countries and the Neo-Institutionalist Synthesis

Since development is a process rather than an end-state, all countries are always in a constant state of change, regardless of their level of income. This article focuses on the challenges that affluent countries face today in shifting to a sustainable development path. These challenges include improving the quality of life, achieving environmental sustainability, and addressing inequality. In the United States in particular, these challenges have increased in recent decades, despite significant economic growth. The neoclassical development model assumes that growth makes it easier to achieve sustainable development and that wellbeing rises with per capita income. We question these assumptions, and find a theory of economic development in institutional economics that better explains and accommodates sustainability. We draw on the work of many original institutionalist economists (OIE), and others working in this tradition, to analyze the challenges of sustainable development in affluent countries, especially in the United States.     

ON THE CONCEPT OF POWER IN ECONOMICS

In this paper we start with the standard definition of power and indicate how orthodox neoclassical economics fails to handle some of the key issues of power. In Sections II and III we discuss in the context of recent advances in economic theory some of the battlefields, so to speak, for the exercise of power: bargaining games in Section II and economic organizations and capitalist authority relations in Section III. In all of this we focus on the underlying structural factors. In the last Section we discuss some problems with both the behavioral and structural concepts of power.     

Growth Volatility and Technical Progress: A Simple Rent-seeking Model

Recent empirical evidence demonstrates that a higher level of technical progress is associated with a lower level of growth volatility and higher expected economic growth. This paper builds a simple growth model which combines the insights of Angeletos and Kollintzas (2000) and Tse (2000; 2001; 2002) with endogenous productivity growth and rent-seeking behavior to account for these stylized facts. Our model complements the literature that focuses on the heterogeneity of different agents.     

On evolutionary technological change and economic growth: Lakatos as a starting point for appraisal

This paper proposes a discussion on evolutionary technological change and economic growth theory, using the Lakatosian Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes as an appraisal criterion. Since the persistence of some inflexibility in this approach made it difficult to capture fundamental features of the scientific undertaking at hand, an alternative hypothesis was explored, that developed by Hoover (Scientific research program or tribe? A joint appraisal of Lakatos and the new classical macroeconomics. In: de Marchi N, Blaug M (eds) Appraising economic theories: studies in the methodology of research programmes. Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1991). This latter framework is used here not as a formal methodology but rather as a language to find patterns in these theories. This exercise evolved then towards a number of considerations on the confrontation between these evolutionary theories particularly in terms of that which can be seen (in a loose sense) as their “rival research programme”, the new neoclassical growth models.     

Economic growth and endogenous intergenerational altruism

The recent literature on the endogenous formation of preferences has emphasized that while some preferences are more conducive to growth than others, economic growth also contributes to the formation of particular tastes [Becker, Gary S. (1996): Accounting for Tastes, Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press]. In this paper, we construct a neoclassical growth model where intergenerational altruism can be endogenously reinforced and entails costly sacrifices on the part of parents to acquire such trait. While the incentives to acquire altruistic traits depend on the economic conditions, in turn altruism determines the level of intergenerational bequests and ultimately the pace of capital accumulation and economic growth. It is shown that intergenerational transfers are driven by a natural degree of altruism at earlier stages of economic growth. Once individuals have satisfied their own physiological constraint in the course of economic development, they devote resources to shaping their altruistic preferences, increasing their social degree of altruism above its natural level. This in turn increases the share of intergenerational transfers and speeds up economic growth.     

Decentralization,agency costs,and the new economic constitution of China

This article examines the evolution of the rules that govern central-local government relations in the Chinese political economy. Although the federalism that accompanied China’s market reforms has substantially facilitated economic growth, it has also created powerful incentives for local authorities to abuse their powers, significantly increasing the agency costs to the central government of maintaining political stability and creating a national market. This article analyzes the institutional design of the nascent Anti-Monopoly Law (AML), known to officials and academics as China’s new “Economic Constitution”. It demonstrates that the major purpose of the AML is to break up the so-called “administrative monopolies”, or bureaucratic fiefdoms over local economies. In contrast to existing academic treatment, it will study the AML in the framework of competition for influence over economic policy between rent-seeking central and local actors. It argues that the AML, despite its stated purposes, is indeed designed to reduce the policy-making powers of the regions to the comparative advantage of the central government. The AML can thus be modeled as a new constitutional contract that the center wishes to enter into with the localities in order to repeal the existing rules of decentralization. It will be further shown that the AML, reflecting the allocation of power in the Chinese state, prioritizes the political imperatives of recentralization over the facilitation of competitive markets.     

The new institutional economics and its relevance to social economics

There has been a quiet revolution in economic theory, led by the New Institutionalists. Pioneered by Douglass C. North, this group argues that institutions are the main determinants of economic performance, yet neoclassical economics has no role for institutions. Contrary to many misconceptions, this theory of institutions can be integrated with neoclassical economics, leaving mainstream economic theory in tact, but broader and more relevant. The purpose of this article is twofold. First, the main arguments of the New Institutionalists are summarized. Second, the bridge between institutions and social economics is explored. The article concludes by arguing that the New Institutional approach is fruitful, and that the theory will gradually be integrated with neoclassical economics, until the two merge into a single body of theory.