The effectiveness of R&D subsidies

In this paper, the effectiveness of R&D subsidies is analyzed in an oligopolistic model that we apply to the cases of international R&D competition and cooperation. We find that the existence of asymmetric information among firms on whether a rival (or partner) is being subsidized or not may play a key role in explaining whether subsidies are effective or not in increasing R&D investments. In particular, it is shown that if the existence of the subsidy is made public (e.g. because strict information release regulation about R&D subsidies is enforced) and depending on the strategic relationship between the firms’ R&D efforts, an R&D subsidy could even hurt the subsidized firm.     

An Empirical Evaluation of The Effects of R&D Subsidies

R&D subsidies are a common tool of technology policy, but little is known about the effects they have on the behavior of firms. This paper presents evidence on the effects that R&D subsidies have on the R&D effort of recipients, and on the probability that a firm will participate in a program granting R&D subsidies. The empirical model consists of a system of equations: a participation equation; and an R&D effort equation. Endogeneity of public funding is controlled for. Estimates are obtained with a cross-section sample of Spanish firms. The main findings are that: 1) small firms are more likely to obtain a subsidy than large firms, probably reflecting one of the public agency's goals; 2) overall, public funding induces more private effort, but for some firms (30% of participants) full crowding out effects cannot be ruled out, and 3) firm size remains related to effort, whether or not a firm gets public funding.     

Spillovers,product innovation and R&D cooperation: a theoretical model

ABSTRACT

We analyze the impact of post-innovation knowledge spillovers on firms’ decisions to invest and cooperate in R&D, forming a research joint venture (RJV). We study the case of two potential investors involved in a non-tournament stochastic competition for developing a new but imitable product. We propose a theoretical model where cooperation may emerge as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a three-stage game. In the first stage, firms decide whether to cooperate; in the second, they decide whether to invest; and in the third, they compete. We show that firms cooperate in R&D when the spillovers are high enough and the fixed costs associated with R&D activities are low enough; however, our analysis suggests that forming an RJV may not always be socially optimal, and subsidizing R&D cooperation may not be efficient. We propose an optimal scheme of subsidies, which should be designed according to the intensity of the spillovers, the level of the R&D costs, and the probability of innovation success. Finally, we show that in the case of mergers the private incentive to invest is maximized, and firms may not need public subsidies to cooperate. When subsidies are costly, not hindering mergers may be the second-best solution.     

Public R&D subsidies,outside private support,and employment growth

In the aftermath of the passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the employment effects of public subsidies have been scrutinized because of new emphasis on public accountability and transparency. In this paper, we investigate conditions in which public subsidies of research and development (R&D) in small firms stimulate employment growth. We find, based on an empirical analysis of employment growth induced by US Department of Defense Small Business Innovation Research program awards, that the stimulated employment growth is greater under two conditions: one, the presence of outside investors providing additional funding for the R&D and, two, when an exceptional amount of intellectual property is created by the publicly subsidized R&D. In addition to outside investors, other firms that make commercial agreements with the subsidized firm appear important for the employment growth of the subsidized firm. Cooperation between the small business doing the R&D and other firms is an important determinant of the commercial success of the technologies created with the support of public funds.     

A matching analysis of why some firms in peripheral regions undertake R&D whereas others do not

Many studies have established the importance of investment in R&D to facilitate innovation and consequently improve firm productivity. Firms decide whether or not to undertake R&D depending on a range of factors such as market orientation, business objectives, competitive advantages and absorptive capacity. This paper studies the factors that influence this decision in peripheral locations; and for firms that do not undertake R&D, we analyse the reasons for not doing so. The research is based on data from a survey of some 250 matched firms operating in Northern Ireland, about half undertaking R&D and half not. Northern Ireland is an interesting case study because it exhibits a low level of investment in R&D despite the public subsidies and policy initiatives that have existed over the last 30 years. For firms that undertake R&D, our results mostly confirm the findings of others while for firms that do not undertake R&D the results point to a capabilities-gap rather than a resource-gap as the fundamental problem. Policy conclusions are drawn as to what might be done to boost both the amount of R&D undertaken and the number of firms engaged in R&D in peripheral regions.     

The impact of technology intermediaries on firm cognitive capacity additionality

Whereas the provision of R&D subsidies has been central to public policy for many years, governments have recently become increasingly involved in stimulating cooperation for innovation and R&D. In many countries, financial support for technology intermediaries has become one of the key measures of indirect public support. However, little research has assessed the impact of indirect policy measures. In this paper, we shed light on the conditions under which technology intermediaries contribute to knowledge and networking outcomes generated by the firms that call upon them. We hereby focus on firm network and competence additionality as measures for cognitive capacity additionality and study the impact of technology intermediaries on firms. In doing so, we distinguish between R&D and R&D related activity technology intermediaries engage in. The results indicate that absorptive capacity of the technology intermediary does not affect cognitive capacity additionality generated by firms in R&D activities, while the results for R&D related activities are mixed and depending on the type of cognitive capacity additionality studied. The absorptive capacity of firms does not directly affect cognitive capacity additionality, but the results of mediation analysis show that firms with higher levels of absorptive capacity use the services of the technology intermediary more intensively, and subsequently generate higher levels of cognitive capacity additionality.     

Input and output additionality of R&D subsidies

This article analyses the effects of public R&D subsidies on R&D input and output of German firms. We distinguish between the direct impact of subsidies on R&D investment and the indirect effect on innovation output measured by patent applications. We disentangle the productivity of purely privately financed R&D and additional R&D investment induced by the public incentive scheme. For this, a treatment-effect analysis is conducted in a first step. The results are implemented into the estimation of a patent production function in a second step. It turns out that both purely privately financed R&D and publicly induced R&D show a positive effect on patent outcome.     

Public Technology Infrastructure,R&D Sourcing,and Research Joint Ventures

In this paper, we define public technology infrastructure to mean public resources that bring new R&D into existence. Examples are public research that yields knowledge spillovers and government contracts that broker new research. Using this definition we explore the effect of public infrastructure on cooperative R&D, especially R&D sourcing and research joint ventures (RJVs). Our findings strongly suggest that public infrastructure promotes cooperative R&D. We begin by studying the role of federal laboratories in R&D sourcing by private laboratories, finding that sourcing increases as a result. Then we examine patents arising from RJVs sponsored by the Advanced Technology Program (ATP). We find that R&D subsidies as well as difficulty and novelty increase patents produced by the RJVs. Contractual oversight by ATP has no direct effect but an indirect effect appears to exist, since firms value ATP oversight more highly for more difficult and novel projects, and these produce more patents.     

Do subsidies have positive impacts on R&D and innovation activities at the firm level?

In this paper we analyze whether and how “research” and “development” subsidies influence private R&D activity. Our empirical results show that “research” subsidies stimulate R&D spending within firms while “development” subsidies substitute such spending. At the theoretical level we find empirical support for the market failure argument that private R&D expenditure is best stimulated in areas where the gap between the social and the private rate of return to R&D is high. A policy implication is that technology programs should support research projects in the private sector in order to stimulate to more R&D.     

On the impact of public policies and wage formation on business investment in research and development

Against the backdrop of mediocre growth prospects in many countries, governments should do more to promote private investment in research and development (R&D). Public fiscal policies and the characteristics of wage formation are key as they affect both the incentives that firms face and their resources. This paper studies their impact at the macro level in a panel of 14 OECD countries since 1981, while we also account for the impact of unobserved common factors like the world level of knowledge. Tax incentives, government intramural expenditures on R&D, public R&D subsidies (if they are not too low nor too high) and especially investment in tertiary education, encourage business R&D investment. Wage moderation may also contribute to innovation, but only in fairly closed economies and in economies with flexible labour markets. In highly open economies with rigid labour markets, high wage pressure promotes investment in R&D. Innovation may then be the only competitive strategy for firms.     

R&D subsidies in a model of growth with dynamic market structure

This paper presents the effects of an R&D subsidy in a Schumpeterian general equilibrium model with rich industry dynamics. R&D subsidies raise the long-run growth rate, but they also raise the level of industry concentration. In the model firms compete for market share through process R&D endogenously determining the market structure within and across industries. Endogeneity of the market structure allows for analysis of changes in the moments of the firm size distribution in response to policy. R&D subsidies primarily benefit large incumbent firms who increase their innovation rates creating a greater technological barrier to entry. Concentration increases with fewer firms and a higher variance in the market shares. In general equilibrium, the greater distortions in the product market cause the wage rate to fall which leads to increased turnover rates. In addition, the analysis demonstrates that the model captures a large number of empirical regularities described in the industrial organization literature, but absent from most endogenous growth models. These features, such as entering firms are small relative to incumbents, the hazard rate of exit is negatively related to firm size, and large firms spend more on R&D than small firms play important roles in understanding the impact of R&D subsidies on the economy.     

R&D policy in a vertically related industry

In this paper, we analyze the effectiveness of public policy aimed to stimulate business-performed R&D in a vertically related market. We examine the role of an R&D active upstream supplier in a four-stage R&D model, where we incorporate public funding. The considered policy instrument is direct funding of firms’ R&D efforts. We calculate the optimal policies and show that they have a positive impact on firms’ R&D investments. From a welfare point of view, it is optimal to differentiate the subsidy rates between the upstream and the downstream markets. Competition in the product market leads to a higher subsidy rate to the upstream supplier than to the downstream firms. When concentration is high in the downstream market, the optimal solution is an R&D subsidy for these firms, otherwise the optimal solution is an R&D tax for the downstream firms.     

Timing of innovation policies when carbon emissions are restricted: An applied general equilibrium analysis

This paper studies the timing of subsidies for emissions-saving research and development (R&D) and how innovation policy is influenced by a carbon tax. We develop a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model with both general R&D and specific emissions-saving R&D. We find two results that are important when subsidizing emissions-saving R&D in order to target inefficiencies in the research markets. First, the welfare gain from subsidies is larger when the carbon tax is high. This is because a high carbon tax raises the social value of the emissions-saving technology and that this increase in value is not fully appropriated by the private firms. Secondly, the welfare gain is greater when there is a falling time profile of the rate of subsidies for emissions-saving R&D, rather than a constant or increasing profile. The reason is that knowledge spillovers are larger in early periods.     

Subsidizing cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers

Comparing the effect on private R&D investments of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D with that of providing R&D subsidies reveals that in general the latter policy is more effective than the former in promoting R&D activity. Analyzing the implementation of both policies simultaneously reveals that subsidizing cooperative and noncooperative R&D leads to the same market outcome. The preferred R&D-stimulating policy is to subsidize optimally an agreement according to which firms only share the outcomes of their independent research.     

Incorporating innovation subsidies in the CDM framework: empirical evidence from Belgium

ABSTRACT

This paper integrates innovation input and output effects of R&D subsidies into a modified Crépon–Duguet–Mairesse (CDM) model. Our results largely confirm insights of the input additionality literature, i.e. public subsidies complement private R&D investment. In addition, results point to positive output effects of both purely privately funded and subsidy-induced R&D. Furthermore, we do not find evidence of a premium or discount of subsidy-induced R&D in terms of its marginal contribution on new product sales when compared to purely privately financed R&D.     

Subsidizing public inputs

If production–cost savings associated with successful research and development are freely disseminated to other firms as soon as they are realized, too few resources may be allocated to this activity. Subsidies to this activity, a public input, can lead to optimal input use. The effectiveness of four alternative subsidy instruments in stimulating firms’ R&D spending are examined. Two are incremental subsidies and two are level subsidies. One of the incremental subsidies and one of the level subsidies crudely capture characteristics of incentive mechanisms used in many countries. A laboratory implementation of these instruments confirms that incremental subsidies are inferior to level subsidies.     

Firm's objective function and product and process R&D

Firms undertake different kinds of R&D activities. They do product R&D (R&D aimed at improving the quality of existing products, and creating new products). They also do process R&D (R&D aimed at lowering the cost of making existing and new products). Moreover, firms often do both product and process R&D simultaneously. As far as the objective of firms is concerned, this need not be limited to profit-maximization only. Rather, firms may have a broader objective, where they care about profits as well as consumer surplus. This paper studies effects of a firm having a general objective function (that takes into consideration both profits and consumer surplus) on its product and process R&D choices, and corresponding implications.I consider product and process R&D choices of firms in an infinite horizon set-up with discrete time. Firms in my framework can simultaneously do both product and process R&D in every period, face a discrete-choice model of consumer demand with vertical product differentiation, and maximize a discounted, weighted sum of their profits and consumer surplus over the infinite time horizon.I show how process and product R&D differ from each other in my framework, and the role of a firm's objective function in this regard. I compare process and product R&D choices across firms that differ in their objective function, and illustrate effects of providing general R&D subsidies (subsidies given for any R&D, regardless of whether it is product or process R&D) to firms. I also characterize how in my framework, the choice of process R&D in total R&D — R&D composition — by an individual firm varies over time, and how process and product R&D choices, process and product R&D productivity, and the choice of R&D composition vary across firms that differ in size but are otherwise similar.     

Strategic R&D policy under multiproduct duopoly and quality-price competition

This paper analyses strategic R&D policy in a third-country trade model where multiproduct firms with different production technologies compete in a vertically differentiated market. I show that the optimal R&D policies for both countries are subsidies when the product market is under price competition.     

Does Firm Size make a Difference? Analysing the Effectiveness of R&D Subsidies in East Germany

We analyse the impact of public subsidies on private sector research and development (R&D) activity for a sample of East German firms. Using propensity score matching, our empirical results indicate that subsidized firms indeed show a higher level of R&D intensity (R&D expenditures relative to total turnover) and a higher probability for patent application compared with non‐subsidized firms. We find that, on average, the R&D intensity increases from 1.5% to 3.9%. The probability of patent application rises from 20% to 40%. These results closely match earlier empirical findings for East Germany. Given the fact that the East German innovation system is particularly driven by small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs), we draw special attention to the effectiveness of R&D subsidies for this latter subgroup. Here, no specific empirical evidence is available so far. Our findings indicate that policy effectiveness also holds for private R&D activity of SMEs, with the highest increase in terms of R&D intensity being estimated for microbusinesses with up to ten employees.