Elevating Repositioning Costs: Strategy Dynamics and Competitive Interactions

Research summary: This article proposes an approach for modeling competitive interactions that incorporates the costs to firms of changing strategy. The costs associated with strategy modifications, which we term “repositioning costs,” are particularly relevant to competitive interactions involving major changes to business strategies. Repositioning costs can critically affect competitive dynamics and, consequently, the implications of strategic interaction for strategic choice. While the literature broadly recognizes the importance of such costs, game‐theoretic treatments of major strategic change, with very limited exceptions, have not addressed them meaningfully. We advocate greater recognition of repositioning costs and illustrate with two simple models how repositioning costs may facilitate differentiation and affect the value of a firm's capability to reduce repositioning costs through investments in flexibility. Managerial summary: This article illustrates how the decision to make a strategic change is affected by both the cost to the firm of making the various strategy modifications, as well as the cost to its rivals of changing their strategies in response. These “repositioning costs” are important because they shape the responses each competitor would likely make to a move by the other competitor, and should be anticipated when considering an initial change to one's own strategy. The paper shows how repositioning costs can be used strategically to facilitate differentiation, and to assess the value of potential investments in flexibility. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Estimating Value Creation from Revealed Preferences: Application to Value‐based Strategies

Research summary : We develop and apply a new set of empirical tools consistent with the tenets of value‐based business strategies, leveraging the principle that “no good deal comes undone” and the methods of revealed preferences, to empirically estimate drivers of value creation. We demonstrate how to use these tools in an analysis of value creation in buyer–supplier relationships in the UK corporate legal market. We show that our approach can uncover evidence of subtle mechanisms that traditional methods cannot easily distinguish from each other. Furthermore, we show how the estimates can be used as parameters of biform games for out‐of‐sample analyses of strategic decisions. With readily available data on relationships between firms, this approach can be applied to many other contexts of interest to strategy researchers. Managerial summary : Managers need to understand the drivers of value creation for customers in order to make competitive positioning decisions and understand when they can capture value under competition. However, estimates of the relative importance of each driver are typically difficult to obtain. In this article, we help remedy this problem by demonstrating a novel method that obtains estimates of the contribution of various drivers of value creation from commonly available data of buyer–supplier relationships. These estimates can then be used to inform the strategy‐making process. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Corporate diversification and the value of individual firms: A Bayesian approach

Research summary: Prior theory suggests that the performance effects of a firm's diversification strategy depend on a firm's individual resources and capabilities and the setting within which it is operating. However, prior tests of this theory have examined the average diversification‐performance relationship across all firms, instead of estimating the diversification‐performance relationship at the individual firm level. Efforts to estimate this average relationship are inconsistent with a central assumption of much of strategic management theory—that firms maximize value by choosing strategies that exploit their heterogeneous resources and individual situation. By adopting an approach that allows an evaluation of the diversification‐performance relationship for individual firms, this article shows that firms, both focused and diversified, tend to choose that diversification strategy—focus, related diversification, or unrelated diversification—that maximizes value. Managerial summary: Instead of a universal diversification discount or premium, this article shows that the effect of diversification on performance is heterogeneously distributed across firms and that firms tend to be rational in their diversification decisions. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

From autonomous strategic behavior to emergent strategy

This study develops a model of emergent strategy formation at a large telecommunications firm. It integrates prominent traditions in strategy process research—strategy as patterned action, as iterated resource allocation and as practice—to show how emergent strategy originates as a project through autonomous strategic behavior, then subsequently becomes realized as a consequence of mobilizing wider support to provide impetus, manipulating strategic context to legitimate the project by constructing it as consonant with the prevailing concept of strategy, and altering structural context to embed it within organizational units, routines, and objectives. The study theorizes the role of “practices of strategy articulation” in emergent strategy formation, and explains why some autonomous strategic behavior becomes “ephemeral” and disappears rather than enduring to become emergent strategy. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does a long‐term orientation create value? Evidence from a regression discontinuity

Research summary : In this paper, we theorize and empirically investigate how a long‐term orientation impacts firm value. To study this relationship, we exploit exogenous changes in executives' long‐term incentives. Specifically, we examine shareholder proposals on long‐term executive compensation that pass or fail by a small margin of votes. The passage of such “close call” proposals is akin to a random assignment of long‐term incentives and hence provides a clean causal estimate. We find that the adoption of such proposals leads to (1) an increase in firm value and operating performance—suggesting that a long‐term orientation is beneficial to companies—and (2) an increase in firms' investments in long‐term strategies such as innovation and stakeholder relationships. Overall, our results are consistent with a “time‐based” agency conflict between shareholders and managers. Managerial summary : This paper shows that corporate short‐termism is hampering business success. We show clear, causal evidence that imposing long‐term incentives on executives—in the form of long‐term executive compensation—improves business performance. Long‐term executive compensation includes restricted stocks, restricted stock options, and long‐term incentive plans. Firms that adopted shareholder resolutions on long‐term compensation experienced a significant increase in their stock price. This stock price increase foreshadowed an increase in operating profits that materialized after two years. We unpack the reasons for these improvements in performance, and find that firms that adopted these shareholder resolutions made more investments in R&D and stakeholder engagement, especially pertaining to employees and the natural environment. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The external knowledge sourcing process in multinational corporations

Research summary: We study the processes through which multinational corporations (MNCs) identify and make use of external sources of knowledge. Based on a seven‐year longitudinal study of one MNC's overseas scouting unit, we show how a simple one‐directional “channelling” process gradually gave way to three higher value‐added processes, labelled “translating,” “matchmaking,” and “transforming.” Building on these insights, we develop an integrative framework, defining the conditions under which each of the four processes is likely to transpire, and showing how the stock of social capital held by the scouting unit allows it to perform increasingly high value‐added activities over time. Implications for the MNC, external knowledge sourcing, and boundary‐spanning literatures are discussed. Managerial summary: Over the years, many multinational corporations (MNCs) have created overseas “scouting” units to tap into new ideas and opportunities in leading‐edge markets, but with mixed outcomes. In this study, we describe the development of a European telecom firm's scouting unit in Silicon Valley during the 2000s, focusing on the specific approaches used by the scouting managers to build effective connections between Silicon Valley start‐ups and the firm's business units back in Europe. We identify four distinct approaches for different types of opportunities, and we observe a clear sequencing of effort over time as the scouting managers built the necessary capabilities and credibility. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategic NPV: Real Options and Strategic Games under Different Information Structures

Research summary : Among the most difficult firm strategic choices is the trade‐off between making a long‐term commitment or holding off on investment in the face of uncertainty. To operationalize strategic management theory under demand, technological and competitive uncertainty, we develop a Strategic Net Present Value (NPV) framework that integrates real options and game theory to quantify value components and interactions at the interface between NPV, real options, and strategic games. Our approach results in new propositions clarifying the way learning‐experience conditions, technological uncertainty, and proprietary information interact to tilt the balance in the interplay between wait‐and‐see flexibility and strategic commitment. As such, Strategic NPV adds to our understanding of the conditions where NPV, real options, or strategic thinking are more relevant. Managerial summary : This study develops and elucidates implementation of a new valuation construct, “Strategic Net Present Value (NPV),” that integrates real options and game theory to more accurately portray strategic decisions underlying management theory. Among the most difficult firm strategic choices in capital intensive industries, such as energy, mining, chip manufacturing, and infrastructure development, is the trade‐off between making a long‐term commitment or holding off on investment in the face of demand, technological, and competitive uncertainties. The study provides new insights on the way various conditions, such as learning‐experience effects, technological uncertainty, and proprietary information, interact to tilt the balance in the interplay between commitment and wait‐and‐see flexibility. As such, Strategic NPV adds to our understanding of when NPV, real options, or strategic thinking matter more critically for decision making. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Context matters: Diversity's short‐ and long‐term effects in fortune's “best companies to work for”

Research summary: Previous research has examined the racial diversity‐productivity relationship in corporations with an evident high commitment to minority programs, Fortune's “Best Companies for Minorities.” To assess generalizability, we replicate this research using a different context of high organizational‐employee value congruence, Fortune's “Best Companies to Work For.” We are not able to find evidence for the curvilinear relationships previously found, but do uncover a linear negative relationship between racial diversity and short‐run performance. Managerial summary: Using Fortune's “Best Companies for Minorities,” previous research found that racial diversity affected both firm productivity and Tobin's q. To see if we could find these results in a different group of firms, we replicate this research using a sample drawn from Fortune's “Best Companies to Work For.” The former sample is distinguished by high commitment to minority programs, while the one used here stresses high congruence of values between the organization and all its employees. We are unable to replicate the relationships previously found, however, but do find that increasing racial diversity had a negative effect on firm productivity. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mental representation and the discovery of new strategies

Research summary : Managers' mental representations affect the perceived payoffs and alternatives that managers consider. Thus, mental representations affect how managers search for profitable strategies as well as the quality of strategies they discover. To study how mental representation and search interact, we formally model the dual search over possible representations and over policy choices of a strategy “landscape.” We analyze when it is preferable to emphasize searching for the best policies rather than the best mental representation, and vice versa. We show that, in the long run, a balance between the two search modes not only results in better expected performance, but also reduces the variation in performance. Additionally, the article describes conditions under which increased accuracy of mental representations can actually worsen firm performance. Managerial summary : Managers' mental representations affect the perceived payoffs and alternatives that managers consider. Thus, mental representations affect the quality of strategies managers can discover. We analyze a computer simulation of how managers use mental representations to search for strategies. This sheds light on how managers should deal with the trade‐off between searching for policies and searching for representations; that is, whether managers should think creatively about how to represent a strategy problem or whether they should just stick to the current problem understanding, and try to find ways to improve performance as suggested by the current representation. We provide insight regarding the balance between the two search modes and describe conditions under which increasingly accurate mental representations can worsen firm performance. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The impact of technical consultants on the quality of their clients' products: Evidence from the Bordeaux wine industry

Research summary : Recent research rooted in the resource‐based view of the firm suggests that resources are more likely to create value if they are effectively managed. An underlying assumption of the literature is that firms manage their resources on their own. However, many firms hire consultants to help them do so. In this study, I develop and test hypotheses regarding the impact of technical consultants on the quality of their clients' products. Using data from the Bordeaux wine industry, I find evidence that the use of technical consultants has a positive impact on relative product quality and a negative impact on the extremeness of relative product quality. Moreover, the positive impact of technical consultants on relative product quality is stronger at lower levels of relative resource quality. Managerial summary : Findings from a study in the Bordeaux wine industry indicate that the decision to hire consultants should depend on a firm's strategy. If a firm wants to improve its performance, it should hire consultants. Indeed, the “best practices” of technical consultants are generally more valuable than internally generated knowledge. If a firm wants to achieve outstanding performance, hiring consultants may not be the right decision. Because the “best practices” of technical consultants have more certain performance implications than internally generated knowledge, they decrease the likelihood of extremely low performance. However, their lack of uniqueness also decreases the likelihood of extremely high performance. Finally, the decision to hire consultants should depend on the quality of a firm's resources. Firms with low‐quality resources tend to benefit more from the “best practices” of technical consultants. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Time and Space in Strategy Discourse: Implications for Intertemporal Choice

Research summary : When describing the future, executives draw analogies between time and space (“we are on the right path,” “the deadline is approaching”). These analogies shape how executives construe the future and influence attitudes to action with long‐term benefits but short‐term costs. Ego‐moving frames (“we are approaching the future”) prompt a focus on the present, whereas time‐moving frames (“the future is approaching”) underscore the advent of the future as inevitable. Ultimately, action that prioritizes long‐term returns depends both on how executives conceive of the future and whether they believe they can engender favorable outcomes. This balance between recognizing the inevitability of the future (time‐moving frame) and the capacity to shape outcomes (control beliefs) stands in contrast to the more agentic forms of discourse that are dominant in strategy . Managerial summary : Executives often prioritize maximizing immediate returns over investing to build a long‐term competitive advantage. How they think about the future offers one explanation for this short‐termism. This article distinguishes two ways of framing the future with implications for decision‐making. Are we approaching the future (the ego‐moving frame) or is it approaching us (the time‐moving frame)? As long as executives have confidence in their ability to achieve forecasted results, they focus on long‐term returns in their decision‐making when they recognize the advent of the future as inevitable (the time‐moving frame). In contrast, though executives use the ego‐moving frame to show that they are active agents, they weigh future returns less heavily when framing the future in this way . Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Is there a “Dark Side” to Monitoring? Board and Shareholder Monitoring Effects on M&A Performance Extremeness

Research summary: W e investigate the effects of monitoring by boards of directors and institutional shareholders on merger and acquisition (M&A ) performance extremeness using a sample of M&A deals from 1997 to 2006. Both governance research and legal reforms generally have espoused a “raise all boats” view of monitoring. We instead investigate whether monitoring may serve as a double‐edged sword that limits CEO discretion to undertake both value‐destroying M&A deals and value‐creating ones. Our findings indicate that the relationship between monitoring and M&A performance is more complex than previously believed. Rather than “raising all boats” in a shift towards better M&A outcomes, monitoring instead is associated with lower M&A losses, but also with lower M&A gains . Managerial summary: M ergers and acquisitions (M&A s) are a quintessential corporate activity. There were $3.8 trillion worth of M&A deals in 2015, despite scholars and practitioners reporting that M&A s often perform poorly. We question the widespread belief that more vigilant monitoring by boards of directors and large shareholders will raise M&A performance, overall. Put differently, does monitoring constrain CEO s' discretion to pursue bad deals, while simultaneously encouraging them to pursue good ones? We find that monitoring limits both large M&A losses and large M&A gains. Contrary to widely held beliefs, our results indicate that constraining executives' ability to pursue value‐destroying M&A deals does not simultaneously encourage or enable CEO s to pursue value‐creating deals . Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cross‐border mergers and acquisitions: The role of private equity firms

Research summary: We show that private equity ownership (“PE backing”) of the acquirer is a signal of deal quality in cross‐border takeovers. As such, PE‐backed acquirers experience higher announcement returns in cross‐border takeovers, but only if targets are in poor information environments. We show that PE backing is a positive market signal because of PE firms' experience and networks that result from prior deals in target countries. We document that the market correctly anticipates that operating performance of PE‐backed acquirers increases as a result of cross‐border mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Managerial summary: We study cross‐border acquisitions by acquirers that are partially owned by private equity firms (“PE backing”). Cross‐border acquisitions are challenging as acquirers often have little information about targets. We document that investors react positively to cross‐border deals of PE‐backed acquirers—their stock prices increase upon deal announcements. However, this is only the case if targets are in countries with poor information environments. This is because PE backing allows acquirers to access PE firms' deal experience and networks. This makes it easier to identify and evaluate good targets, making it more (less) likely that a deal eventually creates (destroys) value. Consistent with this, we find that earnings of PE‐backed acquirers increase after buying targets in poor information environments. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Towards a theory of ecosystems

Research Summary: The recent surge of interest in “ecosystems” in strategy research and practice has mainly focused on what ecosystems are and how they operate. We complement this literature by considering when and why ecosystems emerge, and what makes them distinct from other governance forms. We argue that modularity enables ecosystem emergence as it allows a set of distinct yet interdependent organizations to coordinate without full hierarchical fiat. We show how ecosystems address multilateral dependences based on various types of complementarities—supermodular or unique, unidirectional or bidirectional—which determine the ecosystem's value‐add. We argue that at the core of ecosystems lie nongeneric complementarities, and the creation of sets of roles that face similar rules. We conclude with implications for mainstream strategy and suggestions for future research. Managerial Summary: We consider what makes ecosystems different from other business constellations, including markets, alliances, or hierarchically managed supply chains. Ecosystems, we posit, are interacting organizations, enabled by modularity, not hierarchically managed, bound together by the nonredeployability of their collective investment elsewhere. Ecosystems add value as they allow managers to coordinate their multilateral dependence through sets of roles that face similar rules, thus obviating the need to enter into customized contractual agreements with each partner. We explain how different types of complementarities (unique or supermodular, generic or specific, uni‐ or bi‐directional) shape ecosystems and offer a “theory of ecosystems” that can explain what they are, when they emerge, and why alignment occurs. Finally, we outline the critical factors affecting ecosystem emergence, evolution, and success—or failure.     

Home Alone: The Effects of Lone‐Insider Boards on CEO Pay,Financial Misconduct,and Firm Performance

Research summary: Corporate scandals of the previous decade have heightened attention on board independence. Indeed, boards at many large firms are now so independent that the CEO is “home alone” as the lone inside member. We build upon “pro‐insider” research within agency theory to explain how the growing trend toward lone‐insider boards affects key outcomes and how external governance forces constrain their impact. We find evidence among S&P 1500 firms that having a lone‐insider board is associated with (a) excess CEO pay and a larger CEO‐top management team pay gap, (b) increased likelihood of financial misconduct, and (c) decreased firm performance, but that stock analysts and institutional investors reduce these negative effects. The findings raise important questions about the efficacy of leaving the CEO “home alone.” Managerial summary: Following concerns that insider‐dominated boards failed to protect shareholders, there has been a push for greater board independence. This push has been so successful that the CEO is now the only insider on the boards of more than half of S&P 1500 firms. We examine whether lone‐insider boards do in fact offer strong governance or whether they enable CEOs to benefit personally. We find that lone‐insider boards pay CEOs excessively, pay CEOs a disproportionately large amount relative to other top managers, have more instances of financial misconduct, and have lower performance than boards with more than one insider. Thus, it appears that lone‐insider boards do not function as intended and firms should reconsider whether the push towards lone‐insider boards is actually in shareholders' best interests. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Agency,structure, and the dominance of OEMs: Change and stability in the automotive sector

Research summary: This article reviews structural change in the automotive sector from 1997 to 2007. We find that, following internal framing contests, Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) led efforts to change their sector's architecture, starting from both strong and weak competitive positions and working with suppliers to advocate a new vision based on modularity and outsourcing. As the risks and costs of this vision became apparent, OEMs were able to reverse course and reaffirm their hierarchical control on the sector, taking advantage of structural features that weren't salient ex ante. We consider why certain OEMs initiated this status‐quo challenging change, and identify how sector structure mediated their (and suppliers') efforts to implement it. We document the complex change process, driven by agency, structure, and heterogeneity in firms' understanding of their sector's architecture. Managerial summary: We study the “industry architecture” (i.e., division of labor and profit) of the automotive sector. During the late 1990s, Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) embraced a new vision, based on “Modularity + Outsourcing,” inspired by an analogy with Personal Computers (PCs). This seems puzzling since such a change was hard to implement and could have led to OEMs relinquishing strategic control of the sector. The misstep was caused by internal framing contests and the agendas and influence of suppliers, consultants, and academics. We also consider why OEMs were able to partially reverse these changes, and document the role of structural features that let them control their sector and retain value: managing the customer experience, acting as guarantors of quality, and preserving hierarchical supply chains in which they functioned as system integrators. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Organizational adaptation to interdependence shifts: The role of integrator structures

R esearch summary: We investigate how organizational adaptation to interdependence shifts is influenced by “integrators.” These are formally mandated managerial roles meant to promote coordination across specialized but interdependent organizational subunits, yet they do so without relying on formal authority. While much has been learned about how integrators promote steady‐state coordination within a known pattern of interdependence, less is known about their impact on organizational adaptation when the pattern of interdependence itself is unknown. We discuss mechanisms by which integrators may nonetheless aid organizational adaptation and learning processes in such situations, and test our hypotheses in the context of a regulatory change that affected the in vitro fertilization (IVF) clinics sector in the United Kingdom using a differences‐in‐differences design. M anagerial summary: Organizational structure can influence how an organization adapts to change. We investigate how a regulatory change in the provision of fertility treatments in the United Kingdom forced clinics to change their workflows, and whether the presence of integrator roles enabled clinics to adapt to these changes. It is well known that integrator roles in general are valuable in coordinating across specialized organizational units, but this research points to the surprising implication that their value may persist even when the workflow being coordinated changes suddenly, in ways that nobody necessarily comprehends. Our research highlights the fact that even in an intensively science‐based work context, the “technology of organizing” can have a significant role in shaping organizational performance. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Value creation through stakeholder synergy

Our “stakeholder synergy” perspective identifies new value creation opportunities that are especially effective strategically because a single strategic action (1) increases different types of value for two or more essential stakeholder groups simultaneously, and (2) does not reduce the value already received by any other essential stakeholder group. This result is obtainable because multiple potential sources of value creation exist for each essential stakeholder group. Actions that meet these criteria increase the size of the value “pie” available for essential stakeholder groups, and thereby serve to attract exceptional stakeholders and obtain their increasing effort and commitment. The stakeholder synergy perspective extends stakeholder theory further into the strategy realm, and offers insights for realizing broader value creation that is more likely to produce sustainable competitive advantage. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The disruptor's dilemma: TiVo and the U.S. television ecosystem

Research summary: Firms introducing disruptive innovations into multisided ecosystems confront the disruptor's dilemma: gaining the support of the very incumbents they disrupt. Through a longitudinal study of TiVo, a company that pioneered the Digital Video Recorder, we examine how these firms may address this dilemma. Our analysis reveals how TiVo navigated coopetitive tensions by continually adjusting its strategy, its technology platform, and its relational positioning within the evolving U.S. television industry ecosystem. We theorize how (1) disruption may affect not just specific incumbents, but also the entire ecosystem; (2) coopetition is not just dyadic, but also multilateral and intertemporal, and (3) strategy is both a deliberative and emergent process involving continual adjustments, as the disruptor attempts to balance coopetitive tensions over time. Managerial summary: New entrants confront a dilemma when they introduce a disruptive innovation into an existing business ecosystem, viz., how can they gain the support of the incumbents that their innovation disrupts? Confronting this “disruptor's dilemma”, the disruptor must consider several issues: How might it pitch its innovation to attract end customers and yet reduce the threat of disruption perceived by ecosystem incumbents? How can the innovation be modified to fit into legacy systems while transforming them? Based on an in‐depth analysis of TiVo and its entrepreneurial journey, we explore the strategies disruptors can deploy to address these issues. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do‐no‐harm versus do‐good social responsibility: Attributional thinking and the liability of foreignness

Research summary: The efforts of multinational corporations to be socially responsible do not always engender positive evaluations from overseas stakeholders. Drawing on attribution theory, we argue that two heuristics guide stakeholders in evaluating firms' social performance: foreignness and the valence of firms' social responsibility. We provide evidence from a field study of secondary stakeholders and an experimental study involving 129 non‐governmental organizations. Consistent with attribution theory, the liability of foreignness is minimized when firms engage in “do‐good” social responsibility (focused on proactive engagement creating positive externalities) but is substantial when firms engage in “do‐no‐harm” social responsibility (focused on attenuating negative externalities). In online supporting information, Appendix S1, we demonstrate that these evaluations have consequences for whether stakeholders subsequently cooperate, or sow conflict, with firms. Managerial summary: There is no guarantee that efforts to be socially responsible will improve multinational corporations' relations with overseas stakeholders, such as customers, governments, and activists. In a field study and an experiment, we unpack when foreign firms suffer from harsh stakeholder evaluations. Foreign firms especially suffer from harsh evaluations when they conduct “do‐no‐harm” CSR rather than “do‐good” CSR. Stakeholders attribute the motive for foreign firms' do‐no‐harm CSR to managerial interests and shareholder pressures, perceiving a wedge between managers and owners (who may be unmotivated to reduce the negative impacts of their business activities) and local stakeholders (who bear the social costs). A practical implication is that foreign firms gain more from highlighting do‐good rather than do‐(no)‐harm CSR initiatives. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.