On the strategic value of risk management

This article examines how firms facing volatile input prices and holding some degree of market power in their product market link their risk management and their production or pricing strategies. This issue is relevant in many industries ranging from manufacturing to energy retailing, where firms that are rendered “risk averse” by financial frictions decide on and commit to their hedging strategies before their product market strategies. We find that commitment to hedging modifies the pricing and production strategies of firms. This strategic effect is channeled through the risk-adjusted expected cost, i.e., the expected marginal cost under the probability measure induced by shareholders' “risk aversion”. It has opposite effects depending on the nature of product market competition: commitment to hedging toughens quantity competition while it softens price competition. Finally, not committing to the hedging position can never be an equilibrium outcome: committing is always a best response to non-committing. In the Hotelling model, committing is a dominant strategy for all firms.     

Competition under capacitated dynamic lot-sizing with capacity acquisition

Lot-sizing and capacity planning are important supply chain decisions, and competition and cooperation affect the performance of these decisions. In this paper, we look into the dynamic lot-sizing and resource competition problem of an industry consisting of multiple firms. A capacity competition model combining the complexity of time-varying demand with cost functions and economies of scale arising from dynamic lot-sizing costs is developed. Each firm can replenish inventory at the beginning of each period in a finite planning horizon. Fixed as well as variable production costs incur for each production setup, along with inventory carrying costs. The individual production lots of each firm are limited by a constant capacity restriction, which is purchased up front for the planning horizon. The capacity can be purchased from a spot market, and the capacity acquisition cost fluctuates with the total capacity demand of all the competing firms. We solve the competition model and establish the existence of a capacity equilibrium over the firms and the associated optimal dynamic lot-sizing plan for each firm under mild conditions.     

The dynamic provision of product diversity under duopoly

This paper builds a dynamic duopoly model to examine the provision of new varieties over time. Consumers experience temporary satiation, and hence higher consumption of the current variety lowers demand for future varieties. The equilibrium can be characterized by a combination of monopolistic pricing and nearly zero profits (competitive timing). In particular, if the cost of producing a new variety is not too low then firms tend to avoid head-to-head competition and set the short-run profit maximizing price. However, firms tend to introduce new varieties as soon as demand has grown sufficiently to cover costs. From a second best perspective, the equilibrium may exhibit excessive product diversity. However, if firms coordinate their frequency of new product introductions, then consumers are likely to be harmed. It is also shown that equilibrium prices are moderated by two factors. First, consumers’ option value of waiting reduces their willingness to pay. Second, competition reduces firms’ incentives to engage in intertemporal price discrimination.     

Assessing performance of utilizing organizational modularity to manage supply chains: Evidence in the US manufacturing sector

Recent competition and customization have motivated manufacturers to institute modular organizations to manage supply chains. Proclaimed as a paradigm shift, organizational modularity manifests agility and flexibility to diversify product offerings, utilize production capacity, and allocate network capital and assets. Whereas studies have conceptualized the impacts of modular organizations, large-scale research that examines modularity's impacts on performance are lacking. The study assesses the impacts of organizational modularity in the US manufacturing sector. A set of hypotheses proposes that higher level of modularity is associated with higher efficiency and profitability. I found modularity to negatively affect product specialization and positively impact capacity utilization, ROI and ROA. The findings help to determine the robustness of utilizing the modularity for complex supply chain coordination.     

Technological evolution and competitive response

This paper focuses and extends some emerging views on technological evolution and competition. First, that over the evolution of many product-market segments there is a generalizable pattern, a shift from the investment characteristics of product technology to those of process technology as the primary focus of competition. Eventually, market price falls below production costs, not because firms face U-shaped cost curves, but because of shifts in demand to the innovative form of the product. To this framework is added a hypothesis on the evolving risk structure of rival investments. The interaction of required and realized returns then provides a stopping rule for technologically-driven competition which is different from the static case. Because technological change within a segment is non-controllable but predictable the production functions and organization structures of participating firms must change in generalizable ways which can be used to predict industry structure. For the competing organization, these changes require particular kinds of decisions which are particularly suited to the level of the organization's strategic management.     

The bullwhip effect in capacitated supply chains with consideration for product life-cycle aspects

This paper presents an analysis of the bullwhip effect and net-stock amplification in a three-echelon supply chain considering step-changes in the production rates during a product's life-cycle demand. The analysis is focused around highly complex and engineered products (e.g., automobiles), that have relatively long production life-cycles and require significant capital investment in manufacturing. Using a simulation approach, we analyze three stages of the product life-cycle including low volumes during product introduction, peak demand, and eventual decline toward the end of the life-cycle. Parts of the simulation model have been adopted by a major North-American automotive OEM as part of a scenario analysis tool for strategic supply network design and analysis. The simulation results show that performance of a system as a whole deteriorates when there is a step-change in the life-cycle demand. While restriction in production capacity does not significantly impact the bullwhip effect, it increases the net stock amplification significantly for the supply chain setting under consideration. Furthermore, a number of important managerial insights are presented based on sensitivity analysis of interaction effect of capacity constraints with other supply chain parameters.     

Innovations,Prices and Employment: A Theoretical Model and an Empirical Application for West German Manufacturing Firms

In this paper a theoretical model of the impact of product and process innovations on output, capacity utilization, employment and prices is developed. The model is estimated with a unique set of micro-data from West German manufacturing firms. The empirical results reveal that innovative firms are more successful. They show a higher utilization and more output and employment growth than non-innovative firms. Innovations also change market behaviour. In sectors with a large share of product innovators, firms more often change employment and less often change prices, i.e. product innovations reduce price competition.     

Capacity decisions and supply price games under flexibility of backward integration

A key issue in supply chain design for manufacturing firms is how to make a trade-off between strategies of vertical integration and outsourcing. A two-echelon supply chain model with one supplier and one manufacturer is set up to study this issue. The manufacturer makes decisions on two types of capacities, one is core capacity that cannot be outsourced, the other is non-core capacity on which the manufacturer implements a strategy that includes three options—complete, partial or no outsourcing. Such a strategy is referred to as “flexibility of backward integration”. Optimal capacity decisions of the manufacturer are given and the supplier's pricing strategies are discussed. Managerial implications of partial outsourcing are investigated. The impact of the flexibility of backward integration is presented and finally, supply chain coordination is analyzed.     

Product Market Competition and Corporate Real Estate Investment under Demand Uncertainty

This article theoretically and empirically analyzes the interactions among corporate real estate investment, product market competition and firm risk. In our model, firms own strategic real estate or lease generic real estate. Our model predicts that strategic real estate ownership is positively correlated with industry concentration and negatively related to demand uncertainty. Also, firm risk is higher for firms with more strategic real estate operating in a more concentrated market. This prediction arises because smaller investments induce greater market competition, which effectively eliminates the right tail of the firm's profit distribution. We provide strong empirical support for our predictions. In particular, firm value is more volatile in less competitive markets for a given level of demand uncertainty.     

The Value of Collusion with Endogenous Capacity and Demand Uncertainty

Collusion has often been alleged in industries where long‐lived capacity investments are important. This article develops a computational duopoly model with capacity investments, demand shocks and either competitive or collusive pricing. It shows that allowing for endogenous capacity investments can sometimes make collusion less valuable than competition and that it can change the normal relationships between the profitability of collusion and both the discount rate and industry‐wide demand shocks.     

Non-Nash equilibria of Darwinian dynamics with applications to duopoly

Consider a symmetric, differentiated duopoly. If firms’ strategy choices, in the repeated game, follow a stochastic Darwinian process, then they cluster around a strategy profile that is typically not a one-shot Nash equilibrium. This profile is invariant under a broad class of transformations of the strategy space (e.g. Bertrand vs. Cournot); this implies that mixing imitative and rational decision-makers can produce purely imitative outcomes. The evolution of objectives consistently distorts behavior toward revenue maximization, and the distortion increases in ‘good times’ of high demand and low costs. We generalize the results beyond duopoly to symmetric, two-player games.     

Structuring and contracting in competing supply chains

This paper considers two competing supply chains, each with multiple upstream suppliers producing complementary products and selling to a single buyer (e.g., assembler or retailer), who then sells the finished assembled product to a market that involves both demand uncertainty and competition. Our main research questions focus on what supply chain structure (integration vs. decentralization) and which contracting strategy a business should choose. We find that supply chains that decentralize perform better under strong market competition (i.e., high degree of product substitution between supply chains). However, when a large number of suppliers exist, supply chains that integrate perform better. When decentralized structures are used for both supply chains, a consignment with revenue sharing contract generally outperforms a wholesale price contract from the downstream retailer's point of view. Interestingly, for a supplier, a wholesale price contract, which pushes all demand risks to the downstream retailer, might not be preferred. For the entire supply chain, one contract strategy can outperform another depending on the degree of competition, the cost share of the buyer, and the number of suppliers.     

Coordinated supply chain scheduling

A mixed integer programming approach is proposed for a long-term, integrated scheduling of material manufacturing, material supply and product assembly in a customer driven supply chain. The supply chain consists of three distinct stages: manufacturer/supplier of product-specific materials (parts), producer where finished products are assembled according to customer orders and a set of customers who generate final demand for the products. The manufacturing stage consists of identical production lines in parallel and the producer stage is a flexible assembly line. The overall problem is how to coordinate manufacturing and supply of parts and assembly of products such that the total supply chain inventory holding cost and the production line start-up and parts shipping costs are minimized. A monolithic approach, where the manufacturing, supply and assembly schedules are determined simultaneously, is compared with a hierarchical approach. Numerical examples modeled after a real-world integrated scheduling in a customer driven supply chain in the electronics industry are presented and some computational results are reported.     

Strategic segmentation of a market

When competing firms target information towards specific consumers through direct marketing activities, complete segmentation of markets can result. We analyze a two-stage duopoly where, prior to price competition, each firm targets information to specific consumers and only consumers informed by a firm can buy from it. This has the effect of endogenously determining market segments in a model of ‘sales'. In equilibrium, pure local monopoly emerges; firms target and sell to mutually exclusive market segments. When the cost of marketing approaches zero, market shares reflect relative production efficiency (equal shares when firms are symmetric); this may not be the case when marketing cost is high.     

Foreign Direct Investment,Imports and Innovations in the Service Industry

The paper analyses for the first time empirically the impact of foreign competition due to inward foreign direct investment and imports on the innovation activities using data of German service firms. Based on the hypothesis that foreign competition has a disciplining effect on domestic markets derived from the manufacturing sector, a positive impact can be expected on innovation in the service sector, while other theoretical considerations do not absolutely support this optimistic view. In the empirical analysis, variants of two probit models are estimated for a sample of 2,019 service firms to explain their product and process innovation activities. The results show that both foreign direct investment and imports have highly significant positive effects on product and process innovations. Vice versa, the export and foreign production activities of domestic firms support innovations, too.     

Efficient versus Responsive Supply Chain Choice: An Empirical Examination of Influential Factors

Contemporary strategies in operations management suggest that successful firms align supply chain assets with product demand characteristics in order to exploit the profit potential of product lines fully. However, observation suggests that supply chain assets often are longer lived than product line decisions. This suggests that alignment between supply chain assets and demand characteristics is most likely to occur at the time of initial market entry. This article examines the association between product demand characteristics and the initial investment in a supply chain at the time of market entry. We characterize supply chains as responsive or efficient. A responsive supply chain is distinguished by short production lead‐times, low set‐up costs, and small batch sizes that allow the responsive firm to adapt quickly to market demand, but often at a higher unit cost. An efficient supply chain is distinguished by longer production lead‐times, high set‐up costs, and larger batch sizes that allow the efficient firm to produce at a low unit cost, but often at the expense of market responsiveness. We hypothesize that a firm's choice of responsive supply chain will be associated with lower industry growth rates, higher contribution margins, higher product variety, and higher demand or technological uncertainty. We further hypothesize that interactions among these variables either can reinforce or can temper the main effects. We report that lower industry growth rates are associated with responsive market entry, but this effect is offset if growth occurs during periods of high variety and high demand uncertainty. We report that higher contribution margins are associated with responsive market entry and that this effect is more pronounced when occurring with periods of high variety. Finally, we report that responsive market entry also is correlated positively with higher technological demand uncertainty. These results are found using data from the North American mountain bike industry.     

The effects of personal information on competition: Consumer privacy and partial price discrimination

This article studies the effects of consumer information on the intensity of competition. In a two dimensional duopoly model of horizontal product differentiation, firms use consumer information to price discriminate. I contrast a full privacy and a no privacy benchmark with intermediate regimes in which the firms can profile consumers only partially. I show that with partial privacy firms are always better-off with price discrimination: the relationship between information and profits is hump-shaped. In particular, competing firms prefer to target consumers with partial but asymmetric information about preferences. Instead, consumers prefer either no or full privacy in aggregate, but the effects of information on individual surplus are ambiguous: there are always winners and losers. Finally, I study the information acquisition incentives of the firms when there is an external data seller. When this upstream data broker holds partially informative data, an exclusive allocation arises. Instead, when data is fully informative, each competitor acquires consumer data but on a different dimension. These findings are relevant for the strategic decisions of firms active in digital markets and contribute to the policy debate surrounding privacy, exclusive access to data and competition.     

Pricing in revenue management for multiple firms competing for customers

We consider the pricing strategies of multiple firms providing the same service in competition for a common pool of customers in a revenue management context. The firms have finite capacity and the demand at each firm depends on the selling prices charged by all firms, each of which satisfies demand up to a given capacity limit. We use game theory to analyze the systems when firms face either a deterministic demand or a general stochastic demand. The existence and uniqueness conditions of a Nash equilibrium are derived, and we calculate the explicit Nash equilibrium point when the demand at each firm is a linear function of price. We also conduct sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium prices with respect to cost and capacity parameters.     

R&D competition versus R&D cooperation in oligopolistic markets with evolving structure

This paper considers investment behavior of duopolistic firms subject to technological progress. It is assumed that initially both firms offer a homogeneous product, but after a stochastic waiting time they are able to implement a product innovation. Production capacities of both firms are product specific. It is shown that firms anticipate a future product innovation by under-investing (if the new product is a substitute to the established product) and higher profits, and over-investing (in case of complements) and lower profits, compared to the corresponding standard capital accumulation game. This anticipation effect is stronger in the case of R&D cooperation. Furthermore, since due to R&D cooperation firms introduce the new product at the same time, this leads to intensified competition and lower firm profits right after the new product has been introduced. In addition, we show that under R&D competition the firm that innovates first, overshoots in new-product capacity buildup in order to exploit its temporary monopoly position. Taking into account all these effects, the result is that, if the new product is neither a close substitute nor a strong complement of the established product, positive synergy effects in R&D cooperation are necessary to make it more profitable for firms than R&D competition.     

A Stackelberg model of pricing of complementary goods under information asymmetry

We consider a duopoly market where two separate firms offer complementary goods in a leader–follower type move. Each firm has private forecast information about the uncertain market demand and decides whether to share it with the other firm. We show that information sharing would benefit the leader firm but hurt the follower firm as well as the total system if the follower firm shares information unconditionally. We then devise a “simple to implement” information sharing scheme under which both firms and the total system are better off. We also provide several interesting managerial insights and establish the robustness of the model in managing a supply chain through our analytical and simulation results.