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1.
    
How do firms choose performance peer groups used in chief executive officer (CEO) relative performance evaluation contracts? We find that while firms, for the most part, choose performance peers to better identify their CEOs’ impact on firm performance, they also tend to select underperforming peers. Dynamically, we find that peers that are added and retained every year are weaker than ones that were not chosen. These findings suggest managers may have some influence on the choice of performance peers. Finally, using a quasi-natural experiment, we find that enhanced disclosure did not affect the tendency of firms to select underperforming peers.  相似文献   

2.
Matching talents to tasks is an important part of job design. Organizations routinely use performance thresholds to group agents by talent. We see thresholds defined both in terms of an individual's own performance (absolute value) and in terms of peer performance (percentile). Intuition suggests a preference for percentile thresholds because the resulting rank-order statistic is sufficient to assess relative talent. Yet, in the context of a task assignment problem in which the objective is to match talent with task type (using two agents and two task types), we show that absolute thresholds can dominate percentile thresholds under either of two conditions. First, flexibility in task assignment tilts the balance toward absolute thresholds. Second, performance manipulation can adversely affect the inherent advantage of percentile thresholds because they motivate agents to invest relatively more in personally costly influence activities to cast their performance in a favorable light. We examine how these results hold up when there are countably large number of agents and discuss empirical implications.  相似文献   

3.
We propose an alternative mutual fund performance index which addresses the benchmark problem and controls for economies of scale in managing mutual funds. We advance a new concept of 'return-cost' efficiency as another important element in evaluating portfolio management, in addition to the mean-variance efficiency concept. Our index based on a non-parametric estimation is shown to be similar to the Sharpe index with multiple slopes (or factors). We have shown that all fund categories, except income funds, have similar average efficiency scores after controlling for economies of scale. Most funds operate in increasing returns to scale and seem to be successful in holding mean-variance efficient portfolios, but unsuccessful in allocating transaction costs efficiently, evidenced by excessive turnovers and loads.  相似文献   

4.
    
We use an agency model to address the benefits and costs of transparency in a hierarchical organization in which the principal employs a manager entrusted with contracting authority and several workers, all under conditions of moral hazard. We define the principal's transparency choices as a decision to allow workers to observe their coworkers’ performances (observability) and as an investment in monitoring worker performance (precision). We find that whereas precision alleviates agency conflicts as expected, observability can exacerbate agency conflicts, especially if the manager's interests are misaligned sufficiently with those of the principal. Our results suggest several testable hypotheses including predictions that opaque performance measurement practices are well suited for small organizational units at lower hierarchical ranks, and in settings where the sensitivity-precision of the available measures is low, workers’ performances are correlated positively, and managerial productivity is modest.  相似文献   

5.
    
Using data on European Central Bank's (ECB's) reserve currency portfolios, we find that money managers react to relative rankings (i.e., own vs. peers’ performance) by adjusting portfolio active risk levels measured ex ante by actual deviations from their benchmark. This occurs in the absence of explicit incentives as no monetary reward is promised for winning this “tournament” among portfolio managers. We collect information on managers’ characteristics, including age, education, tenure, salary, and career path, and investigate the role played by implicit incentives. We provide evidence that both individual career concerns and institutional peer pressure contribute to the documented relationship between ranking and risk taking.  相似文献   

6.
One of the more lasting imprints that New Public Management (NPM) has made in the public sector is an increase in the popularity of performance measurement. In Sweden, performance measurement has gained popularity in the public sector, not least at the local government level with the use of relative performance evaluation (RPE). Because utilization of RPE is a decentralized and optional mode of governance, a somewhat heterogeneous practice has evolved. The aim of this paper is to examine the causes of this differentiated practice. We jointly examine economic, political and institutional/cultural explanations in order to account for the utilization of RPE. The empirical material consists of archival data and a questionnaire sent to all Swedish municipalities in late 2005. We show that RPE adoption and use partly has different antecedents and that the institutional/cultural perspective appears to have greater explanatory power than economic and political, not least as a consequence of the potential to explain decoupling and the importance of change facilitating capabilities. The investigation contributes specifically to the literature on the utilization of RPE in local governments and more generally to the literature on why and to what extent management accounting practices are utilized.  相似文献   

7.
本文以主成分分析方法进行指标蕴含信息的整合,重新组合一组线性无关的综合性指标,运用数据包络分析方法(DEA)对山东省科技金融投入进行效益评价。研究结果表明,山东省2000—2010年的金融投入重数量、轻质量,重速度、轻基础,呈现出DEA无效状态。基于此,山东省科技金融发展应转变发展方向,走可持续、集约化的发展路径。  相似文献   

8.
Merton (1973) and Campbell (1993) have demonstrated that if an investor anticipates information shifts, he will adjust his portfolio choice today in an attempt to hedge these shifts. Exploiting these insights, we construct a new performance measure to evaluate fund managers' hedging ability. This new measure is different from two widely adopted performance evaluation measures: securities selectivity and market timing. Moreover, an econometric methodology is developed to simultaneously estimate the magnitudes of these three portfolio performance evaluation measures. The results show that mutual fund managers are on average with positive security selection and negative market timing ability. Furthermore, the mutual funds with investment style classified as Asset Allocation generally have positive hedging timing ability.  相似文献   

9.
    
Many firms use relative stock performance to evaluate and incentivize their CEOs. We document that such firms routinely disclose information that harms their peers' stock prices, and sometimes explicitly mention the harmed peers, by name, in these disclosures. Consistent with deliberate sabotage, peer-harming disclosures appear to be aimed at peers whose stock price depressions are most likely to benefit the disclosing firms' CEOs. The pricing effect of these disclosures does not reverse, suggesting that the disclosures contain legitimate information regarding peers' prospects. In sum, our results suggest that relative performance evaluation in CEO pay motivates CEOs to internalize the externalities of their disclosures, and strategically disclose information that harms peers' stock prices, in order to improve their firms' relative standing within their peer group.  相似文献   

10.
A large stream of work on relative performance evaluation highlights the benefits of using information about peer performance in contracting. In contrast, the potential costs of discouraging cooperation among peers have received much less attention. The purpose of our study is to examine how the importance of cooperation affects the use of information about peer performance in target setting, also known as relative target setting. Specifically, we use data from an industrial services company where business unit managers need to share specialized equipment and staff with their peers to manage bottlenecks in their capacity. We construct several empirical proxies for the costs and benefits of information about peer performance and examine their effects on target setting. We find robust evidence that the sensitivity of target revisions to past peer performance is higher when peer group performance has greater capacity to filter out noise but lower when the importance of cooperation among peers is greater.  相似文献   

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