人的异质性:经济人假设的新内容

“经济人”与“有限理性经济人”是古典和新古典经济学关于人性的经济假设,在这两个假设中,人是“同质”的。然而“同质”的“经济人”假设是不符合现实的,因为现实中的人既是异质的又是同质的。在经济理论的发展过程中,“异质性有限理性经济人”假设催生了很多新理论。     

基于行为金融学的“经济人”与自然人的辨证思考

纵观从亚当·斯密开始至今二百多年的经济学发展史,经济学家们在研究和发展其经济学说时,总是在一定的基本假设前提下进行的。2002年10月9日,瑞典皇家科学院将诺贝尔经济学奖授予美国普林斯顿大学(Princeton University)心理学教授卡尼曼(Dainiel Kahneman)教授和美国乔治—梅森大学(George Meson University)的弗农·史密斯(Vernon Smith)教授,他们因为行为金融学的巨大成就而获此殊荣。文章从行为金融学的崛起对"经济人"与自然人进行了一些的辨证思考。     

论“互惠性”假设对“经济人”假设的非理性冲击——基于委托代理模型的分析

互惠性偏好是行为经济理论中的一个重要研究领域,对传统的理性＂经济人＂假设提出了现实性的挑战。借助于激励理论中的委托--代理模型,通过互惠性假设下与＂经济人＂假设下的博弈均衡解的对比分析可知,新古典体系中的最优契约均衡存在着帕累托改进的可能。互惠性行为下的经济收益可以大于自利性行为下的经济收益,经济个体可以通过经济行为的调整与分配机制的变更来获取更大的利益,并促进组织利益、群体利益与社会利益的扩张。研究表明,长期在经济理论中居于主导地位＂经济人＂假设在现代经济社会中的实践性日渐衰退,包括＂互惠性＂假设在内的非理性假设存在着较高的现实意义。互惠性理论的提出不仅动摇了传统经济理论的基础,也促进了管理理论与管理行为的变革。互惠性理论从一个侧面为行为经济学提供了坚实的理论基础,巩固了行为经济学在现代经济理论中的卓越性地位。     

\"经济人\"利他行为的经济分析

对于利他行为,许多学者往往将它与利己行为分割开来进行分析,而且很少引入成本收益分析.事实上,利他行为和利己行为都是内部动机的一种偏好体现.本文通过引入利他主义参数和成本收益,提出了一个关于理性经济人的利他行为经济模型,并借助该模型对利他行为进行了符合理性的经济分析.     

理性经济人的道德辨析及逻辑演进

该文在理清理性经济人理论的发展演进脉络和分析、归纳、总结现有理性经济人的伦理研究和论争的基本观点的基础上,从理性经济人假设的理论前提、内在规定性、经济责任的角度,以及道德等因素对偏好和偏好驱策下的效用选择影响等方面论证了理性经济人不是非道德主义者。同时指出遵循市场和交易规则的伦理要求是理性经济人的合理边界,超出这一边界理论便成谬误,因而理性经济人是在资源和一般道德双重约束条件下追求利益(效用)“最大化”的道德人,互利双赢是其道德本质规定性。     

经济人“寻租”——腐败的经济学分析

随着改革开放的发展,市场经济的引入,我国建立了社会主义市场经济.目前,我国正处于建立和完善社会市场经济的过程之中,政府部门作为社会主义市场经济的推动者也出现了许多无序的现象,如机构臃肿,行政效率低下以及相当严重的腐败现象.特别是政府腐败现象,已经严重损坏了政府部门的形象和市场经济的秩序.腐败的产生已经成为社会的正常发展的一大毒瘤.本文从经济人的角度对腐败进行了经济分析并提出了建设性意见.     

内部审计:理性经济人的行为选择分析

国家审计署审计长李金华在十届全国人大十次会议上所作的《关于2003年度中央预算执行和其他财政收支的审计工作报告》中列举的问题触目惊心，再次引起人们的广泛关注。国家体育总局动用中国奥委会专项资金1．31亿元建设职工住宅小区，借给下属单位投资办企业；国家电力公司投资、借款、担保、大额采购和重大股权变动项目6818个，有损失或潜在损失的项目631个，     

马克思“社会经济人”假定与西方经济学“经济人”假定之比较

对于人的行为假定是经济学体系形成和发展的逻辑起点,而不同的经济学关于人的行为假定是不同的。马克思主义经济学把人假定为社会经济人,而西方主流经济学把人假定为经济人。马克思主义经济学与西方主流经济学的差别在很大程度上决定于他们各自对人的行为假定的不同。这种不同具体体现在二者存在的基础不同、包含的内容不同以及引起的理论体系和解释力不同等方面。     

“经济人”的嵌入性视角

经济学理论是建立在人性假设的基础之上,自亚当.斯密的“经济人”假设问世以来,学术界对人性假设的争论一直没有停止,尤其是对“经济人”孤立于社会的个体行为的批判,对此,文章提出了自己的看法,认为亚当.斯密的“经济人”是基于人的经济行为建立的假设,并不是脱离社会孤立地存在,其利己心、现实的经济理性和利益最大化之间不仅是相辅相成的关系,而且正是“经济人”的社会性造就了“经济人”的利己心、现实的经济理性和利益最大化目标。     

“经济人”概念的双重假设及其相互关系

“经济人”概念包含着两种基本假设。虽然其第一种假设是毋庸置疑的,但以它为真并不能推出第二种假设为真。无限理性经济人是违反现实与逻辑的抽象虚构。     

The economic agent as rule maker and rule user: <Emphasis Type="BoldItalic">Homo Sapiens Oeconomicus</Emphasis>

The paper discusses the micro foundations of evolutionary economics, introducing a unified concept of the economic agent as a rule maker and rule user. Based on recent findings of the neuronal, cognitive and behavioral sciences, Homo Sapiens Oeconomicus emerges as an alternative to Homo Oeconomicus. A taxonomy of rules distinguishing between cognitive, behavioral and blueprint rules and a set of theoretical propositions related to the structure and evolution of those rules are suggested.JEL Classification: A 12, B 41, B 52, B 53, D 00, D 64, D 80, D 83, E 11, L20The present paper had its origin in a research project on The Interdisciplinary Foundations of Economic Decision Making supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation during 1978-1980. The core of that work was a brain model whose architecture also serves as a corner stone for this paper. Since then there have been substantial developments in the respective areas; some of the major findings of the more recent research in the neuronal, cognitive and related sciences are discussed and integrated into the present paper. - I gratefully acknowledge insightful comments and criticisms from Georg D. Blind. Some ideas were discussed during my tenure as a Visiting Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Queensland, in fall 2003, and I wish to record my appreciation of the hospitality during that visit. Particular thanks for the inspiring discussions go to Peter Earl, John Foster, and, as always, Jason Potts. Special thanks are due to Juli Lessmann and Charles R. McCann for their thoughtful corrections of my English prose and their editorial help. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies: A note

Summary. Serizawa [3] characterized the set of strategy-proof, individually rational, no exploitative, and non-bossy social choice functions in economies with pure public goods. He left an open question whether non-bossiness is necessary for his characterization. We will prove that non-bossiness is implied by the other three axioms in his characterization. Received: October 17, 1997; revised version: January 19, 1998     

基于公平心理偏好的投资博弈——敲竹杠问题的一个行为解决

敲竹杠问题是不完全合约理论的中心话题,经典文献认为,如果合约是不完全的,当事人的专用性投资会引发敲竹杠风险从而导致无效率的专用性投资。但是,关于敲竹杠问题的文献通常假定事后谈判结果对事前投资成本不敏感。通过在雇佣双方的投资博弈中引入投资成本相关性这种合作的谈判方式,将传统敲竹杠模型中影响谈判力的因素与当事人对公平偏好的行为因素二者融合,本文证明:与传统的投资博弈相比,在投资成本影响企业(雇员)谈判力的情况下,双方有更强的专用性人力资本投资激励。雇佣双方所面临的敲竹杠风险取决于双方的初始谈判力,且双方有可能在事前做出社会最优甚至过度的投资。这也从一个方面解释了现实中大量存在的有效投资现象。     

发展与完善新生代农民工社会保障体系探析

随着我国经济的快速发展,城市现代进程的加速,凡是有劳动能力的农民普遍走出农村,离开土地,源源不断流向城市成为新时代的农民工。他们游离于传统农民与城里人之间,非农非城。当今尤其是以新生代农民工为主,这就需要尽快建立面向这些新生代农民工的社会保障制度,从而保障新生代农民工的切身权益,同时也有利于新时期三农问题的解决。因此,探讨我国新生代农民工的社会保障问题是非常有必要的,而且也具有很重要的现实意义。通过对我国新生代农民工社会保障的现状、存在的问题及其产生原因等方面进行论述,并在此基础上提出发展和完善我国新生代农民工社会保障体系的对策和建议。     

中国信用体系转轨的经济史视角考察

本文考察了信用这一概念的内涵演变轨迹,并以之为参照对我国目前存在的社会信用问题进行分析.文章首先回顾了信用概念的原始含义即借贷信用,接着阐述其内涵如何随契约化交易和现代生产组织方式的出现和发展而发生扩充式蜕变,由借贷信用扩充为契约信用,再由有债信用形式拓展到更广泛的无债信用领域.文章的后半部分,作者将着眼点放在对中国信用现状的考察上,根据前半部分的理论推演分析了目前我国信用问题的根源,并提出关于信用体系重构的若干思路.     

Contemporary Capitalism as a New Monetary Economy of Production: The Logic of Conventions,M&A,and LBOs

Social interaction models, i.e. the changing sequence of actions between individuals who modify their behavior under the influence of their peers, have rarely enjoyed as high a profile in economic analysis as they do today. However, the literature growth has not been accompanied by a process of academic consolidation. The difficulties encountered in research are largely but not entirely the result of data constraints. The main argument of this article is that the source of problems may be traceable to the lack of a complementary approach between economics and other disciplines. The difficulties presented by the deficit in academic exchange among social scientists are compounded by the current analytical framework, which still concentrates on the fundamental, but mutually exclusive, traditions of thought: homo oeconomicus and homo sociologicus. In spotlighting these ideas, this article reviews the economic body of literature on social interactions and their effect on individual unemployment status. Two directions in current research are analyzed: the impact of social (work) norms on unemployment and the role of social networks in the job search process. The theoretical and methodological challenges encountered in research suggest that the future of social interactions models might be found at the crossroads of economics and other social sciences.     

The Third Way and the third sector: New Labour's economic policy and the social economy

This paper reviews the relationship between Labour's economicpolicy and the third sector. Since 1997, the third sector hasreceived significant government support and has gradually movedfrom the economic periphery towards the centre such that itis now instrumental in the delivery of a range of governmentpolicies. It operates alongside both the private and publicsectors in delivering employment, education, health and socialcare, housing and environmental policies. The impact of thishas been seen in measures of social exclusion, poverty, theenvironment, social capital, as well as GDP and employment.Future policies should strive to maintain and develop the distinctivecapabilities of third sector organisations and the balance betweeneconomic, social and environmental objectives.     

社会选择的实证之维——当代西方实证社会选择理论评述

当代行为经济学和实验经济学领域的研究越来越关注社会公平正义问题。实证社会选择理论从实证角度研究人们对于公平分配的观念,体现了当代规范经济学与实证经济学的有机结合。在长期大量的实证研究的基础上,实证社会选择理论检验了关于分配正义的很多基础理论,得到了一些重要发现。实证社会选择理论的研究,对于中国的经济学理论建设和改革实践,也具有重要的启发价值和参考意义。     

差异和谐化与和谐差异化的逻辑互动——论江泽民和谐社会思想的方法论特色

差异和谐化与和谐差异化的逻辑互动构成了江泽民和谐社会思想的重要方法论特色。差异和谐化在实质上是“秩序问题”,也就是实现“社会整合”的过程;和谐差异化实质上是“发展问题”,也就是实现社会进步的过程。差异和谐化与和谐差异化的逻辑互动实质上是“发展”与“平衡”的有机统一问题,是一个非均衡协调发展的问题。     

A simple theory and evidence on the determinants of firm R&D

This paper derives a simple, but informative, model of firm R&D to figure out key factors that determine firm R&D effort. The model suggests a demand-pull, technology-push theory of R&D by showing that a firm's profit-maximizing R&D expenditure is determined jointly by both demand-side factors and technology-side factors. The former includes demand size (firm sales) and consumer preference over quality and price and the latter includes R&D cost structure or the production-cost effect of product R&D and firm-specific technological competence. In addition, the model shows that other things being equal, the stock of exogenous technological knowledge, including the firm's previously accumulated technological knowledge, relevant to current R&D which is negatively related with current R&D effort. An empirical analysis of firm R&D intensities and technological capabilities of more than 1600 firms in nine industries across six countries provides supportive evidence for the theory. Further, the theory implies that R&D intensity or the R&D-to-sales ratio is independent of firm size unless firm size affects technological competence and that given consumer preference and R&D cost structure facing all firms in the same industry, the distribution of firm-specific technological competence among firms determines the distribution of firm R&D intensities within the industry.