双重理性：道德经济人的行为选择状态

“经济人”具有经济理性，“道德人”具有道德理性。“道德经济人”实质是“经济人”与“道德人”的统一和融合，因此，“道德经济人”的行为选择状态是经济理性和道德理性并存的双重理性。因此，在讨论“道德经济人”的行为选择状态时，认为人的正常行为是从一定的理性出发，反映了人对于个人与他人、与社会、与自然的相互关系的思考，解决了人的行为的形式与内容，“道德经济人”个体的外部性经济行为带来的经济利益的增加，其结果具有互利性。     

双重理性：道德经济人的行为选择状态

“经济人”具有经济理性,“道德人”具有道德理性。“道德经济人”实质是“经济人”与“道德人”的统一和融合,因此,“道德经济人”的行为选择状态是经济理性和道德理性并存的双重理性。现实中,“道德经济人”能够很好地实现个人利益与社会利益的统一,在经济理性和道德理性共同支配下的“道德经济人”占主导的社会必将是一个和谐、有序的社会。     

经济人理性行为假定的时空相对性

按经济人理性行为假定要求，其本身内含的经济人假定与理性行为假定之间只能保持有条件的一致性；实际上，它主要建立在私有经济制度的基础上；它主要适应于纯粹的个体经济行为分析，而不大适应于群体经济行为分析以及群体中的个体经济行为分析，它是一种个人理性，而不是一种制度理性，从管理和管理学的角度看，各种类型的经济组织中的人，大多是把中他人看作是社会人，复杂人，把人的行为看作是多目标协调导向的社会行为，现代西方经济学对经济人理性行为的假定的批评和修补也从反面说明了这一假定的时空相对性。     

寻找理性经济行为的逻辑新起点——试论中国传统伦理下的中庸理性经济人

在主流经济学的视野中,追求效用最大化是社会个体理性行为的基本准则。文章认为主流经济学理性假设的根本问题在于没有揭示特定人类社会的独特复杂特征。主流经济学家忽略了在现实生活中存在于西方文明之外的实然——中庸理性。文章尝试在以中庸理性为假设的理性经济人模型基础上,探讨中国传统伦理下中庸理性经济人的演化及其存在的可能空间。     

主流经济学中的“经济人”:内涵演变及其缺陷审视

经济人概念经历了一个逐渐演变的过程:早期是内含特定社会伦理关系的自利人,后来由抽象原子化的经济人所取代,接着演变为更中性的理性人;理性的原意也仅仅体现为实现特定目的的有效手段选择,后来却蜕变为行为的一致性问题.正因为理性内涵的不断演变及其外延的不断扩大过程,以致经济人概念成了一个同义反复;结果,经济人假设在强化经济学分析框架的同时,也使得经济理论与现实之间越来越相脱节.     

财务人员职业道德的经济人模型及其归类分析

在经济人假设中，人是有理性的经济人，人的基本行为动机是追求效用最大化。在此假设基础上。本文认为财务人员行为的差异在于其收益较之成本的差异，此差异来源于个人价值观的不同，意识形态在遵守职业道德中是否起着决定性的作用。同时，本文构建了财务人员遵守职业道德的经济人模型，对遵守职业道德中财务人员的各种不同行为倾向进行了数学的解释和分析，并对该问题进行了方向性的探索。     

“经济人”的嵌入性视角

经济学理论是建立在人性假设的基础之上,自亚当.斯密的“经济人”假设问世以来,学术界对人性假设的争论一直没有停止,尤其是对“经济人”孤立于社会的个体行为的批判,对此,文章提出了自己的看法,认为亚当.斯密的“经济人”是基于人的经济行为建立的假设,并不是脱离社会孤立地存在,其利己心、现实的经济理性和利益最大化之间不仅是相辅相成的关系,而且正是“经济人”的社会性造就了“经济人”的利己心、现实的经济理性和利益最大化目标。     

有限理性经济人假说下的财务报告列报和使用

本文在分析西蒙的有限理性经济人假说理论的基础上,论述了其经济意义:知识具有时间和主体的相对性;一般人们发现和选择的只能是满意的方案而不是最优方案;有限理性经济人在进行经济活动时,一般遵循的是程序理性穴Procedualrationality雪而非结果理性穴Rationalityofoutcome雪;无论是完全理性经济人假说,还是有限理性经济人假说,其本质都是经济人假说,经济人的行为动机一定是追求利益最大化。根据这一意义,提出了在有限理性经济人假说理论下,财务报告所列报的是根据财务报告目标要求,依据会计规则所产生的财务信息,这种财务信息必定存在“规则性失真”和信息的不完全性;此外,会计规则内容在不同时期会发生变动,以适应不同时期不同利益集团之间利益协调的改变,为此,财务报告的列报内容也会发生相应的改变。这一结论的现实意义是:人们使用财务报告时,首先,必须具备必要的经济学、会计学、管理学等相关知识;其次,对财务报告所提供的信息应允许有一定范围的“失真”;第三,对信息的不全面性和不完整性以及财务报告内容的变化要有充分的估计和思想准备。只有这样,才能正确地理解和使用财务报告。     

和谐视角下的自利行为与制度分析

经济人理性自利是当代经济学的一个重要命题,自利行为是市场经济的反映,但理性自利行为的限度和目标是需要制度来约定的。和谐社会是经济的和谐;是伦理的和谐;也是制度的和谐。在和谐发展的社会里,自利与利他需协调,崇尚道德是行为准则,遵守法律是生活方式。     

理性只是对自利最大化的追求吗?

基于理性的“经济人”假设,不仅无法解释由“囚犯困境”所引发的个人理性与集体理性之间的悖论,也无法解释现实中行为主体在“囚犯困境”情境下对合作行为的选择。在新古典经济学理论中,总是将追求自利最大化的行为等同于理性,进而再把实际行为等同于理性行为。其实,不仅人类寻求自利最大化的行为是理性的,而且对利他行为的追求也是理性的。现实生活中,行为主体体现出理性“经济人”与理性“道德人”的双重性。对“囚犯困境”悖论的解决应该引入道德维度,引入理性“道德人”进行分析。     

Can sustainable consumption be learned? A model of cultural evolution

This paper shows how sustainable consumption patterns can spread within a population via processes of social learning even though a strong individual learning bias may favor environmentally harmful products. We present a model depicting how the biased transmission of different behaviors via individual and social learning influences agents' consumption behavior. The underlying learning biases can be traced back to evolved cognitive dispositions. Challenging the vision of a permanent transition toward sustainability, we argue that “green” consumption patterns are not self-reinforcing and cannot be “locked in” permanently.     

Thinking Things Through: The Value and Limitations of James Buchanan's Public Choice Theory

Abstract

James Buchanan, one of the founders of Public Choice theory, applies the conceptual apparatus of economics to the public domain. This article investigates which assumptions are crucial to Buchanan's project, concentrating on methodological individualism and the Homo Economicus model. It shows that Buchanan from time to time moves away from these economic concepts, though only in minor ways. The article also focuses on Buchanan's normative emphasis on the role of institutions in coordinating self-interested individual actions in mutually beneficial ways. Criticizing Buchanan's analysis, the article argues that a broader view of the individual and of the role of institutions is necessary in a theory of constitutional choice.     

Work values,endogenous sentiments redistribution

We examine the interactions between individual behavior, sentiments and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution. Agents have moral “work values”. Individuals' self-esteem and social consideration of others are endogenously determined comparing behaviors to moral standards. Attitudes toward redistribution depend on self-interest and social preferences. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribution are determined simultaneously. The equilibria feature different degrees of “social cohesion” and redistribution depending on pre-tax income inequality. In clustered equilibria the poor are held partly responsible for their low income since they work less than the moral standard and hence redistribution is low. The paper proposes a novel explanation for the emergence of different sentiments and social contracts across countries. The predictions appear broadly in line with well-documented differences between the United States and Europe.     

企业家为何要进行媒体呈现*——基于企业家微博的实证检验

随着社交媒体的广泛应用，越来越多的企业家从企业幕后走向台前。本文利用中国上市公司2010—2017年企业家新浪微博的使用数据进行了实证检验。结果发现：（1）高科技企业更倾向于企业家媒体呈现;（2）企业家媒体呈现能够提升企业股票流动性，且微博发布数量越多，股票流动性上升越明显;（3）进一步对企业家微博内容进行文本分析后发现，相比于披露式微博，个性化微博更有助于提升股票流动性，正向情感倾向和负向情感倾向微博均会导致股票流动性的提升。本文结论为信息化时代企业转型升级过程中的企业家行为提供重要参考。     

Exploitation through Contrived Dependence

Socially responsible investment (SRI) refers to investing in companies based on financial and social performance, where the latter includes such concerns as the environment, sweatshop labor, and animal testing. This paper argues that SRI strongly resembles pro-social behaviors and social dynamics found in experimental settings. The role of fairness-related sanctioning is emphasized, wherein companies that treat their various stakeholders “fairly” are screened into SRI portfolios, while those treating them poorly are screened out. It is argued that because SRI creates opportunities for businesses to thrive relative to their competitors by improving social performance, it creates some scope for pro-social change. Still, the magnitude of changes that can be expected from voluntary changes in business behavior remains to be determined.     

STATUS QUO IN THE WELFARE ANALYSIS OF TAX REFORMS

The welfare analysis of tax reforms most often consists of comparing the post‐reform distribution of individual welfare with the pre‐reform distribution or possibly that obtained from another reform as if they were completely independent. Such an “anonymous” approach does not take into account “changes” in individual situations, generally the main source of contention in any tax reform debate. This paper proposes a welfare criterion that allows comparison of reforms while taking into account individual status quo—i.e. pre‐reform—situations. This is done by extending standard utilitarian social welfare criteria to the case where individual utilities depend on initial income and income change.     

中国个体证券投资者交易行为的实证研究

对证券投资者的投资行为进行研究 ,是探究证券市场有效性的重要途径之一。本文运用行为金融学理论 ,根据某证券营业部 7894位个体投资者在 1 998年 7月至2 0 0 1年 1 1月期间的交易数据 ,分别对我国个体投资者的“政策依赖性心理”、“过度自信心理”及投资者的“过度交易”是否损害个人财富等方面进行了实证检验 ,结果表明 ,我国的个体投资者确实存在上述认知偏差。针对这些偏差本文提出了相关的政策建议。     

Individual Differences in the Disposition Effect

The authors model the role of personality traits in explaining the disposition effect building on realization utility theory and Big 5 model and moving from an aggregate level to interindividual differences. The experimental analysis, combining NEO Revised Personality Inventory measures with individual financial data from a trading simulation run by 230 individuals in China and Italy, shows that the disposition effect is driven by 2 distinct psychological processes, one related to holding losers and the other to selling winners. These 2 behavioral mechanisms are uncorrelated and influenced by different personality traits. Controlling for different demographic variables, the authors show (a) a greater sensitivity of the rewarding system that motivates “extroverts” to quickly sell the stock at gain to receive a burst of utility; (b) a tendency for “conscientious” subjects to suppress impulsivity, patiently waiting for higher cumulative returns; and (c) the importance of “openness to experience” to better value information to achieve higher outcomes.     

Organizational Cultures of Corruption

Systematic differences in the incidence of corruption between countries can be explained by models of coordination failure that suggest that corruption can only be reduced by a “big push” across an entire economy. However, there is significant evidence that corruption is often sustained as an organizational culture, and can be combated with targeted effort in individual organizations one at a time. In this paper, we propose a model that reconciles these two theories of corruption. We explore a model of corruption with two principal elements. First, agents suffer a moral cost if their corruption behavior diverges from the level they perceive to be the social norm; second, the perception of the norm is imperfect; it gives more weight to the behavior of colleagues with whom the agent interacts regularly. This leads to the possibility that different organizations within the same country may stabilize at widely different levels of corruption. Furthermore, the level of corruption in an organization is persistent, implying that some organizations may have established internal “cultures” of corruption. The organizational foci are determined primarily by the opportunities and (moral) costs of corruption. Depending on the values of these parameters, the degree of corruption across departments may be relatively uniform or widely dispersed. These results also explain another surprising empirical observation: that in different countries similar government departments such as tax and education rank very differently relative to each other in the extent to which they are corrupt. This is difficult to explain in incentive‐based models if similar departments face similar incentives in different countries.     

Inequality aversion and separability in social risk evaluation

This paper examines how to satisfy “independence of the utilities of the dead” (Blackorby et al. in Econometrica 63:1303–1320, 1995; Bommier and Zuber in Soc Choice Welf 31:415–434, 2008) in the class of “expected equally distributed equivalent” social orderings (Fleurbaey in J Polit Econ 118:649–680, 2010) and inquires into the possibility to keep some aversion to inequality in this context. It is shown that the social welfare function must either be utilitarian or take a special multiplicative form. The multiplicative form is compatible with any degree of inequality aversion, but only under some constraints on the range of individual utilities.