试论后危机时期中国刺激政策的退出战略

世界各国针对金融危机出台的刺激政策,有力地推进了全球经济的复苏。当前,包括中国在内的经济发展已经全面进入后危机时期;各国迫切需要一套既能确保经济复苏成果,又能有效防范通胀风险的退出战略。本文以后危机时期为背景,立足中国国情,结合全球各国的退出政策,分别从中国退出战略的面临困境、退出时机和退出策略三个方面分析,提出了财政和货币刺激政策退出的具体时机和方式,并探讨了中国退出政策的分阶段目标。     

后金融危初（2009—2010）之滞涨探究

金融危机一滞涨总是经济学家热衷于探讨的话题,因为这关乎到一国的经济发展形势、经济政策调整和百姓生活质量。由美国次贷危机所引发的全球经济危机,对我国无论实体经济还是虚拟经济都产生了巨大冲击。为了保证经济增长,我国政府采取了一系列刺激经济的计划和措施。随着经济刺激计划的展开,中国经济迅速回暖,但同时也带了许多负面影响。随着刺激经济政策的逐步退出,中国经济出现通货膨胀,经济增速回落的迹象。本文就中国目前经济发展所可能面临的滞涨进行分析。     

事件

G20峰会开幕6月26日，以“复苏和新开端”为主题的第四次二十国集团峰会在加拿大多伦多拉开帷幕。会议讨论四项主要议题，包括经济可持续与平衡增长、金融部门改革、改革国际金融机构、促进全球贸易增长等。会议期间，各国领导人还举行了一系列双边会谈。中国国家主席胡锦涛在发言中指出，各国要审慎稳妥把握经济刺激政策退出的时机、节奏、力度，巩固世界经济复苏势头。     

后金融危机(2009-2010)之滞涨探究

金融危机一滞涨总是经济学家热衷于探讨的话题,因为这关乎到一国的经济发展形势、经济政策调整和百姓生活质量.由美国次贷危机所引发的全球经济危机,对我国无论实体经济还是虚拟经济都产生了巨大冲击.为了保证经济增长,我国政府采取了一系列刺激经济的计划和措施.随着经济刺激计划的展开,中国经济迅速回暖,但同时也带了许多负面影响.随着刺激经济政策的逐步退出,中国经济出现通货膨胀,经济增速回落的迹象.本文就中国目前经济发展所可能面临的滞涨进行分析.     

我国扩张性货币政策退出的策略分析

本文认为,当前的扩张性货币政策无法解决经济增长方式调整滞后和收入分配失衡等深层次矛盾,并蕴含着财政风险、金融风险与政策信誉风险,这决定了其退出的必然性.从就业、消费和民间投资三个指标来看,扩张性货币政策已逼近安全边界:在时机选择上,我国应先于欧美发达国家实施退出策略;在力度控制上,不仅要考虑经济数据,也要考虑集团利益的制衡;在工具选择上,应结合国情,有计划、有步骤地实施退出策略.另外,应注重与转变经济增长方式、财政刺激计划的退出及国际协调的配合.     

浅析危机后期我国经济刺激政策退出的条件和方式

此次金融危机中我国及时出台了应对危机的一揽子计划,实施了积极的财政政策和适度宽松的货币政策,并取得了显著成效,我国经济复苏速度令人瞩目.然而"非常规"的经济刺激政策能否适时退出决定了危机时政府政策的成败,因此我国在判断刺激政策能否退出时应充分考虑民间投资、失业率及国际环境等条件.文章指出,作为新兴经济体,我国经济刺激政策退出的方式应侧重于转型,将其作为促进我国经济结构调整的重要步骤.     

“后危机时代”的经济复苏管理

2009年全球一直推进的经济刺激计划前所未有,已促进全球走出危机最为艰难的时期,2010年既意味着全球经济步入"后危机时代",也意味着政策退出和复苏管理成为全球的共同课题和宏观经济政策的主旋律。在这个大周期背景下,为了稳固经济复苏的基础,延长新一轮经济的上升周期,我国的内外政策应寻求多个层面的"再平衡"。     

欧洲降息对中国宏观经济的影响分析

欧债危机以来,各国中央银行致力于退出适合本国国情的经济刺激计划,其中备受瞩目的当属欧央行的负利率政策和欧版QE的推行。作为中国最大贸易伙伴之一,欧盟的经济政策转变将对中国的外部经济环境产生重大影响。     

2010年世界各国经济政策变化对我国的影响

受国际金融危机影响,世界及我国经济形势发生了重大变化。随着全球经济在2009年开始缓慢复苏,世界各主要经济体为刺激经济的扩张性政策将逐步退出。本文分析了2010年世界各国经济政策的分化对我国经济环境造成的影响,并对我国的经济发展趋势作出预测。     

中国经济不会硬着陆

正不必对中国经济前景太悲观中国经济放缓不足为奇,且这种放缓是可控的,中国经济应该不会硬着陆。中国得以在三年前的全球经济危机后迅速脱身,主要依靠的是大规模的财政刺激政策。2008年11月18日推出的"四万亿刺激计划"中,中央政府承担的金额为11800亿左右,其余大部分通过银行融资,从而导致了地方政府债务激增、固定资产徒增等问题。进而对中国的银行业危机、房地产泡沫、通货膨胀失控等担忧不断涌现,我不认为这些担忧就意味着中国经济会硬着陆。对中国经济硬着陆的担忧有些言过其实了。     

全球经济周期调整与中国对外开放政策

伴随金融危机,全球经济处于一个艰难的调整期。在这一时期中无论是发达经济体和新兴经济体经济都遭受巨大冲击,甚至不同程度陷入衰退;中国的经济也受到很大不利影响。为了应对金融危机,保持经济增长,中国应积极调整对外开放政策。     

China-Japan-Korean Summit：New Barometer for East Asian Cooperation

On December 13, 2008, China- Japan-Korean Summit was held in Fukuoka, Japan. The summit, which was greatly different from the previously eight summits held in the framework of ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korean, that is 10＋3, was confined to only these three countries and it＇s the first time for them to do so. It happened to be China＇s first foreign activity after the opening of the Central Economic Working Conference in the same month and explained its new economic policy and measures in 2009. In addition, it＇s the first time for three main economic entities to meet after the breakout of the global financial crisis, Thus financial and economic affairs were the core issues of the summit.     

Fiscal stimulus and its effects in the European Union

In the wake of the financial and economic crisis Keynesian macroeconomic management has once again come into the spotlight. The following article takes a critical look at the practice of expansionary fiscal policy in the EU’s old member states between 1980 and 2005 in order to answer the question whether fiscal stimulus can be a successful response to the current crisis in both the short and the long run.     

中国出口增长的就业效应:基于CGE模型的分析

本文通过构建一个具有中国劳动就业结构特征的CGE模型,以2008年下半年国际金融危机以来全球经济增长变化和中国实施经济刺激计划为背景,设计不同的情景方案,模拟分析了中国出口变化对劳动就业的影响效应。结果显示:出口增长1个百分点可以实现0.088个百分点的非农就业增长。但出口就业效应相对于不同的产业部门和就业群体而言具有明显的差异,出口下降将导致纺织、制造业等部门就业人数的显著减少,农民工就业压力明显超过城镇就业。因为出口就业效应显著低于投资就业效应,国际金融危机以来我国劳动就业不仅在数量上经历了从大幅减少到显著增长的突变,同时在结构上也出现了从可贸易部门向非贸易部门的转换。权衡劳动力比较优势利用和产业结构升级,重视就业基数大、出口就业弹性低的服务业部门劳动力吸收能力的提高,实现就业的结构性均衡增长,应成为确保我国未来就业安全的政策方向。     

Economic growth,financial market,and twin crises

In this study, we look not only to provide empirical evidence to investigate the direct impact of financial crises on economic growth, but also to examine the roles of insurance development, financial liberalization, financial institution, and crisis intervention policies on the relationship between the two. We employ a panel data framework from 50 countries by applying the dynamic panel generalized method of moments model. Our main empirical results show that financial crises do have a significantly negative impact on economic growth. In addition, governments or authorities are encouraged to further enhance their insurance sector in order to help spur economic growth when financial crises arise. The government intervention policy choice is also an important factor influencing economic growth during crises.     

日本人为低利率政策及其效应分析

人为低利率政策是日本金融体制的重要组成部分。它通过为民间部门创造租金机会,刺激了民间部门的发展,特别是通过降低企业投资成本,从金融层面有力地支撑了经济的高速增长。然而20世纪70年代以后,由于其形成强的路径依赖,未能随着日本经济结构的变化而及时地被废止,不仅助长了泡沫经济的形成,而且最终导致日本金融危机的爆发。     

Macroeconomic policy cooperation and the G20

Has the G20 achieved its goals in macroeconomic cooperation since 2008? The paper organises the G20's efforts under five themes: macroeconomic stimulus, fiscal consolidation, monetary policy, the global financial safety net and global imbalances. The G20 was initially successful in each of these areas, but this success was short‐lived. While the G20 met its goals on macroeconomic stimulus, it has been less successful in reducing deficits and debt. While it was successful in increasing its resources, the global financial safety net remains too small, too fragmented and institutional reform is incomplete. While the G20 succeeded in moving to more market‐determined exchange rates and avoiding competitive devaluations, it struggled to avoid negative spillovers. Despite years of effort, the G20 has made limited progress in reducing global imbalances. Current account imbalances are creeping back to pre‐crisis levels. Public debt remains high and most economies are moving in the wrong direction in correcting imbalances in household savings and debt. The paper concludes that the G20 has done better in some areas than others. But to suggest the G20 is a forum in decline ignores its shift from reactive crisis response to longer‐term structural challenges outside of the pressing need of an immediate crisis.     

金融危机下中美欧货币政策博弈研究

文章以国际货币政策协调理论为依据,结合中美欧货币政策三方博弈模型为当前全球金融危机应对过程中大国有效参与国际货币政策合作寻求理论和政策上的支持。通过模型论证发现,要治理当前的全球性金融危机,中美欧三方之间货币政策不协调是无效的,美欧领导、中国追随(斯塔克尔伯格协调方式)会使得博弈方的损失提高,美欧合作、中国不参与时的博弈均衡结果是各方得到帕累托改善,中美欧三方合作时的博弈均衡结果则是各方损失进一步减少。因此,中美欧三方货币政策的通力协作是共赢的,有利于三方及世界经济整体的恢复。     

Preparing for a Smooth (Eventual) Exit

One aspect of the U.S. Federal Reserve's efforts to mitigate the financial crisis was the accumulation of unprecedented levels of assets. As financial and economic conditions become healthy and sustainable, the U.S. Federal Reserve will wind down these positions. Doing so without disruption poses serious challenges, but they are challenges that the U.S. Federal Reserve has considered carefully and that can be managed successfully. The approach features caution and transparency and must be coordinated with traditional monetary policy. This paper describes the potential effects of the U.S. Federal Reserve's exit activities and how it will control them.     

Macroprudential Supervision and Monetary Policy in the Post-crisis World

Until two years ago, it was believed that the financial system as a whole was self-correcting and that modern tools of stabilization policy—monetary policy in particular—were sufficient to prevent severe economic contractions. We now know that we need a robust system of regulation and supervision that will recognize and prevent financial excesses before they lead to crisis, while at the same time maintaining an environment conducive to financial innovation. This address traces the causes of the crisis and the role of the Dodd-Frank Act in providing a framework for preventing recurrence. It then describes what must be done to identify emerging systemic financial risk, the tools and implementation of macroprudential financial supervision that must be developed, and the role of coordination between monetary policy and macroprudential supervision. Prevention of crises will not be easy—particularly because it will be necessary to walk a tightrope between prevention of catastrophe and keeping too tight a hold on the financial system.