Estimating the effect of board independence on managerial ownership using a quasi-natural experiment

Grounded in agency theory, this article investigates the effect of board independence on managerial ownership. We exploit the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the associated exchange listing requirements as an exogenous regulatory shock that raises board independence. Our difference-in-difference estimates show that board independence leads to significantly higher managerial ownership. In particular, firms forced to raise board independence exhibit managerial ownership that is 26.35% higher, relative to firms not required to raise board independence. Thus, board independence and managerial equity ownership constitute governance mechanisms that act as complements, rather than substitutes. Our empirical strategy relies on a quasi-natural experiment and is far more likely to show a causal effect than what has been documented in the literature. Finally, an instrumental-variable analysis reinforces our conclusion.     

The optimal choice of central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty

This paper examines the optimal monetary delegation arrangement of central bank independence and conservatism in the presence of uncertainty about the central bank’s output objective. We show that full independence is no longer optimal with uncertain central bank preferences, and that optimal delegation involves the choice of both independence and conservatism. Further, we find that the usual trade-off between independence and conservatism no longer necessarily holds. Consequently, high central bank independence may also require a high level of conservatism.     

More effective than we thought: Central bank independence and inflation in developing countries

This study examines the effect of legal central bank independence on inflation in developing countries. In spite of the policy consensus suggesting that central bank independence is an effective tool to control inflation, the evidence is still limited, particularly for developing countries. Using a novel dataset, we analyze the effect of central bank independence on inflation for a sample of 118 developing countries between 1980 and 2013. We find that higher central bank independence is associated with lower inflation rates. This effect on inflation is stronger the more democratic a country is, but it is also present in non-democratic countries. Our results are robust to different specifications and methodologies. Furthermore, we find that all dimensions included in the measurement of central bank independence (objectives, personnel, policy, and financial independence) contribute to curb inflation. Our results shed light on which types of reforms may be more effective at fighting inflation in developing countries.     

Inflation, government transfers, and optimal central bank independence

The problem of monetary policy delegation is formulated as a two-stage non-cooperative game between the government and the central bank. The solution to this policy game determines the optimal combination of central bank conservatism and independence. The results show that the optimal institutional design always requires some degree of central bank independence and that there is substitutability between central bank independence and conservatism. The results also show that partial central bank independence can be optimal and that there are circumstances under which it is optimal for the government to appoint a liberal central banker.     

论我国独立保证制度的构建

意思自治是我国独立保证制度构建的理论基础,完善我国担保法律制度体系、促进社会经济发展、顺应保证法律制度的国际化趋势是独立保证制度构建价值基础.我国未来担保立法应该在现行担保法第五条的基础上,从独立保证的独立性和从属性,独立保证人和担保债权的范围,独立保证人的抗辩权和独立保证人的追索权等方面,构建我国的独立保证制度.     

Weak Independence and Social Semi‐Orders

This paper provides variants of Arrow's impossibility theorem, which states that there exists no non‐dictatorial aggregation rule satisfying weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives and collective rationality. In this paper, independence of irrelevant alternatives and collective rationality are simultaneously relaxed. Weak independence is imposed instead of independence of irrelevant alternatives. Social preferences are assumed to satisfy the semi‐order properties of semi‐transitivity and the interval‐order property. We prove that there exists a vetoer when the number of alternatives is greater than or equal to six.     

IDENTITY MANAGEMENT: WORKER INDEPENDENCE AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST GAY MEN

I build on a growing literature documenting wage differentials for gay men by showing that the wage differential gay men experience varies significantly across occupations with different levels of worker independence. The penalty is smallest in management and professional occupations, which involve a high level of worker independence. It is largest in service occupations, which include a lower level of independence. This distribution of earnings penalties is consistent with discrimination being the source of the gay wage penalty. The results support the conjecture that higher levels of independence allow gay men to more successfully manage the disclosure of sexual orientation and mediate the negative effects of discrimination. (JEL J3, J7, J15)     

关于中国人民银行独立性的研究--来自独立性指数和政策反应函数的证据

本文的目的在于 :(1 )根据GMT和CWN的方法 ,将中国人民银行有关法律指数化 ,并通过独立性指数的纵向和跨国家比较来分析中国人民银行在法律层面上的独立性变化和独立性程度 ;(2 )构建中国人民银行政策反应函数 (policyreactionfunction) ,并通过政策工具变量 (instrumentvariables)和政治事件虚拟变量 (dummyvariables)的变化来反映中国人民银行的实际独立性。     

Judgment aggregation: (im)possibility theorems

The aggregation of individual judgments over interrelated propositions is a newly arising field of social choice theory. I introduce several independence conditions on judgment aggregation rules, each of which protects against a specific type of manipulation by agenda setters or voters. I derive impossibility theorems whereby these independence conditions are incompatible with certain minimal requirements. Unlike earlier impossibility results, the main result here holds for any (non-trivial) agenda. However, independence conditions arguably undermine the logical structure of judgment aggregation. I therefore suggest restricting independence to “premises”, which leads to a generalised premise-based procedure. This procedure is proven to be possible if the premises are logically independent.     

审计独立性研究

围绕审计独立性的定义、损害因素、保证因素以及衡量尺度诸方面,理论界和实务界业已做出不懈的探索和努力,然而,迄今为止,对于这些问题的回答依然是众说纷纭,莫衷一是。文章在对国内外关于审计独立性的研究文献加以回顾和分析的基础上,结合中国股票市场的特殊制度背景,研究并归纳了审计独立性的上述内容,使得现象与本质的混淆得以厘清,并有助于该主题的后续研究。     

Central Bank Independence in Transition Economies

The paper discusses recent changes in central bank laws and the relationship between inflation and central bank independence in transition economies. Two indices of legal independence are constructed, covering political and economic aspects of independence. Most of the countries experienced high-inflation episodes in the recent past and changes introduced to the laws after, or simultaneously, with stabilization programmes strengthened the position of the central banks. In further analysis, an inverse relationship emerges between inflation and indices of central bank independence. However, the robust relationship is present only at a high level of economic liberalization. This conclusion is supported by results from regressions on time-aggregated and panel data, even after controlling for the government fiscal position and the absence/presence of an IMF stabilization package.     

The Impacts of Financial Integration on the Linkages Between Monetary Independence and Foreign Exchange Reserves

This paper investigates the short-run and long-run effects of financial integration on the dynamics between monetary independence and foreign exchange reserves using a GMM system estimation involving two-year non-overlapping average data (2000-2011) from 114 countries. The results indicate that the effect of foreign exchange reserves on the monetary independence is intensified by the level of financial integration. This suggests a positive spill over effect from the financial integration to the monetary policy independence. Besides, a positive implication of financial integration on monetary independence could be established when the foreign exchange reserves is at the maximum level. In addition, the comparisons between the mean of foreign exchange reserves and the threshold levels of foreign exchange reserves that neutralise the impact of financial integration indicate that on average, the foreign exchange reserves are sufficient to offset the effect of financial integration. A stable exchange rate will undermine the positive impact of foreign exchange reserves on monetary independence. Finally, the long-run and short-run impacts occur in the same direction. This paper ends with some policy implications and suggestions for future research.     

审计基础框架之变革:从独立性到可靠性

在现行的审计基础框架中,独立性一直被视为职业基石。由于独立性概念的不一致及其所导致的运作与执行的不一致,使得对独立性的监管陷入一种不可自拔的恶性循环之中。为此,需要以审计可靠性框架替代审计独立性框架,使审计职业重新回归其原本所应该追求的要义——可靠性,并以此减轻独立性所不应该承担的混乱功能。     

Central bank independence and stock market returns in emerging economies

We investigate the effect of central bank independence on stock market returns in emerging economies. We find evidence for a positive overall effect, but economic independence of the central bank appears to be more relevant than political independence.     

外汇冲销式干预对中国货币政策独立性的影响研究

冲销干预对中国货币政策独立性的影响表现出长短期不一致的特征,在短期内有助于保持货币政策的独立性;但在长期内,冲销干预不仅会制约货币政策的操作空间,削弱其独立性,累积金融风险,导致恶性后果。对此,应优化央行票据的期限结构,完善以国债市场为核心的公开市场操作,发展外汇掉期交易,建立外汇平准基金制度,增强货币政策独立性。     

International Capital Movement and Monetary Independence in Asia

In this paper, we investigate the extent of monetary independence in a group of ten Asian countries: China, Malaysia, Japan, India, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong. While the traditional investigation has considered only the bivariate relationship between the home interest rate and the base rate, we employ both single-equation and vector autoregressive representations of the bivariate and the trivariate relationship including the desired (or optimal) interest rate. We find in most countries, that the ranking of monetary independence is relatively consistent across the models and methodologies although model specifications produce important differences for some countries such as Japan, Indonesia, and India. Trilemma suggests that a country cannot accomplish all three policy objectives: monetary independence, exchange rate stability, and free capital mobility. To increase monetary independence a country must choose between greater exchange rate flexibility or a lower degree of capital mobility. The fact that China and Malaysia, the two countries that are known to have imposed the strictest capital controls, consistently rank high in various scenarios while Hong Kong, which has maintained nearly the freest regime in capital markets, is lowest in monetary independence, indicates that perhaps capital controls may play a more important role than does exchange rate flexibility in securing independence in monetary policy making. On the other hand, countries that maintain greater exchange rate stability do not necessarily rank low, unless it is combined with greater capital mobility as in the case of Hong Kong.     

以可靠性为"基石"的审计框架重构

在监管者和职业界给予独立性前所未有的关注后,并未离我们远去的审计失败让我们从新视角重新思考审计的本质特征。在独立性定义上具有“无形”性,而在实务中保持独立性又存在诸多障碍。我们从委托关系、信息风险角度指出,建立在独立性、正直性和胜任能力基础之上的可靠性是审计的“基石”。     

On the independence from irrelevant alternatives in probabilistic choice models

Probabilistic choice models often invoke a behavioral assumption referred to as the independence from irrelevant alternatives. The implications of this condition have not been fully developed in probabilistic choice contexts. It is well known that nonpathological preferences may not exhibit the independence from irrelevant alternatives, which is apparently an assumption of convenience; and the obvious question is then whether the assumption is very restrictive. This paper addresses this question. A common model of probabilistic choice is constructed. A measure of the likelihood that independence from irrelevant alternatives holds is seen to arise naturally in this model. Given this measure, it is demonstrated that the condition will almost always fail to hold.     

Effective Monetary Policy Conservatism: A Comparison of 13 OECD Countries

Empirical studies of the influence of central bank independence and inflation have yet delivered quite inconclusive results. We argue this to be due to the failure to focus an actual central bank independence and to take the degree of conservatism of the government and the central bank into account. In this paper, we propose a new methodology of measuring the joint degree of central bank independence and conservatism from observed central bank behaviour. After applying the method to 13 OECD countries, we find our indicator to be negatively correlated with a legal index of central bank independence, but positively correlated with the turnover rate. As the latter exclusively focuses on factual central bank independence, the remaining difference might be attributed to conservatism.     

Too small to be independent? On the influence of ECB monetary policy on interest rates of the EEA countries

Monetary policy independence is regarded as the central argument in favour of floating exchange rates and monetary integration. We evaluate the actual independence of non-euro members of the European Economic Area by using heterogeneous panel cointegration methods that allow cross-dependency. We show that domestic interest rates follow the euro interest rates. These spillovers imply a low monetary independence despite the insulation given by floating exchange rate regimes and inflation-targeting frameworks. We therefore find significant spillover effects of the European Central Bank policy and argue that the costs of monetary integration in Europe may be lower than expected.