Shareholder perceptions of the changing impact of CEOs: Market reactions to unexpected CEO deaths, 1950–2009

Research summary : Despite a number of studies highlighting the important impact Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) have on firms, several theoretical and methodological questions cloud existing findings. This study takes an alternative approach by examining how shareholders' perceptions of CEO significance have changed over time. Using an event study methodology and a sample of 240 sudden and unexpected CEO deaths, we show that absolute (unsigned) market reactions to these events in U.S. public firms have increased markedly between 1950 and 2009. Our results indicate that shareholders act in ways consistent with the belief that CEOs have become increasingly more influential in recent decades. Managerial summary : With Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) facing increased scrutiny and receiving ever‐increasing pay packages, substantial debate exists about their overall contribution to firm outcomes. While prior research has sought to calculate the proportion of firm outcomes attributable to the CEO, this study takes an alternative approach by using the “wisdom of the crowds” to assess how shareholders think about the importance of CEOs. Our study finds that shareholders, perhaps the most financially motivated stakeholder, view CEOs as increasingly important drivers of firm outcomes, good and bad, versus their peers from decades earlier. Notably, market reaction to the unexpected death of a CEO has increased steadily over the last six decades, highlighting the importance of succession planning and supporting, at least partially, the increased compensation given today's top executives. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cheap talk? Strategy presentations as a form of chief executive officer impression management

Research summary: We develop and test a set of hypotheses on investors' reactions to a specific form of impression management, public presentations of overall strategy by Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). Contrary to expectations from a “cheap talk” perspective, we suggest that such strategy presentations convey valuable information to investors, especially in conditions of heightened information asymmetry associated with varying types of new CEOs. Broad empirical support for our theoretical arguments is shown in a sample of strategy presentations carried out by NYSE and NASDAQ listed organizations over 10 years. Our research contributes to literature on new CEOs and impression management. We draw out implications both for management and for further research. Managerial summary: We examine the impact of public presentations on company strategy by Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) on company stock prices. Adjusting for market movements in general, on average stock prices rose by 1.6 percent following these strategy presentations. Strategy presentations received larger reactions the more the CEO was unfamiliar to investors. Thus, stock price gains for new CEOs in general were 5.3 percent; for external, within‐industry new CEOs, they were 9.3 percent; and for external, outside‐of‐industry new CEOs, they were 12.4 percent. Given that only 40 percent of new CEOs present on strategy in their first 200 days post‐appointment, we suggest that new CEOs pay more attention to this potential means of communicating, especially if they are unfamiliar to investors. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of the chief technology officer and firm and industry R&D intensity on organizational performance

Between 1993 and 2013 the number and power of CTOs increased; as indicated in the percentage of firms with CTOs, their increasing presence on boards, their compensation relative to their CEOs, and compensation relative to other highly compensated executives. Firms which pursue an aggressive technology strategy (powerful CTO, high R&D spending) in industries in which technology is a critical contingency have well above normal market adjusted returns while those which pursue that strategy in industries in which technology is not critical have well below normal returns. These results empirically confirm longstanding, untested assumptions in the field of technology management. Moreover, the effect of R&D expenditures on firm performance is contingent on the degree to which technology is a critical contingency in the industry and on the power of the firm's CTO. These findings may explain the mixed results of past studies of the effects of R&D expenditure on firm performance. A model which integrates its own insights with those of earlier work on CTOs, R&D expenditures, firm strategy, and firm power dynamics is presented and supported.     

Executive succession: Organizational antecedents of ceo characteristics

Based on 195 succession events in Business Week 1000 firms, this study examines the organizational antecedents of CEO demographic characteristics. Study findings suggest that antecedent conditions of lower firm profits and firm growth are associated with the selection of outsider CEOs. Additionally, R&D intensity is associated with the selection of CEOs having technical functional backgrounds and higher levels of education.     

Generalized vs. specific locus of control expectancies of chief executive officers

Hodgkinson (1992) recently advocated in this journal that measures of generalized control expectancies, such as the well known Rotter I-E scale (Rotter, 1966), are not suited to study the relationship between the locus of control beliefs of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) on the one hand and strategic, structural and performance variables on the other hand. According to Hodgkinson (1992) a more specific scale, measuring strategic control expectancies, should be used in future research. We argue and empirically illustrate that such a methodology will not lead to interesting research results in the ‘strategic leadership’ domain. More specifically, measures of firm-specific control expectancies are likely to be influenced by the CEO's perception of the situational context of the firm and are therefore not indicative of fundamental personality differences between CEOs. Consequently, such measures cannot give an answer to the basic research question whether and why the personality of CEOs plays an important role in explaining organizational behavior and performance.     

Understanding the human side of openness: the fit between open innovation modes and CEO characteristics

In small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), where typically the decision-making process is highly centralised, important decisions, such as open innovation (OI) adoption, will be strongly influenced by the characteristics of their Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). Pointing the attention to the strategic leadership and human elements, this paper sheds light on the micro-foundation of OI by emphasising the role that the personal traits of key individuals in innovation. OI adoption could result in the enactment of several OI modes – each representing an opportunity of potential change (of market, of technology or/and of the organisation) – and this paper attempts to examine the relationships between the CEO characteristics and each of the OI modes. Our analysis, using Korean SME data, shows that CEOs’ positive attitude, entrepreneurial orientation (EO), patience and education can play important roles in facilitating OI in SMEs. However, this paper also observed that the effects of CEO characteristics on OI adoption were differently configured according to the nature of each OI mode, for example, CEOs’ patience and EO had different impacts depending on the degree of uncertainty in the OI mode. This suggest that OI must be understood as a wide innovation spectrum, and, to increase opportunities for successful OI adoption, CEOs have to attempt to compensate for characteristics they may lack by recruiting appropriate complementary top managements. The research has practical implications for CEOs and policy makers who are interested in enhancing competitiveness of SMEs.     

The organizational influence of the Chief Technology Officer

The proposition that the Chief Technology Officer's (CTO) primary bases for power and influence are in technical expertise and position power is critically analyzed from the perspective of upper echelons research. This fresh perspective suggests that CTOs who aspire to have significant influence in their organizations should also build their power bases on broad knowledge of the firm and its environment, a network of personal relationships inside and outside the firm, ownership position in the firm, and intuitive understanding of the business. The CEO's leadership style can also enhance or curtail the influence of the CTO. Research and managerial implications are drawn.     

Does board social capital influence chief executive officers' investment decisions in research and development?

The findings of the chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics–research and development (R&D) investment relationship remain incomplete if previous unexamined contingencies are not considered. Very few studies in this area have invariably focused on the constraints from the external environment and overlooked the important influence of board social capital on such relationship. This study uses insights from resource dependence theory to examine how the effects of CEO characteristics on R&D investment are contingent on board social capital. The results show that board social capital mitigates/enhances the negative/positive effect of CEO tenure/CEO educational level on R&D investment, supporting the view that board social capital, as an important conduit to link firms to critical information and essential resources in the environment, may offer better counsel to CEOs and enhance their decision‐making capabilities in moving toward R&D. One important implication is that firms wishing to encourage innovation through R&D spending should consider nominating directors with rich social capital to the board because they may assist CEOs in coping with R&D complexities and acquiring requisite resources, leading to a better planning of R&D.     

CEO research orientation,organizational context,and innovation in the pharmaceutical industry

This study develops and tests a comprehensive framework that explains what, when, and how CEO characteristics influence firms’ innovation outcomes in R&D-intensive industries. Empirical evidence from 109 CEOs from 87 U.S.-based pharmaceutical firms over the period 2001–2013 reveals that research-oriented CEOs – those with ability and motivation for science and technology – increase their firms’ innovation outcomes. The results indicate that the CEO–innovation relationship strongly depends on the extent of CEOs’ managerial discretion, which is shaped by the organizational context. We contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the role of CEOs in firms´ innovation performance differentials.     

Follow the leader (or not): The influence of peer CEOs’ characteristics on interorganizational imitation

Research Summary: We argue that because charisma and narcissism represent widely held prototypes of effective and ineffective forms of leadership, respectively, the likelihood that a focal firm will imitate the practices of its peer firms is affected by these peer firms’ CEO characteristics. We theorize that peer firm CEO charisma enhances the focal firm’s imitation of peer firms’ behaviors, while peer firm CEO narcissism diminishes it. We further posit that the uncertainty of the context affects these imitation processes: industry dynamism and prior experience in a given strategic domain, respectively, strengthens and dampens focal firms’ susceptibility to these peer CEOs’ attributes. We test and find support for these ideas using a longitudinal sample of Fortune 500 firms in two distinct domains, corporate strategy and corporate social responsibility. Managerial Summary: When companies are uncertain about the costs and benefits of strategic actions this may lead them to imitate the actions of peer companies. But given the uncertainty, the challenge for executives is: which companies to emulate and which to ignore? In a sample of Fortune 500 companies, we find that the charisma or narcissism of a peer company’s CEO positively or negatively influences, respectively, the degree to which the peer company’s strategic actions are imitated. We reason that this is because these particular CEO attributes are widely believed to drive leadership effectiveness or ineffectiveness, respectively. We also find that the effects of these CEO characteristics on imitation are stronger in dynamic industry environments and weaker for companies that already have experience with the given strategy.     

Once an outsider,always an outsider? CEO origin,strategic change,and firm performance

In this study, we examine how the relationship between the level of strategic change in the pattern of resource allocation and firm performance differs between firms led by outside CEOs and those led by inside CEOs. Based on longitudinal data on the tenure histories of 193 CEOs who left office between 1993 and 1998, we find that the level of strategic change has an inverted U‐shaped relationship with firm performance. As the level of change increases from slight to moderate, performance increases; as the level of change increases from moderate to great, performance declines. Further, we find that this inverted U‐shaped relationship differs between firms led by outside CEOs and those led by inside CEOs. That is, both the positive effect of strategic change on firm performance when the level of change is relatively low and the negative effect of strategic change on firm performance when the level of change is relatively high are more pronounced for outside CEOs than for inside CEOs. Supplementary analyses also suggest that this difference between outside and inside CEOs exists in later years but not in the early years of CEO tenure. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Small is big in ICT: The impact of R&D on productivity

We examine the contribution of R&D to firm productivity in a large panel of European firms and study its variation with the age, size, and sub-sector of firms. We find that R&D capital in ICT firms has a larger effect on revenue when compared to non-ICT firms. At the firm level, our results suggest that, surprisingly, smaller and older ICT firms benefit the most from R&D. Small but mature ICT firms are likely to dominate market niches, and small size may enable them to be flexible and adaptable which helps them respond to technological opportunities to develop innovative products and services. This has important implications for public policy based upon firm age.     

The differential effects of CEO narcissism and hubris on corporate social responsibility

Research Summary: While prior studies have predominantly shown that CEO narcissism and hubris exhibit similar effects on various strategic decisions and outcomes, this study aims to explore the mechanisms underlying how narcissistic versus hubristic CEOs affect their firms differently. Specifically, we investigate how peer influence moderates the CEO narcissism/hubris—corporate social responsibility (CSR). With a sample of S&P 1500 firms for 2003–2010, we find that the positive relationship between CEO narcissism and CSR is strengthened (weakened) when board‐interlocked peer firms invest less (more) intensively in CSR than a CEO's own firm; the negative relationship between CEO hubris and CSR is strengthened when peer firms are engaged in less CSR than a CEO's own firm. Managerial Summary: Some CEOs are more narcissistic while others may be more hubristic, but these two groups of CEOs hold different attitudes toward the extent to which their firms should engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR). Our findings with a large sample of U.S. publically listed firms suggest that narcissistic CEOs care more about CSR, but hubristic CEOs care less. Interestingly, when narcissistic CEOs observe their peer firms engaging in more or less CSR than their own firms, they tend to respond in an opposite manner; in contrast, hubristic CEOs will only engage in even less CSR when their peers also do not emphasize CSR. Our findings point to a fundamental difference between CEO narcissism and hubris in terms of how they affect firms' CSR decisions based on their social comparison with peer firms.     

The influence of market structure on technological performance in the food-manufacturing industries

This paper tests the effect of firm and market structure variables on the rate of R&D investment by food processing firms. While the estimated relationship is consistent with the hypotheses of Schumpeter and Galbraith at small firm sizes and small-to-moderale concentration levels, above these critical values expected firm R&D increases at a decreasing rate with firm size and decreases with market concentration. The second part of this paper examines the origins of process patents closely related to six food industries. On average U.S. firms outside the industry, foreign firms, and individuals were each assigned more food-industry patents than were U.S. food processing firm. These findings place the public policy interpretation of observed relationships between market power and firm technological performance into a broader perspective. Even if a reduction in market concentrationn reduced R&D originating within a food industry, this decrease might bede minimus relative to technological changes, originating outside the industry.     

Firm‐specific knowledge assets and employment arrangements: Evidence from CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal

Research summary : We argue that firms with greater specificity in knowledge structure need to both encourage their CEOs to stay so that they make investments with a long‐term perspective, and provide job securities to the CEOs so that they are less concerned about the risk of being dismissed. Accordingly, we found empirical evidence that specificity in firm knowledge assets is positively associated with the use of restricted stocks in CEO compensation design (indicating the effort of CEO retention) and negatively associated with CEO dismissal (indicating the job securities the firm committed to CEOs). Furthermore, firm diversification was found to mitigate the effect of firm‐specific knowledge on both CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal, as CEOs are more removed from the deployment of knowledge resources in diversified firms. Managerial summary : A firm's knowledge structure, that is, the extent to which its knowledge assets are firm‐specific versus general, has implications for both CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal. In particular, we find that a firm with a high level of firm‐specific knowledge has the incentive to retain its CEO through the use of restricted stocks in CEO compensation. Such a firm is also likely to provide job security for its CEO, leading to a lower likelihood of CEO dismissal. These arguments, however, are less likely to hold in diversified corporations as CEOs in such corporations are more removed from the deployment of knowledge assets. A key managerial implication is that CEO compensation and job security design should be made according to the nature of firm knowledge assets. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effect of CEO pay deviations on CEO withdrawal,firm size,and firm profits

We build upon previous work on the effects of deviations in CEO pay from labor markets to assess how overcompensation or undercompensation affects subsequent voluntary CEO withdrawal, firm size, and firm profitability, taking into account the moderating effect of firm ownership structure. We find that CEO underpayment is related to changes in firm size and CEO withdrawal, and that the relationship between CEO underpayment and CEO withdrawal is stronger in owner‐controlled firms. We also show that when CEOs are overpaid, there is higher firm profitability; a relationship that is weaker among manager‐controlled firms. We then discuss the implications that these findings have for future research. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Information asymmetry and the dismissal of newly appointed CEOs: an empirical investigation

Why are some newly appointed CEOs (i.e., those with tenure of three years or less) dismissed while others are not? Drawing upon previous reseach on information asymmetry and adverse selection in CEO selection, I argue that the board of directors may make a poor selection at the time of CEO succession, and as a result, must dismiss the appointee after succession when better information about him/her is obtained. Therefore, the level of information asymmetry at the time of succession increases the likelihood of dismissal. With data on 204 newly appointed CEOs, the results of this study support this argument. After controlling for alternative explanations of CEO dismissal (e.g., firm performance and political factors), the results show that the likelihood of dismissal of newly appointed CEOs is higher in outside successions and/or if the succession follows the dismissal of the preceding CEO. Further, if at the time of succession, the firm's board has a nominating committee that is independent and/or on which outside directors have few external directorships, the likelihood of dismissal is lower. Contributions to the CEO dismissal/succession literature are discussed. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Performance deviations and acquisition premiums: The impact of CEO celebrity on managerial risk‐taking

Research summary: This article draws on identity control theory and a study of acquisition premiums to explore how CEO celebrity status and financial performance relative to aspirations affect firm risk behavior. The study finds that celebrity CEOs tend to pay smaller premiums for target firms, but these tendencies change when prior firm performance deviates from the industry average returns, thereby leading these CEOs to pay higher premiums. The study also finds that the premiums tend to be even larger when celebrity CEOs have more recently attained celebrity status. Taken together, these findings contribute to identity control theory and CEO celebrity literatures by suggesting that celebrity status is a double‐edged sword and that the internalization of celebrity status by CEOs strongly influences the decision‐making of CEOs. Managerial summary: The purpose of this article is to examine how CEO celebrity status and financial performance relative to aspirations affect the size of acquisition premiums. The study finds that celebrity CEOs tend to pay smaller premiums for target firms. However, when celebrity CEOs' prior firm performance is either better or worse than the industry average, these CEOs pay higher premiums. This situation is exacerbated when the CEO has only recently been crowned a celebrity. In effect, these CEOs feel great pressure to match the inflated performance expectations that come with celebrity status. These findings suggest that being a celebrity is a double‐edged sword. The implication here is that CEOs who have recently been crowned a celebrity should be aware of these pressures and cope accordingly. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Who explores further? Evidence on R&D outsourcing from the survey of research and development

Building off the resource‐based view and the knowledge‐based view, our study aims to examine determinants of firms’ R&D outsourcing, using annually‐conducted firm‐level survey data of Japanese R&D companies from 1984–2012. This survey allows us to measure strategic R&D outsourcing, isolated from those more for cost‐reducing, such as prototyping, testing and inspecting. The results corroborate the argument of complementarity in scale between internal R&D and R&D outsourcing. We also find that firms employing more doctorate holders and diversifying in knowledge spaces tend to make more use of R&D outsourcing. This study sheds light on firms’ absorptive capacity, associated both with higher‐order R&D human capital and diversified knowledge spaces, as determinants of R&D outsourcing.     

Who's in charge here? Co‐CEOs,power gaps,and firm performance

At the pinnacles of organizations, comparative tests of unity of command and shared command are nearly impossible because only one individual sits atop most organizations. In organizations led by co‐CEOs, however, such a test is possible because co‐CEOs can truly share power. But do they? Our research pits the unity‐of‐command principle against the shared‐command principle and finds overall support for the former, even within the co‐CEO context. Our sample of 71 co‐CEO pairs at publicly traded U.S. firms shows that increasing power gaps between co‐CEOs are positively associated with firm performance. This positive association wanes and turns negative, however, as power gaps become very large. We conclude that whatever benefits the co‐CEO structure might offer likely lie outside the shared command paradigm. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.