Reaching through the fog: Institutional environment and cross‐border giving of corporate foundations

Research Summary : Corporate philanthropy has long been recognized as an important part of multinational strategy, yet we know relatively little how charitable giving is allocated across countries. Using a sample of 208 U.S.‐based corporate foundations from 1993 to 2008, we find that the foundations give more in countries with opaque institutional environments, but they do so through international intermediaries. They also give more when the funding firms have new entries in countries with weak institutions—hence greater needs for the social license to operate—or when their operations require stronger connections with local suppliers or customers. These findings point to the use of corporate philanthropy as part of corporate diplomacy when the local institutions are ineffective and the importance of reaching out to local constituents is high. Managerial Summary : Corporate foundations play an important role in firms' charitable giving across countries. This article analyzes how foundation giving is associated with the funding firm's need to navigate the local business environments. Using a sample of 208 U.S.‐based corporate foundations from 1993 to 2008, we find that foundations give more in countries characterized by weak rule of law and high levels of corruption, and when the funding firms have newly established subsidiaries or stronger need to connect with local stakeholders there. However, donations to countries with weak institutions are more likely to go through international intermediaries to avoid potential liabilities. The results are consistent with the view that corporate foundations support corporate diplomacy and help obtain the social license to operate in the host countries.     

Reassessing board member allegiance: CEO replacement following financial misconduct

Research summary: We examine how board members' reactions following financial misconduct differ from those following other adverse organizational events, such as poor performance. We hypothesize that inside directors and directors appointed by the CEO may be particularly concerned about their reputation following deceptive financial practices. We demonstrate that directors more closely affiliated with the CEO are more likely to reduce their support for the CEO following financial misconduct, increasing the likelihood of CEO replacement. Enactment of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act similarly alters governance dynamics by creating a greater expectation for sound corporate governance. We demonstrate our findings in U.S. public firms that restated their financial earnings during a 12‐year period before and after the passage of Sarbanes‐Oxley. Managerial summary: Given past concerns about lack of oversight by boards of directors leading to firm financial misconduct, we examine how the relationship between directors and CEOs may be altered in the face of such misconduct. We argue that directors most closely tied to the CEO (inside board members and board members appointed by the CEO), typically the most supportive of the CEO, may become most concerned about their own reputation following financial misconduct. We find that CEOs receive less support from these directors, a finding in contrast to past studies demonstrating that such board members tend to shield CEOs following poor performance. These findings are accentuated following the passage of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act, which places greater responsibility on the CEO for the accuracy of financial reports. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Home Alone: The Effects of Lone‐Insider Boards on CEO Pay,Financial Misconduct,and Firm Performance

Research summary: Corporate scandals of the previous decade have heightened attention on board independence. Indeed, boards at many large firms are now so independent that the CEO is “home alone” as the lone inside member. We build upon “pro‐insider” research within agency theory to explain how the growing trend toward lone‐insider boards affects key outcomes and how external governance forces constrain their impact. We find evidence among S&P 1500 firms that having a lone‐insider board is associated with (a) excess CEO pay and a larger CEO‐top management team pay gap, (b) increased likelihood of financial misconduct, and (c) decreased firm performance, but that stock analysts and institutional investors reduce these negative effects. The findings raise important questions about the efficacy of leaving the CEO “home alone.” Managerial summary: Following concerns that insider‐dominated boards failed to protect shareholders, there has been a push for greater board independence. This push has been so successful that the CEO is now the only insider on the boards of more than half of S&P 1500 firms. We examine whether lone‐insider boards do in fact offer strong governance or whether they enable CEOs to benefit personally. We find that lone‐insider boards pay CEOs excessively, pay CEOs a disproportionately large amount relative to other top managers, have more instances of financial misconduct, and have lower performance than boards with more than one insider. Thus, it appears that lone‐insider boards do not function as intended and firms should reconsider whether the push towards lone‐insider boards is actually in shareholders' best interests. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The differential effects of CEO narcissism and hubris on corporate social responsibility

Research Summary: While prior studies have predominantly shown that CEO narcissism and hubris exhibit similar effects on various strategic decisions and outcomes, this study aims to explore the mechanisms underlying how narcissistic versus hubristic CEOs affect their firms differently. Specifically, we investigate how peer influence moderates the CEO narcissism/hubris—corporate social responsibility (CSR). With a sample of S&P 1500 firms for 2003–2010, we find that the positive relationship between CEO narcissism and CSR is strengthened (weakened) when board‐interlocked peer firms invest less (more) intensively in CSR than a CEO's own firm; the negative relationship between CEO hubris and CSR is strengthened when peer firms are engaged in less CSR than a CEO's own firm. Managerial Summary: Some CEOs are more narcissistic while others may be more hubristic, but these two groups of CEOs hold different attitudes toward the extent to which their firms should engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR). Our findings with a large sample of U.S. publically listed firms suggest that narcissistic CEOs care more about CSR, but hubristic CEOs care less. Interestingly, when narcissistic CEOs observe their peer firms engaging in more or less CSR than their own firms, they tend to respond in an opposite manner; in contrast, hubristic CEOs will only engage in even less CSR when their peers also do not emphasize CSR. Our findings point to a fundamental difference between CEO narcissism and hubris in terms of how they affect firms' CSR decisions based on their social comparison with peer firms.     

Corporate divestitures and family control

This paper investigates the relationship between divestitures and firm value in family firms. Using hand‐collected data on a sample of over 30,000 firm‐year observations, we find that family firms are less likely than non‐family firms to undertake divestitures, especially when these companies are managed by family rather than non‐family‐CEOs. However, we then establish that the divestitures undertaken by family firms, predominantly those run by family‐CEOs, are associated with higher post‐divestiture performance than their non‐family counterparts. These findings indicate that family firms may fail to fully exploit available economic opportunities, potentially because they pursue multiple objectives beyond the maximization of shareholder value. These results also elucidate how the characteristics of corporate owners and managers can influence the value that firms derive from their corporate strategies. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are founder CEOs more overconfident than professional CEOs? Evidence from S&P 1500 companies

Research summary : We provide evidence that founder chief executive officers (CEOs) of large S&P 1500 companies are more overconfident than their nonfounder counterparts (“professional CEOs”). We measure overconfidence via tone of CEO tweets, tone of CEO statements during earnings conference calls, management earnings forecasts, and CEO option‐exercise behavior. Compared with professional CEOs, founder CEOs use more optimistic language on Twitter and during earnings conference calls. In addition, founder CEOs are more likely to issue earnings forecasts that are too high; they are also more likely to perceive their firms to be undervalued, as implied by their option‐exercise behavior. We provide evidence that, to date, investors appear unaware of this “overconfidence bias” among founders. Managerial summary : This article helps to explain why firms managed by founder chief executive officers (CEOs) behave differently from those managed by professional CEOs. We study a sample of S&P 1500 firms and find strong evidence that founder CEOs are more overconfident than professional CEOs. To date, investors appear unaware of this overconfidence bias among founders. Our study should help firm stakeholders, including investors, employees, suppliers, and customers, put the statements and actions of founder CEOs in perspective. Our study should also help members of corporate boards make more informed decisions about whether to retain (or bring back) founder CEOs or hire professional CEOs. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Winning us with trifles: Adverse selection in the use of philanthropy as insurance

Research Summary: We study the use of corporate philanthropy as a form of reputation insurance, developing a formal model of such insurance to examine how the terms of insurance in equilibrium change under different assumptions about the firm and its stakeholders. We then test the predictions from this model in the U.S. petroleum industry and find that philanthropic donations offer insurance‐like benefits, but are also positively associated with subsequent oil spills—firms that give more, spill more—with this association being stronger for spills that are under firms’ control and in states with low civic capacity. These results are consistent with an adverse selection/moral hazard equilibrium and suggest that the use of philanthropy as reputation insurance may benefit firms at the cost of society. Managerial Summary: Firms that donate to social causes develop a reputation for being socially responsible, and are often given the benefit of doubt when negative information about them comes to light. But are philanthropic firms truly more responsible? We argue that firms that donate more may be more likely to do harm—those that expect to do harm later are likely to give more now, and those that know their reputation protects them may become less careful. Evidence from the U.S. petroleum industry is consistent with this argument, with firms that give more having more subsequent oil spills, but only the type of spills that are under the firm's control, and only in states where the firm faces weaker scrutiny.     

Independent director death and CEO acquisitiveness: Build an empire or pursue a quiet life?

Research summary : This study examines the relationship between an independent director's death and CEO acquisitiveness. Using a sample of large U.S. public firms, we find that CEOs who have experienced an independent director's death undertake fewer acquisitions in the post‐director death period, in particular fewer large acquisitions. Our findings are consistent with the prediction of posttraumatic growth theory that mortality awareness can induce CEOs to reevaluate their life priorities and reduce the importance of extrinsic goals in their decision making. This study contributes to the strategic leadership literature by highlighting the influence of the death of CEOs ' social peers on CEOs ' strategic decisions . Managerial summary : Does the death of CEOs ' social peers influence CEOs ' strategic decisions? We find that CEOs who have experienced an independent director's death engage in fewer acquisitions in the post‐director death period, in particular fewer large acquisitions. One likely explanation for our findings is that the death of an independent director may heighten CEOs ' mortality awareness, lead the CEOs to pursue a quieter life, and weaken their propensities for undertaking decisions (i.e., acquisitions) that increase their compensation and social status . Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of social proximity in professional CEO appointments: Evidence from caste/religion‐based hiring of CEOs in India

Research Summary: The role of homophily in CEO appointments at the largest corporations is an important subject in corporate governance. This subject is particularly important in a country like India where a multitude of religions, castes, and communities form its social fabric. We test for the role of homophily in professional CEO appointments in India by empirically examining the preference for same caste/religion CEOs by the largest firms. Using a unique dataset, assembled by detailed identification of castes/religions from family names and counterfactuals obtained through the Coarsened Exact Matching technique, we find that caste/religion plays a crucial role in CEO selection as a source of information (positive discrimination). The evidence is not consistent with its use to pursue taste‐based preferences (negative discrimination). Managerial Summary: We test for the role of homophily in the appointments of CEOs in India by empirically examining the preference for same caste/religion CEOs by the largest firms. We find that caste/religion plays an important role in CEO selection, i.e., as a form of information or “positive discrimination.” The evidence is not consistent with its use to pursue taste‐based preferences or “negative discrimination.”     

Narcissism,director selection,and risk‐taking spending

We explain why CEOs favor new directors who are similar in narcissistic tendency or have prior experience with other similarly narcissistic CEOs. Because powerful CEOs are more able to select such individuals onto their boards, CEO power is predicted to be positively associated with the above characteristics of new directors. These associations are expected to be stronger when a new director is more different from the CEO in salient demographic characteristics. Moreover, we explain why new directors favored by CEOs are more supportive of their decision making, strengthening the positive relationship between CEO narcissism and risk‐taking spending. Our findings provide considerable support for our theory. This study introduces personality theories to corporate governance research on director selection and to research on how triads influence dyadic relations. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

THE GOVERNANCE AND CONTROL OF VOLUNTARY CORPORATE SPIN-OFFS

We investigate the role that a voluntary corporate restructuring can play in the design of efficient internal corporate control mechanisms. To this end, we examine the post-restructuring internal control practices in 78 voluntary corporate spin-offs that were completed between 1972 and 1987. We find that the selection of the new CEOs, the design of their compensation contracts, and the staffing of the boards of directors and their compensation committees in the spun-off firms can be seen as ex ante efficient. These governance and control practices, however, are not strongly related to the observed positive market reactions to the spin-off announcements. The results indicate that equity reorganizations facilitate the implementation of efficient internal governance and control practices, but that other factors must influence the share price reactions to the announcement of such voluntary corporate restructurings.     

Threat of falling high status and corporate bribery: Evidence from the revealed accounting records of two South Korean presidents

Research Summary: Social status and its dynamics may be an important predictor of which firms will engage in large‐scale bribery. Prior theory is incomplete, however, and prior studies have lacked comprehensive and reliable data on firm‐level bribery decisions. We offer a new theoretical prediction and a novel data set on high‐level corruption in South Korea, where the accounting records of two presidents in the 1987–1992 era were exposed to after‐the‐fact legal and public scrutiny. We find that, controlling for a range of alternative explanations, the threat of falling high status—that is, the combination of longstanding high social status with current‐period mediocre economic performance relative to that of industry peers—is a statistically and economically meaningful predictor of increases in the amount of large‐scale corporate bribery. Managerial Summary: What leads companies to engage in large‐scale bribery of senior politicians? Our concept of “threat of falling high status” refers to a circumstance where companies that have historically enjoyed high status through their owner families’ elite marriage networks experience mediocre economic performance relative to their peers. We show that this threat of falling high status is a notable determinant of large‐scale corporate bribery of senior politicians, using court data on corporate bribery of two South Korean presidents during 1987–1992. The implication of our study is twofold. Companies can strengthen internal control systems to avoid any large‐scale illegal activities at a higher level. Law enforcement agencies can also implement targeted monitoring programs to preempt illegal activities among companies facing the threat of falling high status.     

The effects of board human and social capital on investor reactions to new CEO selection

This study extends work on independent directors to examine the influence of their human capital and social capital on investor reactions to the board's CEO selection decision. We predict that human capital, as represented by the board's CEO experience and industry experience, and social capital, as represented by directors' co‐working experience on the board and external directorship ties to other corporate boards, will influence the stock market reactions to new CEO appointments. In a sample of 208 new CEO appointment events in U.S. manufacturing firms between 1999 and 2003, we found that the stock market reacted favorably to the appointments made by boards with higher levels of human and social capital. We also found that the effect of internal social capital was stronger when the new CEO was an insider rather than an outsider. The implications of the results for director selection and CEO succession are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Well Known or Well Liked? The Effects of Corporate Reputation on Firm Value at the Onset of a Corporate Crisis

Research summary : We study how two dimensions of reputation (i.e., generalized favorability and being known) and attribution of crisis responsibility affect firm value at the onset of a crisis. Analyzing 126 corporate crises befalling publicly listed firms in China from 2008 to 2014, we find that generalized favorability serves as a buffer, while being known can be a burden, in influencing firm value. We also find that the buffering effect of generalized favorability is stronger when the attribution of crisis responsibility is low (vs. high). In addition, there is a negative interaction effect between the two dimensions of reputation such that the buffering effect of generalized favorability weakens when firms are better known. We discuss our contributions to research on corporate reputation and crisis management. Managerial summary : Corporate reputation is an intangible asset, especially at the onset of a corporate crisis. This research sheds light on the “double‐edged sword” of corporate reputation by examining the effects of two reputation dimensions (i.e., being liked and being known) on firm value. Our results suggest that well‐liked firms can leverage their generalized favorability among stakeholders to assuage firm value loss, whereas well‐known firms may have to better communicate with stakeholders to overcome the burden of stakeholders' attention that escalates firm value loss. To better cope with the onset of a crisis, firms should therefore enhance their generalized favorability and simultaneously avert stakeholders' excessive attention. In addition, well‐liked firms can further buffer against the loss in firm value by reducing the perceived intentionality of a crisis. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The strategic impetus for social network ties: reconstituting broken ceo friendship ties

Research on organization–environment relations has focused primarily on formal linkages between organizations such as board interlock ties as a strategy for managing resource dependence. This study examines whether top corporate executives may maintain more informal ties to executives of other firms in order to manage uncertainty arising from resource dependence. Our point of departure is prior research on boards of directors that has examined whether so‐called ‘broken board ties’ (i.e., ties that are disrupted due to executive turnover) tend to be reconstituted, and whether resource dependence explains the likelihood of reconstitution. These studies have generally provided little evidence that corporate board ties are used to manage resource dependence. We draw from theory and research on social embeddedness and friendship to suggest that, as a strategy for managing dependence, the maintenance of friendship ties between top executives provides benefits that are comparable to the supposed benefits of board cooptation, while imposing fewer constraints on the organization. Our theory leads to the contention that, despite limited prior evidence that resource dependence determines the formation of formal board ties, corporate leaders may nevertheless reconstitute informal (i.e., friendship) ties to leaders of other firms that have the power to constrain their firms' access to needed resources when those ties have been disrupted (e.g., due to turnover of the CEO's friend). We test our hypotheses with a unique dataset that includes survey data from U.S. corporate leaders collected at two points in time, thus permitting an assessment of whether top executives reconstitute broken social ties to leaders of other firms, and whether various sources of resource dependence predict the likelihood of reconstitution. We discuss implications for strategic perspectives on inter‐organizational relations and the sociological literature on embeddedness. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Initial compensation of new CEOs hired in turnaround situations

Our paper examines the initial compensation of new CEOs hired in turnaround situations. Building on prior literature on executive job demands, we posit that new CEOs hired in turnaround situations will receive higher pay, particularly higher performance‐based pay, and that the pay premium will incentivize them to undertake retrenchment and restructuring turnaround initiatives. An interaction between pay premium and CEO credentials is shown to have a stronger effect on the extent to which firms engage in such turnaround initiatives. Our empirical results, based on 98 new CEOs hired in 223 turnaround situations, largely support our arguments. We discuss the contribution of our study to the CEO compensation, executive job demands, and corporate turnaround literature. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CEO career horizon,corporate governance,and real options: The role of economic short‐termism

Research Summary: Combining studies on real options theory and economic short‐termism, we propose that, depending on CEOs’ career horizons, CEOs have heterogeneous interests in strategic flexibility, and thus, have different incentives to make real options investments. We argue that compared to CEOs with longer career horizons, CEOs with shorter career horizons will be less inclined to make real options investments because they may not fully reap the rewards during their tenure. In addition, we argue that long‐term incentives and institutional ownership will mitigate the relationship between CEOs’ career horizons and real options investments. U.S. public firms as an empirical setting produced consistent evidence for our predictions. Our study is the first to theoretically explain and empirically show that a CEO's self‐seeking behavior will impact real options investments. Managerial Summary: This article helps to explain how a CEO's self seeking‐behavior may shape a firm's real option investment, which could result in different level of strategic flexibility. We argue that CEOs with short career horizons have less time to exercise their firms’ real options, which should lower the investments in the firms’ real options portfolios relative to CEOs with long career horizons. We study a sample of U.S. public firms and find strong evidence that a CEO's expected tenure in the firm is positively related to the real options investments at the firm level. We find that this agency issue can be mitigated by adopting appropriate corporate governance mechanisms such as long‐term incentives and institutional investors.     

Scope versus speed: Team diversity,leader experience,and patenting outcomes for firms

Research Summary: How does the organization of patenting activity affect a firm's patenting outcomes? We investigate how the composition of patenting teams relates to both the scope of their patent applications and the speed with which their patents are approved, by examining the main effects of team members’ intra‐organizational diversity (based on affiliations with formal organizational units and informal organizational communities) and the moderating effects of team leader experience. We test our moderated mediation model in a sample of 121 teams that filed patents in a Fortune 50 company's India R&D center between 2005 and 2015, using proprietary employee data combined with newly released micro‐data from the U.S Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Our findings illuminate the micro‐foundations of innovation in firms by highlighting a trade‐off between organizing patenting activity to maximize scope versus speed. Managerial Summary: Patenting is an important strategic tool that firms can use to protect and create value from their innovations. A firm can benefit from filing a patent application that gives it a wider possible set of claims related to an innovation. It can also benefit from faster approval of a patent application by the Patent Office. However, our study shows that there is a trade‐off between patent application scope and patent approval speed, which creates tensions for the organization of patenting activities inside firms. In particular, we find that the diversity of a patenting team is positively related to patent scope but negatively related to patenting speed, and that these relationships vary with the experience of the team leader.     

Corporate environmental responsibility (CER) weakness,media coverage,and corporate philanthropy: Evidence from China

This study investigates the hidden connection between corporate philanthropy and corporate environmental responsibility (CER) weakness. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms in polluting industries and hand-collected data on corporate environmental performance and corporate philanthropy, we show that CER weakness is significantly positively associated with corporate philanthropy, suggesting that corporate philanthropy may be used by environmentally unfriendly firms to mitigate the negative influence of CER weakness and offset pressures from stakeholders. This finding also implies that Chinese enterprises in polluting industries are inclined to engage in greenwashing via the conduit of corporate philanthropy. In addition, media coverage reinforces the positive association between CER weakness and corporate philanthropy. Above results are still valid after controlling for the potential endogeneity between CER weakness and corporate philanthropy.     

Executive turnover in the stock option backdating wave: The impact of social context

While boards are known to react to corporate misconduct by removing the executives responsible, little is known about whether the board's response is shaped by the firm's social context. Using the 2006 stock option backdating scandal, in which firms manipulated stock option grant dates, we examine the impact of two dimensions of social context—the pervasiveness of the misconduct and the media attention to the misconduct. We find that firms implicated later in the backdating scandal are less likely to experience executive turnover than those implicated earlier. We also find that the amount of media attention to backdating at the time a firm is implicated in the scandal increases the likelihood that the firm experiences executive turnover.Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.