Steuerflucht und Steueroasen

The current debate on tax planning has to distinguish between tax evasion and aggressive tax planning. While tax evasion is illegal and requires the enhanced exchange of information, measures against aggressive tax planning seem to be very complex and complicated. Tax havens’ benefits from tax haven activities are inversely related to the intensity of competition among tax havens. Once the set of tax havens narrows, each havens’ share of the business increases and its margins go up. This competition aspect makes initial successes easy but final success very difficult. Nevertheless, some authors argue that action against tax flight is inevitable. As tax flight is a multilateral phenomenon, coordinated initiatives by country groups appear particularly promising. Here the EU should be in the vanguard. Only automatic information exchange generates the transparency and leeway needed to eliminate income tax evasion and to permit countries to devise tax codes at their own discretion. Despite the European trend towards lower corporate taxes, an empirical analysis shows that German multinationals have increased their tax haven activities. Recent research suggests that this development might be explained by the increased usage of anti-tax avoidance measures by high-tax countries. The substitutive nature of different tax-avoidance schemes indicates that only a coordinated closing of loopholes for profit shifting would reduce the demand for tax-haven operations significantly.     

Limiting Laissez Faire Profits: The Financial Implications

Traditional corporate finance endorses the principle of stockholder wealth maximization as the purpose of business. In light of recent scandals and legislation, businesses are increasingly expected to use financial resources in a manner which benefits society and not just the owners of the firm. This imputation of a corporate soul will necessarily reduce investor returns, which has at least two major financial implications for the firm and the economy. The first is that it may cause investors to change their required rates of return and thereby change the amount of capital available to firms (in␣particular), and the economy (in general). The second is that it may implicitly replace equity with debt in the capital structure of firms, with all that implies for financing and corporate governance. The purpose of this article is to examine these implications and evaluate their sometimes counterintuitive consequences.     

Does the WTO Increase Trade and Cause Convergence?

We study whether proximity to the nearest tax haven affects FDI and the number of American affiliates in a tax haven. Our results show that distance to the nearest tax haven is positively related to FDI inflows and the number of American affiliates in tax havens. These findings suggest that there is harmful competition between tax havens. We also find evidence of positive spillovers: the number of American affiliates in a tax haven is positively related to the number of affiliates in its closest neighboring tax haven. This suggests the presence of agglomeration benefits given there is an affiliate in a nearby tax haven.     

Corporate governance and MNE strategies in emerging economies

We explore factors of convergence and divergence in corporate governance of emerging and developed market economies, focussing on the role of firm internationalisation. In particular, foreign investments by emerging economy firms led to upgrade of their governance capabilities. These firms also became advocates for home-country policy reforms that mandated the development of similar capabilities for local firms. We present a broad overview of the literature and propose an approach that considers the evolution of corporate governance, both at the national level and the firm level, with MNEs from both emerging market economies and developed economies as active actors in this process.     

Fighting multiple tax havens

This paper develops a competition theory framework that evaluates an important aspect of the OECD's Harmful Tax Practices Initiative against tax havens. We show that the sequential nature of the process is harmful and more costly than a “big bang” multilateral agreement. The sequentiality may even prevent the process from being completed successfully. Closing down a subset of tax havens reduces competition among the havens that remain active. This makes their “tax haven business” more profitable and shifts a larger share of rents to these remaining tax havens, making them more reluctant to give up their “tax haven business”. Moreover, the outcome of this process, reducing the number of tax havens, but not eliminating them altogether, may reduce welfare in the OECD.     

Imperfect tax competition for profits, asymmetric equilibrium and beneficial tax havens

We present a model of tax competition for real investment and profits and show that the presence of tax havens in some cases increases the tax revenue of countries. In the first part of the paper, we argue that tax competition for profits is likely to be imperfect in the sense that the jurisdiction with the lowest tax rate does not necessarily attract all shifted profits. Under this assumption, tax competition between a large number of identical countries may lead to either a symmetric equilibrium with no profit shifting or an asymmetric equilibrium where firms shift profits from high-tax to low-tax countries. In the second part of the paper, we introduce tax havens. Starting from a symmetric equilibrium, tax havens unambiguously reduce the tax revenue of countries due to a ‘leakage effect’ — tax havens attract tax base from countries — and a ’competition effect’ — the optimal response to the increased tax sensitivity of tax bases involves a reduction of tax rates. Starting from an asymmetric equilibrium, however, tax havens also raise the tax revenue of countries through a ’crowding effect’ — tax havens make it less attractive to compete for profits and thus induce low-tax countries to become high-tax countries. We demonstrate that the latter effect may dominate the former effects so that countries, on balance, benefit from the presence of tax havens.     

Board of director attributes and CSR engagement in emerging economy firms: Evidence from across Asia

This study investigates the relationship between the board of director attributes and corporate social responsibility (CSR) engagement across a sample of Asian emerging economy firms. We find a statistically positive relationship between CSR engagement and several directors' attributes including their political influence, international experience, business expertise, other directorships held and independence from management. These empirical results indicate that while corporate governance recommendations designed for developed economy firms are relevant for emerging economy firms, additional director attributes are also important in encouraging CSR engagement in emerging economy firms given the divergent institutional and resource dependency issues they face.     

Corporate spinoffs and executive compensation

This paper investigates the impact of corporate spinoffs on executive compensation. We find no significant association between executive compensation and stock returns prior to spinoffs, but a significant positive association between the two afterwards. We also find evidence that corporate governance generally improves after the spinoff. In addition, the positive association between executive compensation and stock returns is more pronounced for firms with greater improvements in their corporate governance. Overall, our findings support the notion that spinoffs create value by reducing agency costs.     

Corporate governance,bank concentration and economic growth

We examine the effects of bank concentration and corporate governance among firms in terms of economic growth using panel data for 34 countries and 29 manufacturing sectors over the period 1980–2010. We show the following results: First, bank concentration exerts a negative effect on growth for industries that are most dependent on external financing. However, for countries with a high level of corporate governance bank concentration is less harmful to economic growth. Our results have important policy implications for emerging markets. Most importantly, they suggest that high corporate governance is a crucial means for promoting growth and prosperity in developing and emerging economies, in which we commonly observe under-developed financial sectors and high levels of bank concentration.     

The performance of cross-border acquisitions targeting African firms

This paper examines the performance of cross-border acquisitions (CBAs) of fims domiciled in Africa. We examine 503 deals involving firms from 23 developed and 20 emerging countries, acquiring targets in 33 African countries. We find that, on aggregate, Africa bound CBAs significantly underperform, and that emerging economy acquirers outperform their developed economy counterparts. Further, significant variations in deal performance is documented when the target firms are categorised according to the level of development of African financial markets, industries, and to some extent, economic blocs. The results are robust to various firm, industry, deal and country specific characteristics.     

Corporate governance in emerging markets: A survey

This paper reviews recent research on corporate governance, with a special focus on emerging markets. It finds that better corporate governance benefit firms through greater access to financing, lower cost of capital, better performance, and more favorable treatment of all stakeholders. Numerous studies show these channels to operate at the level of firms, sectors and countries—with causality increasingly often clearly identified. Evidence also shows that voluntary and market corporate governance mechanisms have less effect when a country's governance system is weak. Importantly, how corporate governance regimes change over time and how this impacts firms are receiving more attention recently. Less evidence is available on the direct links between corporate governance and social and environmental performance. The paper concludes by identifying issues requiring further study, including the special corporate governance issues of banks, and family-owned and state-owned firms, and the nature and determinants of public and private enforcement.     

Productivity and Corporate Governance in Smaller Firms

Our starting point was to argue that the entrepreneur is central to the organisation of production in smaller firms. We also contended that it was crucial to understand how differences in corporate governance structures affect productivity. This is particularly important given that many small firms have relatively unsophisticated and non-complex governance structures. Our results show positive, and significant, effects from the founding entrepreneur, the board of directors and the management team on productivity. We also find that the majority of smaller firms face increasing returns to scale. In total, our results cast serious doubts on the relevance of "black box" theories of production which exclude a role for the entrepreneur.     

Corporate ownership and the theory of the multinational enterprise

This paper makes a contribution to the theory of the multinational enterprise (MNE) and, in particular, to why firms undertake foreign direct investment (FDI) rather than alternative strategies. We argue that FDI and its strategic alternatives involve different patterns of costs and returns over time, and hence different levels of risk and uncertainty. Traditional theories of the MNE conceptualize the firm as a risk-neutral decision-making entity with short-term efficiency objectives, and hence do not take these issues into account. This may be reasonable for firms with passive professional managers and widely-dispersed shareholders, operating in countries with the Anglo-American system of corporate governance. But many firms operate under quite different systems of corporate governance where concentrated shareholdings are commonplace and markets for corporate control are weak or non-existent. In these cases, shareholders exert considerable influence on all aspects of firm strategy including FDI. Furthermore, different groups of shareholders (State, family, institutions) are likely to have different objectives, different attitudes towards risk, and different decision-making time horizons. We thus suggest that the traditional theories of the MNE need to be extended to embrace consideration of corporate ownership (and other governance dimensions).     

Does the Quality of Corporate Governance Affect Firm Valuation and Risk? Evidence from a Corporate Governance Scorecard in Hong Kong*

Using Hong Kong firm data, we construct an index of corporate governance during 2002–2005, which scores the corporate governance practices of listed companies from the public shareholders' perspective based on the Organization for Economic Corporation and Development Principles of Corporate Governance. The findings show that family firms and firms with concentrated ownership structures are associated with bad corporate governance. The evidence also shows that these firms improve their corporate governance practices slower than their peers. Overall, the quality of corporate governance is very significant in explaining future company stock returns and risk. Good corporate governance is associated with both higher stock returns and with lower risk. Improvements in corporate governance are associated with significantly higher stock returns and lower company risk.     

Intragroup Transactions,Corporate Governance,and Corporate Philanthropy in Korean Business Groups

This study examines how the corporate philanthropy decisions of group-affiliated firms in Korea (Chaebol firms) are made. Based on the attention-based view, we argue that when corporate decision makers at group-affiliated firms focus their attention more (less) on internal markets than external stakeholders because of the firm’s high (low) reliance on intragroup transactions, the firm will decrease (increase) its level of corporate philanthropy. We further argue that the relationship will be stronger when governance mechanisms focus on the instrumental value of corporate philanthropy. Using a panel sample of group-affiliated firms in Korea from 2011 to 2015, we find that as intragroup sales increase, the level of corporate philanthropy decreases, and such a negative relationship is stronger when outside director representation and foreign investor ownership are high. Our study suggests that internal dependence and corporate governance mechanisms jointly affect the level of corporate philanthropy at firms in a business group. Thus, this study contributes to the literature on corporate philanthropy, business group, and corporate governance.     

Labor-Friendly Corporate Practices: Is What is Good for Employees Good for Shareholders?

As corporate managers interact with non-shareholder stakeholders, potential tradeoffs emerge and questions arise as to how these interactions impact shareholder value. We argue that this shareholder–stakeholder debate is an important issue within the overall corporate governance and corporate policy domain and examine one such stakeholder group – employees – by studying labor-friendly corporate practices. We find that announcements of labor-friendly policies are associated with positive abnormal stock returns. Labor-friendly firms also outperform otherwise similar firms, both in terms of long-run stock market returns and operating results. In addition, we find that the probability and benefits of labor-friendliness increase with the demand for highly skilled labor. Our analysis of excess executive compensation suggests that top management derives no pecuniary benefits from labor-friendly practices. We interpret our results as consistent with a genuine concern for employees translating into higher productivity and profitability, which in turn facilitate value creation. It appears that the benefits of labor-friendly practices significantly outweigh the costs and that what is good for employees is good for shareholders.     

Responsibility in Paradise? The Adoption of CSR Tools by Companies Domiciled in Tax Havens

In contrast to the recent rise to economic importance of offshore finance centres (OFCs), the topic of taxation has so far created little interest among scholars of corporate social responsibility (CSR). This paper makes two contributions to addressing this lacuna. Applying a range of influential normative theories of ethics, it first offers an ethical evaluation of tax havens. Second, the paper examines what use large firms that are headquartered in two OFCs??Bermuda and the Cayman Islands??make of formal CSR tools. The emerging duplicity in tax haven-based companies professing social responsibility highlights once more the political nature of CSR, where at least some firms and/or industries can successfully limit government power to enact regulation as well as shape the discourse around CSR. The study of CSR in OFC-based firms thus calls into question the usefulness of the often quoted definition of CSR as going beyond the law.     

绿色金融政策、公司治理与企业环境信息披露——以502家重污染行业上市公司为例

以502家重污染行业上市公司为研究对象,选取2006-2008年度上市公司披露的环境信息,构建环境信息披露指数,系统考察绿色金融政策下公司治理因素对企业环境信息披露水平的影响。研究结果发现,国有股权、第一大股东持股比例、审计委员会以及设立环保部等公司治理因素对环境信息披露水平的提高影响非常显著,而绿色金融政策则强化了这些因素的环保作用。     

Property and liability stockholder yields and accounting profits

The market rate of return and related risk of a group of 23 property-liability insurers are explored. The focus is on the return earned by the stockholders of these firms. Previous studies have only examined the accounting rate of return. This study compares the accounting rate of returns to stockholder yields. Several factors that effect the return earned by shareholders are reviewed.The average return on the property-liability stocks studies was 4.0 percentage points greater than the accounting rate of return (0.14 vs 0.10). This evidence suggests that studies based only on accounting rates of return under-estimate returns earned by property-liability shareholders. On a risk-return basis property-liability profits were found not to be significantly different from the general stock market. However, several individual firms had superior stockholder yields. The beta for the group of firms was 1.09.