Asset Allocation and Selectivity of Asian Mutual Funds During Financial Crisis

This paper evaluates the ability of US-based Asian mutual fund managers in coping with the 1997 Asian financial crisis. We find that the actively managed mutual funds under-perform with respect to the market portfolio by 1.71% in average monthly return. Such poor performance is caused by fund managers' relative weakness in country selection as well as in stock picking. Fund managers are also found to be more skillful in picking the correct market when the market is going up than going down. Our results are consistent with the literature that asset allocation in Asian mutual funds is a dominating factor relative to selectivity in explaining fund returns during the financial crisis. In addition, there exists a negative relation between asset allocation ability and selectivity of fund managers.     

Fund Management and Systemic Risk – Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis

Fund managers play an important role in increasing efficiency and stability in financial markets. But research also indicates that fund management in certain circumstances may contribute to the buildup of systemic risk and severity of financial crises. The global financial crisis provided a number of new experiences on the contribution of fund managers to systemic risk. In this article, we focus on these lessons from the crisis. We distinguish between three sources of systemic risk in the financial system that may arise from fund management: insufficient credit risk transfer to fund managers; runs on funds that cause sudden reductions in funding to banks and other financial entities; and contagion through business ties between fund managers and their sponsors. Our discussion relates to the current intense debate on the role the so‐called shadow banking system played in the global financial crisis. Several regulatory initiatives have been launched or suggested to reduce the systemic risk arising from non‐bank financial entities, and we briefly discuss the likely impact of these on the sources of systemic risk outlined in the article.     

Precautionary Reserves and the Interbank Market

Extreme disruptions in the interbank market severely hampered the broader financial system during the 2007–08 financial crisis. We use Fedwire data to estimate fed funds trades and track banks’ intraday balances. We show empirical evidence of banks’ precautionary holding of reserves and reluctance to lend linked to documented extreme fed funds rate volatility, including the fed funds rate spiking above the discount rate and crashing to zero. We develop a model of constrained banks that makes new predictions and provides a unified explanation for the stark anomalies during the crisis, our empirical findings, and previous stylized facts from normal times.     

Who benefits in a crisis? Evidence from hedge fund stock and option holdings

We use a unique data set of hedge fund long equity and equity option positions to investigate a significant lockup-related premium earned during the tech bubble (1999–2001) and financial crisis (2007–2009). Net fund flows are significantly greater among lockup funds during crisis and noncrisis periods. Managers of hedge funds with locked-up capital trade opportunistically against flow-motivated trades of non-lockup managers, consistent with a hypothesis of rent extraction in providing crisis era liquidity. The success of this opportunistic trading is concentrated during periods of high borrowing costs, in less liquid stock markets, and is enhanced by hedging in the equity option market.     

Should investors invest in hedge fund-like mutual funds? Evidence from the 2007 financial crisis

This study empirically examines the value added for investors during the 2007–2009 financial crisis from hedge fund-like equity mutual funds, including 130/30, market neutral, and long/short equity funds. We find that based on the information ratio, all market neutral funds, top 90% of long/short funds, and top 25% of 130/30 funds outperform a long-only passive index fund over the crisis period. However, we find little evidence of abnormal performance by the average and median funds in our sample, based on either unconditional or conditional four-factor alphas. The reason for the overall under-performance in the crisis period is that while short positions taken by these funds do generate alpha, the gain from their short positions is not sufficiently large to offset the loss from their long positions. Finally, the abnormal performance of short positions is found to be attributable to managers’ characteristic-adjusted and industry-adjusted stock selection skills. One implication of this study is that even though market neutral and long/short funds on average may not generate alpha, investors can benefit from holding these funds, especially the former, that can provide a hedge against down markets due to their low betas and that can be useful for asset allocation.     

Asset value management in the Portuguese real estate sector

This paper analyzes whether real estate investment fund managers use asset valuation discretion strategically to achieve financial reporting objectives. Portuguese real estate investment funds represent a unique opportunity to investigate executive behavior regarding accounting choice, as fund managers may choose to use historical cost, fair value or a mixed system (historical cost with internal revaluations) to value fund properties. We also investigate the factors that influence this strategic behavior. Empirical results confirm that fund managers manage asset valuations in order to avoid net asset value declines, particularly in a period of financial distress. We also observe that funds with a higher level of past unconditional conservatism are more likely to manage asset values. With respect to corporate governance issues, we conclude that audit quality reduces managerial discretion and that the conflicts that may arise between fund management company shareholders and fund participants due to management fees do not seem to have impact on fund managers’ opportunistic behavior.     

International Real Estate Mutual Fund Performance: Diversification or Costly Information?

We investigate the net effect between diversification benefit and information cost of international real estate mutual funds from three dimensions: whether investors can benefit from investing in international real estate mutual funds, whether managers of international real estate mutual funds possess superior market knowledge and timing abilities, and whether investors are motivated by returns or diversification. Our findings are threefold. First, the results show that international real estate mutual funds perform better and are less risky than domestic real estate mutual funds before Jun 2007. That is, diversification benefits outweigh the information costs, and investors therefore gain from investing in international real estate mutual funds. However, the benefit is reduced because of the economic shock of sub-prime financial crisis. Second, on average, neither international mutual fund managers nor domestic mutual fund managers possess market timing abilities. Finally, we find that fund flows are driven by investors’ return-chasing behaviors and fund size, but not by diversification purpose.     

Deconstructing Herding: Evidence from Pension Fund Investment Behavior

In this paper, we examine herding across asset classes and industry levels. We also study what incentives managers at various layers of the financial industry face when investing. To do so, we use unique and detailed monthly portfolios between 1996 and 2005 from pension funds in Chile, a pioneer in pension-fund reform. The results show that pension funds herd more in assets that have more risk and for which pension funds have less market information. Furthermore, the results show that herding is more prevalent for funds that narrowly compete with each other, namely, when comparing funds of the same type across pension fund administrators (PFAs). There is much less herding across PFAs as a whole and in individual pension funds within PFAs. These herding patterns are consistent with incentives for managers to be close to industry benchmarks, and might be also driven by market forces and partly by regulation.     

The Front Men of Wall Street: The Role of CDO Collateral Managers in the CDO Boom and Bust

I study the incentives of the collateral managers who selected securities for ABS CDOs—securitizations that figured prominently in the financial crisis. Specialized managers without other businesses that could suffer negative reputational consequences invested in low‐quality securities underwritten by the CDO's arranger. These securities performed significantly worse than observationally similar securities. Managers investing in these securities were rewarded with additional collateral management assignments. Diversified managers who did assemble CDOs suffered negative reputational consequences during the crisis: institutional investors withdrew from their mutual funds. Overall, the results are consistent with a quid pro quo between collateral managers and CDO underwriters.     

A model of unconventional monetary policy

We develop a quantitative monetary DSGE model with financial intermediaries that face endogenously determined balance sheet constraints. We then use the model to evaluate the effects of the central bank using unconventional monetary policy to combat a simulated financial crisis. We interpret unconventional monetary policy as expanding central bank credit intermediation to offset a disruption of private financial intermediation. Within our framework the central bank is less efficient than private intermediaries at making loans but it has the advantage of being able to elastically obtain funds by issuing riskless government debt. Unlike private intermediaries, it is not balance sheet constrained. During a crisis, the balance sheet constraints on private intermediaries tighten, raising the net benefits from central bank intermediation. These benefits may be substantial even if the zero lower bound constraint on the nominal interest rate is not binding. In the event this constraint is binding, though, these net benefits may be significantly enhanced.     

A theoretical model of bank lending: Does ownership matter in times of crisis?

The present study investigates theoretically the lending responses of government-owned and private banks in the event of unexpected financial shocks. Our model predicts that public banks provide more loans to the real sector during times of crisis, compared to private banks which cut down on lending and increase liquidity holdings. We put forth three reasons for this heterogeneous behavior. First, the objective of public banks, in contrast to their private peers, is not only to maximize profits given risks, but also to stabilize and promote the recovery of the economy. Second, public banks may suffer less deposit withdrawals or avoid a bank run in a severe crisis, because the state has better access to additional funds making a recapitalization more likely. And finally, public banks may suffer less deposit withdrawals due to their higher credibility in promising a future recapitalization in the case of a severe crisis.     

The fragile capital structure of hedge funds and the limits to arbitrage

During a financial crisis, when investors are most in need of liquidity and accurate prices, hedge funds cut their arbitrage positions and hoard cash. The paper explains this phenomenon. We argue that the fragile nature of the capital structure of hedge funds, combined with low market liquidity, creates a risk of coordination in redemptions among hedge fund investors that severely limits hedge funds' arbitrage capabilities. We present a model of hedge funds' optimal asset allocation in the presence of coordination risk among investors. We show that hedge fund managers behave conservatively and even abstain from participating in the market once coordination risk is factored into their investment decisions. The model suggests a new source of limits to arbitrage.     

Best-performing US mutual fund families from 1993 to 2008: Evidence from a novel two-stage DEA model for efficiency decomposition

When analyzing relative performance, especially at the institutional level, the traditional data envelopment analysis (DEA) models do not recognize vastly different and important activities as separate functions and therefore cannot identify which function may be the main source of inefficiency. We propose a novel two-stage DEA model that decomposes the overall efficiency of a decision-making unit into two components and demonstrate its applicability by assessing the relative performance of 66 large mutual fund families in the US over the period 1993–2008. By decomposing the overall efficiency into operational management efficiency and portfolio management efficiency components, we reveal the best performers, the families that deteriorated in performance, and those that improved in their performance over the sample period. We also make frontier projections for poorly performing mutual fund families and highlight how the portfolio managers have managed their funds relative to the others during financial crisis periods.     

NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: PERSPECTIVES ON PERFORMANCE AND THE USE OF PERFORMANCE INFORMATION

Performance information is a key‐element of NPM, but politicians and managers rarely use this information. On the basis of three case studies, this paper seeks to explain the use of the newly developed performance information. The paper argues that there is a distinction between the customer perspective and the citizen perspective on performance. NPM implies a customer and an internal perspective on performance. These perspectives may be relevant to managers, but politicians are primarily interested in a citizen perspective and a financial perspective. Two situations are identified in which governmental organizations more actively use performance information with a customer perspective and an internal perspective (as implied in NPM): (1) a crisis in the organization's internal processes with political and/or financial consequences and (2) loose coupling of the performance reports to politicians and to managers, which stimulates the information use by both politicians and managers.     

Investment Management and Risk Sharing with Multiple Managers

This paper addresses the investor's decision to employ multiple managers for the management of investment funds. Under conditions such that specialization of managers and diversification among managers are not motives for the use of multiple managers, the paper shows that risk sharing considerations may be sufficient. A model is developed in which the decision to use multiple managers is explicitly treated, and conditions are studied such that an increase or decrease in the number of managers would be desirable. Under some conditions, a multiple manager solution is preferred over a single manager solution.     

The evolution of the Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility and FDIC-insured bank utilization

The Term Auction Facility (TAF) was designed by the Federal Reserve during the financial crisis to inject emergency short-term funds into banks, as a supplement to the lender of last resort discount window offerings. We describe how the Federal Reserve altered the design of the Term Auction Facility (TAF) over the course of the financial crisis and examine the utilization of this stand-alone facility. Most specifically we detail the impact of the greatly increased offering amounts in all auctions after October 2008, which resulted in the facility no longer auctioning scarcely available funds. We also document significantly different usage of the facility by FDIC-insured community and non-community banks, consistent with the notion of a two-tiered banking system in the U.S. Community banks were far less likely to use the facility than larger, non-community banks.     

The performance of female hedge fund managers

Using data for the period 1994–2013, we examine the return and risk-taking behavior of hedge funds having at least one female portfolio manager and funds that have all female portfolio managers. Funds with all female managers perform no differently than all male-managed funds and have similar risk profiles. For single-style funds, those with mixed teams of both genders underperform male-only funds on both a raw and risk-adjusted basis, although mixed funds incur less risk and their Sharpe ratios do not differ. For funds of funds, both all-female and mixed funds have similar performance to male-managed funds. We then consider the failure rate across all fund styles. Funds with at least one female manager fail at higher rates, driven by difficulty in raising capital—these funds are smaller and are less likely to be closed to new investment. Surviving funds with at least one female manager have better performance than male-managed surviving funds, consistent with the idea that female managers need to perform better for their funds to survive. Yet, female-managed surviving funds have fewer assets under management than surviving male-managed funds. Using media mentions as a proxy for investor interest, female-managed funds receive proportionately less attention. Our results suggest that there are no inherent differences in skill between female and male managers, but that only the best performing female managers manage to survive.     

Safe but fragile: Information acquisition,liquidity support and redemption runs

This paper proposes a theory of redemption runs based on strategic information acquisition by fund managers. We argue that liquidity lines provided by third parties can be a source of financial fragility, as they incentivize fund managers to acquire private information about the value of their assets. This strategic information acquisition can lead to inefficient market liquidity dry-ups caused by self-fulfilling fears of adverse selection. By lowering asset prices, information acquisition also reduces the value of funds’ assets-under-management and may spur inefficient redemption runs by investors. Two different regimes can arise: one in which funds’ information acquisition incentives are unaffected by the volume of redemptions, and another where market and funding liquidity risk mutually reinforce each other.     

Commonality in hedge fund returns: Driving factors and implications

We measure the commonality in hedge fund returns, identify its main driving factor and analyze its implications for financial stability. We find that hedge funds’ commonality increased significantly from 2003 until 2006. We attribute this rise mainly to the increase in hedge funds’ exposure to emerging market equities, which we identify as a common factor in hedge fund returns over this period. Our results show that funds with a high commonality were affected disproportionately by illiquidity and exhibited negative returns during the subsequent financial crisis, thereby providing little diversification benefits to the financial system and to investors.     

Bank Liquidity Creation and Risk‐Taking: Does Managerial Ability Matter?

This study investigates the impact of managerial ability on banks' liquidity creation and risk‐taking behavior. We find that higher ability managers create more liquidity and take more risk. During times of financial crisis, however, higher ability bank managers reduce liquidity creation as a way to de‐leverage their balance sheets. Our findings inform recent theoretical and empirical studies that investigate determinants of liquidity creation and risk by introducing managerial ability as a prominent antecedent of the banks' intermediation and risk‐transforming service. Moreover, this study has policy‐related implications, since managerial ability can be quantified as a key performance indicator for prudential supervision of banks and could help regulators to target intervention efforts more purposefully during times of crisis.