Mutual fund corporate culture and performance

In this paper we test if a mutual fund's own corporate culture predicts fund performance. To do this we use Morningstar's corporate culture ratings for mutual funds and then examine the ability of these corporate culture ratings to predict risk-adjusted performance of domestic equity funds over the period 2005–2010. Using methods that are robust to survivorship bias, we find there is little significant evidence that corporate culture predicts better fund performance. Indeed, we find that no individual component of the Morningstar stewardship rating including board quality, fees, manager incentives and regulatory issues is able to consistently predict fund performance.     

Does it matter who pays for bond ratings? Historical evidence

We test whether Standard and Poor's (S&P) assigns higher bond ratings after it switches from investor-pay to issuer-pay fees in 1974. Using Moody's rating for the same bond as a benchmark, we find that when S&P charges investors and Moody's charges issuers, S&P's ratings are lower than Moody's. Once S&P adopts issuer-pay, its ratings increase and no longer differ from Moody's. More importantly, S&P only assigns higher ratings for bonds that are subject to greater conflicts of interest, measured by higher expected rating fees or lower credit quality. These findings suggest that the issuer-pay model leads to higher ratings.     

Disclosure and agency conflict: Evidence from mutual fund commission bundling

This study provides empirical evidence on the role of disclosure in resolving agency conflicts in delegated investment management. For certain expenditures, fund managers have alternative means of payment which differ greatly in their opacity: payments can be expensed (relatively transparent); or bundled with brokerage commissions (relatively opaque). We find that the return impact of opaque payments is significantly more negative than that of transparent payments. Moreover, we find a differential flow reaction that confirms the opacity of commission bundling. Collectively, our results demonstrate the importance of transparency in addressing agency costs of delegated investment management.     

MUTUAL FUND BROKERAGE COMMISSIONS

The brokerage commissions paid for portfolio transactions by a large sample of equity mutual funds are investigated. Median brokerage commissions measured as a percentage of net assets are 21 basis points per year with a standard deviation of 27 basis points. The commission levels are negatively correlated with fund size and positively correlated with fund turnover and expense ratio. The average brokerage commission measured as a percentage of assets traded exceeds the typical execution-only commissions for large institutional traders. This finding is consistent with many mutual fund brokerage commissions including payments for research, so-called soft dollar payments. Funds' expense ratios are positively correlated with commissions per trade, inconsistent with the idea that mutual fund managers who pay soft dollars for research have a corresponding reduction in management fees.     

Daily mutual fund flows and redemption policies

We examine how redemption policies affect daily fund flows in open-end mutual funds. Since short-term trading of fund shares, as manifested in daily fund flows, can have an adverse impact on returns to the fund’s shareholders, mutual funds might find it desirable to discourage short-term trading through the use of redemption fees. However, if daily fund flows are due to fund shareholders’ legitimate liquidity demands, the redemption fee would have little effect on daily fund flows and possibly adversely affect fund shareholders by imposing a liquidity cost on them. We find that the likelihood of a fund charging a redemption fee is largely a function of its overall fee structure. We also use a sample of funds that imposed redemption fees to examine whether the distribution of daily fund flows changes after the initiation of the redemption fee. We find that the redemption fee is an effective tool in controlling the volatility of fund flows.     

UNITARY BOARDS AND MUTUAL FUND GOVERNANCE

A unique governance structure for mutual funds is unitary board—one board overseeing all funds in the entire family. We find strong evidence for unitary board as an effective governance mechanism. Funds with unitary boards are associated with lower fees, are more likely to pass the economies of scale benefits to investors, are less likely to be involved in trading scandals, and rank higher on stewardship. In contrast, funds with larger or more independent boards charge higher fees and rank lower on stewardship. Our findings indicate that unitary boards of small size, rather than independent boards, may be more beneficial to fund shareholders.     

Accurate forecasts attract clients; Biased forecasts keep them happy

We examine whether business relationships between mutual funds and sell-side analysts influence earnings forecasts using Chinese data from 2007 to 2019. Consistent with prior studies, our results support the commission pressure hypothesis. Analysts' forecasts are overly optimistic for the holdings of existing fund clients. Significantly, we propose the potential client hypothesis and show that analysts' forecasts are more accurate for the holdings of funds that are not clients than for holdings of clients or for stocks not held by any fund. Our results suggest that commission pressure from existing fund clients increases analysts' optimistic bias, while potential clients pressure inhibits analysts' optimistic bias to some extent. Finally, our evidence supports the conflicts of interest hypothesis. Commission pressure is reduced as economic uncertainty grows.     

AGENCY CONFLICTS IN DELEGATED PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT: EVIDENCE FROM NAMESAKE MUTUAL FUNDS

Namesake funds provide a unique sample for studying the two agency conflicts that exist within a mutual fund. The first is between the fund management company and fund shareholders, and the second is between the fund management company and the fund manager. A typical namesake fund manager sits on his or her fund's board, frequently as the chairman, is the majority owner of the fund management company, and has significant investments in the fund he or she manages. Our results indicate that namesake funds charge higher fees, suggesting that the boards of namesake funds are less effective. We find that namesake funds are more tax efficient, consistent with the idea that managerial ownership helps align the interests of managers with those of shareholders. Because of fewer career concerns, namesake fund managers herd less while assuming greater unsystematic risk. We find weak evidence that namesake fund managers outperform their benchmarks and peers. Finally, we observe that namesake funds attract higher levels of investor cash flow.     

Information sharing between mutual funds and auditors

This paper examines whether there is information sharing between mutual funds and their auditors about the auditors’ other listed firm clients. Using data from the Chinese market, we find that mutual funds earn higher profits from trading in firms that share the same auditors. The effects are more pronounced when firms have a more opaque information environment and when the audit partners for the fund and the partners for the listed firm share school ties. The evidence is consistent with information flowing from auditors to mutual funds, providing mutual funds with an information advantage in firms that share the same auditors. Our findings are robust to the use of audit-firm mergers and acquisitions (M&As) as exogenous shocks and several other robustness checks. We further find that auditors benefit by charging higher audit fees for mutual fund clients and by improving their audit quality for listed firm clients. Our study provides evidence of bi-directional information sharing between two important market intermediaries.     

Affiliated mutual funds and analyst optimism

This paper extends the literature on analyst optimism. Our analysis of a large sample of recommendations issued from 1995 through 2006 indicates that sell-side analysts are likely to assign frequent and favorable ratings to a stock after the analysts’ affiliated mutual funds invest in that stock. Controlling for a number of variables, including the ties between analysts and investment banks, we find that the greater the portfolio weight of a stock in the fund family, the more optimistic the stock ratings from affiliated analysts become. Since 2002, analysts’ optimism on stocks held by affiliated mutual funds has declined. However, an analyst's decision of upgrading a stock to a “strong buy” rating is still significantly associated with the portfolio weight of that stock in the fund family.     

Split bond ratings and rating migration

This paper examines the relationships between split ratings and ratings migration. We find that bonds with split ratings are more likely to have future rating changes. A one-notch (more-than-one-notch) split rating increases the probability of rating change within one year of initial issuance by about 3% (6%). Furthermore, we find that about 30% of split rated bonds have their two ratings converge after four years of initial issuance. The rating convergence tapers off after three years, and the rating agency with a higher (lower) initial rating generally maintains a higher (lower) rating in subsequent years if the two ratings do not converge. We also show that rating transition estimation can be improved by taking into consideration split ratings. We find that one-year rating transition matrices are significantly different between non-letter-split rated bonds and letter-split rated bonds, and we show that the difference has an economically significant impact on the pricing of credit spread options and VaR-based risk management models. Overall, our results suggest that split ratings contain important information about subsequent rating changes.     

Agency costs,governance, and organizational forms: Evidence from the mutual fund industry

Using a comprehensive sample of mutual funds and fund families for the period 1992–2004, this study examines the impact of fund management companies’ organizational forms on the level of agency costs within mutual funds. We find that, all else being equal: (1) funds managed by public fund families charge higher fees than those managed by private fund families; (2) public fund families acquire more funds than private fund families; and (3) funds of public fund families significantly underperform funds of private fund families. Collectively, these findings suggest that agency costs are higher in mutual funds managed by public fund families. Our results are consistent with the idea that the agency conflict between the fund management company and fund shareholders is more acute for public management companies because of their shorter-term focus.     

Herding in the German Mutual Fund Industry

This paper analyses the trading activity of German mutual funds in the 1998–2002 period to investigate whether German mutual fund managers are engaged in herding behaviour. Another objective of the study is to determine the impact of this herd‐like trading on stock prices. Our results provide evidence of herding and positive feedback trading by German mutual fund managers. We show that a significant portion of herding detected in the German market is associated with spurious herding as a consequence of changes in benchmark index composition. Investigating the impact of mutual fund herding on stock prices, we find that herding seems to neither destabilise nor stabilise stock prices.     

Informed trading around earnings and mutual fund alphas

We examine whether informed trading around earnings announcements drives mutual fund performance. The measure is motivated by prior studies arguing that a mutual fund is skilled if it buys stocks with subsequent high earnings announcement returns. We find that this measure predicts future mutual fund returns. On average, after adjusting for Carhart’s four risk factors, the top decile of mutual funds outperforms the bottom decile by 44 basis points per quarter. By decomposing fund alphas into two components in their relations to earnings, we find that this measure is only associated with earnings-related fund alphas. This measure can also be used to predict stock returns at future earnings announcements.     

Do Rating Agencies Benefit from Providing Higher Ratings? Evidence from the Consequences of Municipal Bond Ratings Recalibration

We ask whether credit rating agencies receive higher fees and gain greater market share when they provide more favorable ratings. To investigate this question, we use the 2010 rating scale recalibration by Moody's and Fitch, which increased ratings absent any underlying change in issuer credit quality. Consistent with prior research, we find that the recalibration allowed the clients of Moody's and Fitch to receive better ratings and lower yields. We add to this evidence by showing that the recalibration also led to larger fees and to increases in the market shares of Moody's and Fitch. These results are consistent with critics’ concerns about the effects of the issuer‐pay model on the credit ratings market.     

Does concurrent management of mutual and hedge funds create conflicts of interest?

This paper shows that conflicts of interest may exist in cases where a hedge fund manager starts a mutual fund but not in the opposite case. We compare performance, asset flows, and risk incentives to establish several key differences between these two scenarios: First, prior to concurrent management, hedge fund managers experience worse performance while mutual fund managers achieve better performance relative to their full-time peers. Second, hedge fund managers who choose concurrent management are disproportionately the ones with less experience. Their hedge funds tend to suffer a decline in performance after the event. By contrast, mutual fund managers who choose concurrent management tend to outperform their full-time peers. Based on our findings, we make important recommendations for policy makers and companies. The relevance of our recommendations extends beyond the small share of companies presently engaged in concurrent management.     

Do hedge funds trade on private information? Evidence from syndicated lending and short-selling

This paper investigates an important contemporary issue relating to the involvement of hedge funds in the syndicated loan market. In particular, we investigate the potential conflicts of interest that arise when hedge funds make syndicated loans and take short positions in the equity of borrowing firms. We find evidence consistent with the short-selling of the equity of the hedge fund borrowers prior to public announcements of both loan originations and loan amendments. We also find that hedge funds are more likely to lend to highly leveraged, lower credit quality firms, where access to private information is potentially the most valuable and where trading on such information could lead to enhanced profits. Overall, our results have important implications for the current debate regarding regulating the hedge fund industry.     

Asset management and investment banking

We find evidence that conflicts of interest are pervasive in the asset management business owned by investment banks. Using data from 1990 to 2008, we compare the alphas of mutual funds, hedge funds, and institutional funds operated by investment banks and non-bank conglomerates. We find that, while no difference exists in performance by fund type, being owned by an investment bank reduces alphas by 46 basis points per year in our baseline model. Making lead loans increases alphas, but the dispersion of fees across portfolios decreases alphas. The economic loss is $4.9 billion per year.     

Do mutual funds time the market? Evidence from portfolio holdings

Previous research finds insignificant market-timing ability for mutual funds using tests based on fund returns. The return-based tests, however, are subject to the “artificial timing” bias. In this paper, we propose and implement new measures of market timing based on mutual fund holdings. Our holdings-based measures do not suffer from the artificial timing bias. We find that, on average, actively managed U.S. domestic equity funds have positive timing ability. Market timing funds use non-public information to predict market returns, tend to have high industry concentration, large fund size, a tilt toward small-cap stocks, and are active in industry rotation.     

Mutual fund herding and audit pricing

This study investigates how investor trading behavior affects audit pricing by examining mutual fund herding in specific. When mutual fund managers herd due to information cascade, mimicking incentive, or agency problem, it causes information friction and weakens their monitoring effectiveness. Heightened governance risk is associated with higher audit risk and thus higher audit pricing. In our empirical tests, we find that herding weakens mutual funds’ information advantage and monitoring effectiveness, ultimately resulting in higher audit fees. To mitigate the endogeneity concern, we employ the natural experiment of the 2004 SEC regulation change on mutual fund disclosure frequency to capture exogenous change in herding intensity. Our findings are robust using propensity score matching method and alternative measures. Consistent with our conjecture, we document that firms facing stronger mutual fund herding are associated with deteriorated corporate disclosure quality.