Insurance demand in the presence of loss-dependent background risk

We analyze insurance demand when insurable losses come with an uninsurable zero-mean background risk that increases in the loss size. If the individual is risk vulnerable, loss-dependent background risk triggers a precautionary insurance motive and increases optimal insurance demand. Prudence alone is sufficient for insurance demand to increase in two cases: the case of fair insurance and the case where the smallest possible loss exceeds a certain threshold value (referred to as the large loss case). We derive conditions under which insurance demand increases or decreases in initial wealth. In the large loss case, prudence determines whether changes in the background risk lead to more insurance demand. We generalize this result to arbitrary loss distributions and find conditions based on decreasing third-degree Ross risk aversion, Arrow–Pratt risk aversion, and Arrow–Pratt temperance.     

Credibilistic risk aversion

In the probabilistic risk aversion approach, risks are presumed as random variables with known probability distributions. However, in some practical cases, for example, due to the absence of historical data, the inherent uncertain characteristic of risks or different subject judgements from the decision-makers, risks may be hard or not appropriate to be estimated with probability distributions. Therefore, the traditional probabilistic risk aversion theory is ineffective. Thus, in order to deal with these cases, we suggest measuring these kinds of risks as fuzzy variables, and accordingly to present an alternative risk aversion approach by employing credibility theory. In the present paper, first, the definition of credibilistic risk premium proposed by Georgescu and Kinnunen [Fuzzy Inf. Eng., 2013, 5, 399–416] is revised by taking the initial wealth into consideration, and then a general method to compute the credibilistic risk premium is provided. Secondly, regarding the risks represented with the commonly used LR fuzzy intervals, a simple calculation formula of the local credibilistic risk premium is put forward. Finally, in a global sense, several equivalent propositions for comparative risk aversion under the credibility measurement are provided. Illustrated examples are presented to show the applicability of the theoretical findings.     

Identity Theft and Consumer Payment Choice: Does Security Really Matter?

In their paper “Spectral Risk Measures: Properties and Limitations”, Dowd et al. (J Financ Serv Res 341:61–75, 2008) introduce exponential and power spectral risk measures as subclasses of spectral risk measures (SRMs) to the literature, and claim that they are subject to three serious limitations: First, for these subclasses, the spectral risk may be counterintuitively decreasing when the user’s risk aversion is increasing. Second, these subclasses, and power SRMs in particular, become completely insensitive to market volatility when the respective parameters of risk aversion tend to their lower and upper boundaries. Third, exponential SRMs exhibit constant absolute risk aversion, while constant relative risk aversion better meets the empirical evidence. Consequently, “users of spectral risk measures must be careful to select utility functions that fit the features of the particular problems they are dealing with, and should be especially careful when using power SRMs.” (p. 61). In this comment, we show that the findings of Dowd et al. (J Financ Serv Res 341:61–75, 2008) suffer from misinterpretations and wrong conclusions.     

A Generalisation of the Mean-Variance Analysis

In this paper we consider a decision maker whose utility function has a kink at the reference point with different functions below and above this reference point. We also suppose that the decision maker generally distorts the objective probabilities. First we show that the expected utility function of this decision maker can be approximated by a function of mean and partial moments of distribution. This 'mean-partial moments' utility generalises not only mean-variance utility of Tobin and Markowitz, but also mean-semivariance utility of Markowitz. Then, in the spirit of Arrow and Pratt, we derive an expression for a risk premium when risk is small. Our analysis shows that a decision maker in this framework exhibits three types of aversions: aversion to loss, aversion to uncertainty in gains, and aversion to uncertainty in losses. Finally we present a solution to the optimal capital allocation problem and derive an expression for a portfolio performance measure which generalises the Sharpe and Sortino ratios. We demonstrate that in this framework the decision maker's skewness preferences have first-order impact on risk measurement even when the risk is small.     

CVP under uncertainty and the manager's utility function

Cost-volume-profit analysis has focused on the firm's short-run output decision assuming that the manager maximizes the firm's objective function rather than his or her own. This study argues that the decision problem facing the manager is to determine not only the level of output, but also the level of investment in risky assets in such a way that the expected utility of the manager's own end-of-period wealth can be maximized when the manager's wealth function is dependent on vested interests both within and outside of the firm, possibly in competition with the firm. Through analytical work, it is demonstrated that a change in fixed costs of the firm affects not only the production decision of a manager, but also his orher decision to invest in risky assets. The direction of this fixed cost effect depends on the particular type of risk aversion displayed by the manager. From the analytical work, five propositions are developed for empirical investigation in the future.The most helpful comments of Professor Cheng-few Lee are greatly acknowledged. We wish to thank anonymous referees who's comments have improved the paper. Furthermore, participants at the seminar at the University of Massachusetts Lowell also provided helpful comments.     

Emotions,attitudes, and appraisal in the management of climate-related risks by fish farmers in Northern Thailand

Many previous studies have documented that farmers are risk-averse, while other studies have shown that farmers analyze and estimate risks. Conventional risk aversion measures and analytical judgment often do not fully explain decision behavior. Thus, it may be necessary to consider emotions. The objective of this study was to enhance understanding of the interactions between attitudes, analysis, and emotions in making risk decisions. The study used a mixture of methods, including: a tablet game, risk aversion scales, in-depth interviews, and focus group discussions with fish cage farmers in Northern Thailand. There was no significant difference in risk aversion with respect to gender, age group, or region. Having sufficient capital made it possible to take more risks. Recently being impacted by floods or droughts, or being very concerned with climate change, was not associated with taking fewer risks. Measures of risk aversion did not predict risk decisions. Feeling worried, concerned, anxious, or stressed were the most common negative emotions referred to in interviews. Fear was a reason for not taking risks. Common positive emotions were joy, excitement, and feeling relaxed or relieved. Men who expressed feeling excited or thrilled chose riskier, higher stocking densities in games than women. A common belief was that men were quicker and more confident when making decisions. Another was that emotions had little impact on decisions, but were a response to success and failure – a claim inconsistent with other findings that imply emotions are also important prior to stocking decisions, and while waiting for the harvest. Fear and anxiety in the period prior to harvest may help motivate risk management practices, such as close monitoring and aeration. In conclusion, emotions may play a more important role in making decisions about climate-related risks than was previously recognized.     

Investment option under CIR interest rates

We analyze extensively the characteristics of the solution to an irreversible investment decision when the only source of uncertainty comes from interest rates. They are assumed to be driven by the popular Cox–Ingersoll–Ross (CIR) stochastic process. Particular attention is paid to the impact that both CIR parameters and risk aversion have on the threshold rate.     

Loss aversion and the price of risk

This paper derives a simple theoretical relationship between the degree of loss aversion, the concavity/convexity of the value function, and the equilibrium market price of risk. We show that while the degree of loss aversion is key in determining the market price of risk, the convexity/concavity of the value function is much less important in this respect. The theoretical relationship obtained is tested empirically by using international data from 16 different countries during over 100 years, as documented by Dimson et al. [Triumph of the Optimists: 101 Years of Global Investment Returns, 2002 (Princeton University Press)]. The empirical data yield an estimate of λ=2.3 for the loss aversion index. This value is in striking agreement with estimates obtained in the very different methodology of laboratory experiments of individual decision-making.     

Optimal capital growth with convex shortfall penalties

The optimal capital growth strategy or Kelly strategy has many desirable properties such as maximizing the asymptotic long-run growth of capital. However, it has considerable short-run risk since the utility is logarithmic, with essentially zero Arrow–Pratt risk aversion. It is common to control risk with a Value-at-Risk (VaR) constraint defined on the end of horizon wealth. A more effective approach is to impose a VaR constraint at each time on the wealth path. In this paper, we provide a method to obtain the maximum growth while staying above an ex-ante discrete time wealth path with high probability, where shortfalls below the path are penalized with a convex function of the shortfall. The effect of the path VaR condition and shortfall penalties is a lower growth rate than the Kelly strategy, but the downside risk is under control. The asset price dynamics are defined by a model with Markov transitions between several market regimes and geometric Brownian motion for prices within a regime. The stochastic investment model is reformulated as a deterministic programme which allows the calculation of the optimal constrained growth wagers at discrete points in time.     

The Spillover effect of compulsory insurance

The assumption usually made in the insurance literature that risks are always insurable at the desired level does not hold in the real world: some risks are not—or are only partially—insurable, while others, such as civil liability or health and workers' injuries, must be fully insured or at least covered for a specific amount. We examine in this paper conditions under which a reduction in the constrained level of insurance for one risk increases the demand of insurance for another independent risk. We show that it is necessary to sign the fourth derivative of the utility function to obtain an unambiguous spillover effect. Three different sufficient conditions are derived if the expected value of the exogenous risk is zero. The first condition is that risk aversion be standard—that is, that absolute risk aversion and absolute prudence be decreasing. The second condition is that absolute risk aversion be decreasing and convex. The third condition is that both the third and the fourth derivatives of the utility function be negative. If the expected value of the exogenous risk is positive, a wealth effect is added to the picture, which goes in the opposite direction if absolute risk aversion is decreasing.     

Locally Greater Vulnerability to Background Risk

Willingness to take on risk is influenced by the presence of fair and unfair background risks for decision makers who are risk vulnerable as defined by Gollier and Pratt [1996], for these decision makers are more risk averse when they possess such an uninsurable background risk. We present an alternative derivation of the index of local vulnerability based on Diamond and Stiglitz [1974] compensated increases in risk, such that risk aversion increases with the introduction of any small fair background risk if and only if the index of local vulnerability is positive. We establish that the increase in risk aversion is greater for those who are more vulnerable as measured by the index of local vulnerability.     

CVP under Uncertainty and the Manager's Utility Function Revisited

This paper re-examines the model of Kim, Abdolmohammada, and Klein (KAK, 1996) in which owners of a firm delegate the production decision to a risk-averse manager. Conflict of interest between the owners and the manager emerges as the latter maximizes the expected utility of his/her own wealth rather than that of the firm's profits. This paper shows that the results of KAK on the expected contribution margin and the excess return on the risky asset are flawed. Furthermore, while KAK study the effects of delegating the production decision to the manager on the firm's optimal output based on the mean-variance analysis, this paper derives parallel results within utility functions exhibiting constant absolute risk aversion and any arbitrary probability distribution functions.     

Investment,idiosyncratic risk,and growth options

We provide evidence that growth options play an important role in determining the negative relation between corporate investment and idiosyncratic risk in the absence of agency problem. A simple real options model predicts that the negative relation between corporate investment and idiosyncratic risk is a U-shaped function of the level of idiosyncratic risk: investment responds the most when idiosyncratic risk is at the intermediate level. And the negative relation is stronger when firms possess more growth options. Our results are robust when we control for the effect of managerial risk aversion, supporting the view that firms’ optimal response to uncertainty is an important driving force behind the negative investment–idiosyncratic risk relation.     

Religion and venture investing: A cross-country analysis

Using a sample of 56 countries over the 2000–2016 period, we document lower levels of venture capital investments in more religious countries. These results are not specific to any primary religion. Furthermore, we show that the negative relation between religiosity and venture investing mainly stems from risk aversion inherent in religiosity. Our results are unlikely driven by economic clout, as we show more religious countries in fact have higher levels of domestic credit or nonfinancial investments, despite lower levels of venture investments. We also present several findings consistent with risk aversion. Venture investments in more religious countries are more likely to have successful exits and are less likely to be foreign or early-stage deals. Our results are robust to different measures of venture investments and religiosity, and to alternative specifications that account for endogeneity.     

Increasing return response to changes in risk

Risk aversion theory is based on an individual's choice among risky assets with expected utility in its foundation. It is about investor behavior (i.e., investor choice), under normal circumstances, toward assets with various levels of risk. A positive and marginally diminishing relationship between risk and return exists. This study is about investor behavior related to their response (not choice) to risk. We present an argument and supporting evidence that investors’ return response to risk is increasing with the level of risk. Thus, investor behavior is subject to change and the level of risk is a determinant of such change. We also explain the negative time‐series correlation between risk and return.     

Wealth and Executive Compensation

Using new data on the wealth of Swedish CEOs, I show that higher wealth CEOs receive stronger incentives. Since high wealth (excluding own‐firm holdings) implies low absolute risk aversion, this is consistent with a risk aversion explanation. To examine whether wealth is likely to proxy for power, I use lagged wealth (typically measured before the CEO was hired), and the results remain for one of two incentive measures. Also, the wealth–incentive result is not stronger for CEOs likely to face limited owner oversight. Finally, wealth is unrelated to pay levels, and is hence unlikely to proxy for skill.     

Managerial Ownership and Corporate Hedging

Abstract:  Using information on 443 UK non-financial companies, this work provides evidence supporting the hypothesis that managerial risk aversion is an incentive to deviate from the optimal hedging position. Conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers are at the centre of the decision about the firm's risk profile but are not relevant as determinants of the decision to hedge. This is rather associated with factors enhancing the firm's expected value (underinvestment, scale economies, tax savings).     

The effect of a decision aid on risk aversion in capital investment decisions

In this study we examine whether a decision aid is an effective means of reducing risk aversion within a capital investment decision context, and under what conditions. Participating in the experiment were 78 working adults (mid management) with a mean age 30 and enrolled in a leading U.S. MBA program. We predict and find that a decision aid will be most effective among individuals intolerance of ambiguity and exhibiting high negative affect.     

What do asset prices have to say about risk appetite and uncertainty?

Building on intuition from the dynamic asset pricing literature, we uncover unobserved risk aversion and fundamental uncertainty from the observed time series of the variance premium and the credit spread while controlling for the conditional variance of stock returns, expectations about the macroeconomic outlook, and interest rates. We apply this methodology to monthly data from both Germany and the US. We find that the variance premium contains a substantial amount of information about risk aversion whereas the credit spread has a lot to say about uncertainty. We link our risk aversion and uncertainty estimates to practitioner and “academic” risk aversion indices, sentiment indices, financial stress indices, business cycle indicators and liquidity measures.     

Coherent risk measures under filtered historical simulation

Recent studies have strongly criticised conventional VaR models for not providing a coherent risk measure. Acerbi provides the intuition for an entire family of coherent measures of risk known as “spectral risk measures” [Spectral measures of risk: A coherent representation of subjective risk aversion. Journal of Banking and Finance 26 (7) (2002) 1505–1518]. In this study we illustrate how the Filtered Historical Simulation [Barone-Adesi, G., Bourgoin, F., Giannopoulos, K., 1998. Don’t look back. Risk 11, 100–104; Barone-Adesi, Giannopoulos, K., Vosper, L., 1999. VaR without correlations for non-linear portfolios. Journal of Futures Markets 19, 583–602], can provide an improved methodology for calculating the Expected Shortfall. Thereafter, we prove that these new risk measures are spectral and are coherent as well, following Acerbi. Furthermore, we provide the statistical error formula that allows to calculate the error for our model.