Determinants of Investment Cash Flow Sensitivity

I classify firms into groups of high, low, and negative sensitivity. I find that investment-cash flow sensitivity is nonmonotonic with respect to financial constraints, cash flows, and growth opportunities. Firms classified as negative cash flow sensitive have the lowest cash flows, highest growth opportunities, and appear the most financially constrained. Cash flow insensitive firms have the highest cash flows, lowest growth opportunities, and appear the least financially constrained. To a large extent, the negative relationship between cash flow and investment is driven by the opposite trends followed by investment and cash flow, as firms grow through stages of their life cycle.     

Internal financial constraints,external financial constraints,and investment choice: Evidence from a panel of UK firms

This paper uses a panel of 24,184 UK firms over the period 1993–2003 to study the extent to which the sensitivity of investment to cash flow differs at firms facing different degrees of internal and external financial constraints. Our results suggest that when the sample is split on the basis of the level of internal funds available to the firms, the relationship between investment and cash flow is U-shaped. On the other hand, the sensitivity of investment to cash flow tends to increase monotonically with the degree of external financial constraints faced by firms. Combining the internal with the external financial constraints, we find that the dependence of investment on cash flow is strongest for those externally financially constrained firms that have a relatively high level of internal funds.     

Concentrating on q and cash flow

Investment spending by US public firms is highly concentrated. The 100 largest spenders account for 60% of total capital expenditures and drive most of the variation in aggregate investment. This high concentration creates a disconnect between the average public firm and macroeconomic aggregates. For large firms, cash flow remains the primary driver of investment spending and has not declined in importance as it has for smaller public firms. The cash flowing to big spenders provides a better forecast of future investment opportunities than noisy proxies for Tobin's q even though these firms are not financially constrained. These results suggest that, at least for the largest spenders, it is unlikely that measurement error drives the significance of cash flow. Our results are also inconsistent with recent models that predict higher investment-cash flow sensitivity for small young growth firms and suggest that cash flow is still the most important determinant of macroeconomic fluctuations in investment spending.     

The impact of labor unions on investment-cash flow sensitivity

This paper empirically examines how labor unions affect investment-cash flow sensitivity using samples from the US covering the period of 1984–2009. We find a significant positive union effect using a q model of investment. The capital expenditures of firms are 1.71 times more sensitive to internal cash flows when unionization rates increase one standard deviation from the mean. This effect holds when we control for other proxies of financial constraints. In addition, unionized firms are associated with lower cash–cash flow sensitivity, which suggests that the higher investment-cash flow sensitivity in unionized firms is primarily driven by the incentive of these firms to reduce liquidity and enhance bargaining power against the union. We also show that the above union effects become more pronounced during labor contract negotiation years.     

IFRS adoption in Europe and investment-cash flow sensitivity: Outsider versus insider economies

We examine the economic consequences of the mandatory adoption of IFRS in EU countries by showing which types of economies have the largest reduction in investment-cash flow sensitivity post-IFRS. We also examine whether the reduction in investment-cash flow sensitivity depends on firm size as well as economy type.We find that the investment-cash flow sensitivity of insider economies is higher than that of outsider economies pre-IFRS and that IFRS reduces the investment-cash flow sensitivity of insider economies more than that of outsider economies. Also, we find that small firms in insider economies have the highest sensitivity of investment to lagged cash flow pre-IFRS, and that they are no longer sensitive to lagged cash flow post-IFRS. Overall, our results suggest that IFRS adoption might have improved the functioning of capital markets in relation to small firms in insider economies.     

Do Acquisitions Relieve Target Firms’ Financial Constraints?

Managers often claim that target firms are financially constrained prior to being acquired and that these constraints are eased following the acquisition. Using a large sample of European acquisitions, we document that the level of cash that target firms hold, the sensitivity of cash to cash flow, and the sensitivity of investment to cash flow all decline, while investment increases following the acquisition. These effects are stronger in deals that are more likely to be associated with financing improvements. Our findings suggest that acquisitions relieve financial frictions in target firms, especially when the target firm is relatively small.     

Does financing influence the sensitivity of cash and investment to asset tangibility?

Research shows that asset tangibility substantially impacts firms’ cash levels and investment. Using the deregulation of equity issuance in the U.S. as an exogenous shock to access to equity markets, we investigate the influence of financing on the dependence of cash and investment on asset tangibility. We show that financing dampens the sensitivity of cash and investment to asset tangibility, and promotes investment and firm growth. Our results suggest that greater access to financing allows financially constrained firms to invest in productive projects that may otherwise not be taken up. This provides evidence that public firms even in well-developed financial markets such as the U.S. benefit from financial deregulation that removes barriers to external financing, shedding light on the role of financial markets in fostering growth.     

The Relationship between Voluntary Disclosure,External Financing and Financial Status

Using unique Swedish disclosure data from 2007 to 2012, this paper reports three important sets of findings with regard to the relationship between firms’ voluntary disclosure, external financing and financial status. First, financially strong firms disclose more than weaker ones. Second, firms that obtain new financing (equity or debt) disclose more than firms that do not. Third, the association between voluntary disclosure and financing events is stronger in financially weak firms. This last finding is new in the literature. Perhaps financially weak firms that obtain external funding have higher disclosure to counteract contracting and valuation problems in the financial markets.     

A note on a semiparametric approach to estimating financing constraints in firms

In this paper, we present a novel approach to modeling financing constraints of firms. Specifically, we adopt an approach in which firm-level investment is a nonparametric function of some relevant firm characteristics, cash flow in particular. This enables us to generate firm-year specific measures of cash flow sensitivity of investment. We are therefore able to draw conclusions about financing constraints of individual firms as well as cohorts of firms without having to split our sample on an ad hoc basis. This is a significant improvement over the stylized approach that is based on comparison of point estimates of cash flow sensitivity of investment of the average firm of ad hoc sub-samples of firms. We use firm-level data from India to highlight the advantages of our approach. Our results suggest that the estimates generated by this approach are meaningful from an economic point of view and are consistent with the literature.     

Disappearing investment-cash flow sensitivities: Earnings have not become a worse proxy for cash flow

According to a recent conjecture in the literature, earnings have become a poorer proxy for cash flow from operations over time. We find that since 1988, when cash flow statements started to be consistently reported in Compustat, the cash effectiveness of earnings has actually increased for a large sample of US manufacturing firms. This occurs despite the introduction of fair value accounting and increasing accounting accruals during the last three decades. Also contrary to the conjecture, using more comprehensive measures of cash flow does not restore the investment-cash flow sensitivity, which continues to be around 0.05 in more recent periods.     

The determinants of cash flow sensitivity of cash: The family ownership effect

This paper investigates firms’ cash flow sensitivity of cash (CFSC) in a European setting. We examine the differing effects of financial constraints and income and substitution effects on CFSC in the context of the family ownership structure. When examining the shareholders’ behavior within the ownership structure of family firms, we find a positive CFSC level for our full sample. Our results show a significant connection between the family ownership structure and CFSC’s determinant factors: the higher (lower) sensitivity for the firms with more (less) financial constraints suggests that family firms are financially less constrained than non-family firms. Additionally, contrary to prior literature, we find income and substitution effects have a nonnegative effect on CFCS. We explain this finding from a productivity shocks perspective related to the financial crisis, which occurs during our analysis period.     

The Effect of Venture Capital Financing on the Sensitivity to Cash Flow of Firm's Investments

This work studies the effect of venture capital (VC) financing on firms' investments in a longitudinal sample of 379 Italian unlisted new‐technology‐based firms (NTBFs) observed over the 10‐year period from 1994 to 2003. We distinguish the effects of VC financing according to the type of investor: independent VC (IVC) funds and corporate VC (CVC) investors. Previous studies argue that NTBFs are the firms most likely to be financially constrained. The technology‐intensive nature of their activity and their lack of a track record increase adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Moreover, most of their assets are firm‐specific or intangible and hence cannot be pledged as collateral. In accordance with this view, we show that the investment rate of NTBFs is strongly positively correlated with their current cash flows. We also find that after receiving VC financing, NTBFs increase their investment rate independently of the type of VC investor. However, the investments of CVC‐backed firms remain sensitive to shocks in cash flows, whereas IVC‐backed firms exhibit a low and statistically not significant investment–cash flow sensitivity that we interpret as a signal of the removal of financial constraints.     

Is Family Control Relevant for Corporate Cash Holding Policy?

This empirical research examines the effect of family control on firms’ cash holding policy. Using a sample of Western European firms, we confirm the precautionary motive for holding cash as family‐controlled firms’ desire to perpetuate the family legacy for future generations motivates them to accumulate more cash than their non‐family counterparts. We also show that, given family‐controlled firms’ long‐term perspective, they focus on cash flow volatility rather than cash flow level. Finally, the relation between financing constraints and cash holdings is not homogeneous: financially constrained family‐controlled firms hold higher levels of cash than financially constrained non‐family firms. Overall, these results suggest that family firms’ cash holding policy is the result not of a specific financial outcome but rather on the strategic objectives of the firm.     

The impact of the financial system’s structure on firms’ financial constraints

We estimate firms’ cash flow sensitivity of cash to empirically test how the financial system’s structure and level of development influence their financial constraints. For this purpose we merge Almeida et al.’s work, a path-breaking design for evaluating a firm’s financial constraints, with that of Levine, who paved the way for comparative analysis of financial systems around the world. We conjecture that a country’s financial system, both in terms of its structure and its level of development, should influence the cash flow sensitivity of cash of constrained firms but leave unconstrained firms unaffected. We test our hypothesis with a large international sample of 30,000 firm-years from 1989 to 2006. Our findings reveal that both the structure of the financial system and its level of development matter. Bank-based financial systems provide constrained firms with easier access to external financing.     

Financial constraints on credit ratings and cash-flow sensitivity

This study investigates whether financial constraints, as measured by the level of credit ratings and their migrations would affect the firm's cash flow allocation policies and reflect the main financial constraints on a firm's cash flow sensitivity of cash. For a given credit quality shock, control for firm-level characteristics and endogeneity of cash flow allocation, our results suggest that firms with higher credit financial constraints have significantly higher cash flow sensitivities on cash holding, investment, and debt financing activities. Our results provide evidence that credit rating risk has a larger impact on cash flow allocation and drives the financial constraints on cash flow sensitivity for various reasons, including precautionary motivation and restricted access to external financing.     

Investment–Cash Flow Sensitivities: Constrained versus Unconstrained Firms

From the existing literature, it is not clear what effect financing constraints have on the sensitivities of firms' investment to their cash flow. I propose an explanation that reconciles the conflicting empirical evidence. I present two models: the unconstrained model, in which firms can raise external funds, and the constrained model, in which firms cannot do so. Using low dividends to identify financing constraints in my generated panel of data produces results consistent with those of Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen; using the constrained model produces results consistent with those of Kaplan and Zingales.     

The effect of financial constraints,investment policy,product market competition and corporate governance on the value of cash holdings

This study empirically investigates the value shareholders place on excess cash holdings and how shareholders’ valuation of cash holdings is associated with financial constraints, firm growth, cash‐flow uncertainty and product market competition for Australian firms from 1990 to 2007. Our results indicate that the marginal value of cash holdings to shareholders declines with larger cash holdings and higher leverage. However, firms that are more financially constrained, that have higher growth rates and that face greater uncertainty exhibit a higher marginal value of cash holdings. These findings are consistent with the explanation that excess cash holdings are not necessarily detrimental to firm value. Firms with costly external financing and that also save more cash for current operating and future investing needs find that the market values these cash hoarding policies favourably. Finally, there is limited evidence of an association between various corporate governance measures and the value of cash holdings for a shorter sample period.     

External finance and dividend policy: a twist by financial constraints

This study assesses distorting effect of financial constraints on the inverse relationship between internal and external finance by examining impact of an exogenous financing shock (i.e. a regulation released in China in 2008) on dividend policies in a quasi‐natural experimental setting. Our result shows that in the absence of the regulation, the inverse relationship holds. However, the relation is twisted by the 2008 regulation. Compared with unconstrained firms, financially constrained firms are more willing to pay dividends and are more restrained to reduce cash dividends after the regulation, despite the fact that their external financing capacities are further constrained.     

Investment-cash flow sensitivity cannot be a good measure of financial constraints: Evidence from the time series

Investment-cash flow sensitivity has declined and disappeared, even during the 2007-2009 credit crunch. If one believes that financial constraints have not disappeared, then investment-cash flow sensitivity cannot be a good measure of financial constraints. The decline and disappearance are robust to considerations of R&D and cash reserves, and across groups of firms. The information content in cash flow regarding investment opportunities has declined, but measurement error in Tobin's q does not completely explain the patterns in investment-cash flow sensitivity. The decline and disappearance cannot be explained by changes in sample composition, corporate governance, or market power—and remain a puzzle.     

Why has the investment-cash flow sensitivity declined so sharply? Rising R&D and equity market developments

The study of the investment-cash flow (ICF) sensitivity constitutes one of the largest literatures in corporate finance, yet little is known about changes in the ICF relationship over time, and the literature has largely ignored how rising R&D investment and developments in equity markets have impacted ICF sensitivity estimates. We show that for the time period 1970–2006, the ICF sensitivity: (i) largely disappears for physical investment, (ii) remains comparatively strong for R&D, and (iii) declines, but does not disappear, for total investment. We argue that these findings can largely be explained by the changing composition of investment and the rising importance of public equity as a source of funds, particularly for firms with persistent negative cash flows.