Implications of Internal Funds Surplus for Determining Agency Spending of SEO Proceeds and Timing Incentives

According to the pecking order theory, firms with potential investment projects should raise external capital if and only if sufficient internal funds are not available. The theory can be violated if equity issuers are motivated by market timing and increasing funds for insiders’ benefits, indicating that firms may already have internal funds surplus without including external funds, but still issue equity. By controlling for future funds needs, the analyses show that issuers that engage in market timing and spend the SEO proceeds on value-destroying projects are strongly associated with their internal funds surplus. Moreover, SEO announcement returns are lower for issuers with internal funds surplus. This pattern strongly supports the predictive ability of internal funds surplus to detect the need for external capital and ultimately to determine timing incentives and agency spending of SEO proceeds.     

Equity issues when in distress

We investigate the role of financial distress in the seasoned equity market. We find that distressed firms comprise about 40% of SEOs and these distressed issuers have worse abnormal announcement returns than non‐distressed issuers. Stock return volatility is an important determinant for announcement returns for non‐distressed SEO issuers but not for distressed SEO issuers. Signals of firm quality are associated with better announcement returns, larger issues, increased investment, improved operating performance, and lower likelihood of delisting for distressed SEO firms as compared to non‐distressed firms. Our findings suggest equity finance is valuable for financially distressed firms with strong growth prospects.     

Carbon emissions and stock returns: Evidence from the EU Emissions Trading Scheme

This paper provides an empirical investigation of the effect of the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme on German stock returns. We find that, during the first few years of the scheme, firms that received free carbon emission allowances on average significantly outperformed firms that did not. This suggests the presence of a large and statistically significant “carbon premium,” which is mainly explained by the higher cash flows due to the free allocation of carbon emission allowances. A carbon risk factor can also explain part of the cross-sectional variation of stock returns as firms with high carbon emissions have higher exposure to carbon risk and exhibit higher expected returns.     

Investor attention,information acquisition,and value premium: A mispricing perspective

This paper investigates the impact of investor attention on the dynamics of the value premium. We find superior return differences to value-growth strategy conditioned as low degree of investor attention. In contrast, return differences to the value-growth strategy conditioned as high investor attention are indifferent from zero. We show that return differences to low degree of investor attention across value and growth firms are attributed to mispricing explanation using common risk factors, mispricing factors, sentiment analysis, multivariate analysis, and market expectation errors approach. The findings suggest that investor attention contributes to generating superior return differences to standard value-growth strategy. Our finding concludes that long-short investment strategy in value stocks and growth stocks conditioned as low investor attention generate superior value premium.     

The economics of PIPEs

Private investments in public equities (PIPEs) are an important source of finance for public corporations. PIPE investor returns decline with holding periods, while time to exit depends on the issue's registration status and underlying liquidity. We estimate PIPE investor returns adjusting for these factors. Our analysis, which is the first to estimate returns to investors rather than issuers, indicates that the average PIPE investor holds the stock for 384 days and earns an abnormal return of 19.7%. More constrained firms tend to issue PIPEs to hedge funds and private equity funds in offerings that have higher expected returns and higher volatility. PIPE investors’ abnormal returns appear to reflect compensation for providing capital to financially constrained firms.     

Stock Returns and Operating Performance of Securities Issuers

We examine long‐run stock returns and operating performance around firms’ offerings of common stock, convertible debt, and straight debt from 1985 to 1990. We find that pre‐issue abnormal returns are positive and significant for stock issuers, but not for convertible and straight debt issuers. The post‐issue mean returns show that common stock and convertible debt issuers experience underperformance during the post‐issue periods, but straight debt issuers do not. Consistent with these results, common stock issuers experience the best pre‐issue operating performance among all three types of issuers, and operating performance declines during the post‐issue periods for common stock and convertible debt issuers. Using a new approach in linear model estimations to correct heteroskedasticity and to adjust for finite sample, we find a positive relation between post‐issue operating performance and issue‐period stock price reactions. The results suggest that future operating performance is anticipated at the issue and that securities issues provide information on issuers’ future performance.     

Raising capital in emerging markets with restricted Global Depositary Receipts

Despite serious governance concerns revealed in Rule 144A and/or Regulation S Global Depositary Receipt (GDR) circulars, institutional investors voluntarily purchase these illiquid securities. Like issuers of Level III American Depositary Receipts (ADRs), GDR issuers exhibit strong pre-offer performance, with higher average Tobin's q ratios, sales growth rates, sales levels, returns on equity, and dividend payout ratios than their home-market counterparts. However, GDRs are issued predominantly by firms in emerging markets, while ADRs are issued mostly by firms in developed markets. After controlling for country and industry effects, we find that ADR issuers are larger and that they employ more reputable underwriters than GDR issuers do, but no other significant differences emerge. Notwithstanding their similarities, GDRs have larger discounts than ADRs, suggesting that legal bonding provides benefits that reputational bonding cannot fully replicate. However, within the sample of GDRs, pre-offer performance attributes also influence pricing. Specifically, discounts vary inversely with issue size but directly with firm size, suggesting that economies of scale exist in the GDR issue process and that potential agency costs are higher in larger firms. GDR discounts also vary inversely with incremental returns on equity in all partitions of the data, indicating the importance of pre-offer profitability in establishing the reputation of the issuing firm and in increasing the GDR offer price.     

Discretionary accruals: signalling or earnings management in Australia?

We investigate the signalling effect of discretionary accruals (DAC). Although we find that discretionary accruals are insignificantly related to contemporaneous stock returns, we uncover that income‐increasing discretionary accruals of GAAP‐complying growth firms are significantly and positively related to contemporaneous stock returns. Furthermore, we find that this positive effect is stronger among firms with better corporate governance mechanisms, such as Board of Directors Independence, Audit Committee Independence and Large Shareholders’ Ownership. In addition to contemporaneous stock returns, we also find similar results with the future increase in dividends. Our findings are consistent with the argument that corporate governance can enhance the signalling effect of reported earnings of GAAP‐complying growth firms.     

Pseudo Market Timing and the Long-Run Underperformance of IPOs

Numerous studies document long-run underperformance by firms following equity offerings. This paper shows that underperformance is very likely to be observed ex-post in an efficient market. The premise is that more firms issue equity at higher stock prices even though they cannot predict future returns. Ex-post , issuers seem to time the market because offerings cluster at market peaks. Simulations based on 1973 through 1997 data reveal that when ex-ante expected abnormal returns are zero, median ex-post underperformance for equity issuers will be significantly negative in event-time. Using calendar-time returns solves the problem.     

Share Issuance and Factor Timing

We show that characteristics of stock issuers can be used to forecast important common factors in stocks' returns such as those associated with book‐to‐market, size, and industry. Specifically, we use differences between the attributes of stock issuers and repurchasers to forecast characteristic‐related factor returns. For example, we show that large firms underperform after years when issuing firms are large relative to repurchasing firms. While our strongest results are for portfolios based on book‐to‐market (i.e., HML), size (i.e., SMB), and industry, our approach is also useful for forecasting factor returns associated with distress, payout policy, and profitability.     

Excess cash holdings and shareholder value

We examine the determinants of corporate cash holdings in Australia and the impact on shareholder wealth of holding excess cash. Our results show that a trade‐off model best explains the level of a firm’s cash holdings in Australia. We find that ‘transitory’ excess cash firms earn significantly higher risk‐adjusted returns compared to ‘persistent’ excess cash firms, suggesting that the market penalises firms that hoard cash. The marginal value of cash also declines with larger cash balances, and the longer firms hold on to excess cash. The results are consistent with agency costs associated with persistence in excess cash holdings.     

The Operating Performance of Firms Conducting Seasoned Equity Offerings

Recent studies have documented that firms conducting seasoned equity offerings have inordinately low stock returns during the five years after the offering, following a sharp run-up in the year prior to the offering. This article documents that the operating performance of issuing firms shows substantial improvement prior to the offering, but then deteriorates. The multiples at the time of the offering, however, do not reflect an expectation of deteriorating performance. Issuing firms are disproportionately high-growth firms, but issuers have much lower subsequent stock returns than nonissuers with the same growth rate.     

Evidence on the Trade-Off between Risk and Return for IPO and SEO Firms

Do the low long‐run average returns of equity issuers reflect underperformance due to mispricing or the risk characteristics of the issuing firms? We shed new light on this question by examining how institutional lenders price loans of equity issuing firms. Accounting for standard risk factors, we find that equity issuing firms' expected debt return is equivalent to the expected debt return of nonissuing firms, implying that institutional lenders perceive equity issuers to be as risky as similar nonissuing firms. In general, institutional lenders perceive small and high book‐to‐market borrowers as systematically riskier than larger borrowers with low book‐to‐market ratios, consistent with the asset pricing approach in Fama and French (1993) . Finally, we find that firms' expected debt returns decline after equity offerings, consistent with recent theoretical arguments suggesting that firm risk should decline following an equity offering. Overall, our analysis provides novel evidence consistent with risk‐based explanations for the observed equity returns following IPOs and SEOs.     

Does a Parent–Subsidiary Structure Enhance Financing Flexibility?

I examine whether firms exploit a publicly traded parent–subsidiary structure to issue equity of the overvalued firm regardless of which firm needs funds, and whether this conveys opposite information about firm values. Using 90 subsidiary and 37 parent seasoned equity offering (SEO) announcements during 1981–2002, I document negative returns to issuers but insignificant returns to nonissuers in both samples, and insignificant changes in combined firm value and parent's nonsubsidiary equity value in subsidiary SEOs. Firms issue equity to meet their own financing needs. My evidence contrasts with previous studies and suggests that parent–subsidiary structures do not enhance financing flexibility.     

Is There a Size Effect in the Pricing of Stocks in the Chinese Stock Markets?: The Case of Bull Versus Bear Markets

Size effect studies generally suggest that a return premium exists for small firms. While the size effect has mostly disappeared in recent years in mature markets (e.g., US and UK), it remains mostly strong in developing markets. The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between firm size and excess stock returns in the Chinese stock markets, and to examine this effect in both a bull and bear market. No studies have previously examined these relationships in the Chinese markets. The results of the study indicate that a size effect exists in the Chinese stock markets over the 6-year period from 1998 to 2003. We find small firms have significantly greater excess returns than large firms. Moreover, small firms are found to have a stronger reaction to the direction of the market than large firms. Small firms have significantly greater positive excess returns than large firms during the bull market. However, small firms have significantly greater negative returns (using total market value), or no significant difference in returns (using float market value) during the bear market period.     

Do Firms Knowingly Sell Overvalued Equity?

This article examines the relation between top executives' trading and the long-run stock returns of seasoned equity issuing firms. Primary issuers, who sell mostly newly-issued primary shares, significantly underperform their benchmarks, regardless of the top executives' prior trading pattern. However, top executives' trading is reliably associated with the stock returns of secondary issuers, who sell mostly secondary shares previously held by existing shareholders. On average, secondary issuers do not underperform their benchmarks. The results suggest that increased free cash flow problems after issue play an important role in explaining the underperformance of issuing firms.     

What Drives the Issuance of Putable Convertibles: Risk-Shifting,Asymmetric Information,or Taxes?

This paper presents the first empirical analysis of firms’ rationale for issuing putable convertible bonds in the literature. We distinguish between three possible rationales for the issuance of putable convertibles: 1) the risk-shifting hypothesis, 2) the asymmetric information hypothesis, and 3) the tax savings hypothesis. The results of our empirical analysis can be summarized as follows. First, putable convertible issuers are larger, less risky firms, having larger cash flows, smaller growth opportunities, and lower bankruptcy probabilities as compared to ordinary convertible issuers. Second, putable convertible issuers have lower preissue market valuations, more favorable announcement effects, and better postissue operating performance when compared to ordinary convertible issuers. Third, putable convertible issuers have better postissue long-run stock return performance as compared to ordinary convertible issuers. Finally, putable convertible issuers typically have greater tax obligations and better credit ratings than ordinary convertible issuers. Overall, the results of our univariate as well as multivariate analyses provide support for the asymmetric information and tax savings hypotheses, but little support for the risk-shifting hypothesis.     

The financial impact of COVID-19: Evidence from an event study of global hospitality firms

This paper examines the daily abnormal stock price returns of a sample of 154 publicly-traded hospitality firms from 23 different countries representing over $400 billion in combined market capitalization around the time that COVID-19 was first viewed by stock market participants as a major—possibly even existential—threat. The findings of the study suggest that, financially, hotels performed better than restaurants, which themselves performed better than casinos. These findings are consistent with medical recommendations concerning the relative safety of various hospitality-related activities and, therefore, also with the tenets of financial market efficiency in the hospitality sector. Additional findings suggest that hospitality firms with strong balance sheets and income statements characterized by relatively low leverage ratios, high market value (consistent with a “too big to fail” mentality), and higher price/earnings ratios (implying higher relative profitability) all fared better than smaller, weaker firms. Although, in no case, did Bloomberg's proprietary environmental, social, and governance (ESG) variable possess any predictive power, variables reflecting cross-country cultural differences support Huynh’s (2020) finding that “individualism” was an important factor in explaining the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on hospitality firms.     

Growth through rigidity: An explanation for the rise in CEO pay

The dramatic rise in CEO compensation during the 1990s and early 2000s is a longstanding puzzle. In this paper, we show that much of the rise can be explained by a tendency of firms to grant the same number of options each year. Number-rigidity implies that the grant-date value of option awards will grow with firm equity returns, which were very high on average during the tech boom. Further, other forms of CEO compensation did not adjust to offset the dramatic growth in the value of option pay. Number-rigidity in options can also explain the increased dispersion in pay, the difference in growth between the US and other countries, and the increased correlation between pay and firm-specific equity returns. We present evidence that number-rigidity arose from a lack of sophistication about option valuation that is akin to money illusion. We show that regulatory changes requiring transparent expensing of the grant-date value of options led to a decline in number-rigidity and helps explain why executive pay increased less with equity returns during the housing boom in the mid-2000s.