Shareholder coordination and stock price informativeness

We show that firm‐specific information is more likely to be incorporated into stock prices when firms have stronger shareholder coordination. The premise of our work is that geographic proximity reduces communication costs among shareholders, thereby leading to better coordination. The positive coordination‐informativeness relation is driven mainly by shareholder coordination among dedicated and independent institutions. We further show that the positive effect is more pronounced for firms with weaker governance mechanisms, suggesting that shareholder coordination could serve as a substitute conduit of price discovery. Lastly, we propose that shareholder coordination improves stock price informativeness through the channel of enhanced voluntary disclosure quality.     

Ownership concentration,foreign shareholding,audit quality,and stock price synchronicity: Evidence from China

This paper investigates the effects of largest-shareholder ownership concentration, foreign ownership, and audit quality on the amount of firm-specific information incorporated into share prices, as measured by stock price synchronicity, of Chinese-listed firms over the 1996–2003 period. We show that synchronicity is a concave function of ownership by the largest shareholder with its maximum at an approximate 50% level. Further, we find that synchronicity is higher when the largest shareholder is government related. We also find that foreign ownership and auditor quality are inversely associated with synchronicity. Finally, we show that the amount of earnings information reflected in stock returns is lower for firms with high synchronicity.     

Equity‐Based Incentives,Risk Aversion,and Merger‐Related Risk‐Taking Behavior

We find that post‐merger equity risk is negatively related to the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock return volatility (vega), but is concentrated in CEOs with high proportions of options and options that are more in‐the‐money. The probability of industrial diversification also increases in vega. Additional tests show that the decline in post‐merger equity risk results in a significant decrease in shareholder wealth. This decrease is concentrated among firms with CEOs having the highest delta and the highest delta and vega. Our results suggest that the increased convexity provided by option‐based compensation does not necessarily increase risk‐taking behavior by CEOs.     

INFORMATION ASYMMETRY,DIVIDEND STATUS,AND SEO ANNOUNCEMENT‐DAY RETURNS

We analyze the relation between the dividend‐paying status of a firm and the seasoned equity offering (SEO) announcement‐day return. Asymmetric information theory suggests there should be a positive relation: the larger the disagreement, particularly between managers and shareholders, the larger the price drop on the SEO announcement day. However, this theoretical result has not been supported by prior empirical research. In this article we reconcile the gap between the theory and extant empirical results by identifying a structural change in the way the stock market treats dividend‐paying firms. Since the mid‐1980s the difference in information asymmetry between dividend‐ and non‐dividend‐paying firms has increased sharply. As a result, before the mid‐1980s the market did not differentiate strongly between them, but subsequently the market has reacted less negatively to announcements by dividend payers.     

Stock return volatility,operating performance and stock returns: International evidence on drivers of the ‘low volatility’ anomaly

This study highlights the link between stock return volatility, operating performance, and stock returns. Prior studies suggest that there is a ‘low volatility’ anomaly, where firms with a low stock return volatility out-perform firms with a high stock return volatility. This paper confirms that low volatility stocks earn higher returns than high volatility stocks in emerging markets and developed markets outside of North America. We also show that low volatility stocks have higher operating returns and this might explain why low volatility stocks earn higher stock returns. These results provide a partial explanation for the ‘low volatility effect’ that is independent from the existence of market anomalies or per se inefficiencies that might otherwise drive a low volatility effect. We emphasize the importance of controlling for stock return volatility when analyzing operating performance and stock performance.     

Governance quality and privately negotiated stock repurchases: Evidence of agency conflict

This study examines the impact of shareholder rights on the wealth effects of privately negotiated stock repurchases. Our results show that wealth gains are lower when shareholder rights are more suppressed. We also find that the premium paid for shares is inversely related to the strength of shareholder rights, and this suggests that managers pay higher premiums when shareholder rights are more restricted. These findings imply that managers use shareholders’ funds to eliminate blockholders who are more likely to monitor them when shareholder rights are relatively weak, thereby entrench themselves. Consistent with this view, we further show that significant positive abnormal long-run returns after private stock repurchases are limited to firms with stronger shareholder protection. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the predictions of agency theory.     

SECURITIES PRICE EFFECTS OF UNIONIZATION LEGISLATION

Prior studies document that firms experience negative stock price effects in response to unionization. We study the economic effects of a radical change in unionization legislation in New Zealand and hypothesize that the stock price effect of unionization is a function of prior unionization status of firms. We provide evidence that legislative events that increase the likelihood of introducing more stringent legislation do not affect stock prices of high‐unionized firms, whereas low‐unionized firms are affected negatively and significantly. Legislative events that signal less stringent unionization legislation result in significant stock price increases for all firms.     

Financial constraints and share repurchases

We examine how the financial constraints of repurchasing firms affect their post-buyback performance. By every constraint measure we use, a set of constrained firms repurchase. They display significantly poorer post-buyback abnormal return and operating performance than unconstrained firms. Financial constraints are more important in explaining the performance of share buybacks for firms with high actual repurchase ratios. Constrained firms, especially those with high actual repurchase ratios, experience a significantly greater increase in post-buyback distress risk than unconstrained firms. Managerial hubris could explain why constrained firms buy back shares even if the buybacks do not improve shareholder wealth.     

Comovement and investment banking networks

We test the hypothesis that investment banking networks affect stock prices and trading behavior. Consistent with the notion that investment banks serve as information hubs for segmented groups of investors, the stock prices of firms that use the same lead underwriter during their equity offerings tend to move together. We also find that when firms switch underwriters between their initial public offering (IPO) and a seasoned equity offering (SEO), they comove less with the stocks associated with the old bank and more with the stocks associated with the new bank. This change in comovement is greater for stocks completing their first SEO and for those experiencing large changes in institutional ownership.     

Acquisitions driven by stock overvaluation: Are they good deals?

Theory and recent evidence suggest that overvalued firms can create value for shareholders if they exploit their overvaluation by using their stock as currency to purchase less overvalued firms. We challenge this idea and show that, in practice, overvalued acquirers significantly overpay for their targets. These acquisitions do not, in turn, lead to synergy gains. Moreover, these acquisitions seem to be concentrated among acquirers with the largest governance problems. CEO compensation, not shareholder value creation, appears to be the main motive behind acquisitions by overvalued acquirers.     

Political Incentives to Suppress Negative Information: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms

This paper tests the proposition that politicians and their affiliated firms (i.e., firms operating in their province) temporarily suppress negative information in response to political incentives. We examine the stock price behavior of Chinese listed firms around two visible political events—meetings of the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and promotions of high‐level provincial politicians—that are expected to asymmetrically increase the costs of releasing bad news. The costs create an incentive for local politicians and their affiliated firms to temporarily restrict the flow of negative information about the companies. The result will be fewer stock price crashes for the affiliated firms during these event windows, followed by an increase in crashes after the event. Consistent with these predictions, we find that the affiliated firms experience a reduction (an increase) in negative stock return skewness before (after) the event. These effects are strongest in the three‐month period directly preceding the event, among firms that are more politically connected, and when the province is dominated by faction politics and cronyism. Additional tests document a significant reduction in published newspaper articles about affected firms in advance of these political events, suggestive of a link between our observed stock price behavior and temporary shifts in the listed firms’ information environment.     

Does investor recognition predict returns?

Merton [1987. A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information. Journal of Finance 42, 483–510] shows that stocks about which not all investors are informed should yield a return premium. This premium depends on the shadow cost of incomplete information which in turn depends on the shareholder base, relative market size, and idiosyncratic risk. Utilizing a comprehensive database of Swedish shareholdings, we demonstrate that stock returns are positively related to the shadow cost. We also find that the shareholder base is negatively related to returns when controlling for size and idiosyncratic risk. Zero-cost portfolios based on the shadow cost/shareholder base yield substantial trading profits that are never positively correlated with the market and are only modestly explained by the four-factor model.     

Distress risk premia in expected stock and bond returns

Prior studies find that shareholders’ strategic actions over debtholders are significant for stock prices but not for bond prices. I find that for firms with private and public debt, strategic default has no significant effect on distress risk premia in expected stock or bond returns, suggesting that the dispersion of bondholders greatly weakens the shareholder advantage effect. The shareholder advantage effect on stock prices is only significant for firms with only private debt and to some degree affected by the dispersion of stockholders and complexity in capital structure. Overall, renegotiation friction helps explain the cross-sectional implications of strategic default for stock and bond prices.     

Investor Conferences,Firm Visibility,and Stock Liquidity

We examine the influence of investor conferences on firms’ stock liquidity. We find that firms participating in conferences experience a 1.4% to 2.8% increase in stock liquidity compared to nonconference firms. Consistent with investor conferences improving firm visibility, the increase in liquidity is larger for firms with low pre‐conference visibility and varies predictably with conference characteristics that affect the ability of investors to revise their beliefs about the firm. However, for firms with a large investor base and high visibility, conference participation is associated with a decline in stock liquidity, consistent with investor conferences exacerbating the information asymmetry among investors.     

Managerial risk-taking behavior and equity-based compensation

Equity-based compensation affects managers’ risk-taking behavior, which in turn has an impact on shareholder wealth. In response to an exogenous increase in takeover protection in Delaware during the mid-1990s, managers lower firm risk by 6%. This risk reduction is concentrated among firms with low managerial equity-based incentives, in particular firms with low chief executive officer portfolio sensitivity to stock return volatility. Furthermore, the risk reduction is value-destroying. Finally, firms respond to the increased protection accorded by the regime shift by providing managers with greater incentives for risk-taking.     

Equity Ownership and Firm Value: Evidence from Targeted Stock Repurchases

In contrast to the negative average abnormal return associated with the announcement of a control‐related targeted repurchase (greenmail transaction), we find that the announcement of a noncontrol‐related targeted repurchase is associated with a positive and significant average abnormal return. Cross‐sectional analysis indicates that the change in firm value at the announcement of a noncontrol‐related targeted repurchase is negatively related to the resulting changes in both insider ownership and outside blockholdings. We also find significant differences in announcement‐period stock price effects depending on the identity of the selling shareholder.     

Do small shareholders count?

We hypothesize that age similarity among small shareholders acts as an implicit coordinating device for their actions and, thus, could represent an indirect source of corporate governance in firms with dispersed ownership. We test this hypothesis on a sample of Swedish firms during the 1995-2000 period. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that compared with shareholders of differing ages, same-age noncontrolling shareholders sell more aggressively following negative firm news; firms with more age-similar small shareholders are more profitable and command higher valuation; and an increase (decline) in a firm's small shareholder age similarity brings a significantly large increase (decline) in its stock price. The last effects are more pronounced in the absence of a controlling shareholder.     

Why Are U.S. Stocks More Volatile?

U.S. stocks are more volatile than stocks of similar foreign firms. A firm's stock return volatility can be higher for reasons that contribute positively (good volatility) or negatively (bad volatility) to shareholder wealth and economic growth. We find that the volatility of U.S. firms is higher mostly because of good volatility. Specifically, stock volatility is higher in the United States because it increases with investor protection, stock market development, new patents, and firm‐level investment in R&D. Each of these factors is related to better growth opportunities for firms and better ability to take advantage of these opportunities.     

Stock Market Development and the Decline of the Portion of Dividend Payers throughout the World

I contend that stock market development has substantially contributed to the decline of dividend payers worldwide. Using data from 31 countries, my research shows that stock market development makes firms in countries with a relatively high dependence on stock market financing less likely to pay dividends, to pay less, and more likely to omit. These results also are robust to the sample selection, the time‐varying firm characteristics, and the differences in legal systems, capital market scales, and country‐level information disclosure.