Can there be a social contract with business?

Professor Donaldson in his book Corporations and Morality has attempted to use a social contract theory to develop moral principles for regulating corporate conduct. I argue in this paper that his attempt fails in large measure because what he refers to as a social contract theory is, in fact, a weak functionalist theory which provides no independent basis for evaluating business corporations. I further argue that given the nature of a morality based on contract and the nature of the modern corporation, it is highly unlikely that any plausible contract theory of business ethics can be developed.Dr. Hodapp is an associate professor of philosophy at The University of Northern Colorado where he teaches courses in business ethics and legal philosophy. He earned a doctorate at Washington University, St. Louis. Dr. Hodapp also has a law degree from The University of Denver and practices law with a Denver law firm specializing in management labor relations.     

Should Corporations Have the Right to Vote? A Paradox in the Theory of Corporate Moral Agency

In his 2007 Ethics article, “Responsibility Incorporated,” Philip Pettit argued that corporations qualify as morally responsible agents because they possess autonomy, normative judgment, and the capacity for self-control. Although there is ongoing debate over whether corporations have these capacities, both proponents and opponents of corporate moral agency appear to agree that Pettit correctly identified the requirements for moral agency. In this article, I do not take issue with either the claim that autonomy, normative judgment, and self-control are the requirements for moral agency or the claim that corporations possess them. I claim that if both of these claims are correct, then corporate moral agency entails that, in a liberal democracy, corporations should have the right to vote. I show that under the conception of democracy supported by most liberal political theorists, all parties subject to the law are entitled to the right to vote, and all parties that possess autonomy, normative judgment, and self-control are subject to the law. Therefore, if the proponents of corporate moral agency are correct, then corporations satisfy the requirements for the right to vote. I then consider potential objections to this argument. I show that the strongest objection to the corporate right to vote is undermined by Pettit’s own argument for corporate autonomy. I then show that objections derived from other arguments for limiting the rights of corporations are equally unavailing. I conclude with some observations about the implications of my argument for the question of corporate speech rights.     

Morality, Ethics, and Values Outside and Inside Organizations: An Example of the Discourse on Climate Change

The public debate on climate change is filled with moral claims. However, scientific knowledge about the role that morality, ethics, and values play in this issue is still scarce. Starting from this research gap, we focus on corporations as central decision makers in modern society and analyze how they respond to societal demands to take responsibility for climate change. While relevant literature on business ethics and climate change either places a high premium on morality or presents a strong skeptical bias, our sociological model depicts morality as an indeterminate force: it can lead to both workable solutions or merely reinforce the status quo, depending on what different corporations make of it. We describe, on the one side, the diffusion of moral values in the media discourse on climate change and, on the other side, the specific responses of corporations. While the media discourse generates a pressure on corporations to act responsibly, their moral claims do not provide clear advice for action. As a result, morality becomes available to organizations as a medium that can be re-specified according to their internal dynamics. Corporations transform moral values into something compatible with their own structures through a variety of different responses: introducing formal ethical structures (e.g., codes of conduct), initiating value-oriented projects, or developing informal moral norms, and so on. In some occurrences, morality becomes a mere façade, while in others it serves as a decision-making criterion and deeply influences core activities in firms.     

Peter French, Corporate Ethics and The Wizard of Oz

For more than two decades, Peter French has been arguing in books, articles and symposia that corporations are genuine actors in the moral universe. Like adult human beings, they can and should take moral responsibility for their actions and be held accountable by the other actors in this universe. I have always argued with my students that the position is both metaphysically incorrect and practically harmful. Now (1995) French has redeveloped his position through 380 pages in Corporate Ethics, probably the most challenging and original Business Ethics textbook yet to appear. It is a work of intellectual sophistication with real world applications. Using the metaphor invaders throughout the book, French argues not only that corporations are moral agents, but also that their moral agency has made the business world of the late twentieth century and of the coming century different from anything of preceding epochs. It is, in his argument, an agency of great potential danger and of great potential benefit, one in terms of which we can address every ethical problem of business. In the essay, I explore Corporate Ethics both on the metaphysical and the practical level.     

Individual, Social and Organizational Sources of Sharing and Variation in the Ethical Reasoning of Managers

A growth in consumer and media ethical consciousness has resulted in the need for organizations to ensure that members understand, share and project an approved and unified set of ethics. Thus understanding which variables are related to sharing and variation of ethical reasoning and moral intent, and the relative strength of these variables is critical. While past research has examined individual (attitudes, values, etc.), social (peers, significant others, etc.) and organizational (codes of conduct, senior management, etc.) variables, it has focused on their influence on the individual – and not on their role in relation to patterns of group sharing and variation in an organization. Introduced as a new methodology to study ethics, microcultural analysis stipulates that to explain patterns of sharing and variation, one must understand how individual, social and organizational variables influence sharing and variation. Key hypotheses predict that managers who share in individual, social or organizational determinants will be more likely to share in ethical reasoning and moral intent. Qualitative and quantitative research supports the key hypotheses, finding social ties, personal moral intensity, Machiavellianism, locus of control and codes of ethics as significant determinants. Individuals who share in these determinants are more likely to share in ethical reasoning and moral intent. Additionally, regression analysis reveals social ties and personal moral intensity to be the strongest determinants. Based on these results, managerial recommendations focus on a holistic approach, manipulating these three determinants to cultivate a unified code of ethics within an organization.     

Corporations,minors, and other innocents — A reply to R. E. Ewin

R. E. Ewin has argued that corporations are moral persons, but Ewin describes them as being unable to think or to act in virtuous and vicious ways. Ewin thinks that their impoverished emotional life would not allow them to act in these ways. In this brief essay I want to challenge the idea that corporations cannot act virtuously. I begin by examining deficiencies in Ewin's notion of corporate personhood. I argue that he effectively reduces corporations to the status of incompetent patients. I shall make use of a richer notion of corporate personhood as I explore the logical relationship between corporate action and the quality of the corporate emotional life. After discussing an alternate methodology for making moral assessments of action I consider briefly two corporate disasters: the crash on Mt. Erebus, the Imperial Foods plant fire. These cases are used to show the inadequacy of Ewin's thesis that only corporate managers are capable of displaying vice.P. Eddy Wilson taught philosophy full time for two years after graduation at the University of the South and he was a participant in Peter French's 1990 NEH Summer Seminar. He is currently employed as a member of the Department of Philosophy and Religion of Shaw University to teach philosophy at their High Point CAPE Center in High Point, North Carolina. He is interested in philosophy of religion, process philosophy, and ethics. Two of his articles have been accepted for publication by theJournal of Social Philosophy.     

Beyond Stockholders and Stakeholders: A Plea for Corporate Moral Autonomy

In order to ensure that corporations act in socially responsible ways. R. Freeman says that firms should be legally required to act in accordance with the directives of a moral theory which he developed especially for business – a theory which has come to be called "normative stakeholder theory" (NST). I argue that NST fails as a moral theory and that this failure indicates: (1) that we should abandon the quest to develop a special moral theory for use in business, and (2) that we should not attempt to impose the use of any moral theory upon business, but rather should allow corporations to determine their moral responsibilities in any way they see fit.     

Globalization and the Good Corporation: A Need for Proactive Co-existence

Large corporations are coming under intense pressure to act in a socially responsible manner. Corporations have accepted this notion provided that it is exercised voluntarily. It has also been argued that corporations can do well by doing good, and that good ethics is good business. This paper presents an alternative viewpoint by demonstrating that while voluntary socially responsible conduct is desirable, it plays a rather small role in inspiring good corporate conduct. Instead, (a) it is the external economic-competitive conditions that define the parameters and opportunities for good corporate conduct; and (b) the values and traditions of the corporations, and their perceived risk in exploiting those opportunities, that influence the extent of a corporation's socially responsible conduct. The framework presented here analyzes certain market-competitive conditions, which determine the scope and direction of socially responsible corporate conduct, and the instruments available to society to enhance ethical corporate conduct. It suggests that from society's perspective, we should move away from the notion of corporate social responsibility and toward corporate social accountability. Most modern economies operate under conditions of imperfect competition where corporations gain above-normal profits, i.e., market rent, from market imperfections. Therefore, corporations should be held accountable for a more equitable distribution of these above-normal profits with other groups, e.g., customers, employees, etc., who were deprived of their market-based gains because of market imperfections and corporate power. Three approaches are suggested for measuring corporate accountability through corrections. These are: information imbalance, bargaining power imbalance, and, adjudication, remedy and relief imbalance.     

Understanding consumers’ moral consciousness

The issue driving this paper is ‘Why don’t people, in their consumer role, have a well developed moral conscience?’ To address this compelling question, the paper explores the moral consciousness of consumption behaviour (or lack thereof). The first part of the paper provides brief overviews of: (1) moral consciousness applied to consumption, (2) the essence of morality and ethics, (3) four facets of the field of ethics, (4) two moral development models, and (5) the affective domain of learning. The intent is to prepare the reader for a discussion of an approach to understanding the moral consciousness of consumption that integrates particular concepts drawn from the theory of ethics and morality with the moral development models and the affective domain of learning.     

Machiavellianism, Profit, and the Dimensions of Ethical Judgment: A Study of Impact

Research by Reidenbach and Robin (1990) provides a means to study the differential impact of three dimensions of attitude toward ethics: moral equity, relativism, and contractualism. It is hypothesized that moral equity will be the most significant predictor of ethical judgment and intent to act. It is also hypothesized that Machiavellianism and profit will affect relativism and contractualism dimensions, but not moral equity. Additionally, it is hypothesized that Machiavellianism will interact with profit to affect intent to act. Moral equity was found to be the only predictor of ethical judgment, and moral equity and contractualism were predictors of intent to act. Machiavellianism impacted contractualism, but not relativism. Corporate profit did not affect either ethical judgment or intent to act, and did not interact with Machiavellianism. Implications for business ethics education and training are discussed.     

Corporations as persons: Objections to goodpaster's ‘principle of moral projection’

Goodpaster's ‘principle of moral projection’ is intended to support a program of corporate moral improvement based on an analogy between persons and corporations. In this paper I try to show that the analogy breaks down at a crucial point — namely at the search for amotive for moral improvement. Further, the analogy may foster a tendency to suppose that corporations, like persons, have intrinsic value. I conclude that the analogy does more harm than good for the following reasons: (a) it distracts from the crucial question, which is, how can we motivate people to shape the institutions in which they work into morally better ones? and (b) it may reinforce a morally dangerous tendency to serve corporations for their own sakes.     

The moral responsibility of corporate executives for disasters

This paper examines whether or not senior corporate executives are morally responsible for disasters which result from corporate activities. The discussion is limited to the case in which the information needed to prevent the disaster is present within the corporation, but fails to reach senior executives. The failure of information to reach executives is usually a result of negative information blockage, a phenomenon caused by the differing roles of constraints and goals within corporations. Executives should be held professionally responsible not only for trying to prevent negative information blockage, but for succeeding. It is concluded that executives are professionally responsible for fulfilling their moral obligation to prevent disasters.John D. Biship has a Ph.D. in moral philosophy from Edinburgh University (1979), and an MBA from McMaster University. He has worked for several years for two multi-national computer corporations. In 1987 he read a paper on Greed; The Limits of Selfishness in a Free Enterprise Economy at Trent University.     

A conceptual model of corporate moral development

The conceptual model presented in this article argues that corporations exhibit specific behaviors that signal their true level of moral development. Accordingly, the authors identify five levels of moral development and discuss the dynamics that move corporations from one level to another. Examples of corporate behavior which are indicative of specific stages of moral development are offered.R. Eric Reidenbach is Professor of Marketing and Director of the Center for Business Development and Research at the University of Southern Mississippi. He has written extensively on business and marketing ethics.Donald P. Robin, Professor of Business Ethics and Professor of Marketing at the University of Southern Mississippi, is coauthor with R. Eric Reidenbach of two recent books on business ethics with Prentice-Hall. He is a frequent lecturer on business ethics and is the author of several articles on the subject.     

The business of ethics and the ethics of business

This is an essay in personal business ethics of executives as distinguished from the institutional ethics of corporations. Its purpose is to give practical moral guidance to executives for the conduct of their lives both as corporate decision-makers and as human beings. The pivotal concept in this model of personal business ethics is a direct appeal to the self-interest of executives in their being moral. Our thesis is that generally there is a twofold return on investment in ethics (ROIE) for executives. The first one is related to employee output: by becoming a self-actualizing moral type, executives indicate commitment to excellence. Accordingly, they so manage employees that the latter can also live up to their full potential and excell. And that would increase corporate productivity and product or service quality. The second payback of morality is personal: fully developed, self-actualized managers are generally happier people than those whose growth has been arrested. In brief, moral self-actualization is the same as commitment to excellence and there is a payback in being the best. Return on investment in ethics and return on investment in excellence can both be abbreviated as ROIE. We accomplish the purpose and establish the thesis of this essay by seeking answers to the following questions: What business does ethics have in business? What business does business have in ethics? Is there a return on investment in ethics for executives? and Does being moral help executives become more effective managers? In sketching answers to these questions, we first show why executives need a personal business ethics especially in today's world. Then, we sketch the nature of ethics and of business. After these introductory materials, the body of the paper argues for a personal business ethics for executives by correlating elements of management theory with ethics. Specifically, it links a theory of employee motivation with a scale of values, management character types with moral types, and management leadership styles with morality. Then, the practical technique of life by objectives (LBO) is explained. It can help executives manage their lives more effectively in both the business and ethical sense. We conclude by explaining ideals of excellence which can guide executives in their work and development both as managers and as human beings.     

Managerial Decision-Making on Moral Issues and the Effects of Teaching Ethics

This study uses judgment and decision-making (JDM) perspective with the help of framing and schema literature from cognitive psychology to evaluate how managers behave when problems with unethical overtones are presented to them in a managerial frame rather than an ethical frame. In the proposed managerial model, moral judgment of the situation is one of the inputs to managerial judgment, among several other inputs regarding costs and benefits of various alternatives. Managerial judgment results in managerial intent leading to managerial action. The model and the effects of taking an ethics course on ethical and managerial judgment and managerial intent were then indirectly tested in this study, wherein subjects judged the ethical wrongness, managerial badness, and the managerial intent regarding decisions made in a case. Forty-nine MBA students analyzed a case involving budget-based bonuses and production, in which the ethical issue evolved over three stages. It appears from the Path-analysis results that managerial judgment mediated between moral judgment and the judgment of managerial intent as suggested by the proposed model, and that taking an ethics course directly affected managerial judgment but did not affect the moral judgment. Additionally, in the first stage of decision-making (early stage of a developing “ethical slippery slope”), moral judgment did not significantly influence managerial judgment. However, students with ethics course still were more inclined to judge the decision as managerially bad as compared to others, indicating that they were more aware or sensitive to the moral issues involved.     

Do corporations have moral rights?

My aim in this paper is to explore the notion that corporations have moral rights within the context of a constitutive rules model of corporate moral agency. The first part of the paper will briefly introduce the notion of moral rights, identifying the distinctive feature of moral rights, as contrasted with other moral categories, in Vlastos' terms of overridingness. The second part will briefly summarize the constitutive rules approach to the moral agency of corporations (à la French, Smith, Ozar) and pose the question of the paper. The third part will argue that, since the moral agency of corporations is dependent on the choices of those whose acceptence of the relevant rules constitutes the corporation as a moral agent, the rights of corporations are conventional; that is, they exist because they are so created. Thus, as a first answer, corporations do not have moral rights. But this raises a further question which we must explore. Once a corporation has been constituted, by the acceptance of the relevant rules by the relevant persons, does the corporation then have rights which endure? Can those who have constituted a corporation with certain rights morally change or cancel those rights in medias res without doing some sort of moral violence to the corporation? Do corporations at least have a moral right to persist in the conventional rights with which they were constituted? The balance of the paper will explore this question. I shall speak of the overriding character of a corporation's claim that its conventional rights persist, and also the important way in which such a moral claim is non-conventional, if such a claim can be made at all. But I shall argue in conclusion that corporations do not have such a right. But I shall also argue that those persons whose acts have originally constituted the corporation as a moral agent may well have rights which would be violated if the conventional rights of the corporation were changed or terminated without their participation.     

Strategy Making and the Search for Authenticity

Recent work in the business ethics field has called attention to the promise inherent in the concept of authenticity for enriching the ways we think about core issues at the intersection of management ethics and practice, like moral character, ethical choices, leadership, and corporate social responsibility [Driver, 2006; Jackson, 2005; Ladkin, 2006]. In this paper, I aim to extend these contributions by focusing on authenticity in relation to a set of organizational processes related to strategy making; most specifically an organization’s strategic intent, arguing that these provide an ideal venue for particularising this exploration, as they represent the key processes through which an organization defines the self it aspires to be. In order to do this, I examine specifically what a shift from “business as usual” to the search for the creation of a more authentic corporate self might look like in practice, contending that such a shift offers the possibility for improving both the moral good and the business outcomes of an institution simultaneously. I conclude with assessment of the risks inherent in undertaking such a search for more authentic strategic intention in business organizations today.     

Google,Human Rights,and Moral Compromise

International business faces a host of difficult moral conflicts. It is tempting to think that these conflicts can be morally resolved if we gained full knowledge of the situations, were rational enough, and were sufficiently objective. This paper explores the view that there are situations in which people in business must confront the possibility that they must compromise some of their important principles or values in order to protect other ones. One particularly interesting case that captures this kind of situation is that of Google and its operations in China. In this paper, I examine the situation Google faces as part of the larger issue of moral compromise and integrity in business. Though I look at Google, this paper is just as much about the underlying or background views Google faces that are at work in business ethics. In the process, I argue the following: First, the framework Google has used to respond to criticisms of its actions does not successfully or obviously address the important ethical issues it faces. Second, an alternative ethical account can be presented that better addresses these ethical and human rights questions. However, this different framework brings the issue of moral compromise to the fore. This is an approach filled with dangers, particularly since it is widely held that one ought never to compromise one’s moral principles. Nevertheless, I wish to propose that there may be a place for moral compromise in business under certain conditions, which I attempt to specify.     

Corporate responsibility and corporate personhood

In this paper, I consider the claim that a corporation cannot be held to be morally responsible unless it is a person. First, I argue that this claim is ambigious. Person flags three different but related notions: metaphysical person, moral agent, moral person. I argue that, though one can make the claim that corporates are metaphysical persons, this claim is only marginally relevant to the question of corporate moral responsibility. The central question which must be answered in discussions of corporate moral responsibility is whether corporations are moral agents or moral persons. I argue that, though we can make a case for saying corporations are moral agents, they are not moral persons, and hence, we can hold them responsible. In addition, we need not treat them the way we would be obligated to treat a moral person; we needn't have the same scruples about holding a corporation morally responsible as we would a moral person. Rita C. Manning is Lecturer at California State College, San Bernardino. She has published in Southern Journal of Philosophy and in Informal Logic.