Fiscal position and the financing of productive government expenditures: an application to Latin America

Government spending on public infrastructure, education, and health care can increase economic growth. However, the appropriate financing depends on a country’s fiscal position. We develop a two-sector endogenous growth model to explore how variations in the composition and financing of government expenditures affect economic growth. We find that, when tax rates are moderate, funding public investment by raising taxes may increase long-run growth. If existing tax rates are high, public investment is only growth enhancing if funded by restructuring the composition of overall public spending. Additionally, public investment that is debt financed can have adverse effects on long-run growth due to the resulting increases in interest rates and debt-servicing costs.     

Interregional infrastructure,competition for capital,and local public expenditure policies: Evidence from China's high-speed rail network

Interregional infrastructure promotes market integration and enhances the mobility of capital, thereby intensifying fiscal competition among local governments. Exploiting the expansion of China's high-speed rail (HSR) network as plausibly exogenous shocks, this study examines how Interregional infrastructure affects the fiscal competition among local governments. We find that after connecting with the HSR network, city governments tend to dedicate a lower proportion of public spending to consumption goods, which benefit immobile households, and invest more in productive inputs, which attract mobile firms. We also find that the negative effect of HSR connection on the proportion of consumption goods is more pronounced in peripheral cities than core cities because periphery cities face a larger increase in capital mobility due to the core–periphery effects of trade integration induced by HSR. Our findings indicate that the behavioural responses of local governments should be accounted for when assessing the social welfare of interregional infrastructure.     

A Simple Model of Corporate Bailouts in a Globalized Economy*

In this paper, we explore how globalization influences the decision of governments to rescue inefficient domestic firms when bailouts affect firms’ markup. We develop a model of international trade in which immobile domestic-owned enterprises (DOEs) compete with foreign-owned enterprises (FOEs) in an oligopolistic market. The decision to bail out DOEs leads to lower corporate tax revenues if FOEs are immobile, whereas tax revenues might increase if FOEs are mobile. Interestingly, the mobility of FOEs makes governments more prone to rescuing inefficient domestic firms because tax competition reduces the opportunity cost of a bailout policy in terms of public good provision.     

Globalization, Asymmetric Tax Competition, and Fiscal Equalization

Trade integration and the increasing mobility of firms have raised the need for international coordination in corporate tax. In this paper, we study the ability of fiscal equalization to avoid the misallocation of capital across asymmetric countries arising from tax competition. Such a reform respects the principle according to which the tax decision is entirely left up to the nation and links nations engaged in strategic tax policy by transfers. We use a model of trade and location where firms produce under imperfect competition. Our analysis suggests that falling trade costs increase the distortion created by tax competition in the international allocation of production. However, we show that fiscal equalization based on differences in tax revenues or tax base can implement a more efficient tax wedge and spatial allocation of the tax base.     

Does right or left matter? Cabinets, credibility and fiscal adjustments

This paper tests the widely held assumption that left-wing cabinets favor higher public spending and examines whether cabinet ideology affects the persistence of major fiscal adjustments. In a panel of large fiscal adjustments in OECD countries during the last 40 years, we find evidence that left-wing and right-wing cabinets are partisan: the left tends to reduce the deficit by raising tax revenues while the right relies mostly on spending cuts. Our testable hypothesis is that cabinets can signal commitment by undertaking fiscal adjustments in ways that are not favored by their constituencies. In other words, the left gains credibility when it cuts spending while the right becomes more credible when it increases tax revenues. Probit estimates of the determinants of persistence in fiscal adjustments confirm that spending cuts by the left and tax increases by the right are associated with persistent adjustments. The effect is significant for cuts in public spending, public consumption (wage or nonwage), increases in total revenues, direct taxes on businesses and other taxes. We test for the role of several other determinants of persistence, confirming that coalition and majority cabinets are associated with less persistence while periods of high or rising levels of indebtedness favor persistence. The estimates of the impact of ideology and other variables on GDP and its components show that it is the size of the spending cut rather than cabinet ideology that is most important.     

Investment scaling up and the role of government

This article studies the fiscal and welfare implications of a scaling up of public investment when the government is subject to inefficiencies on the spending and on the tax collection side. In our simulations, the scaling up of public investments results in higher long-run output and consumption levels but requires a fiscal stabilization package in order to preserve fiscal sustainability. The effects on consumers’ welfare after the fiscal adjustment are nontrivial. Our welfare analysis shows that consumers’ welfare is increased when the government smooths the fiscal adjustment via higher borrowing and not through an increase in taxation. Moreover, the comparison between several stabilization packages via tax adjustment shows that higher welfare is achieved when the government relies mostly on taxation of capital as this allows higher levels of consumption. Lower fiscal costs that do not undermine fiscal sustainability can however be achieved if the government manages to reduce inefficiency in tax collection. Finally, we consider a change in the trade regime that causes a decline in revenues. We find that the higher fiscal burden required to preserve fiscal sustainability would completely wipe out the welfare gain of higher public investments.     

The importance of government commitment in attracting firms: A dynamic analysis of tax competition in an agglomeration economy

Agglomeration tendencies of industrial firms significantly affect the nature of tax competition. This paper analyzes tax competition between two countries over an infinite time horizon in an economy with trade costs and internationally mobile industrial firms. Most of the previous studies on tax competition in the ‘new economic geography’ framework employ static models. In this study, two governments dynamically compete with each other to attract firms through their choices of taxes and subsidies. It is shown that the commitment of the governments to their policies is crucial in determining the distribution of firms in the long run. Specifically, if governments find each others׳ tax policies credible, then one country will attract all the firms when trade costs are low enough to make agglomeration forces dominant. If policies are not credible, both countries may attract an equal share of firms even when trade costs are low, as the lack of commitment by governments acts as a dispersion force.     

Algeria: A three-sector macrofiscal model for debt sustainability and growth policy analysis

In this paper, we present a dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) model to address the macrofiscal vulnerabilities and the effects of fiscal policy on growth and employment in Algeria. We first discuss the baseline scenario over the period 2021–2040. According to our baseline results, without fundamental changes in fiscal policies, even relatively high growth will not be sufficient to put public debt on a sustainable path. We then conduct four experiments and assess their impact on fiscal accounts, growth, and unemployment: an increase in the efficiency of public spending on infrastructure investment, a gradual reduction in the share of noninterest government spending in GDP, the same gradual reduction in spending combined with a permanent increase in the share of investment in infrastructure in total noninterest government expenditure, and a composite fiscal reform program that combines these individual policies, respectively. The results suggest that public debt sustainability can be achieved, and growth and employment can be promoted, as long as an ambitious fiscal reform program involving tax, spending, and governance reforms is implemented. Importantly, our quantitative analysis shows that, with a well-designed fiscal program, there may be no trade-off between fiscal consolidation and economic growth.     

Decentralization and sectoral expenditures in Europe

This article presents an empirical analysis of the recent impact of fiscal decentralization in Europe on total expenditure for specific government functions as well as on total government size. A panel data set for the years 2000–2009 for European countries has been constructed from EUROSTAT data. The effects of decentralization interact with the degree of vertical imbalances and tend to be negative as predicted by the Leviathan view of government. Effects vary strongly across government functions and are strongest in relative terms for social spending and infrastructure. Moderate restraining effects are found for education, while health spending is not significantly affected. This is consistent with competition between subnational entities, which try to attract taxpayers and shift expenses away from policies that benefit neighbouring jurisdictions.     

中国财政竞争与地方公共支出结构分析

This article examines the impact of intergovernmental fiscal competition on local public expenditure in China under current performance assessment system in which GDP is a critical factor. First, we present the assignment of public goods and tax burden and the share of foreign direct investment (FDI) of 30 provinces, and we find that current fiscal competition in China has taken the form of public expenditure improvement accompanied by preferential tax policies. Second, we regress the share of FDI on different components of provincial public expenditure, and find that the share of FDI is correlated negatively with the public service, tax burden and health care service while positively with infrastructure development. Therefore, FDI-based infrastructural investment crowds out public services investment, which fails to support the view that fiscal competition improves social welfares.     

空间外部性视角下的地方政府支出策略互动模式

运用空间面板计量方法研究了分税制改革以来中国地方政府支出的策略互动模式。结果表明,基本建设、文教科卫和预算外支出具有显著的空间自相关性,表现出策略互补,行政管理支出则由于地方财力情况的差异形成策略替代,效益外溢性、财政竞争机制和标尺效应在其中交替发挥了主导作用。财政收支分权对支出策略互动模式的影响效果并不一致,扩张支出分权将加剧以基建支出为主的地方政府竞争。财政分权的改革方向是使地方政府在一定程度上拥有收入自主权,中央适当上收具有强烈区域外溢性的公共品供给责任,降低地方非正式收支自主权,从制度层面营造地区间协调有序的竞争关系。     

A macrotheoretic analysis of inflation,taxes, and the price of equity

This paper examines the effects of higher inflation on asset prices via the impact on effective tax rates. The problem is addressed in a full macroeconomic context where explicit attention is paid to the government budget constraint. The analysis shows that the magnitude of the inflationary impact on asset prices varies significantly according to the nature of the government's fiscal response to changes in tax revenues generated by more inflation; in particular, by whether increased inflation revenues are met by an equal increase in public expenditures or by commensurate reductions in other tax parameters which keep total revenues constant.     

Fiscal decentralisation,local institutions and public good provision: evidence from Indonesia

Using data from the Indonesian Family Life Surveys, we study the impact of fiscal decentralisation in Indonesia on local public spending across communities characterised by different types of informal and formal institutions. Our results provide new evidence that fiscal decentralisation led to a significant increase in community spending on social infrastructure (health and education) in communities which observed strict adherence to customary laws and had a tradition of local democracy. We argue that investment in transport and communication facilitates exchange with outsiders and improves the outside options of community members, thus making it more difficult to sustain intra-community cooperation. Consequently, communities which enjoy a high level of cooperation in collective activities benefit less from investing in transport and communication and are more inclined to invest in social infrastructure.     

Fiscal federalism and the composition of public investment in Europe

We analyse the determinants of the composition of public investment in Europe, with a special focus on the role of fiscal decentralisation. The results suggest that fiscal decentralisation boosts economically productive public investment, notably infrastructure, and curbs the relative share of economically less productive investment, such as recreational facilities. While not readily reconcilable with the traditional theory of fiscal federalism, these findings can be interpreted in terms of the literature on fiscal competition, with not only tax rates but also the quality of public expenditure weighing in firms' location decisions.     

政府间财政转移支付、激励效应与 地方税收收入体系

如何维护地方税收体系的有效性，始终是财政分权化改革的核心。本文以我国县级财政实践为基础，系统考察了政府间财政转移支付的税收激励作用及其在维护地方税收体系有效性方面的作用。研究表明，我国省级以下财政转移支付在税收激励方面并不成功，未能在促进县级地方税收收入增加、维护县级地方税收体系有效性方面发挥积极作用，2002年所得税分享改革以来东部地区表现得尤为突出。专项转移支付具有良好的激励作用，有利于县级地方税收收入特别是营业税和增值税共享收入的增加，税收返还和财力性转移支付均不利于县级地方税收收入增加。     

Fiscal policy and economic activity in South Asia

This paper analyzes whether fiscal policy in South Asia amplifies or smoothens business cycle fluctuations. It estimates several econometric models to explore the cyclicality of government spending and tax buoyancy. In South Asia, tax revenue increases less than one to one with changes in gross domestic product (GDP), but public spending increases more than proportionally. For each percentage point change in GDP growth, government expenditure changes by 1.3 percentage points. While changes in tax revenue have no significant impact on economic activity, the government spending multiplier is positive and significant: each additional US dollar (USD) of spending leads to an immediate increase in GDP of 0.2 USD and to an increase of 0.4 USD in the medium run. The impact of public spending on economic activity is entirely due to capital expenditure, which is also more procyclical. Procyclical public spending and a positive expenditure multiplier imply that fiscal policy in South Asia amplifies boom‐and‐bust cycles. These results are in line with those of other emerging markets and developing economies and robust to different model specifications and estimation strategies.     

The role of Provincial Government Spending Composition in growth and convergence in China

China’s development policy since 1978 has differed across regions. With rapid aggregate growth has come widening regional inequality. The fiscal decentralisation reforms in 1994 shifted political pressure onto provincial officials to boost local growth through local public investments. These investments affect regional convergence by counteracting regulatory frictions in factor accumulation, and can also determine steady-state growth. However, the effect of public spending allocations across physical and human capital on growth and convergence processes is empirically unexplored for Chinese provinces. We take provincial time-series data on public spending by category, finding local public spending and its components augment convergence rates differently across regions. Spending on education and health contributes significantly more to growth and convergence than capital spending, confirming that the public capital-spending bias is not a local growth-optimising strategy. We suggest a policy of aligning local government promotion incentives to human capital targets to correct local resource misallocation.     

Public budget composition,fiscal (de)centralization,and welfare

Abstract We study the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization in a dynamic federal economy where governments decide on budget size and its allocation between public education and infrastructure spending. We find that full centralization of tax and expenditure policies is optimal when infrastructure productivity is similar across regions. When differences are not too large, partial centralization is optimal. With strong differences, full decentralization becomes optimal. National steady‐state output tends to be highest under full decentralization. We provide a justification for the mixed evidence regarding the Oates conjecture by showing that full dominates partial decentralization, despite being inferior to complete decentralization.     

Debt, Growth and Budgetary Regimes

Within the Barro (1990) model of productive public services, but with the inclusion of public debt, we derive and characterize on the balanced growth path, a set of welfare‐maximizing fiscal rules under two budgetary regimes – one with only the standard dynamic government budget constraint, and the other involving the golden rule of public finance. We demonstrate analytically that the optimal fiscal policy differs in the two budgetary regimes considered. We also analyse two cases within the second regime: one, where the ratio of current spending to tax revenues is parametrically given, and another, where this ratio is optimally chosen by the government.     

Transparency and Economic Policy

We provide a two period model of political competition in which voters imperfectly observe the electoral promises made to other voters. Imperfect observability generates an incentive for candidates to offer excessive transfers even if voters are homogeneous and taxation is distortionary. Government spending is larger than in a world of perfect observability. Transfers are partly financed through government debt, and the size of the debt is higher in less transparent political systems. The model provides an explanation of fiscal churning; it also predicts that groups whose transfers are less visible to others receive higher transfers, and that imperfect transparency of transfers may lead to underprovision of public goods. From the policy perspective, the main novelty of our analysis is a separate evaluation of the transparency of spending and the transparency of revenues. We show that the transparency of the political system does not unambiguously improve efficiency: transparency of spending is beneficial, but transparency of revenues can be counterproductive because it endogenously leads to increased wasteful spending.