Fair,Efficient and Envy-Free Bargaining: An Experimental Test of the Brams-Taylor Adjusted Winner Mechanism

The Adjusted Winner mechanism for two-player bargaining has been theoretically shown to produce “fair” (efficient and envy-free) outcomes (Brams and Taylor 1996). We study this claim experimentally in a bilateral bargaining game of incomplete information for two divisible goods using three information conditions. Results indicate that the Adjusted Winner mechanism can be quite effective in achieving both efficient, equitable and envy-free outcomes in an experimental setting but results vary greatly depending on the knowledge that each party has of the preferences of their bargaining partner. Under conditions of common knowledge, when players have competing preferences, their bilateral decisions converge toward efficient outcomes, yet only one-third can be classified as “envy-free.” In an environment where there is more uncertainty about preferences, pronounced strategic bidding emerges yet the result is twice as many envy-fee outcomes with increased levels of efficiency. Despite the fact that players dramatically misrepresent their true valuation for objects when ordinal preferences are commonly known to be complementary, both efficiency and envy-freeness approach maximum levels.     

Game-theoretic properties of Final-Offer Arbitration

Final-Offer Arbitration (FOA) is a dispute settlement procedure in which an arbitrator chooses one side's final position as the resolution. Game-theoretic models of FOA in two-sided interest disputes are reviewed, especially models of the disputants' final offer choices under uncertainty about the arbitrator's preferences. The extent to which the Brams-Merrill Theorem (1986) reveals optimal strategic behavior under FOA, and the implications for efficiency and equity, are assessed. Analysis of a model not satisfying the hypotheses of the Theorem suggests that, for some arbitrators, FOA can have an undesirable tendency. Another game model is used to address the question of how disputants' differential risk-aversion is reflected in their strategic behavior, and in the fairness of FOA outcomes. This calculation clarifies some apparently contradictory empirical evidence about FOA.     

Brexit und die Zukunft Europas – eine spieltheoretische Einordnung

After the Brexit referendum’s leave outcome last summer, the new relationship between the UK and the EU has to be shaped institutionally. For the two bargaining parties the question now is which negotiation strategy to take. In order to choose the optimal strategy, the players have to factor in their time preferences. A game theoretical approach yields that the EU — no matter what is economically feasible in the short run — has to play a tough negotiation strategy if they care about the long run. This result is not a question of punishment but of pure economic rationale.     

Experiments on strategic choices and markets

Much of experimental research in marketing has focused on individual choices. Yet in many contexts, the outcomes of one’s choices depend on the choices of others. Furthermore, the results obtained in individual decision making context may not be applicable to these strategic choices. In this paper, we discuss three avenues for further advancing our understanding of strategic choices. First, there is a need to develop theories about how people learn to play strategic games. Second, there is an opportunity to enrich standard economic models of strategic behavior by allowing for different types of bounded rationality and by relaxing assumptions about utility formulation. These new models can help us to more accurately predict strategic choices. Finally, future research can improve marketing practice by designing better mechanisms and validating them using experiments.     

三方博弈情景下品牌真实性的提升策略研究

为了研究品牌真实性的提升,通过构建政府、企业、消费者的三方博弈模型,分析提升品牌真实性的过程中博弈主体各方的变量影响关系、策略选择,并用Matlab模拟仿真三方博弈行为的相互演化过程。研究发现,在监督、惩罚、品牌价值提升等因素的作用下,当公众参与水平较高且达到一定水平时,会推动政府及企业积极实施品牌真实性策略,博弈主体三方的策略选择在演化过程中彼此相互影响。     

What makes you click?—Mate preferences in online dating

We estimate mate preferences using a novel data set from an online dating service. The data set contains detailed information on user attributes and the decision to contact a potential mate after viewing his or her profile. This decision provides the basis for our preference estimation approach. A potential problem arises if the site users strategically shade their true preferences. We provide a simple test and a bias correction method for strategic behavior. The main findings are (i) There is no evidence for strategic behavior. (ii) Men and women have a strong preference for similarity along many (but not all) attributes. (iii) In particular, the site users display strong same-race preferences. Race preferences do not differ across users with different age, income, or education levels in the case of women, and differ only slightly in the case of men. For men, but not for women, the revealed same-race preferences correspond to the same-race preference stated in the users’ profile. (iv) There are gender differences in mate preferences; in particular, women have a stronger preference than men for income over physical attributes.     

Dynamic learning in behavioral games: A hidden Markov mixture of experts approach

Over the course of a repeated game, players often exhibit learning in selecting their best response. Research in economics and marketing has identified two key types of learning rules: belief and reinforcement. It has been shown that players use either one of these learning rules or a combination of them, as in the Experience-Weighted Attraction (EWA) model. Accounting for such learning may help in understanding and predicting the outcomes of games. In this research, we demonstrate that players not only employ learning rules to determine what actions to choose based on past choices and outcomes, but also change their learning rules over the course of the game. We investigate the degree of state dependence in learning and uncover the latent learning rules and learning paths used by the players. We build a non-homogeneous hidden Markov mixture of experts model which captures shifts between different learning rules over the course of a repeated game. The transition between the learning rule states can be affected by the players?? experiences in the previous round of the game. We empirically validate our model using data from six games that have been previously used in the literature. We demonstrate that one can obtain a richer understanding of how different learning rules impact the observed strategy choices of players by accounting for the latent dynamics in the learning rules. In addition, we show that such an approach can improve our ability to predict observed choices in games.     

For the Greater Good? A Test for Strategic Bias in Group Environmental Decisions

This paper presents a study which tests for strategic bias in group decision support models. Strategic bias occurs when individuals provide preference information to a group decision model which, they perceive, will improve their own outcomes and not necessarily those of the group. A test is made for strategic bias in a decision model used to allocate funds amongst 14 natural resource management regions in Queensland. The funds are a crucial source of revenue for the regions to achieve environmental objectives. In this real decision problem representatives from each region supplied criteria weights for a multiple criteria analysis model. Results reveal moderate to weak presence of strategic bias. Regions mostly selected weights that would improve their outcome relative to the weights of other regions. But this was not overly pronounced and there were exceptions. Whilst some degree of strategic bias existed these results show a willingness to separate individual and group preferences when interacting with formal decision procedures. Further research is required to see how this changes under unstructured negotiation and arbitration as opposed to a formal model.     

Maximin Envy-Free Division of Indivisible Items

Assume that two players have strict rankings over an even number of indivisible items. We propose two algorithms to find balanced allocations of these items that are maximin—maximize the minimum rank of the items that the players receive—and are envy-free and Pareto-optimal, if such allocations exist. To determine whether an envy-free allocation exists, we introduce a simple condition on preference profiles; in fact, our condition guarantees the existence of a maximin, envy-free, and Pareto-optimal allocation. Although not strategy-proof, our algorithms would be difficult to manipulate unless a player has complete information about its opponent’s ranking. We assess the applicability of the algorithms to real-world problems, such as allocating marital property in a divorce or assigning people to committees or projects.     

Transaction factors’ influence on the choice of payment by Polish consumers

The choice of payment instrument, which is used every day to make life easier, comprises one of the consumer financial decisions influenced by several factors. To investigate when, where, and for what amount customers use different forms of payment an interview of statistically representative group of 1005 consumers from all over Poland have been realized, in the first quarter of 2019 with the use of the computer assisted personal interviewing method. The data gives a unique combination of information on consumers payment choice and detailed information about demographics, income, and consumer preferences within a nationally representative consumer survey. Within this article statistical analyzes of the influence of transaction factors on consumer choice of payment have been performed together with a first attempt to employ a data-mining method known as Random Forests for predict the choices that those consumers make regarding the method of payment. The results revealed the complexity and diversity of factors influencing consumer choices. The findings show that, despite the development of innovative forms of payment, traditional forms, especially cash, still have a strong position. Notwithstanding among the customers' personal traits, financial knowledge is one of the most important determinants of their payment choices. These results are an important step toward a predictive model of consumer choice. Additionally presented findings on consumers’ payment behavior can guide policy formulation and strategic decision-making of central banks and stakeholders, and thereby contribute toward improving the efficiency of the payment system in Poland as a whole.     

Fair Division Approach for the European Union’s Structural Policy Budget Allocation: An Application Study

Fairness of resource allocation remains one of the basic criteria of public choice. Taking fairness into account in public resource allocation is critically important when decision-making creates conflicts of interest among potential stakeholders. The European Union’s structural policy budget allocation is especially prone to such conflicts, mainly due to its complexity and lack of commonly accepted indexes to measure its effects. The objective of this paper is to evaluate if a fair-division algorithm can be effectively implemented in practice to diminish conflicts and provide a fair allocation of resources. The practical application involves a problem of the EU’s rural-development policy budget in Poland. The algorithm provides a simple formal framework for budget allocation and utilizes structural program evaluation questionnaires of the key stakeholder groups. The provided example demonstrates that the implementation of a fair division algorithm is feasible in practice. The algorithm is flexible, robust to variation in pre-set budget constraints, and results in a sensible solution that achieves consensus among the stakeholder groups.     

不同基金组织形式下管理人行为的博弈分析

建立了基金管理人与投资者之间的不完全信息动态博弈模型,用以说明不同基金组织形式下基金管理人行为选择的差异。研究认为管理人的行为选择是其相机抉择的结果,开放式基金制度是否对管理人有更强约束力,取决于监督机制、声誉机制、管理人收入方案等因素。在模型分析的基础上,提出了减轻管理人机会主义行为的制度设计方案。     

Effects of knowledge types on choice quality and perceptions of choice performance

Two types of knowledge used in making choices are examined: knowledge of product-specific information and knowledge of a choice strategy. Product-specific information comprises information about available alternatives, including features and their importance. Strategy information includes knowing an appropriate strategy for integrating and evaluating information about alternatives, as well as knowing how to implement the strategy. The effects of these knowledge types, both singly and jointly, upon choice quality and perceptions of choice quality are examined in two studies. The results of the first study indicate that the knowledge types are differentially beneficial, and that subjects tend to be more overconfident about the perceived quality of their choices when they have product-specific information than when they have choice strategy information. The hypothesis that this difference is due to subjects' greater awareness of produce-specific information, rather than strategy information, is examined and supported in the second study. Implications for marketing and public policy are discussed. © 1996 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Argumentation-Based Qualitative Preference Modelling with Incomplete and Uncertain Information

This paper presents an argumentation-based framework for the modelling of, and automated reasoning about multi-attribute preferences of a qualitative nature. The framework presents preferences according to the lexicographic ordering that is well-understood by humans. Preferences are derived in part from knowledge. Knowledge, however, may be incomplete or uncertain. The main contribution of the paper is that it shows how to reason about preferences when only incomplete or uncertain information is available. We propose a strategy that allows reasoning with incomplete information and discuss a number of strategies to handle uncertain information. It is shown how to extend the basic framework for modelling preferences to incorporate these strategies.     

Belief-value structures as determinants of consumer behaviour: A study of housing preferences and choices

The role of consumers' belief-value structures was investigated in the context of residential preferences and simulated residential choices by means of a questionnaire answered by 36 adult Swedish respondents. Three models with different assumptions concerning how beliefs about the attainment of life values affect consumer behaviour were used for predicting preferences for and choices among hypothetical housing alternatives. A model assuming that the evaluation of a given alternative is determined by a weighted sum of the evaluations of the life values which it is believed to lead to, without specifying how individual attributes contribute to this value-fulfillment, was found to be the most successful one in predicting both preference ratings and choices. The results further suggested that whereas the age of the respondents and the format of the information about attributes may have an effect on belief-value structures, the ability to use such structures in order to predict preferences and choices may not be much affected by these factors. The present approach was compared with the laddering technique, and it was suggested that the two methods may be fruitfully combined in the study of consumer attitudes and behaviour.     

On the Unethical Use of Privileged Information in Strategic Decision-Making: The Effects of Peers’ Ethicality,Perceived Cohesion,and Team Performance

In order to make strategic decisions and improve their firm’s performance, top management teams must have information on the competitive context in general, and the firm’s competitors in particular. During the decision-making process, top managers can have access to “privileged information”—i.e., information of a confidential and potentially strategic nature that could ultimately confer a decisional advantage over competing parties. However, obtaining and using privileged information in a business context is often illegal—and if not, is usually deemed unethical or “against the rules.” Using a quasi-experimental design, this study explores the reasons why an individual might engage in such unethical behavior. We assess the extent to which managers use privileged information with respect to perceived team cohesion and peers’ ethicality. More specifically, our results show that the use of privileged information is predicted by the decision-maker’s perceptions of their team cohesion and their peers’ ethicality. Moreover, we find that team performance, as a group-level nonself-reported factor (measured by the firm’s share price in our simulation), moderates the relationship between cohesion and the use of privileged information. The relationship between cohesion, ethical behavior, and team performance is also discussed. We draw on these findings to make some practical suggestions on how to incorporate practices that could better prevent the unethical use of privileged information in strategic decision-making processes.     

Using Bids,Arguments and Preferences in Sensitive Multi-unit Assignments: A p-Equitable Process and a Course Allocation Case Study

Bonus distribution in enterprises or course allocation at universities are examples of sensitive multi-unit assignment problems, where a set of resources is to be allocated among a set of agents having multi-unit demands. Automatic processes exist, based on quantitative information, for example bids or preference ranking, or even on lotteries. In sensitive cases, however, decisions are taken by persons also using qualitative information. At present, no multi-unit assignment system supports both quantitative and qualitative information. In this paper, we propose MUAP-LIS, an interactive process for multi-assignment problems where, in addition to bids and preferences, agents can give arguments to motivate their choices. Bids are used to automatically make pre-assignments, qualitative arguments and preferences help decision makers break ties in a founded way. A group decision support system, based on Logical Information Systems, allows decision makers to handle bids, arguments and preferences in a unified interface. We say that a process is p-equitable for a property p if all agents satisfying p are treated equally. We formally demonstrate that MUAP-LIS is p-equitable for a number of properties on bids, arguments and preferences. It is also Pareto-efficient and Gale–Shapley-stable with respect to bids. A successful course allocation case study is reported. It spans over two university years. The decision makers were confident about the process and the resulting assignment. Furthermore, the students, even the ones who did not get all their wishes, found the process to be equitable.     

Empathic cultural consumers: Pay what you want in the theater

Pay what you want (PWYW) is an increasingly popular sales strategy in which consumers voluntarily decide how much to pay for a product or service. PWYW has often been described as an exercise in the “empathy economy,” where consumers' payment choices might be seen as empowered expressions of their tastes and preferences, and sellers have a stronger incentive for empathizing with them. Beyond their economic interest, PWYW experiences also deserve significant attention in the social sciences given that they challenge several key assumptions of rational choice and neoclassical economic theory, as well as conventional consumer behavior and pricing theories. This paper analyzes three plays performed at the Beckett Theater in Barcelona using PWYW with very profitable outcomes. Our analysis shows that socio-psychological factors, such as payments attributed to others and satisfaction with the play, are the best predictors of customer payments.     

The strategies of small and large international specialists

Falling trade barriers and corporate restructuring are resulting in the creation of international specialists, firms that focus on one line of business but with an international scope. International specialists compose the growing middle ground between diversified multinational companies and local firms. This study of 41 firms identifies two types—large and small international specialists—that differ substantially in their governance structures, resources, functional strategy, and approach to international markets.Large international specialists have abundant resources and high growth expectations, make a concerted push to dominate worldwide markets, and increase their reach over multiple stages of their industry. Small international specialists do not have strong growth motivations. They are upstream players that outsource extensively, serve intermediate users, and enter international markets selectively in ways that conserve their limited resources.Managers should consider the strategic option of becoming an international specialist in addition to the known strategic alternatives of being a domestic or a diversified multinational firm. To become international specialists, strategists need to implement several, consistent actions across functions that reinforce one another.