A Comparison of Centralized and Fragmented Markets with Costly Search

How does quotation transparency affect financial market performance? Biais's irrelevance proposition in 1993 shows that centralized markets yield the same expected bid–ask spreads as fragmented markets, other things equal. However, de Frutos and Manzano demonstrated in 2002 that expected spreads in fragmented markets are smaller and market participants prefer to trade in fragmented markets. This paper introduces liquidity traders' costs of searching for a better quote into the Biais model and derives opposite conclusions to these previous studies: expected spreads in centralized markets are smaller and liquidity traders prefer centralized markets, while market makers prefer fragmented markets.     

Information Disclosure and Stock Liquidity: Evidence from Borsa Italiana

This article examines the effect of increased corporate information disclosure on stock liquidity. Using the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in Italy as a natural experiment we extend previous work examining the effect on one measure of liquidity—bid‐ask spreads—to others, specifically depth and the price impact of transactions (or effective bid‐ask spreads). Consistent with previous research we find that bid‐ask spreads of stocks decline following the introduction of IFRS, which implies that stock liquidity increases for small traders. However, we also provide evidence that depth at the best quotes declines, which challenges the proposition that liquidity increases for large trades following an increase in disclosure. In additional tests, we find that effective bid‐ask spreads of block trades also decline following the introduction of IFRS. Overall, this evidence confirms that stock liquidity for both small and large trades increases following an increase in corporate information disclosure.     

Liquidity commonality and the intervalling effect

Past studies of liquidity commonality have reported conflicting findings regarding the relationship between market liquidity and firm size. The present paper provides empirical evidence that underlying estimation problems might be responsible for these results. We develop a model of information and spreads that provides some insights into the firm size–liquidity relationship. Our empirical evidence confirms the main testable implications of the model and presents evidence that the presence and strength of common covariability in liquidity depends upon the interval over which liquidity movements are measured. These intervalling effects are caused by delays in information being incorporated into bid and ask spreads.     

Money market microstructure and monetary policy: the Indian experience

Money market microstructure has recently started drawing attention in the empirical literature on financial markets of emerging market economies. In the Indian context, a GARCH(1, 1) model shows that policy instruments impact bid–ask spreads in the money market. Volatility of bid–ask spreads seems to be more persistent in the overnight market than in longer maturity segments. The results also suggest the dominance of policy interventions over the market microstructure across the term structure of the Indian money market. Unanticipated policy actions can delay mean reversion and, therefore, the return to stability.     

Information, Trading Demand, and Futures Price Volatility

We examine the relation between futures price volatility and trading demand by type of trader in the Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500-stock index futures market. We find that volatility covaries negatively with signed speculative demand shocks but is positively related to signed hedging demand shocks. No significant relation between volatility and demand shocks for small traders is found. Our results suggest that changes in positions of large hedgers destabilize the market, whereas changes in positions of large speculators stabilize volatility. Consistent with models with asymmetrically informed traders, we find that large speculators are likely to possess superior forecasting ability, large hedgers behave like positive feedback traders, and small traders are liquidity traders.     

The relationship between bid–ask spreads and holding periods: The case of Chinese A and B shares

The Chinese stock markets for A (domestic) shares and B (foreign) shares were completely separated. This study examines the relationship between spreads and holding periods across these segmented markets on the same set of firms. Our major findings are as follows. (1) There is a positive relationship between holding periods and bid–ask spreads in the Chinese stock market. (2) Investors' sensitivity toward liquidity is approximately the same in the A and B share markets, even though bid–ask spreads are substantially different across the two markets. These results provide strong support for the theoretical argument of Amihud and Mendelson [Amihud, Y., & Mendelson, H. (1986). Asset pricing and the bid–ask spread. Journal of Financial Economics, 17, 223–249.] that stocks with higher spreads tend to be held by long-term investors. Evidence also suggests that liquidity has a role in explaining the B share discount, although the results are less than conclusive.     

The relationship between bid–ask spreads and holding periods: The case of Chinese A and B shares

The Chinese stock markets for A (domestic) shares and B (foreign) shares were completely separated. This study examines the relationship between spreads and holding periods across these segmented markets on the same set of firms. Our major findings are as follows. (1) There is a positive relationship between holding periods and bid–ask spreads in the Chinese stock market. (2) Investors' sensitivity toward liquidity is approximately the same in the A and B share markets, even though bid–ask spreads are substantially different across the two markets. These results provide strong support for the theoretical argument of Amihud and Mendelson [Amihud, Y., & Mendelson, H. (1986). Asset pricing and the bid–ask spread. Journal of Financial Economics, 17, 223–249.] that stocks with higher spreads tend to be held by long-term investors. Evidence also suggests that liquidity has a role in explaining the B share discount, although the results are less than conclusive.     

A learning market-maker in the Glosten–Milgrom model

This paper develops a model of a learning market-maker by extending the Glosten–Milgrom model of dealer markets. The market-maker tracks the changing true value of a stock in settings with informed traders (with noisy signals) and liquidity traders, and sets bid and ask prices based on its estimate of the true value. We empirically evaluate the performance of the market-maker in markets with different parameter values to demonstrate the effectiveness of the algorithm, and then use the algorithm to derive properties of price processes in simulated markets. When the true value is governed by a jump process, there is a two regime behaviour marked by significant heterogeneity of information and large spreads immediately following a price jump, which is quickly resolved by the market-maker, leading to a rapid return to homogeneity of information and small spreads. We also discuss the similarities and differences between our model and real stock market data in terms of distributional and time series properties of returns.     

Impact of MiFID II tick-size regime on equity markets—Evidence from the LSE

This study investigates the impact of MiFID II on the London Stock Exchange. We find that a tick-size reduction leads to lower bid–ask spreads, lower trade values, reduced cost of trading at and beyond the best bid-offer, an acceleration of quote updates, an increase in aggressive trades and a reduction in price impact. Increased tick size widens spreads and increases trading costs. Step functions reveal that liquidity adjusts opposite to the tick change. To determine if impacts are proportional, we identify potential functions that predict cost changes with tick updates, implying that traders adjust their trade sizes according to the new tick levels.     

Measuring the liquidity impact on EMU government bond prices

Abstract

The work reported in this paper aimed to measure the impact of liquidity on European Monetary Union (EMU) government bond prices. Although there is a growing theoretical and empirical literature on liquidity effects in fixed income markets there is no clear answer to the questions how to measure liquidity and whether liquidity is priced in the market at all. The empirical analysis here is based on a unique data set containing individual bond data from six major EMU government bond markets, allowing one to compare yield curves estimated for subportfolios formed with respect to different potential liquidity measures. In a second procedure, liquidity measures are collected on the individual bond level and estimated pricing errors, given some reference yield curve, are regressed against these liquidity variables. This enables the conduction of formal tests on the pricing impact of liquidity measures. Results indicate that the benchmark property and the number of contributors are the most promising liquidity proxies having significant results in most countries. The results do not support the hypothesis that other liquidity measures under consideration, such as the on-the-run property, the issue size, and bid–ask spread related measures have a persistent price impact. A cross-country analysis of the subportfolio level indicates that liquidity effects cannot explain the size of the yield spreads between different issuers. This implies that effects other than liquidity, such as credit risk, are important driving factors of cross-country yield spreads.     

Subsidizing Liquidity: The Impact of Make/Take Fees on Market Quality

Facing increased competition over the last decade, many stock exchanges changed their trading fees to maker‐taker pricing, an incentive scheme that rewards liquidity suppliers and charges liquidity demanders. Using a change in trading fees on the Toronto Stock Exchange, we study whether and why the breakdown of trading fees between liquidity demanders and suppliers matters. Posted quotes adjust after the change in fee composition, but the transaction costs for liquidity demanders remain unaffected once fees are taken into account. However, as posted bid‐ask spreads decline, traders (particularly retail) use aggressive orders more frequently, and adverse selection costs decrease.     

Non-Fundamental Speculation

We study an intertemporal asset market where insiders coexist with “non-fundamental” speculators. Non-fundamental speculators possess no private information on fundamental values of assets, but have superior knowledge about some aspect of the market environment. We show that the entry of these (rational) speculators can lead to reductions in market liquidity and in the information content of prices, even in an efficient market. Also, equilibrium trades display patterns of empirical interest. For example, speculators appear to chase trends and lose money after market “overreactions,” while insiders trade as contrarians and profit after such overreactions.     

How and when is dual trading irrelevant?

Within a general model of speculative trade, we derive the aggregate consequences of dual traders who process retail liquidity trades and trade on their own account. We prove that dual trading reduces total expected speculator profits unless speculators process all liquidity trade and trade with the same intensity on liquidity trade. In contrast, dual trading does not affect the information content of prices. We show how results generalize when we endogenize (a) speculator information via costly information acquisition about fundamentals or costly processing of liquidity trade, and (b) liquidity trader motives and welfare via endowment shocks.     

NUMBER OF TRANSACTIONS AND VOLATILITY: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY USING HIGH‐FREQUENCY DATA FROM NASDAQ STOCKS

Our empirical evidence based on transactions data of a sample of Nasdaq stocks indicates that trades of large firms are related to the proxies of marketwide and firm‐specific information. For large firms, an increase in the number of trades seems to have a beneficial effect on liquidity as measured by bid‐ask spreads. On the other hand, trades of small and medium firms are associated with firm‐specific information and are not related to marketwide information. For small and medium firms, the frequency of trades is positively associated with bid‐ask spreads, apparently because of the adverse information content of trades. JEL classification: G10, G12, G13     

Liquidity of emerging markets

Emerging markets are characterized by volatile, but substantial returns that can easily exceed 75% per annum. Balancing these lofty returns are liquidity costs that, using the bid–ask spread as a basis, range from 1% for the Taiwanese market to over 47% for the Russian market. However, the paucity of bid–ask spread information across countries and time requires the use of liquidity estimates in emerging markets even though little is known about the efficacy of these estimates in measuring bid–ask spread costs. Using firm-level quoted bid–ask spreads as a basis, I find that price-based liquidity measures of Lesmond et al. [Review of Financial Studies 12 (1999) 1113] and Roll [Journal of Finance 39 (1984) 1127] perform better at representing cross-country liquidity effects than do volume based liquidity measures. Within-country liquidity is best measured with the liquidity estimates of either Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka or, to a lesser extent, Amihud (2002). Examining the impact of legal origin and political institutions on liquidity levels shows that countries with weak political and legal institutions have significantly higher liquidity costs than do countries with strong political and legal systems, even to the exclusion of legal origin or insider trading enforcement. Higher incremental political risk is associated with a 10 basis point increase in transaction costs, using the Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka estimate, or a 1.9% increase in price impact costs, using the Amihud estimate.     

Market liquidity and institutional trading during the 2007–8 financial crisis

This paper shows that institutional sell-side herding increased bid–ask spreads and liquidity risk during the 2007–8 financial crisis. Such an impact on liquidity is most pronounced in firms with large numbers of institutions that sold the same stocks, that is, have correlated trades. For the same reason, we find institutional investors with a dedicated, buy-and-hold, investment style to be the least likely to herd; their trading activity did not affect stock market liquidity during the crisis. Our results are robust to alternative explanations, different test specifications and consistent with recent theories highlighting the negative impact of institutional trading activity on market liquidity during a crisis.     

EVIDENCE ON THE BEHAVIOR OF BID AND ASK PRICES AT THE TURN OF THE YEAR: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SURVIVAL OF STOCK RETURN SEASONALITY

We analyze changes at the turn of the year in the relative and standardized bid-ask spreads of New York Stock Exchange stocks before and after the introduction of personal income taxes in 1917. Previous research indicates the return seasonal arose in 1917. Here, we investigate when spread seasonals arose and whether spread changes are cross-sectionally correlated with the return seasonal. The results indicate that the year-end selling pressure, which began in 1917, is apparent as downward shifts in the stocks' bid and ask prices rather than as widening spreads. Additional evidence suggests the January return seasonal originated as compensation to specialists, as well as to competing traders, for incurring the costs of providing liquidity during the tax-induced seasonal trading pattern.     

Is faster or slower trading better? An examination of order type execution speed and costs

We examine order type execution speed and costs for US equity traders. Marketable orders that execute slower exhibit lower execution costs. Those who remove liquidity faster and pay higher trading costs transact in smaller size, spread trading across more venues, take more liquidity, and are better informed. Nonmarketable limit orders that execute slower exhibit greater adverse selection; and larger, uninformed traders who concentrate their trading in fewer venues submit them. Our findings suggest that slowing down the trading process, when faster options exist, can benefit certain market participants who seek to cross the bid–ask spread.     

Liquidity Crunch in the Interbank Market: Is it Credit or Liquidity Risk, or Both?

The interplay between liquidity and credit risks in the interbank market is analyzed. Banks are hit by idiosyncratic random liquidity shocks. The market may also be hit by bad news at a future date, implying the insolvency of some participants and creating a lemons problem; this may end up with a gridlock of the interbank market at that date. Anticipating such possible contingency, banks currently long of liquidity ask a liquidity premium for lending beyond a short maturity, as a compensation for the risk of being short of liquidity later and being forced to liquidate some illiquid assets. When such premium gets too high, banks currently short of liquidity prefer to borrow short term. The model is able to explain some stylized facts of the 2007–2009 liquidity crunch affecting the money market at the international level: (i) high spreads between interest rates at different maturities; (ii) “flight to overnight” in traded volumes; (iii) ineffectiveness of open market operations, leading the central banks to introduce some relevant innovations into their operational framework.     

An empirical comparison of quoted and implied bid–ask spreads on futures contracts

This paper investigates the performance of a range of alternative measures of quoted and implied bid–ask spreads on futures contracts, using a complete record of all quotes and trades. Accurate calibration of bid–ask spreads is important for many applications, including tests of market efficiency and assessment of market microstructure models. The results show that the transactions based spread measures are biased estimates of quoted and effective spreads, which illustrates the need for considered implementation of such measures. Similar intraday behaviour is shown by the different measures, with wide spreads at the open and narrow spreads at the close under a competing market maker environment.