Non-stationary,stable Markov processes on a continuous state space

We extend our previous result on simple stable Markov (SSM) processes to the case where the state space is continuous. As anapplication we show the existence of a competitive general equilibrium of a cobweb model where price volatility is generated both by exogenous shocks and by stochastic, so called generating variables (that may be interpreted as sunspots) that govern the correlation of the rational beliefs of individual agents. I would like to thank Danish Social Science Foundation, The Carlsberg Foundation, Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics (SITE) and Universita Cattolica for financial help. I would also like to thank Trinidad Casasus, Mordecai Kurz, an anonymous referee as well as participants at SITE, ESAM (2004) and ESEM (2004) for helpful discussions and comments. Peter Harremoes provided me with an illuminating counter example and Hiro Nakata provided many comments that helped improve the exposition of the paper. Part of this work is from a paper previously circulated under the title: “Sunspot rational belief structures: anonymity and endogenous uncertainty”.     

Federal Stability in Unequal Societies

The stability of federal systems is a thorny issue. Several scholars have attempted to come to grips with this problem and have proposed mechanisms or institutions which may contribute to the stabilization of federal systems. In many instances, however, the underlying mechanisms and micro-foundations are poorly specified. In this paper I build upon existing models dealing with decentralization and secession to incorporate unequal income distributions and externalities of public goods. Based on this some insights may be derived on the appropriate mechanisms to foster federal stability. JEL Classification: H77, H41, C72 This paper partly draws on research funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (Grant No. 5004-0487882/1). An earlier version entitled ‘‘Federalism and the Size of Nations’’ was presented at the conference ‘‘Micro-Foundations of Federal Institutional Stability’’ at Duke University (Durham, April 30–May 1, 2004). Comments by participants at this conference and greatly appreciated. First version: March 2004, this version: November 1, 2004     

Survival auctions

Dynamic clock auctions with drop-out information typically yield outcomes closer to equilibrium predictions than do comparable sealed-bid auctions. However, clock auctions require congregating bidders for a fixed time interval, which has limited field applicability and introduces inefficiencies of its own given the time cost of congregating bidders. In this experiment we explore the effects of removing these inefficiencies through survival auctions—a multi-round sealed-bid auction which is theoretically isomorphic to the dynamic clock auction with drop-out information. Kagel’s research was partially supported by National Science Foundation Grants No. 0136925 and 0136928. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. We thank the associate editor, an anonymous referee, seminar participants at Purdue University, especially Tim Cason, participants at International Industrial Organization April 2004 Conference, the ESA June 2003 meetings, and our discussant, Tim Salmon, for valuable comments. Kirill Chernomaz provided valuable research assistance. The usual caveat applies.     

Dynamic welfare costs of the 1997 Asian crisis

This paper measures and investigates the welfare costs, other effects and recovery process of the 1997 Asian crisis, and evaluates the impact of the policy program supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The main findings are as follows. First, the ratio of ‘whole cost’ to the level of consumption in a hypothetical economy is high: 50% for Indonesia, 39% for Hong Kong, 36% for Korea, 30% for Thailand and 18% for Malaysia. Second, the dynamic process of ‘cost at period t’ quickly converges to 40% immediately after the crisis, though the costs for Indonesia and Hong Kong gradually increase toward 100%. Third, the IMF-supported programs in Thailand, Indonesia and Korea were implemented straight after the peak cost. Finally, the cost of the IMF-supported program was relatively inexpensive compared with the welfare cost of the crisis. The authors would like to thank Kenneth S. Chan, Makoto Saito, Yum K. Kwan, Yong Wang, Eiji Ogawa, Yoshiro Tsutsui, Yuzo Honda, Shinsuke Ikeda, Soyoung Kim, Joshua Aizenman and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and useful suggestions. Earlier versions of this paper were presented in 2003 at Osaka University and Hitotsubashi University, in 2004 at the City University of Hong Kong, Tokyo University and the Western Regional Science Association Conference (Hawaii), Western Economic Association Conference (Vancouver) and East Asian Economic Association Conference (Hong Kong). Funding from a Grant-in-Aid 16530204 from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sport, Science, Technology of Japan, the Nomura Foundation for Social Science 2005 and Kanpo Foundation 2002 supported the first-named author’s research.     

Matching and anonymity

This work introduces a set-theoretic foundation of deterministic bilateral matching processes and studies their properties. In particular, it formalizes a link between matching and informational constraints by developing a notion of anonymity that is based on the agents’ matching histories. It also explains why and how various matching processes generate different degrees of “informational isolation” in the economy. We illustrate the usefulness of our approach to modeling matching frameworks by discussing the classical turnpike model of Townsend.This research is supported in part by the NSF grants EIA-0075506, SES-0128039, DMS-0437210, and ACI-0325846. We thank two anonymous referees for constructive comments that improved the exposition of the paper. We also thank the participants in seminars at the University of Aarhus, Purdue University, University of Texas at Austin, and at the XI Meeting on Real Analysis and Measure Theory in 2004, the spring 2004 Midwest Economic Theory Meeting, the summer 2004 North American and European Econometric Society meetings.     

Monte Carlo simulation of macroeconomic risk with a continuum of agents: the general case

In large random economies with heterogeneous agents, a standard stochastic framework presumes a random macro state, combined with idiosyncratic micro shocks. This can be formally represented by a random process consisting of a continuum of random variables that are conditionally independent given the macro state. However, this process satisfies a standard joint measurability condition only if there is essentially no idiosyncratic risk at all. Based on iteratively complete product measure spaces, we characterize the validity of the standard stochastic framework via Monte Carlo simulation as well as event-wise measurable conditional probabilities. These general characterizations also allow us to strengthen some earlier results related to exchangeability and independence. Parts of this work were done while Yeneng Sun was visiting Stanford University in July 2003, March–May 2005 and July 2006, and while Peter Hammond was visiting the National University of Singapore in March–April 2004. An early version was presented at the World Congress of the Econometric Society in 2005.     

Incentives in market games with asymmetric information: the core

Summary. This paper examines the ex ante core of a pure exchange economy with asymmetric information in which state-dependent allocations are required to satisfy incentive compatibility. This restriction on players' strategies in the cooperative game can be interpreted as incomplete contracts or partial commitment. An example is provided in which the incentive compatible core with nontransferable utility is empty; the game fails to be balanced because convex combinations of incentive compatible net trades can violate incentive compatibility. However, randomization of such strategies leads to ex post allocations which satisfy incentive compatibility and are feasible on average. Hence, convexity is preserved in such a model and the resulting cooperative games are balanced. In this framework, an incentive compatible core concept is defined for NTU games derived from economies with asymmetric information. The main result is nonemptiness of the incentive compatible core. Received: December 26, 2001; revised version: June 11, 2002 RID="*" ID"*" This work was financed, in part, by contract No 26 of the programme “P?le d'attraction interuniversitaire” of the Belgian government, and, in part, by research grant SBR93-09854 from the U.S. National Science Foundation. Much of my thinking about this topic was developed during a wonderful visit to CORE for the 1991–1992 academic year (on sabbatical from the University of Pennsylvania). This paper was originally circulated in December 1991 as CARESS Working Paper #91-38, Center for Analytic Research in Economics and the Social Sciences, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and in February 1992 as CORE Discussion Paper 9221, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics, Université Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium. RID="*" ID="*" At the very start of my research, Jean-Fran?ois Mertens was almost a co-author. Fran?ois Forges provided detailed comments at a later stage, during my visit to THEMA, Université Cergy-Pontoise, in Spring 1997. They are entitled to the customary disclaimer.     

Punishment,counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment

We present the results of an experiment that explores the sanctioning behavior of individuals who experience a social dilemma. In the game we study, players choose contribution levels to a public good and subsequently have multiple opportunities to reduce the earnings of the other members of the group. The treatments vary in terms of individuals’ opportunities to (a) avenge sanctions that have been directed toward themselves, and (b) punish others’ sanctioning behavior with respect to third parties. We find that individuals do avenge sanctions they have received, and this serves to decrease contribution levels. They also punish those who fail to sanction third parties, but the resulting increase in contributions is smaller than the decrease the avenging of sanctions induces. When there are five rounds of unrestricted sanctioning, contributions and welfare are significantly lower than when only one round of sanctioning opportunities exists, and welfare is lower than at a benchmark of zero cooperation. We thank James Andreoni, participants in seminars at Emory University, the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the University of New South Wales, the University of Sydney, Deakin University, the 2004 North American Regional Meetings of the ESA in Tucson, Arizona, USA, the 2004 IMEBE Meetings in Cordoba, Spain, and the 2005 SAET meetings in Vigo, Spain, for constructive and helpful comments. We thank Elven Priour for programming and organization of the sessions. Instructions for the experiment are available from the authors.     

Technology,convergence, and growth in the European Union

This paper contains an empirical analysis of growth and convergence in the European Union using a cross-country data set covering the period 1950–92. It seeks an answer to the question why some countries in Europe manage to catch up, while others, most notably the poorest ones, apparently do not. The empirical evidence provided in the paper points to several responsible factors. The distance of the economy to the technological leader differed across economies, which contributed to differences in convergence and growth behavior. In addition, the finding of conditional convergence implies that economies converge to different steady state levels of income per capita. Poor economies, like Portugal, Greece, Spain, and Ireland, presumably converge to a lower steady state level of income per capita, which leads to persistent differences in income per capita. Funding for this project was provided in part by the Securities Industry Foundation for Economic Education, the Council on Economic Education in Maryland, and the Towson State University Faculty Development and Research Committee.     

North–South Trade and Pollution Migration: The Debate Revisited

The paper examines the effect of freer North–South trade in goods on pollution, commodity terms-of-trade and national welfare, utilizing a factor endowment framework. North and South are distinguished in terms of the relative endowment of a pollution causing natural resource: South is relatively more resource abundant. Compared to the analysis of Copeland and Taylor (1994)—which is the central work so far on this subject—this paper internalizes the commodity terms-of-trade impact of individual environment policies. It is derived that if countries specialize completely in the free-trade equilibrium, both are induced to reduce their pollution as compared to autarky. It is interesting and paradoxical that the South also reduces its pollution, despite specializing in the pollution-intensive good. Again, contrary to common perception, free trade may entail an overall terms-of-trade loss for the North, while South will always have a positive change in the terms-of-trade. Finally, inspite of better environment, free trade may cause both the countries to gain or lose in terms of aggregate welfare. This research has benefitted from comments received at the conference on International Dimension of Environment Policy organized by the European Science Foundation and Tilburg University, October 7–12, 2000 Kerkrade, The Netherlands and the International Conference on Environment and Development organized by CITD, School of International Studies, JNU, April 7–8, 2005, New Delhi, India, as well as those received from two anonymous referees. A small section of this research was published in Mehra and Das (2002).     

The dynamics of wealth distribution with asymmetric incentives and endogenous matching

In a dynastic economy with warm-glow bequest individuals can form firms in a frictionless matching market. Contracts within firms are subject to moral hazard. Production tasks differ in incentive intensity and the matching market is open until production takes place. The credit market is perfect. In a principal–agent context, we examine the long-run effects on the wealth distribution, and show the presence of hysteresis and poverty traps. The first draft of the paper was written in the Fall 2002 while I was visiting GSIA at Carnegie Mellon University. Subsequent developments were reached while I visited Columbia Business School in the Fall 2004. I want to thank Oded Galor, and especially Archishman Chakraborty for many valuable discussions.     

Can Natural Experiments Measure Behavioral Responses to Environmental Risks?

Efforts to measure people’s responses to spatially delineated risks confront the potential for correlation between these risks and other, unobserved characteristics of these locations. The possibility of correlation arises in part because individuals observe other locational attributes that can be expected to influence the hedonic equilibrium. One response to this problem is to use events from nature to exploit both temporal and spatial variation in the behavioral responses of interest. This paper evaluates the use of hurricanes as a source of new risk information to households in coastal counties potentially subject to the effects of these storms. We study the extent to which housing prices before and after hurricane Andrew, a hurricane with unprecedented property loss, reveal how Floridians responded to the risk information provided by the storm. Two counties are selected – one without and another with damage from the hurricane. To evaluate the plausibility of using quasi-random experiments for locations not directly affected by natural events, we compare Lee County’s results to those of Dade County, where the majority of the damage occurred. Our findings suggest, after controlling for ex post storm damage and changes in insurance markets, there is a reasonably high level of consistency in a repeat sales model’s ability to estimate the effects of the risk information conveyed by the storm for both counties. Department of Economics, Williams College, Affiliated Economist, CEnREP, North Carolina State University and University Distinguished Professor, North Carolina State University, and Resources for the Future University Fellow, respectively. Senior authorship is not assigned. Thanks are due to Shelby Gerking and two anonymous reviewers for careful and constructive comments that substantially improved the paper. Michael Darden and Jaren Pope provided excellent research assistance and Alex Boutaud and Susan Hinton helped to make sense out of numerous drafts of this work. Smith’s contribution was partially supported by the United States Department of Homeland Security through the Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE), grant number EMW-2004-GR-0112. However, any opinion, findings, and conclusions or recommendations in this document are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect views of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.     

Evolutionary choice of markets

We consider an economy where a finite set of agents can trade on one of two asset markets. Due to endogenous participation the markets may differ in the liquidity they provide. Traders have idiosyncratic preferences for the markets, e.g.due to differential time preferences for maturity dates of futures contracts. For a broad range of parameters we find that no trade, trade on both markets (individualization) as well as trade on one market only (standardization) is supported by a Nash equilibrium. By contrast, whenever the number of traders becomes large, the evolutionary process selects a unique stochastically stable state which corresponds to the equilibrium with two active markets and coincides with the welfare maximizing market structure. We are grateful to Thorsten Hens, Fernando Vega-Redondo and a referee for valuable comments. We also thank seminar participants at the University of Zurich, the CES research seminar at the University of Munich, the Koc University in Istanbul as well as conference participants at the SAET conference in Ischia, the ESEM in Lausanne and the ESF workshop on Behavioural Models in Economics and Finance in Vienna. A first version of the paper was written while Marc Oliver Bettzüge was visiting the Institute for Empirical Research in Economics at the University of Zurich. Financial Support by the Swiss Banking Institute and by the National Centre of Competence in Research “Financial Valuation and Risk Management” (NCCR FINRISK) is gratefully acknowledged. The NCCR FINRISK is a research program supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation.     

Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly with unit cost asymmetry

Summary This paper characterizes the set of Nash equilibria in a price setting duopoly in which firms have limited capacity, and in which unit costs of production up to capacity may differ. Assuming concave revenue and efficient rationing, we show that the case of different unit costs involves a tractable generalization of the methods used to analyze the case of identical costs. However, the supports of the two firms' equilibrium price distributions need no longer be connected and need not coincide. In addition, the supports of the equilibrium price distributions need no longer be continuous in the underlying parameters of the model.As an application of our characterization, we examine the Kreps-Scheinkman model of capacity choice followed by Bertrand-Edgeworth price competition and show that, unlike in the case of identical costs, Cournot equilibrium capacity levels need not arise as subgame-perfect equilibria. The low-cost firm has greater incentive to price its rival out of the market than exists under Cournot behavior.We are grateful to Joseph Harrington, Marie Thursby, Casper de Vries and, especially, William Novshek for helpful discussions and comments. Thomas Faith and Ioannis Tournas provided valuable research assistance. This paper was presented at the Winter Meetings of the Econometric Society in December 1988, the Midwest Mathematical Economics Conference in April 1989, the Sixteenth Annual Congress of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics in August 1989, the European Meetings of the Econometric Society in September 1989, and in seminars at the Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Indiana University, INSEAD, Texas A&M University, Tilburg University, the University of Bonn and the University of Florida. Deneckere acknowledges financial support through National Science Foundation Grant SES-8619012 and the Kellogg Graduate School of Management's Beatrice/Esmark Research Chair. Kovenock acknowledges financial support through Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Purdue Research Foundation, the Ford Motor Company Fund, and an Ameritech Foundation Summer Faculty Research Grant.     

Theory of negative consumption externalities with applications to the economics of happiness

This paper investigates the problem of obtaining Pareto efficient allocations in the presence of negative consumption externalities. In contrast to the conventional wisdom, we show that even if consumers’ preferences are monotonically increasing in their own consumption, one may have to dispose of resources to achieve Pareto efficiency when negative consumption externalities exist. We provide characterization results on destruction both for pure exchange economies and for production economies. As an application, our results provide an explanation to Easterlin’s paradox: average happiness levels do not increase as countries grow wealthier. We thank an anonymous referee, Xiaoyong Cao, Li Gan, and Tapan Mitra for helpful comments and suggestions that improved the exposition of the paper. The first author thanks the National Natural Science Foundation of China and Private Enterprise Research Center at Texas A&M University for financial support.     

Information,capital, and organization

Summary This paper examines on of the roles that information plays in the production process by looking at the information that firms collect about their workers. This information, concerning the worker's abilities, is used to improve the quality of job matches within the firm and reduce future production costs. This paper models this information as a capital good and shows how the existence of this capital good can be used to explain some of the residual firm value observed in equity markets as well as the rigidities observed when firms expand their scale.I would like to acknowledge the assistance of Edward Prescott, Hugo Hopenhayn, Herbert Mohring and Jim Schmitz who provided many insights and comments concerning this work. This paper has benefited from the comments and suggestions of seminar participants at Minnesota, Western Ontario and Caltech. This research was supported in part by grants from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and a National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship.     

Intangible capital,corporate valuation and asset pricing

Recent studies have found unmeasured intangible capital to be large and important. In this paper we observe that by nature intangible capital is also very different from physical capital. We find it plausible to argue that the accumulation process for intangible capital differs significantly from the process by which physical capital accumulates. We study the implications of this hypothesis for rational firm valuation and asset pricing using a two-sector general equilibrium model. Our main finding is that the properties of firm valuation and stock prices are very dependent on the assumed accumulation process for intangible capital. If one entertains the possibility that intangible investments translates into capital stochastically, we find that plausible levels of macroeconomic volatility are compatible with highly variable corporate valuations, P/E ratios and stock returns. We thank Ellen McGrattan, Edward Prescott, Rene Stulz and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments as well as workshop participants at FAME, the 5th Conference of the Swiss Society for Financial Market Research, the European Central Bank, Columbia Business School Finance Free Lunch and the University of Zürich. This research has benefited from financial support from the National Center for Competence in Research “Financial Valuation and Risk Management”. The National Centers of Competence in Research are managed by the Swiss National Science Foundation on behalf of the Federal Authorities.     

On the definition of differentiated products in the real world

Summary. This paper proposes an abstract model of commodity differentiation that incorporates manufacturing imprecision and dimensioning and tolerancing standards. The potential consistency of such a model based on engineering consideration is analyzed. For a large pure exchange economy, competitive equilibria exist and are Pareto optimal. Production issues such as the derived demand for intermediate products, continuity of cost functions, and product selection and technology issues such as mass customization, agile manufacturing, and manufacturability are discussed.Received: 21 June 2003, Revised: 1 March 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D51, L15, D21.This work was supported by the National Science Foundation through research grants DMI-9816144 and DMI-0070257. This paper was presented at the Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen in Fall 2000. As always, Birgit Grodal was an energetic and enthusiastic academic host during my month-long visit. I wish to thank Marcus Berliant for a long, pleasant, and helpful conversation. An anonymous referee read the paper carefully and provided helpful comments.     

On the informational content of advice: a theoretical and experimental study

This paper examines the market for advice and the underlying perception that advice is useful and informative. We do this by first providing a theoretical examination of the informational content of advice and then by setting up a series of experimental markets where this advice is sold. In these markets we provide bidders with a demographic profile of the “experts” offering advice.The results of our experiment generate several interesting findings. The raw bid data suggest that subjects bid significantly more for data than they do for advice. Second, in the market for advice there appears to be no consensus as to who are the best advisors although on average economists demand the highest mean price and women suffer a discount. In addition, we find that whether a subject suffers from a representativeness bias in the way he or she processes data has an impact on how he or she bids for advice and on his or her willingness to follow it once offered. Finally, we find that on average people impute a low level of informativeness onto advice, consistent with their bidding behavior for data versus advice.This work was done under grant number SES-0425118 of the National Science Foundation. The authors would like to recognize the Center for Experimental Social Science at New York University for its additional support. We also acknowledge the help of Elizabeth Potamites for her research assistance.