Open core and quasi-equilibria with lower semi-continuous preferences

Summary. This note introduces a new concept of core –open core, using which it shows a quasi-equilibrium existence result in an economy where consumers' preference relations are assumed to be lower semi-continuous, but not necessarily to have open lower sections nor to be open valued, such as the lexicographic ordering. As an application, a competitive equilibrium existence result without non-satiation assumption is proved. Received: October 28, 1996; revised version: November 4, 1997     

Income,inequality, and the stability of democracy — Another look at the Lipset hypothesis

This paper studies the endogenous emergence of political regimes, in particular democracy, oligarchy and mass dictatorship, in societies in which productive resources are distributed unequally and institutions do not ensure political commitments. The political regime is shown to depend not only on income levels, but also, in particular, on resource inequality. The main results imply that under any economic environment a distribution of resources exists such that democracy is the political outcome. This distribution is independent of the particular income level if the income share generated by the poor is sufficiently large. On the other hand, there are distributions of resources for which democracy is infeasible in equilibrium regardless of the level of economic development. The model also delivers results on the stability of democracy. Variations in inequality across several dimensions due to unbalanced technological change, immigration or changes in the demographic structure affect the scope for democracy or may even lead to its breakdown. Among other historical examples, the results are consistent with the different political regimes that emerged in Germany after its unification in 1871.     

回归失落的传统:广义虚拟经济理论的政治经济学解读(I)

政治经济学曾经是经济学科的核心,其重要的标志就是强调国家的富强和政府的经济调控职能。然而,在后来的发展历程中,经济学科逐渐分裂为强调归纳和历史研究的政治经济学范式与推崇纯演绎和数学分析的纯经济学范式。前者延续了早期经济学科的政治经济学视角,强调政治对经济发展的影响作用,并进而对制度尤其是文化因素进行了新的考察;而后者则抛弃了早期经济学科的政治经济学,在过分强调模型分析和数学方法的趋势下,逐渐演变成为一门专注于模型分析的纯粹经济学,在越来越脱离政治经济学的同时,也越来越与现实脱节。本文把政治经济学与当今一些中国学者提出的广义虚拟经济理论相联系,从政治经济学发展的角度对广义虚拟经济理论进行解读。本文认为在政治经济学研究缺失的今天,广义虚拟经济理论是对政治经济学的一种回归;其不仅坚持了传统的政治和文化视角,而且通过"制文化权"等理论的提出,对政治经济学理论体系进行了发展和创新。     

论政府供给偏好的短期决定:政治均衡与经济效率

本文以财政支出为主体,研究了我国政府供给偏好(规模与结构)短期决定问题。政治均衡而非经济市场均衡是理解这一问题的关键。在“有管理的竞争性政治市场”和政府追求政治支持最大化等假定下,我们考察了政治均衡决定政府供给偏好的过程及其效率属性,以及“政治价格”在两级“政治市场”上的形成机制。结论表明:政治均衡决定资源配置固有的低效率属性,因政府供给范围的“越位”和“缺位”而加剧。当前改革的重点应是推动经济市场化转轨的完成和公共财政的转型,而非完全的民主化。权威因素对“政治价格”的管理在利益分化严重的当前形势下具有建设性作用。推动渐进民主化,完善权力对等的“二级政治市场”则是长远之策。     

经济发展水平与旅游规划实施成功的关系

衡量旅游规划实施成功与否,不但要对比规划蓝图与实施现状之间的差距,更在于审视其为规划区域是否带来满意的社会经济效益。从经验上看,经济因素可能对于这样的成功产生了重要影响。经过对2007年全世界145个国家的旅游产业截面统计数据进行国际比较分析,间接证明了在一般情况下旅游规划实施成功的概率与经济发展水平呈正相关。基于此认识,进一步讨论了经济发达地区旅游规划实施更容易成功的理论原因,并提出促进中国旅游规划实施成功的策略。     

Bad loans,soft budget constraints and the political economy of financial market reform in transition economies

Financial market imperfections and especially the bad debt problem are among the most important factors impeding economic restructuring in transition economies. This paper analyses the implications of non-performing loans for the lending policy of banks and for the ensuing allocation of credit. It is shown that a lending bias exists in favour of old debtors, which not only impedes structural change but may also counteract policies intended to harden budget constraints and to promote restructuring. The paper also discusses from a political economy perspective, why despite these negative implications financial market reforms were not pursued more forcefully in most countries.     

转型期中国县级政府的客观治理绩效与政治信任——从“经济增长合法性”到“公共产品合法性”

善治是中国政府的执政要务,政治信任反映着公民对政府治理的认可和支持。文章利用2008年中国公民意识调查及政府统计数据,实证分析了政府治理绩效的主观和客观维度对政治信任的影响。研究发现,公民对政府在经济增长、民生福利、纯公共产品领域治理绩效的回顾性和前瞻性积极评价都正相关于政治信任;纯公共产品提供的主观评价对政治信任的影响大于经济增长和民生福利。县级政府的客观治理绩效对政治信任有重要影响,在高人均福利支出、低基尼系数和低失业率的县级单位,政治信任更高,而人均GDP反而微弱地负作用于政治信任。因此,尽管经济增长仍然是政治信任的重要来源,但民生福利和纯公共产品正赶上并超越经济增长,成为公民提供政治信任的新源泉。     

What remains of the popularity function? The case of Austria

In this paper, the effects of changes in economic conditions on the popularity of political parties in Austria are investigated. According to the traditional theory of the popularity function, economic variables such as the rate of unemployment, the rate of inflation, and the growth rate of real disposable income exert direct influence upon voters' evaluations of political parties. Estimations of such popularity functions for Austria show that some effects of this kind can be found, but they seem to be unstable over time. On the other hand, models of political popularity based on the assumption of voters' rational expectations predict that only unexpected changes in economic conditions affect political popularity. One of these models seems to have favorable predictive properties for Austria.The authors are grateful to A. Kirschhofer-Bozenhardt (IMAS Linz) for providing the Austrian popularity data and to G. Kirchgässner for valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper. Financial support from the Ludwig Boltzmann-Institut zur Analyse wirtschaftspolitischer Aktivitäten is gratefully acknowledge. Sohbet Karbuz acknowledges support from the Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna.     

基于演化博弈的和谐社会构建模型分析

经济学在社会科学中的主导性地位决定了经济和谐是和谐社会构建的基础。以"理性经济人"假设为基础的正统经济理论与和谐社会的本质内容存在着一定程度的差异性,因而不能够为和谐社会的存在性构建起科学的理论体系,而行为经济学为和谐社会的实现提供了现实性的理论依据。互惠性偏好是行为经济学的基础性假设之一,基于互惠性偏好的个体行为博弈可以改善博弈双方的经济利益,从而为演化博弈环境下群体经济行为从自利型向互惠型的演化创造了条件,最终为经济学视角下和谐社会微观经济理论体系的构建提供了坚实的理论基础。     

Anchored preference relations

This note explores the implications of a simple and intuitive restriction on reference-dependent preferences assuming the status quo serves as the reference point. The condition imposed potentially rules out situations in which a decision maker has a choice between two prospects, selects one which subsequently becomes the new reference point, and then regrets her initial choice. It is shown that a surprising number of models in a riskless and risky setting violate this behavioral assumption, including Cumulative Prospect Theory as well as any theory exhibiting local non-satiation in which all reference-dependent indifference surfaces are smooth. It is also shown that the condition does admit a class of non-trivial reference-dependent preferences.     

中国和平发展战略对全球应对气候变化行动的影响

2005年中国首次发布《中国的和平发展道路》白皮书,2011年9月6日中国再次发布《中国的和平发展》白皮书,向全世界公布中国和平发展的战略。中国采取什么样的发展战略,不仅对全球世界政治经济格局具有重要影响,同时也对全球应对气候变化的行动产生重要影响。重点分析了中国和平发展战略对全球应对气候变化行动的影响:(1)中国的和平发展,坚持以科学发展为指导,本身就是全球应对气候变化行动的重要组成部分;(2)中国的和平发展,推动了世界的和平与发展,有利于创造全球应对气候变化的良好政治经济环境;(3)中国的和平发展,推动了全球资源合理有效配置,有利于提高全球应对气候变化的实际成效;(4)中国的和平发展,提倡的是国际合作,有利于推动全球应对气候变化的国际协同。     

Marx's critique of “eternal” political economy: how Mill is alien to Marx's attacks

Marx deplored political economy's claims to establish “eternal” – or “natural” – laws. This paper seeks to defend John Stuart Mill from his critique. It argues that, contrary to what Marx alleged, these two economists have a great deal more in common on this topic than is frequently realised. Both on the theoretical level and on the political one, Mill's views about the relativity of capitalism seem very close to Marx's. This paper also suggests that Marx may have ignored Mill's insistence on the relativity of economic theories because it may have challenged his own “scientific socialism”.     

基于公平偏好的实验经济学研究综述

传统经济学建立在自利性假设之上,认为参与人仅仅关心自身利益,即使出现有悖于自利性假设的行为,也只是暂时性的偏离。而最近二十多年的实验经济学研究对该假设提出了质疑,利用大量实验数据不仅证明了人类行为中公平偏好的存在性,而且还表明这种存在性绝非是暂时性的偏离,其对人类的行为决策具有很强的系统性影响。目前相关学术研究主要体现在公平偏好与其他社会偏好的区分、有关人类行为决策中公平偏好存在性的实验证明、基于结果的公平偏好与基于动机的公平偏好的差异以及公平偏好对传统激励契约产生的影响。本文指出了国外学术界对公平偏好实验中包括实验对象、货币金额和文化等方面的质疑,同时也揭示了未来进一步的研究方向,构成了有关公平偏好实验经济学的研究进展及前沿趋势。     

Zur Wahlzyklik wirtschaftspolitischer Maßnahmen

Summary Election cycles of economic policy measures: An empirical test of the votemaximizing hypothesis.A special characteristic of the economic theory of democracy lies in the assumption of the behaviour of politicians: they are not as much striving for the advancement of public interest but display much rather a behaviour of utility maximization. It is their goal to win the next elections. Public preferences are taken into consideration only because voters seem to favour the political party whose election pledge most closely corresponds to their own ideas. Assuming further that voters are forgetful, we can derive the hypothesis that governments set popular (i.e. vote capturing) economic policy measures ahead of elections and unpopular ones right afterwards. In this paper we test this hypothesis using the increase of political prices and the development of certain categories of public expenditure as explanatory variables.Administered prices and public tariffs proved greatly dependent upon the timing of elections. For all of the tariffs under examination a statistically significant predominance of increases (unpopular) could be observed shortly after elections. The extent of the increase, however, does not appear to have any correlation with the election date.As to popular government expenditures, only subsidies have been paid clearly in line with election cycles in the period under consideration.As to further spending categories, our hypothesis appears to be directionally confirmed, yet the data available is infufficient for a statistically significant proof. Besides, especially in the case of Austria, other factors seem to be important in the determination of economic policy measures as well. Some reasons are given in this paper.     

Politics and institutions: European parliamentary technology assessment

This paper analyses, from an institutionalist perspective, the emergence, nature and ways in which parliamentary scientific and technological advice activities are carried out in different European countries. A diffusion process from the United Sates could be identified in the early times, but some local preconditions are also important for the adoption of these practices in Europe, as well as the existence of some political entrepreneurs willing to advance the initiatives within their respective political systems. We argue that the connection of technology assessment (TA) with the political process can only be understood if the former is regarded not only as an input in the decision-making process but also as a legitimising mechanism.Different models of arrangements of parliamentary TA (PTA) are identified, depending on the degree of inclusiveness of different actors in the TA process. The adaptation, consolidation and differential impact of these organizations are mediated by two factors: the capacity of PTA organizations to gain support, both inside and outside the Legislature, and their capacity to access decision makers in an environment of competition with other organizations that also produce TA. Models of PTA have both types of these capacities in differing degrees. It is argued that differences in the potential impact of TA activities in the different countries are to be analysed in the context of the rules of the political game and the types of incentives that TA organizations face. The degree of autonomy/dependence and exclusivity/nonexclusivity of the assessment for the parliaments are essential for understanding the diversity of impacts.     

Familiarity breeds growth: The impact of factional ties on local cadres’ economic performance in China

Some attribute China's rapid economic growth to a cadre promotion system that rewards economic performance. Others argue that political promotion in China hinges on factionalism. Extant empirical studies often assume that performance can be measured independently from the effect of factionalism. We test the validity of this assumption by examining whether local cadres’ economic performance would change as a result of losing vertical ties to a higher authority. We find an immediate increase in the growth rates of local GDP and government revenue. However, the performance change is mediated by the type of succeeding leaders, as it occurs only under locally promoted leaders who have existing ties with the local cadres. We further examine various channels through which a leader's insider status may affect local economic performance and find that newly appointed outsider leaders would cut fiscal transfers to the local level, which may explain the drop in their short‐term performance.     

Signaling in Political Budget Cycles: How Far Are You Willing to Go?

A key assumption in the literature on political cycles with rational voters and opportunistic politicians is that opportunism is common knowledge. In this framework, political cycles have been interpreted as a signal of competency. However, if opportunism is not common knowledge, cycles may no longer indicate competency, but rather opportunism. This is because highly opportunistic incumbents are willing to go farther to be reelected. Since political cycles require discretionality to reallocate budget items, a decrease of discretionality curbs cycles. It may also make elections more effective at selecting competent incumbents.     

Limiting the system and reshaping lifestyles: Solving unemployment by social and technical innovations

We have become used to seeing crises in growth, unemployment, and inflation as purely economic problems that can be overcome by suitable economic and political means. One basic assumption of the following reflection however, is that the above might be only half the picture. To paraphrase a formula of Friedrich Engels, the concern is not “in the first and last instance” with questions of the “economic basis,” but with questions of the current images of human kind, social milieus and lifestyles. Solutions will thus tend to lie in social innovations and reorganization of the System insofar as they complement the new lifestyles.     

Income Distribution, Redistributive Politics, and Economic Growth

This article studies the political economy of inequality and growth by combining the political economy approach with an imperfect capital market assumption. In the present model, there emerges a class of individuals whose members do not invest privately beyond the state-financed schooling, due to their initial wealth constraint. We show that inequality affects private investment not only through the political effect, which relates inequality to private investment negatively, but also through what we call the threshold effect, which associates inequality to private investment positively. In general, private investment and inequality do not show a monotone negative relationship.     

The Political Cause of the Movement of RMB Exchange Rate：A Research Based on the Spillover Effects of US Political Cycle

Movement of the renminbi (RMB) exchange rate is not only affected by economic factors, but also by political factors home and aboard. This paper analyzes the transmission mechanism of political cycles on the RMB exchange rate first, and then sets up a “political cycle spillover effect model” followed by an empirical analysis. We find that: (1) the US political cycle has a direct effect on the RMB exchange rate in the short run, which is mainly transmitted by capital flows and China’s exchange rate policy control; (2) the RMB exchange rate changes periodically in accordance with the US presidential election and midterm election cycle, with the appreciation ratio significantly lower in the first year of the election cycle, while significantly higher in the year after the midterm election; (3) The effect of the political cycle will not be affected by which party holds power, though it will be affected if the president and parliament are ruled by the same party. This paper not only extends the research of the influencing factors of the RMB exchange rate to the political field, but also sets up a use theoretical model to analyze the impact of political issues on the RMB exchange rate, providing a new perspective to fully understand the external environment of RMB exchange rate reform.