The logic of Keynes' criticism of the Classical model

The Classics' remedy for unemployment was to lower money wages. Keynes opposes this remedy. Therefore, in The General Theory, he aims at building a model in which a fall in money wages may not cause an increase in employment. Most of the interpretations of Keynes identified this aim, but did not attach enough importance to it. Reading The General Theory in the light of this aim, we discover what Keynes' logic of elaboration is, then what Keynes' ideas about voluntary or involuntary unemployment are.     

Keynes and probability: An assessment

Abstract

Most interpreters agree that Keynes had a wide-ranging, complex, ‘vision of the world’, which underlies his theoretical contributions. Whenever this is forgotten, as happens in the so-called neoclassical synthesis, not only the original Keynesian spirit goes lost but also, and especially, we lose substantive bricks for our theoretical constructions. The paper considers an important instance of this general rule; namely Keynes's views on the logic of probability, meant as the field concerning human behaviour in an uncertain world (hence connected to, but distinct from, the pure theory of probability, meant as a field of mathematics). The paper begins by recalling the main aspects of the classical and frequentist approaches to probability and the main criticisms they received, pertaining among other things to the limits of their applicability. We then consider Keynes's own views, stressing three aspects: the definition of probability as pertaining to the field of logic, the notion of uncertainty and of the ‘weight of the argument’, the ‘theory of groups’. We then discuss the subjective approach of de Finetti, Ramsey and Savage, and contrast it with Keynes's own views. Finally, we consider the implications of our analysis for the interpretation of Keynes's General Theory, and of his attitude towards econometrics.     

Some Misunderstood Aspects of the Final Chapter of Keynes’s General Theory

ABSTRACT

Some seriously misunderstood issues arise in three paragraphs in the last chapter of Keynes’s General Theory concerning the relationship between his theory and orthodox theory. That these passages permit a form of theoretical reconciliation is a view shared by prominent commentators of opposing persuasions. Joan Robinson and John Eatwell strongly criticised Keynes for inconsistency and for opening the door to neoclassical elements that undermine his theorising, while Paul Samuelson made Keynes’s comments the foundation of his textbook neoclassical synthesis. The reconciliation view, however, is based on hasty non-contextual readings and is mistaken. More careful analysis leads to three conclusions: neither internal inconsistency nor neoclassical appeasement exists; Keynes’s paragraphs are aligned with the theoretical positions previously advanced in the General Theory; and what is actually deployed is a complementarity view relating his macro-theory to one particular part of orthodox micro-theory. Rejecting the dominant view, however, does not remove the issue of the absence in Keynes’s work of an adequately exposited micro-theory to accompany his macro-theory.     

The Role of credit in a Keynesian monetary economy

Abstract

This paper describes the features of a monetary economy on the basis of Keynes's distinction between a real exchange economy and a monetary economy. In The General Theory, Keynes identifies the reasons for the non-neutrality of money by highlighting the store of wealth function of money; this approach has been adopted by most Keynesian economists. The aim of this paper is to show that such an approach only partially explains the reasons for money non-neutrality and that important elements which demonstrate the relevance of monetary variables emerge when the means of payment function of money is considered. Investigating the role of this function requires that we deal explicitly with how spending decisions are financed. The paper argues that the market for credit must be considered separately from the market for money, and that a viable credit theory can be built from Keynes's post-General Theory writings.     

A tale of two traditions: Pierre Force's Self-interest before Adam Smith

Abstract

The paper compares different strands of New Keynesian Economics with regard to Keynes' original work. Two issues are analysed in detail. First, the explanations provided by Keynes and New Keynesians of nominal and real wage behaviour. Second, the different theories concerning the ability of flexible nominal wages in assuring full employment. It is argued that, although involuntary unemployment is a central problem both in Keynes' and New Keynesians' views, referring to the role of nominal and real wages in explaining unemployment, New Keynesians theories present important features that differ, sometimes substantially, from the concepts developed by Keynes in his General Theory.     

Whither Keynesian probability? Impolite techniques for decision-making

The critical literature on Keynes has provided extensive analysis of why individual agents may find convenient to adopt a “conventional judgement”, and what he meant by “polite techniques” used to save their faces as “rational, economic men.” This paper concentrates instead on impolite techniques of thought suited to deal with Keynesian uncertainty. The paper suggests that the thread going from Keynes's Treatise on Probability to the General Theory and its defence provides a positive analysis of decision-making under uncertainty, and that placing emphasis on this positive analysis simply means adhering to Keynes's long-standing commitment to a (surely peculiar) probabilistic set-up.     

Involuntary unemployment: the missing piece in Keynes's General Theory *

Using a retrospective methodology, my paper examines critically the insights on involuntary unemployment offered by Keynes in his General Theory. Keynes, it is argued, gave involuntary unemployment a modern micro-founded definition yet — quite opportunely, in view of the difficulty of the task—did not attempt to provide a direct microeconomic explanation of it Rather, his claim to the demonstration of its existence rests on an indirect argument, where involuntary unemployment emerges at the corollary of effective demand falling short of its full employment level. This justification is based on the more or less tacit assumption that involuntary unemployment and effective demand-deficiency are equivalent. This claim of equivalence, it will be argued, is wanting. Hence the view that involuntary unemployment may have been demonstrated through the proxy of demand-deficiency falls. My paper evaluates whether Keynes's other arguments in favour of involuntary unemployment are robust. Several alternative interpretations of his General TheoryChapter Two ‘fundamental observation’, focusing respectively on money illusion, adjustment flaws, and resistance to cuts in nominal wages, are discussed. Here also the verdict will be negative. The general conclusion then follows that no solid explanation for the existence of involuntary unemployment is to be found in theGeneral Theory.     

Keynes on the nature of capital: a note on the origin of The General Theory's chapter 16

In The General Theory, unlike Keynes's previous works, we find a chapter explicitly devoted to a discussion of capital. It's title, however, does not accurately reflect the actual content of the chapter itself; and the text, which contains a discussion of the concept of roundaboutness, may leave the reader uncertain about Keynes' attitude towards that concept and on the actual focus of the chapter. In this paper a study of the surviving drafts of The General Theory and of other sources relevant to the purpose of elucidating the process of composition of the chapter allows us to show how and why those peculiarities emerged and helps to cast light on their meaning.     

Keynes,Ricardo and the classical theory of interest

Keynes made harsh and repeated attacks on the work of Ricardo, blaming him particulary for what Keynes called the ‘classical theory’ of interest. Garegnani and others argue that Keynes' criticisms of the classical theory of interest apply to later neoclassical writers, but not to Ricardo. This paper re-examines Keynes' criticisms. It argues that Keynes attacked Ricardoapos;s theory of interest despite his awareness that Ricardo did not hold the ‘classical theory’. Moreover, Keynes not only expressed sympathy for Ricardo's understanding of interest, but his criticisms which do apply to Ricardo do not address Ricardo's theory of interest.     

The Point of Effective Demand

Abstract

Keynes's principle of effective demand conceives competitive equilibrium in terms of the choices of entrepreneurs, investors and consumers, rather than of the optimal allocation of factors of production. In The General Theory, effective demand is distinguished from aggregate demand and from income, expected or realised, and there is no suggestion that equilibrium means the convergence of expectations. Reconsideration of Keynes's use of time and equilibrium periods leads to the conclusion that he treats employment as in continuous equilibrium, at the point of effective demand, determined by the state of expectation, the correctness of which is strictly irrelevant. The nature of the equilibrium represented by the point of effective demand is here described, not in terms of the multiplier, but in terms of the continuous equilibrium of supply and demand in short-term forward markets. This reading is faithful to Keynes's conception of aggregate demand as dependent upon the expectations of entrepreneurs, and it resolves the meaning of his ‘long-period employment.’ Formal appendices identify the differences between Keynes and Walras and the nature of the multiplier. The paper concludes that the Keynesian cross and ‘Swedish’ analysis should be abandoned, and the Walrasian conception recognised as only the limiting case of general competitive equilibrium in a monetary economy.     

Sraffa,Keynes and 'The Years of High Theory'

This paper argues that Shackle's interpretation of 'the years of high theory' is flawed. Shackle (1967) sees Sraffa's critique of the Marshallian theory of value only as a step in the development of the theory of imperfect competition. In the same vein, Shackle reduces the message of Keynes's General Theory to the claim that unemployment results from the existence of uncertainty and irrational expectations. Thus, Shackle leaves open the possibility that both Sraffa's critique of Marshall and Keynes's theory of effective demand do not question the internal coherence of neoclassical theory, but instead merely assert that market imperfections render it irrelevant for the analysis of the real world. This paper argues, in contrast, that the theories of Sraffa and Keynes should be interpreted as radical departures from marginalism, and represent a return to the surplus approach of classical political economy.     

Joan Robinson and the three cambridge revolutions

Joan Robinson's association with three Cambridge ‘revolutions’—imperfect competition, effective demand and capital theory—is examined in the context of her personal and intellectual partnership with Richard Kahn, John Maynard Keynes and Piero Sraffa. Initially, imperfect competition appeared to have successfully extended marginal analysis to all market forms. It also allowed Richard Kahn and Joan Robinson to persuade Keynes to present the main argument of The General Theory in terms of aggregate demand and aggregate supply. By the early 1950s, however, Joan Robinson had rejected the Marshallian methodology and had become a strenuous censor of neoclassical theory. In this paper the origin of her critique is traced to her reading of Sraffa's Introduction to Ricardo's Principles.     

Effective Demand: Securing the Foundations

Abstract

This paper is one of three contributions to a symposium commenting on papers previously published by the other authors. Allain (Allain, O. (2009) Effective demand and short-term adjustments in the General Theory, Review of Political Economy, 21, pp. 1–22) argues that Keynes elides a distinction between aggregate demand and global expenditure that is necessary to explain the formation of price expectations by individual entrepreneurs. Allain's conclusions depend upon redefinitions of aggregate and effective demand and the consumption function. Hartwig (Hartwig, J. (2007) Keynes vs. the Post Keynesians on the principle of effective demand, European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 14, pp. 725–739) argues that entrepreneurs must take into account the state of the economy as a whole, in order to form price expectations independently and not as a market equilibrium determined by aggregate supply and demand. This leaves demand price expectations to be determined outside the principle of effective demand. Neither author does full justice to Keynes's own treatment. We still need to agree by what mechanism individual entrepreneurs form a collective and mutually consistent state of expectation in The General Theory.     

Keynesian uncertainty and the instability of beliefs

In an influential critique, Coddington (1982) argues that Keynes uses the theme of uncertainty in an opportunistic way in the General theory emphasizing it when it suits his purposes and ignoring it when it does not. This reading is examined in the light of Keynes's earlier Treatise on probability. The first part of the paper argues that Keynes's epistemology differs in important respects from the one Coddington is attacking, and in particular, that Keynes's account contains conceptions of uncertainty not considered by Coddington. The two premises of Coddington's argument are then assessed. These are: 1) that Keynes provides no account of the relative impact of uncertainty in different decision-making contexts; and 2) that uncertainty is not a sufficient condition for unstable beliefs about future outcomes of current (investment) decisions. It is argued that Coddington is mistaken in asserting 1) and, although 2) is correct in principle, that there is nevertheless a strong presumption that uncertainty does lead to unstable beliefs in the particular situations Keynes describes. The conclusion is that the connection between uncertainty and unstable beliefs cannot be regarded as either analytically destructive or somehow beside the point, even on Coddington's terms.     

On exogenous money and bank behaviour: the Pandora's box kept shut in Keynes' theory of liquidity preference?

This essay examines Keynes' views on banking behaviour and the relationships between central banks and banks as they evolved from his Tract on Monetary Reform to The General Theory. The objective is to clarify in what sense money may be exogenous in his final work. We identify a distinctly Keynesian position on the money-supply process, featuring money exogeneity due to bank behaviour. Our findings run counter to both neoclassical synthesis view on exogenous money cum passive banks as well as the post Keynesian challenge of endogenous money cum passive banks.     

Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply: Will the Real Keynes Please Stand Up?

Two recent articles in this journal present conflicting interpretations of the Aggregate Demand/Aggregate Supply (D/Z) model contained in Chapter 3 of Keynes's General Theory. This paper evaluates the two interpretations to determine which aligns more closely with Keynes's own views.     

KEYNES ON WAGE FLEXIBILITY AND THE AUSTRALIAN WAGES SYSTEM*

Keynes' General Theory briefly discusses the Australian wages system, as an example of a system in which an attempt was made to fix real wages by law. Keynes argues that such a system, strictly enforced, generates an unstable unemployment equilibrium or highly volatile money wages and prices. This paper clarifies Keynes' views on the Australian system, with a view to their wider relevance for the significance of real and money wage flexibility and inflexibility in Keynes' economics. The most striking finding is that money wage stickiness is a conclusion, not an assumption, of Keynes' theory of employment.     

The Role of Keynesian Policies in Semi-industrialized Countries: theory and evidence from India

This paper examines the relevance of Keynesian policies—interpreted as those policies implied by Keynes's theoretical analysis of unemployment developed in The General Theory—for a subset of developing economies, which are called semi-industrialized countries. It draws on recent contributions in development economics to argue on theoretical grounds that Keynesian policies are relevant for semi-industrialized countries even when they are constrained by capital shortages, stagnant agricultural sectors, and foreign exchange availability. It then discusses the recent development experience of India to illustrate the empirical relevance of some of these theoretical issues.     

A historiographical exhumation of J.A. Hobson's Over-Saving Thesis: General theory versus historiography

Abstract

The discussion of J.A. Hobson's understanding of over-saving has been largely confined within John Maynard Keynes' famous critique in the General Theory. I argue that gauging Hobson's contribution by ‘general theory’, that is, by an ahistorical, non-evolutionary yardstick, is to miss the larger part of Hobson's achievement. Hobson's conception of over-saving was contained within an evolving historiography of capital accumulation and took on various meanings depending on whether Hobson was discussing a competitive or monopolistic environment. I show that Keynes' ‘corrected’ version of over-saving was implicitly contained within Hobson's analysis of an evolving monopolistic industrial structure.     

Marx and the Development of Critical Political Economy

Abstract

Although relevant analytical developments were provided over time by the critique of economic theory, they did not succeed in inhibiting the occurrence of a full-fledged revival of the neoclassical interpretation of capitalism. The development of critical economics and its capability of checking the influence of the dominant economic culture have been especially prejudiced by the failed integration between the analyses of Marx and Keynes. Following Keynes, once the ‘inducement to invest’ had been singled out as the central question for the explanation of output levels, one should have promptly acknowledged that on this very question Marx's analysis was significantly richer and more relevant than Keynes's—the richness and relevance of the former ultimately resting on the great attention Marx dedicated to the complex question of the influence of income distribution on the capitalists’ incentive to invest. It is argued in the article that through the study of this influence Marx succeeded in putting together the essential elements of a critical theory of effective demand, based on the principles and mechanisms that govern the distribution of income between profits and wages.