The dynamics of a differentiated duopoly with quantity competition

We analyse the dynamics of a Cournot duopoly with heterogeneous players to investigate the effects of micro-founded differentiated products demand on stability. The present study, which indeed modifies and extends Zhang et al. (2007) (Zhang, J., Da, Q., Wang, Y., 2007. Analysis of nonlinear duopoly game with heterogeneous players. Economic Modelling 24, 138–148) and Tramontana, F., (2010) (Tramontana, F., 2010. Heterogeneous duopoly with isoelastic demand function. Economic Modelling 27, 350–357), reveals that a higher degree of product differentiation may destabilise the market equilibrium. Moreover, we show that a cascade of flip bifurcations may lead to periodic cycles and ultimately chaotic behaviours. Since a higher degree of product differentiation implies weaker competition, then a theoretical implication of our findings, that also constitute a policy warning, is that a fiercer (weaker) competition tends to stabilise (destabilise) the unique positive Cournot–Nash equilibrium.     

A fractionally integrated exponential STAR model applied to the US real effective exchange rate

The aim of this paper is to study the dynamics of the US real effective exchange rate by capturing non-linearity and long-memory features. In this context, we use the family of fractionally integrated STAR (FISTAR) models proposed by van Dijk et al. (van Dijk, D., Franses, P.H., and Paap, R., 2002. A non-linear longmemory model with an application to US unemployment. Journal of Econometrics 110, 135–165.) in the case when the transition function is an exponential function and we develop an estimation procedure. Indeed, these models can take into account processes characterized by several distinct dynamic regimes and persistence phenomena.     

Validation in agent-based models: An investigation on the CATS model

In this paper we deal with some validation experiments on the complex adaptive trivial system (CATS) model proposed in Gallegati et al. [Gallegati, M., Giulioni, G., Palestrini, A., Delli Gatti, D., 2003a. Financial fragility, patterns of firms’ entry and exit and aggregate dynamics. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 51, 79–97; Gallegati, M., Delli Gatti, D., Di Guilmi, C., Gaffeo, E., Giulioni, G., Palestrini, A., 2005. A new approach to business fluctuations: heterogeneous interacting agents, scaling laws and financial fragility. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 56, 489–512]. In particular starting from a sample of Italian firms included in the AIDA database, we perform several ex post validation experiments over the simulation period 1996–2001. In the experiments, the model parameters have been estimated using actual data and the initial set up consists of a sample of agents in 1996. The CATS model is then simulated over the period 1996–2001. Using alternative validation techniques, the simulations’ results are ex post validated respect to the actual data.     

Dynamic properties of a Cournot–Bertrand duopoly game with differentiated products

In this paper we consider a Cournot–Bertrand duopoly model with linear demand and cost functions and with product differentiation. We propose a dynamic framework for the study of the stability properties of this kind of mixed oligopoly game, a rather neglected topic in the existing literature despite its relevance. In particular, in this paper we highlight the role of best response dynamics and of an adaptive adjustment mechanism for the stability of the equilibrium.     

Vertical differentiation in a Cournot industry: The Porter hypothesis and beyond

We modify the vertically differentiated duopoly model by André et al. (2009) replacing Bertrand with Cournot behaviour, and we characterise the region wherein a Porter-type result takes place. We show that the Porter hypothesis applies in an equilibrium taking always the form of a prisoner's dilemma. Moreover, whenever the asymmetry in the cost parameters between green and brown technology is not too high, a class of equilibria emerges wherein firms converge spontaneously onto the green standard as a result of dominant strategies, any environmental regulation being altogether absent.     

Strategic Product R&D Investment Policy under International Rivalry in the Presence of Demand Spillover Effects

Abstract

We develop a model of product (i.e., quality-improving) research and development (R&D) investment competition in a horizontally differentiated duopoly. In particular, based on a third-country market model, we consider the optimal product R&D investment policy under international rivalry in the presence of demand spillover effects associated with improving the quality level of a product. We show how the optimality of a non-cooperative and a cooperative R&D investment policy depends on the strength of demand spillover effects. Furthermore, we consider the same issues in the case of heterogeneous consumers and alternative utility functions.     

R&D Subsidies Under Asymmetric Duopoly: A Note

This paper analyses the question of optimum R&D subsidies in the context of a two-stage asymmetric Cournot duopoly model with endogenous R&D. For the special case of symmetric duopoly, whether the firms should be subsidized or taxed in their R&D activities crucially depends on the concavity/convexity property of the demand function. It is also shown that a firm with some initial cost advantage should be subsidized in its R&D activities and a firm without should be taxed. In this way, we obtain policy implications that cast doubts on the universal applicability of competition policies.
JEL Classification Numbers: L13, L52, H25.     

Strategic interactions and airline network morphology under demand uncertainty

In this paper, we examine how strategic interactions affect airline network under demand uncertainty. We develop a three-stage duopoly game: at stage 1 airlines determine their network structure (linear versus hub-and-spoke); at stage 2 they decide on their capacities; at stage 3 firms compete in quantities. The main feature of the model is that firms have to decide on network structure and capacities while facing demand uncertainty. We show that while hubbing is efficient, airlines may choose a linear network for strategic reasons. Furthermore, we show that this structure softens competition by preventing contagion of competition across markets.     

Does licensing promote innovation?

ABSTRACT

We analyse the impact of licensing on the equilibrium amount of cost-reducing innovation under several licensing mechanisms in the case of a duopoly model with heterogeneous firms. Under a wide class of licensing mechanisms, we find that as product substitutability increases, the possibility of higher innovation under licensing compared to no licensing decreases. Therefore, firms’ heterogeneity is crucial to assess whether licensing incentivizes or not R&D cost-reducing investments.     

Strategic trade policy under asymmetric information with screening

The design of strategic rent-extracting trade policies requires information that may be private, such as the cost structure of an industry or parameters of the demand function. As a consequence, under asymmetric information, the design of these policies is problematic. We propose screening menus consisting of different instruments (tariff vs. quota) designed to solve this informational issue. We first use a simple model that examines a Cournot duopoly between a domestic firm and a foreign firm with linear demand and cost functions, with both firms supplying a homogeneous good on the domestic market. In this scenario, if the government does not have information regarding the demand parameter, which is known by both firms, a menu consisting of a rent-extracting tariff for a low demand parameter and a rent-extracting quota for a high demand parameter maximizes the government's objective function. This menu leads the domestic firm to reveal private information. We then generalize this framework to a scenario with imperfect information regarding the firms' marginal cost. Finally, we discuss the issue of quotas generating public revenues and study the case of a menu consisting of a tariff and a free quota.     

Product R&D Investment Policies in an International Duopoly

This study analyzes the optimal product R&D investment policies of a developed and a developing country in an international Cournot duopoly where firms from these two countries compete through endogenous quality–quantity decisions. We explore a new international trade model by using demand functions derived from utility functions. We find that the optimal product R&D investment policies for both countries are subsidies. This study counters a finding that used Hotelling‐type demand functions and it partially modifies another result that adopted the same demand functions but with an international Bertrand duopoly.     

An evolutionary explanation of the value premium puzzle

As early as 1934 Graham and Dodd conjectured that excess returns from value investment originate from a tendency of stock prices to converge towards a fundamental value. This paper confirms their insights within the evolutionary finance model of Evstigneev et al. (Econ Theory 27:449–468, (Evstigneev et al. 2006)). Our empirical results show the predictive power of the evolutionary benchmark valuation for the relative market capitalization and its dynamics in the sample of firms listed in the Dow Jones Industrial Average index in 1981–2009.     

MARKET‐DEMAND BOOSTING AND PRIVATIZATION IN A MIXED DUOPOLY

This study incorporates demand‐boosting strategies into a mixed duopoly model in order to consider the endogenous determination of market demand. The results indicate equilibrium characteristics that differ from those found under an exogenous demand setting. As consumers become more sensitive to the demand‐boosting strategies of firms, the government must choose a lower level of privatization. This suggests that the responsiveness of consumer demand to the demand‐boosting strategies of firms constitutes a limiting factor for privatization.     

Tobin <Emphasis Type="Italic">q</Emphasis>: Forecast performance for hierarchical Bayes,shrinkage, heterogeneous and homogeneous panel data estimators

This paper reconsiders the Tobin q investment model studied by Hsiao et al. (1999) using a panel of 337 U.S. firms over the period 1982–1998. It contrasts the out-of-sample forecasts performance of hierarchical Bayes, shrinkage, as well as heterogeneous and homogeneous panel data estimators. We are very grateful to Cheng Hsiao and A. Kamil Tahmiscioglu for providing us with the data set and computer code for the Hierarchical Bayes estimator as well as useful suggestions and comments.     

Sequential location under one-sided demand uncertainty

In entering a new market, firms face demand uncertainty. We depart from the usual Hotelling duopoly model with sequential entry. We allow firms to locate outside of the city and assume that market conditions are common knowledge. We then introduce one-sided demand uncertainty. We find that demand uncertainty can be seen as a differentiation force when faced by the first entrant and as an agglomeration force when faced by the second entrant. Finally, the second firm’s imperfect information implies higher welfare losses.     

Dynamic Pricing in Declining Demand: The Case of Duopoly

The purpose of this study is to investigate what theory predicts about price dynamics when firms face a decline in demand for their product due to an arrival of a new substitutable product. To this end, this paper constructs a dynamic duopoly model and simulates price paths. The study demonstrates that the price path is nonmonotonic and could be divided into three stages. The basic mechanism of generating the path is a tradeoff between two counteracting motives to set the price: pricing lower to delay the adoption of the new product, and pricing higher to exploit price‐insensitive consumers.     

Emission taxes and the adoption of cleaner technologies: The case of environmentally conscious consumers

We model a market with environmentally conscious consumers and a duopoly in which firms consider the adoption of a clean technology. We show that as pollution increases, consumers shift more resources to the environmental activities, thereby affecting negatively the demand faced by the duopoly. This effect generates incentives for firms to adopt the clean technology even in the absence of emissions taxes. When such taxes are considered, our results indicate that the benefit of adopting the clean technology is initially increasing and then decreasing in the emission tax. The range of values for which the emission tax increases this benefit becomes narrower when the consumers’ environmental awareness is stronger.     

Optimal punishments in linear duopoly supergames with product differentiation

We analyze optimal penal codes in both Bertrand and Cournot supergames with product differentiation. We prove that the relationship between optimal punishments and the security level (individually rational discounted profit stream) depends critically on the degree of supermodularity in the stage game, using a linear duopoly supergame with product differentiation. The security level in the punishment phase is reached only under extreme supermodularity, i.e., when products are perfect substitutes and firms are price setters. Finally, we show that Abreu's rule cannot be implemented under Cournot behavior and strong demand complementarity between products.     

Asymmetric Oligopoly and Foreign Direct Investment: Implications for Host-Country Tax-Setting

We present a duopoly model with heterogeneous firms that vary in cost-efficiency, each of which can choose to serve a foreign market by either exporting or local production. We do so to analyse the effects of a host-country corporate profit tax on both the scale and composition of FDI, and find that: strategic interaction between oligopolistic firms provides for a pattern of FDI that favours cost-inefficiency to the detriment of host-country welfare; and the host-country tax rate can be optimally used to avoid such patterns of FDI and instead promote direct investment by a relatively cost-efficient firm.     

Dynamic duopoly with learning through market experimentation

Summary This paper analyzes how learning behaviors can substantially modify the outcome of competition in an oligopolistic industry facing demand uncertainty. We consider the case of a symmetric duopoly game where firms have imperfect information about market demand and learn through observing the volume of their sales. The main body of the paper consists in showing how market experimentation can explain the existence ofprice-dispersion in an oligopolistic industry. We study this phenomenon and its dynamic evolution in the context of an Hotelling duopoly model; we then extend the analysis to general demand functions and toN-firm oligopolies. We discuss some implications of the public good aspect of information about market demand. We then conclude with a few comments on what happens when the value of information in the oligopolistic industry is negative.We are very grateful to Patrick Bolton for his helpful advice. We also wish to thank Richard Caves, Anthony Creane, Jean-Jacques Laffont, Andreu Mas-Colell, Eric Maskin, Jean-Charles Rochet, Margaret Slade, John Sutton, Jean Tirole, Mike Whinston and an anonymous referee.