Taxation and Market Power

We analyze the incidence and welfare effects of unit sales tax increases in experimental monopoly and Bertrand markets. We find, in line with economic theory, that firms with no market power are able to shift a high share of the tax burden to consumers, independent of whether buyers are automated or human players. In monopoly markets, a monopolist bears a large share of the burden of a tax increase. With human buyers, however, this share is smaller than with automated buyers, as the presence of human buyers constrains the pricing behaviour of a monopolist. Several control treatments corroborate this finding.     

Do budget maximizing public officials increase the probability of property reassessment?

County governments in Pennsylvania face non‐binding limits on their property tax rates. These are considered non‐binding because they do not place a limit on tax levies or expenditures. Assuming local public officials have monopoly power, tax rate limits can be circumvented by reassessing the property tax base. A two‐stage process was hypothesized in which the probability of reaching tax rate limits first was determined and the probability of reassessment then was determined. The effect of budget maximizing government officials at each stage was tested for 66 Pennsylvania counties over the 1970–1995 period. The empirical results showed that variables associated with budget maximizing behaviour influenced the choice in each stage. Public expenditure growth increased the probability of reaching the tax rate limit in the first stage while reaching the tax rate limit increased the probability of reassessment in the second stage. The estimates also showed that economic, fiscal and taste variables were significant determinants of these probabilities.     

Supply‐ versus Demand‐Side Policies in the Presence of Carbon Leakage and the Green Paradox

We consider a climate coalition that seeks to reduce global emissions in the presence of carbon leakage and resource exhaustibility. We show that a credible announcement of future unilateral supply‐side policies delays foreign emissions, and we derive the optimal combination of consumer taxes and producer taxes when we consider leakages from free riders, both within periods and across periods. The tax shares generally differ over time. A decline in the present value of the social cost of carbon over time supports a time path where the consumers’ tax share of the total carbon tax also declines over time. We illustrate our findings with a numerical model.     

Market structure and casino taxation in tourist resorts

This article examines the association of tax effects with market structure for casino gaming. We show that if market structure is uncompetitive, much of casino taxation falls on tourists whose demand is inelastic relative to supply. The tax is likely to be efficient under strong external demand if imposed on oligopoly casinos with a monopoly location in a cross-border market. The likelihood of economically ‘good’ taxation is greater under oligopoly than under competition but lower than under monopoly. Casino taxes should be lowered in a more competitive market with weaker external demand. Our prediction is consistent with the evidence found from casino tourism development in Macao with ‘high’ gambling taxes.     

Power Structure and Rent Competition

This paper presents a model of rent competition in a mixed economic system in which wealth maximizing interest group coalitions share wealth according to their relative political power. The model solves for optimal lobbying expenditures of a producer group, a consumer group, and individual firms. The existence of monopolistic rent is not presupposed. Instead, the equilibrium market price, output, and market shares of firms are determined endogenously. As a result, the distribution of rent depends upon the relative political power of each interest group coalition and total lobbying expenditure decreases as the asymmetry in marginal political power among interest group coalitions increases.     

DYNAMIC ENTRY WITH DEMAND AND SUPPLY SIDE SPILLOVERS

Supply side spillovers have been used to explain firms' entry behavior in the pharmaceutical industry. In contrast, demand side spillovers have received less attention. This paper identifies supply and demand spillovers using a dynamic model of strategic interaction. The results indicate that demand side spillovers are more significant than the supply side spillovers to generic drug firms, and the demand side spillovers increase a firm's market share by 3%–4% on average in subsequent market entry. In addition, with supply side spillovers alone, lowering entry barriers can increase future entry rates, while in the case of demand side spillovers, lowering entry barriers will have the opposite effect. (JEL L110, L130, D220)     

Monopoly pricing with negative network effects: The case of vaccines

We study the market for vaccinations considering income heterogeneity on the demand side and monopoly power on the supply side. A monopolist has an incentive to exploit the external effect of vaccinations and leave the poor susceptible in order to increase the willingness to pay the rich. Even the possibility of price discrimination does not remove this incentive. We demonstrate that the weaknesses of standard policy measures are mitigated when income heterogeneity is taken into account. This offers an efficiency based rationale for distribution oriented national or international public health interventions.     

Inflation Adjustment and Labour Market Structures: Evidence from a Multi‐country Study*

The impact of labour market structures on the response of inflation to macroeconomic shocks is analysed empirically. Results based on a 20‐country panel show that if labour market coordination is high, the effect on inflation of movements in unemployment, import prices, tax rates and productivity is dampened, both on impact and dynamically. In contrast, monopoly power in labour supply, measured by the percentage unionisation of the workforce, appears to amplify the response of inflation to its reduced‐form determinants. These findings are attributed to the behaviour of wages following movements in demand‐ and supply‐side conditions.     

On the growth and welfare maximizing allocation of public investment

In this paper we present an endogenous growth model to analyze the growth maximizing allocation of public investment among N different types of public capital. Using this general model of public capital formation, we analyze the stability of the long-run equilibrium and we derive the growth-maximizing values of the shares of public investment allocated to the different types of public capital, as well as the growth-maximizing tax rate (amount of total public investment as a share of GDP). The empirical implication of the model is that both the effects of the shares of public investment and the tax rate on the long-run growth rate are non-linear, following an inverse U-shaped pattern. Our analysis is completed by showing that the growth-maximizing shares of public investment and the growth-maximizing tax rate also maximize welfare in the decentralized economy.     

Fuel Prices,Sales Taxes and Passenger Car Market Shares in New Zealand, 1963–1978*

This paper estimates a set of market share equations for new passenger cars in New Zealand over the period 1963 to 1978. These equations are then used to determine the effects on market shares of the fuel price increases and tax rate changes that occurred in the 1970s. The results indicate that the fuel price increases had a major impact on market shares, but that the tax changes probably did not.     

British tourism demand elasticities in Mediterranean countries

We use the almost ideal demand system (AIDS) model developed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) to estimate tourism demand elasticities for a number of Mediterranean countries (Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain and Turkey) in relation to tourists originating from the United Kingdom during the period 1963 to 2009. Using the restrictions imposed by theory, we find that the model is able to explain developments in market shares reasonably well, despite the large and at times sudden changes in market shares over the sample period. Our share estimates indicate that while Spain and Portugal managed to keep a stable market share over time, Malta and especially Italy lost market share to Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. Overall, we observe that Italy and Spain have the lowest own-price elasticities, whereas Greece, Portugal, Spain and Turkey are expenditure inelastic holiday destinations. We also improve over the traditional treatment of the AIDS model in the literature by studying the stability of the estimated elasticities over time using recursive estimates. The results indicate that some elasticities are indeed time varying and highlight the potential pitfalls of assuming fixed and stable elasticities over a long period, as is customary in the tourism literature.     

Environmental policy and growth when inputs are differentiated in pollution intensity

Environmental policy affects the distribution of market shares if intermediate goods are differentiated in their pollution intensity. When innovations are environment-friendly, a tax on emissions skews demand towards new goods which are the most productive. In this case, the tax has to increase along a balanced growth path to keep the market shares of goods of different vintages constant. Comparing balanced growth paths, we find that tightening the policy stance spurs innovation, because it increases the market share of recent vintages, and promotes environment-friendly technological progress. As a result the cost of environmental policy in terms of slower growth is weaker.     

The simple analytics of tobacco taxation with illegal supply

This paper examines the impact of tobacco excise taxes where legal and illegal supplies coexist. The government's objective is to minimize cigarettes smoked in the economy (or to maximize revenue or to minimize illegal activity). It reacts to a competitive illegal supply in an adjoining jurisdiction. A model of consumer choice is used to demonstrate how demand response to tax changes can yield counterintuitive results. While the model mimics the Canadian market, similar situations characterize the US and European markets. A novel element of the paper is the treatment of externalities on the supply side rather than the demand side.     

Tax incidence in a two good model

In a two consumer, two commodity economy with an excise tax on one good, analysis is done of the effects of lump sum transfers between consumers and of an increase in the excise tax, proceeds being returned as a lump sum. Changes in price, incomes, and utilities are calculated in terms of demand and supply derivatives and changes in profit shares going to the two consumers. Analysis complements that of Harberger by concentrating on the demand side and considering only a reduced form of supply responses. Some of the analysis parallels consideration of the classical transfer problem in international trade.     

Viscous demand

In many markets, demand adjusts slowly to changes in prices, i.e., demand is “viscous”. This viscosity gives each firm some monopoly power, since it can raise its price above that of its competitors without immediately losing all of its customers. The resulting equilibrium pricing behavior and market outcomes can differ significantly from what one would predict in the absence of demand viscosity. In particular, the model explains the importance of market share as an investment, as well as “kinked demand curves”. It also explains how apparently “competitive” pricing behavior can lead to outcomes that mimic those of collusion.     

相关市场、生态倾销与最优战略环境政策

本文在Anam和Shiang的研究框架中,提出一个基于随机和相关需求的相互贸易模型,其中政府通过设置环境税(或提供生产补贴)来实现环境改善(或市场份额扩张)的目标。论文的结论表明,在相关需求条件下非合作与合作最优环境税均高于确定需求条件下的环境税水平,且环境税将随着随机需求风险、市场间正相关系数和风险偏好态度的增加而上升。同时,由于相关需求和跨边界污染的存在,政府在合作条件下更加关注怎样抑制生态倾销的动机,因此,合作条件下的环境税高于古诺纳什均衡条件下的水平。     

中国铁路运输业市场主体多元化改革研究——基于沃特森自然垄断理论的实证券析

沃特森的自然垄断理论表明,严重的供不应求和独家经营规模不经济两种状况同时出现是自然垄断行业市场主体多元化的前提条件。对我国铁路运输业的供需状况进行考察,发现整个行业处于严重的供不应求状态;对在我国铁路运输业中几乎处于独家垄断经营的国铁的规模经济状况进行分析,发现其出现了严重的规模不经济现象。综合考虑上述两种情况,我国铁路运输业已经具备了进行市场主体多元化改革的条件。     

无就业增长与非均衡劳工市场动态学

本文直接模拟了劳工市场的非均衡过程、工资动态轨迹、经济人的最优行为和适应性优化行为。劳动供给源于家庭的效用最大化 ,劳动需求源于企业的利润最大化。企业的适应性优化行为和若干制度因素构成了工资刚性的基本要素 ,劳工市场的供求力量也是影响工资变动的重要因素。根据劳动生产率的变化对工资进行适应性的调节是现实世界企业工资决策的普遍实践。工资刚性与高劳动生产率并存是造成无就业增长的真正原因     

内生无效制度——对进入壁垒和贸易保护的思考

本文构建一个模型来考察为什么垄断、进入壁垒和贸易保护在许多国家长期存在。政治精英对中间产品索取高价的偏好导致了支持垄断和贸易保护的无效经济制度和政治制度。价格操纵机制表明,政治精英偏好于通过提高中间产品价格来增加垄断利润。提高税率虽然会增加政治精英的税收收入,但会降低对中间产品的需求,从而减少垄断利润。因此,价格操纵情况下的最优税率低于收入摄取情况下的最优税率,这与Acemoglu(2006)的结论相反。     

A generalization of working's model

Working's (1943) model states that budget shares are linear functions of the logarithm of income; it implies constant differences between corresponding marginal and budget shares. A one-parameter generalization is proposed which allows each marginal share to be a linear function of the corresponding budget share. This model can be further extended (with one extra parameter) so that all goods are either specific substitutes or specific complements.