从次贷危机看国际金融体系面临的风险

次级房贷及其衍生品中的问题按照借款人的信用等条件,美国的房屋贷款分为优级、ALT-A 级、次级三级。房价下跌和利率上调等因素引发的次级贷款危机其实并非局限于次级贷款,而是涉及到 ALT-A 贷款和次级房屋权益贷款。近来,义有向优级贷款蔓延的趋势,这已在经济大区加州表现出来。次级房屋贷款的发放机构多为小     

国际金融危机的若干解释

2008年,世界遭遇了自1929年以来最严重和最具有破坏力的国际金融危机。结合理论和实践两方面的研究成果,可以总结出国际金融危机产生原因的13种解释目前,对国际金融危机的解释主要有以下13个方面:     

危机后国际金融市场再杠杆化系统风险不容忽视

2007年开始的全球性金融危机经过两年多的时间,在各国的共同努力下,影响渐渐减弱,世界经济和国际金融市场开始逐步恢复。本文通过分析此次经济危机的原因和当前国际金融市场的现状,对刚刚出现的再杠杆化迹象做了简要分析,并探讨了此过程中可能隐含的系统性风险。     

关于国际金融危机传递机制

研究国际金融传递机制,对于防范国际金融风险,建立有效防范机制具有重要意义。国际金融传递可分为正常传递与非正常传递两种类型。正常传递指在维持各国汇率稳定和金融市场正常运行的条件下国际资本的流动和影响,非正常传递指引起各国汇率剧烈波动和金融市场秩序混乱的国际资本流动,它不仅由一国的金融危机影响到另一国．而且造成各国和地区之间的连锁反应,即危机“传染”。本文所讨论的国际金融机制,主要指后一种类型。     

国际金融危机中的金融负外部性考察

金融的本质属性(自然垄断倾向、弱公共品性质、金融市场的信息不对称)极易导致金融负外部性问题,即金融产品的私人成本低于社会成本,出现风险外溢效应。以前的研究重在微观金融外部性,而此次世界性金融危机中,宏观金融负外部性更值得关注:利益集团的成本外化、弱势美元的风险转嫁、政府创租以及救市的全球性负面社会效应。全球化的金融市场及其国家化的主宰者是宏观金融负外部性产生的制度根源,只有通过适当考虑对方的利益的国际合作、改革国际货币体系,世界各国才可能摆脱被动的金融负外部性承受者的身份。     

国际金融危机与金融宏观审慎管理问题研究

国际金融危机暴露了现行金融监管制度存在的问题。本文通过研究宏观审慎管理的起源、发展及其与金融危机的关系,分析受国际金融危机危害较深的国家和地区,如美国、英国、欧盟以及日本等在金融危机中采取的金融监管改革措施,结合我国金融监管中存在的问题,提出在我国建立宏观审慎管理框架及框架工作流程设想的相关建议。     

2008年国际金融危机的经验教训

2008年9月,以"雷曼兄弟"倒闭为标志,因"次贷蝴蝶"扇起的金融海啸席卷全球,世界经济遭遇沉重打击,迅速陷入困境。在百年一遇的灾难面     

两年之后话危机——国际金融危机以来的思考与启示

正值金融危机发生两周年之际,我有幸随总行赴美国培训考察团实地感受了一下危机始作俑者的现实情况,从而对危机产生原因、应对措施等又有了进一步的认识。2007年发端于此的次贷危机已南债务危机发展为流动性危机．进而发展为全球性的金融危机．是一场因次级抵押贷款机构破产、投资银行及基金被迫关闭、股市剧烈震荡而形成的金融风暴。     

警惕国际金融危机对中国的传染

美国最近的金融危机．在世界范围内引起了一场惊涛巨浪。虽然有大量的新闻报道,但身处现在仍隔岸观火的中国,对于理解这次金融危机过程还是很难得要领。雷曼倒闭后,我一直追问在美国工作的同事,美国到底发生了什么事．为什么总资产超过6000亿美元的雷曼兄弟会因为摩根大通追加50亿美元抵押品要求而出现流动性危机最后轰然倒下;     

Estimating systemic risk in the international financial system

This paper develops three distinct methods to quantify the risk of a systemic failure in the global banking system. We examine a sample of 334 banks (representing 80% of global bank equity) in 28 countries around five global financial crises. Our results suggest statistically significant, but economically small, increases in systemic risk. Although policy responses are endogenous, the low estimated probabilities suggest that the distress of central bankers, regulators and politicians about the events we study could be overstated and that current policy responses to financial crises could be adequate to handle major macroeconomic events.     

Individual financial risk tolerance and the global financial crisis

We investigate individual investors’ tolerance towards financial risk by focusing on changes associated with the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007–2009. Financial risk tolerance (FRT) is analysed longitudinally controlling for demographic, socio‐economic and regional variations. In absolute terms, the change in FRT is small and contrasts with a popular view that risk tolerance is an elastic psychological state overly influenced by the pervading market conditions. Even in the presence of significant financial events, FRT tends to be a reasonably stable attribute in the shorter term but possibly influenced and reshaped by events more gradually over time.     

危机之下问道金融创新与风险管理

盛世华彩,国之华诞!新中国成立60周年之际,各行各业相继推出各色国庆主题产品和活动,共同见证这不平凡的时刻.我国的信用卡行业从无到有,取得了辉煌的成绩:截至2009年第二季度末,我国累计发行银行卡197 953.62万张,其中,信用卡发卡量为16 261.51万张.乘盛世之光烘托盛世,借发展之际纪念发展--中国信用卡行业发行以歌颂祖国、体现建国60年来建设成果为主题的信用卡,推出一系列优惠活动为伟大祖国60周年献礼.     

Federal Reserve financial crisis lending programs and bank stock returns

We use an E-GARCH model to estimate the wealth effects of Federal Reserve lending during the financial crisis to Investment banks (I-Banks), “Too Big to Fail” (TBTF) banks, and “traditional” commercial banks. Borrowing from the Term Auction Facility program has negative wealth effects for all banks and I-banks in particular. We also find that the market view of the liquidity programs changed across the sample sub-periods. I-Bank and TBTF bank borrowing from the discount window is initially viewed positively, however continued use of the discount window and the Term Auction Facility was generally (though not universally) viewed negatively. Commercial Paper Funding Facility program participation is consistently positive only for traditional banks and programs that focus on the purchase of specific securities (e.g., commercial paper) to address specific problems also appear to primarily benefit traditional banks. The inconsistency of results across the time periods of the crisis is telling as market participants struggled to discern what access to these programs meant.     

Has the financial system become safer after the crisis? The changing nature of financial institution risk

Six years after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the question of whether the U.S. financial system has become less risky remains unanswered. On the one side, new regulations including Dodd-Frank and Basel III have made improvements by requiring higher bank capital, and financial institutions themselves have reduced risk-taking activities. On the other side, it has been argued that “the fundamental risks remained and the efforts of regulators and politicians were simply rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic.” (Baily and Elliott, 2013) This paper highlights the changing nature of financial institution risk from 2005 to 2011. It finds that while these institutions have become less risky individually after the crisis, the financial market has become more vulnerable to systemic contagion. The causal inference that the crisis and the post-crisis legislation have gradually changed the nature of financial institution risk is drawn from a quasi-experimental design. This finding suggests that the ever more integrated financial system might experience more synchronized contractions in future crises, providing empirical support for the proposals of the inter-bank collective regulation of banks by Acharya (2009) in addition to the intra-bank collective regulations as in Froot and Stein (1998) and BIS (1996, 1999).     

越南金融危机与信用风险防范

越南金融危机的发生,让中国出口信用保险公司再一次承担了为我国企业对越投资、出口保驾护航的重任     

Liquidity risk management and credit supply in the financial crisis

Liquidity dried up during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Banks that relied more heavily on core deposit and equity capital financing, which are stable sources of financing, continued to lend relative to other banks. Banks that held more illiquid assets on their balance sheets, in contrast, increased asset liquidity and reduced lending. Off-balance sheet liquidity risk materialized on the balance sheet and constrained new credit origination as increased takedown demand displaced lending capacity. We conclude that efforts to manage the liquidity crisis by banks led to a decline in credit supply.