我国涉外定牌加工商标侵权司法认定之演进及反思

涉外定牌加工行为是否构成商标侵权在国际条约和我国国内法上没有直接的规定。我国司法机关早期以商标权地域性为基础,认为受托方加工相同产品、贴附相同商标并交付至境外的行为构成商标侵权,后来逐渐转变态度,认定受托方的行为属于“非商标使用”,不构成商标侵权。“非商标使用”虽然为认定受托方不构成商标侵权提供了理论便利,但与常识相悖,也难以自洽。在面对日益复杂的涉外定牌加工案件时,以该理论全面替代混淆性判断,无法精细平衡涉外定牌加工委托方和商标权人之间的利益。我国法院近年考察涉外定牌加工受托方的必要审查注意义务,则是将涉外定牌加工受托方定位为商标侵权的帮助者,这与其倡导的“非商标使用”思路自相矛盾,进一步导致法律适用的混乱。应限制“非商标使用”理论的适用,回归传统的商标侵权认定。     

红罐对决 谁的王老吉?

<正>赢了官司就等于赢得一切?经过如此旷日持久的纷争后,"王老吉"这个已有很好知名度的品牌会否被逼入死胡同而渐渐走向灭亡呢?对于未来市场上两种红罐凉茶,竞争才刚刚开始。加多宝集团在17年的凉茶运营中获得了配方、产能、资金、渠道、综合体系的积淀,广州医药集团则有着巨大的品牌优势和集团优势。     

Impact of personalization and privacy concerns on information disclosure and pricing

Advances in IT have enabled some firms to offer personalized products according to the private information disclosed by consumers, while others are still offering standardized products, which brings about asymmetric competition. For consumers, disclosing private information for personalized products leads to reduced misfit cost as well as privacy loss. To illuminate the impact of consumers' trade-off between the benefit of information disclosure and the associated privacy concerns on firms' asymmetric price competition, we consider a setting where only one firm is capable of product personalization based on consumers' personal information. The capable firm makes a profit from selling the product and monetizing consumers' information. We demonstrate that as the capable firm becomes more adept at personalization, he may raise or lower the price depending on his profit foci, and an improvement in his capability does not always guarantee a higher profit. Counterintuitively, an increase in the unit misfit cost (i.e., greater product differentiation) can, under certain circumstances, intensity price competition, making both firms worse off and leading to higher consumer surplus. We also show that when consumers are more privacy-concerned, there exists an indirect effect that weakens the impact of an increase in price on the monetization of consumers’ information, and hence price competition can be mitigated and both firms can be better off. Furthermore, we demonstrate that product personalization with misfit-reducing effect always increases consumer surplus under the asymmetric competition. Our findings provide firms and policy-makers with great managerial insights.     

“低价揽业”与审计市场的价格竞争

采用2001—2005年A股审计市场的面板数据,对审计市场的"低价揽业"行为进行实证检验。结果表明,在审计师更换当年,会计师事务所对客户给予了明显的价格优惠。进一步的分析发现,这种价格折扣主要发生在相同质量等级的事务所间的审计更换。因此,在消除审计质量差异的情况下,我国A股证券审计市场出现了普遍的"低价揽客"行为。然而,与美国审计市场出现的25%的初始价格折扣相比,我国的初始价格折扣更低。这意味着在审计费披露更为透明的市场上,"低价揽业"行为会受到有效抑制。因此,加强审计费披露机制可以作为政府直接干预的替代机制,对审计市场的价格竞争进行更有效的监管。     

Price Versus Quantity in a Duopoly with a Unilateral Effect and with Bargaining over Managerial Contracts

This study examines the endogenous choice of each firm’s strategic contract, that is, a price contract or a quantity contract, in a duopoly in which their demand functions are asymmetric when the content of their managerial contracts is determined through bargaining between the owner and the manager. The degree of asymmetry between their demand functions corresponds to the relation between the goods they produce. In contrast to the case wherein each firm’s delegation parameter is determined through profit maximization, we show that the quantity competition cannot become the equilibrium market structure when the bargaining power of the manager relative to that of the owner is sufficiently low. In particular, when the relation between the two goods is complementary, two asymmetric market structures can be observed in equilibrium. Furthermore, we consider the situation in which the relative bargaining power of the manager to that of the owner within each firm is different between the two firms.     

论政府的价格控制及其后果

传统经济理论认为,自由市场的“无形之手”,与政府干预的“有形之手”,往往并不能实现同一个目的。本文选取了几个西方历史上政府对价格控制的典型案例,分析了价格控制导致的福利损失。政府通常出于市场价格过高的缘故而对价格实行控制。其实,在某些情形下较高的市场价格可以通过市场的方式来解决,而不是诉诸于政府控制。这将对我国当前经济生活中政府对价格的控制提供一个新的参考视角。     

Price Discrimination and the Cruise Line Industry: Implications for Market Definition,Competition, and Consumer Welfare

This article extends the price discrimination literature and applies it to market definition and competitive effects analysis in recent mergers in the cruise line industry. In that industry, short run output is fixed. If firms want to increase price and restrict output to price‐insensitive customers, they have to increase the output and lower price to the price‐sensitive customers. We show that with fixed output (1) it is in firms’ interest to engage in price discrimination, (2) firms have increased ability to engage profitably in price discrimination as the intensity of competition decreases, and (3) the average price of price‐sensitive and ‐insensitive consumers increase with reduced competition. Unlike the economists at the Federal Trade Commission, our analysis suggests that cruise lines engage in third‐degree price discrimination. Moreover, the cruise industry could be a separate market and a reduction in the number of competitors might raise average prices.     

Input Pricing and Market Share Delegation in a Vertically Related Market: Is the Timing Order Relevant?

This paper adds to the literature on the strategic use of managers’ contracts in competition by examining whether market‐share delegation, in which managers receive rewards based on a combination of profits and market share, and the order of moves affect input pricing in a vertically related market. It shows that: (i) input pricing is not affected by delegation form and the order of moves between upstream and downstream firms under quantity competition; (ii) downstream firms obtain the same profit as in the simple Nash equilibrium regardless of delegation forms in a delegation–input price–quantity competition game; and (iii) the upstream monopolist will set input price beforehand regardless of the delegation form. Since the outcomes in our model create higher quantity and lower price in a Cournot product market, it lessens the double‐marginalization problem in such a vertically separated industry.     

Can Mergers to Monopoly,Price Fixing,and Market‐Division Agreements Raise Welfare?

Naked market division, price fixing agreements and mergers which result in dominant positions have long been opposed by the courts and the government because of the high likelihood that they will result in a reduction in output and an increase in price. We show that the opposite may be true if the market is characterized by marketing spillovers. When marketing investment is required to educate consumers about the general capabilities or qualities of a product, marketing efforts by one producer will benefit rival producers. A theoretical model of these types of markets shows that marketing spillovers can forestall entry altogether or force incumbent firms to engage in ‘limit marketing’ that leaves the market underserved from a welfare‐maximizing perspective. Under these circumstances, market output and social welfare are potentially raised not only through horizontal agreements among competitors, but also through cost‐raising strategies and commitments to predatory behavior by incumbent firms.     

Collusion and Price Wars in the Australian Coal Industry during the Late Nineteenth Century

This essay examines the behaviour of coal mining companies in late nineteenth-century Australia in light of recent research on strategic firm behaviour. The Northern Collieries vend explored a number of institutional arrangements designed to increase the amount of public information and raise the costs of cheating. Output apportioning and profit redistribution schemes were employed to increase the costs to any individual firm of over-production. Wage contracts between the coal mining union and collieries included a sliding-scale component linked to the cartel price; the union was an important monitoring agent increasing the amount of public information on firm behaviour. Periodic price wars involved chiselling on the cartel price and bargaining behaviour to influence future agreements.     

涉外定牌加工中的商标侵权问题 对我国《商标法》第五十二条第(一)项的理解与适用

本文从涉外定牌加工商标侵权实际案件出发,通过对该类纠纷中认定构成侵权的主要案例及主要理由、不认定侵权的主要理由及规定和区别情况加以认定的主要观点的研究,着重分析商标侵权认定的实质要件、"商标使用"含义的理解等法律问题,同时对于商标侵权纠纷中的利益主体、商标地域性及国际贸易分工合作等进行综合考量,提出对该类纠纷的法律适用应当考虑3个方面,包括对我国《商标法》第五十二条第(一)项合理解释、工商海关部门行政查处与司法衔接以及针对不同的情况采取不同的处理方法。     

环境管制、产品质量与企业收益——兼论污染罚金政策的使用效率

本文引入消费者效用函数、政府环境管制成本函数、企业生产成本函数,研究了环境管制对企业产品质量和利润的影响。研究表明:(1)在政府财政收入最大化的条件下,政府对企业征收污染罚金是不会让污染生产的企业退出市场的;(2)在政府财政收入最大化、消费者效用最大化和企业利润最大化的均衡条件下,政府征收污染罚金时,会降低产品环境质量;(3)政府加大罚金力度会提高生产清洁产品企业的净收益,而降低生产污染产品企业的净收益,并且清洁生产企业的利润比污染生产企业的利润高;(4)政府如果放弃财政收入最大化目标,对清洁生产的企业予以激励,对污染的企业在说服教育的基础上采用创新弃权书的管制方式,否则即对其征收罚金,这样会使两类企业都进行清洁生产。这些结论表明政府对污染生产企业征收罚金时,重在引导教育并建立激励型生态补偿制度,注重政策的使用效率。     

考虑存在平行进口的跨国供应链价格竞争研究

跨境电商以及配套物流网络的快速发展致使平行进口对部分行业产生了巨大影响。通过建立三种市场权力模式下跨国制造商与本地制造商的博弈模型,本文对比分析有无灰色市场的不同模式供应链参与者的定价及利润,探析平行进口对低支付意愿市场的跨国制造商与本地制造商之间寡头竞争的影响。研究发现:市场支付意愿比值低于某一阈值时不会出现平行进口,市场权力模式和灰色市场的存在能影响跨国供应链参与者的收益多寡及定价策略;灰色市场有益于本地制造商和平行进口商,市场处于单一制造商主导模式有助于减少跨国制造商损失、增加本地制造商收益及缩减平行进口商的利润,在制造商共同主导模式下存在一个市场支付意愿比值区间,致使跨国制造商收益增加;平行进口促进还是抑制寡头供应链的价格竞争,取决于市场权力的结构形式。     

电商异质性与线上价格离散

线上价格没有如预期一般走向收敛，反而普遍存在价格离散的情况。文章利用京东、国美、苏宁、天猫经营的六大类家电的价格数据来衡量线上价格离散度，并从电商异质性角度探讨其对于线上市场效率的影响。结果发现：首先，差异化的电商经营模式会通过调价行为、价格黏性以及消费者搜寻活动来加大价格离散程度。其次，电商平台通过其行业占有率以及市场渗透率来提高细分市场的可能性，从而加剧价格离散、降低市场效率。最后，相比平台式电商，自营式电商并没有通过增加调价频次和价格黏性来促进价格离散，反而有可能削弱自营电商的正向加剧效应。文章为线上统一市场的研究提供了新的研究思路，也为政府在电商平台监管和治理方面上提供了有益的借鉴。     

How Valuable are the Patents Behind Section 337 Cases?

A US patent protects the owner of the intellectual property from imitators producing in the US and foreign imitators selling in the US market. There are two venues for filing infringement cases against international infringement of US patents, with the International Trade Commission (ITC) using Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 or with federal district courts. Three indicators of patent value suggest that patents litigated under Section 337 are on average more valuable; however, their values tend to be more variable. The latter suggests that some firms may be using Section 337 not for protection against international infringement of US patents but for protection against imports.     

Regulating Marketing Communications on the Internet

Abstract

Cybersquatters register internet domain names matching trademarks owned by other individuals or companies, intending to coerce payments before relinquishing that domain name to the rightful trademark owner. As online commerce expanded, so too has trademark infringement complaints concerning internet domain names. Congress passed two acts in recent years to deal with the controversy, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, also known as Section 43(c) of the Lanham Trademark Act, and the more recent Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999, also known as Section 43(d) of the Lanham Trademark Act. Causes for action, defenses, and remedies are discussed for both. This article analyzes their impact.     

农产品物流主体合作边界及效应探讨

行为绩效在很大程度上取决于不同主体的博弈关系。文章从农产品物流主体的行为偏好与合作倾向出发,对农产品物流需求主体之间、供给主体之间、供需双方之间合作与不合作情况下的收益进行比较分析。研究发现,合作成本影响合作倾向及合作的经济效应,且需求主体之间的合作能够使物流量价齐升,活跃农产品市场;供给主体之间的合作能够减小规模、提高价格,有利于农产品物流资源向优势企业集中;在供需双方之间的合作中,规模和价格呈反向关系,为最大程度地发挥农产品物流的作用提供了参考。为提高农产品物流主体的合作倾向,增加合作收益,应充分重视合作成本的降低。这就要求在政策导向、行业规制、主体融合上有所创新,通过产业联盟和供需联盟等,构建分工协作、相互信任、相互促进的合作形式,为活跃农产品市场、提高物流效率、增强物流主体积极性提供良好的平台,不断提高农业比较效益与核心竞争力。     

国际贸易中涉外贴牌生产中的商标侵权问题研究

我国涉外贴牌生产中围绕贴牌商标的"侵权"问题已经产生了不少的法律纠纷和诉讼。但是对此我国并没有明确的司法解释,法院的判决也相互冲突。根据侵权行为构成的法理分析、《商标法》第52条中商标使用的分析和利益衡量原则,涉外贴牌生产企业的贴牌行为不应视为商标侵权行为。     

从Google被词典收录再谈驰名商标淡化问题

随着经济全球化进程的加快,进一步加强对驰名商标的保护已成当务之急。驰名商标淡化是近年来国内外较为常见的一种特殊商标侵权行为,它减少、削弱驰名商标的识别性和显著性。商标淡化不仅侵害了驰名商标权利人的合法权益,而且扰乱了市场竞争秩序,是各国立法普遍予以规制的对象。     

A comparative analysis of marketing promotions and implications for data analytics

Retailers use many different marketing promotions to increase sales and profits. These promotions include price reductions, coupons, cash mail-in rebates, free gift cards, and buy-one-get-one (BOGO) discounts. The type of promotion used results in different outcomes for demand, profit, average price, consumer surplus, and sales taxes collected. We perform comparative analysis of these five promotions and their outcomes. We show that for the same discount amount, price reductions result in the lowest average price. For products with weakly diminishing consumer utility and low consumer stockpiling, BOGO promotions result in the largest demand, profit, consumer surplus, and taxes collected. Cash mail-in rebates may result in large profit and taxes collected, but they perform poorly in terms of average price paid and consumer surplus. We also find that a retailer offering a delayed incentive (i.e. gift cards and mail-in rebates) offers a larger reward but provides lower consumer surplus than when offering an immediate incentive (i.e. price reduction and BOGO). In a segmented market with a price-insensitive consumer segment, immediate incentives have the disadvantage of allowing price-insensitive consumers arriving during the promotion to obtain the discount, which reduces the discount effectiveness. The addition of more retailer objectives to maximizing profit, such as demand maximization or consumer surplus, increases the effectiveness of immediate incentives. We also provide a framework for estimating the important parameters for evaluating promotion effectiveness using readily available transactional data and examine its accuracy using a simulation experiment.